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ERRATA.

Page 5, line 31, for "formerly," read "formally."

Page 12, line 10 of note, for "Nicholas V.," read "Nicholas III."

Page 349, line 4 from bottom, for "control," read "conceal."

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ARTICLE I.—THE TEMPORAL POWER OF THE POPE.

Geschichte der Entstehung und Ausbildung des Kirchenstaates.
Von SAMUEL SUGENHEIM. Leipzig. 1854.

L'Eglise et La Société Chrétiennes en 1861. Par M. GUIZOT.
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THE great Popes in the middle ages endeavored to realize the splendid, but impracticable, conception of a theocratic empire, which should embrace all Christian nations, and of which the Pope was to be the head. The attempt was made to establish an administration such as would require wisdom, justice, and benevolence, as well as power, in a superhuman measure. The Popes renounce no pretension that has once been made; but the extravagant claims of Hildebrand, Innocent III., and Boniface VIII., are silently dropped—the claim to set up and pull down princes, and to settle international disputes—and the revival of such claims at the present day would only excite ridicule. For several centuries, national interests have been strong enough, in the politics of Europe, to override ecclesias

tical and religious interests. The design of this Article is not to discuss the obsolete claim of the Papacy to a temporal dominion over Christendom, but to touch on the salient points in the history of their own peculiar kingdom in Italy.

I.

On Christmas Day, in the year 800, in the old Basilica of St. Peter at Rome, Pope Leo III. placed the imperial crown on the head of Charlemagne. It was one of those particular events or scenes in which sometimes a great epoch is signalized and presented, as it were, to the eye. It is a landmark bounding the first period in the annals of the Pope's temporal sovereignty.

During the first three centuries, while the Church was a persecuted, but rapidly growing, sect, the Bishop of Rome was steadily acquiring moral influence and hierarchical authority. After Constantine began to take the Church under his patronage—his edict of toleration was issued in 312—and he and his successors not only granted to the Church the right to receive legacies and hold property, but also enriched it by their own offerings, the Roman Bishops were in a position to profit greatly by this new order of things. Gradually they became possessed of extensive estates, not only in Italy, but also in Sicily and Gaul, and even in Africa and Asia. In the time of Gregory the Great (590–604), their annual income from the estates near Marseilles alone amounted to four thousand pieces of gold. It is true that this “patrimony of Peter,” as even then it was called, was held by the Pope as a private proprietor or trustee, and not as a sovereign. For example, the Papal lands in Gaul were subject to the king of the country, like the lands of any other proprietor. Yet the control of the Pope over extensive estates would border, in some particulars, upon that of a sovereign, and the rudiments of a secular dominion are properly found in this early relation. The downfall of the Empire left the Roman Pontiff the most important personage in all the West. But during the score of years (from 551 to 568) that followed the conquest of Italy by the generals of Justinian, and preceded the partial overthrow of the Byzantine rule in that country through the Lombards, the coercion exer-

cised upon the Popes by the tyrants of Constantinople serves to show how much the Papacy was to be indebted for its growth to the absence of an overshadowing power in its neighborhood.

To the Lombard conquest the Popes owed their secular dominion. That which to them was the greatest terror turned out providentially to be the greatest benefit. This barbarian people, partly Arian and partly pagan in their religion, overran the larger portion of Italy, leaving to the Byzantine Emperor, in middle and northern Italy, besides Rome, and a few other fortified places, a strip of territory along the sea-coast, in which were included Ravenna, the seat of the so-called Ex-Arch, or Governor-General, under the Eastern Empire, and the five cities (Pentapolis), Ancona, Sinigaglia, Fano, Pesaro, and Rimini. The various cities outside of the Exarchate, of which Rome was one, had been placed under subordinate Governors, called Dukes. After the Lombard invasion, the Byzantine rule over the places which had not yielded to the conquerors was little more than a nominal sovereignty. In this time of dire confusion and distress, the Pope became the natural leader and defender, as well as the benefactor, of the people whom the Emperor was unable to protect. When the quarrel broke out between the Pope and Leo the Isaurian, in regard to the worship of images, the Romans warmly sided with their Bishop against the iconoclastic Emperor. They even drove out the Byzantine Duke, who had long possessed only the shadow of power, and would have proclaimed their independence and a Republic, had not the Pope withstood them, his motive being an intense anxiety lest imperial power should fall into the hands of the Lombard King. He naturally chose to keep up a nominal union with the Eastern Empire, which brought no real inconvenience, in preference to falling under the sway of his encroaching, powerful, and heretical neighbor.* It was evident that the Lombard Kings were determined to extend their dominion over Italy. Yet Pope Zacharias, in return for

* See, on this point, Sugenheim's work (the title of which is given above), p. 9, seq. This very thorough monograph throws light on many difficult questions connected with our subject.

favors rendered to them, obtained from them the gift, first of Sutri, and then of four other towns, which had been wrested by them from the Greek Empire. The Pope, though still the subject of that Empire, set up the principle that these places, being the property of the Lombards by right of conquest, might be withheld from the Emperor and granted to him. In truth, this gift from the heretical enemy was the beginning of the Papal Kingdom. But when the haughty Aistulph, in 749, mounted the throne of the Lombards, and when, having seized upon Ravenna, the Exarchate, Pentapolis, and the Greek territory on the Adriatic as far as Istria, he turned his arms against Rome, the Pope saw no way to escape from the imminent peril in which he was thrown, except by imploring the intervention of Pepin, king of the Franks. Fortunately Pepin was obliged to the Pope for lending a religious sanction to the usurpation by which he had dethroned the Merovingian family, the founder of the new dynasty having been annointed, in 752, at Soissons, by Boniface, according to the direction of Zacharias, and having been absolved afterwards from his violated oath of fealty to Childerich III., the last representative of the old line. In two campaigns (754-5), the Lombards were defeated, and expelled from their new conquests; and Pepin now gave to the Pope the Exarchate and the Pentapolis. He had won these territories, he said, not for the Greek Emperor, but for St. Peter.

What was now the position and what were the rights of the Pope, as a secular prince? This is a nice and difficult question to determine. The Pope received the name and title of Patricius over the Exarchate, while Pepin became Patricius of Rome. In regard to the donation of Pepin, it is a controverted question whether it made over to the Pope the rights of sovereignty, or only the property and incomes which had formerly belonged to the Byzantine Emperor. The great German lawyer, Savigny, is decidedly of opinion that the rights of sovereignty were included.* Sugenheim holds that this was probably not the original idea, but rather the interpretation successfully affixed to the donation by the Popes.† The gift

* Savigny, *Das Römische Recht*. Vol. I., p. 358.

† Sugenheim, p. 27.

of Pepin was made to the Pope and the Roman Republic : and it is further declared by Savigny that "the Roman Republic," as the representative of which the Pope appears, "was not the city of Rome, still less the Greek Empire;" "it was rather the old Western Empire, which in this small compass, though as yet without a visible head, was again restored, the idea of its formal restoration, which was soon to follow, being, perhaps, already present."* It seems clear that *Patricius* was an honorary title, that carried with it no very definite prerogatives. It involved the right and duty of affording protection. We may conclude, then, that by this transaction the Pope acquired in reference to the greater part of what was afterwards called Romagna, a station similar to that held by the former Exarchs, with the difference that the superior to whom he would be subordinate, was an ideal personage, the future head of the Western Empire which had not been then reconstituted. In respect to Rome, it is remarkable that the Pope still kept up the show of allegiance to the Eastern Empire, his motive being a jealous desire to prevent the Patriciate of Pepin over the eternal city from passing into an imperial station.

Such was the position of the Pope, as a temporal ruler, up to the time of Charlemagne. The overthrow of the Lombard kingdom by this monarch, in 773, was followed by a confirmation of the gift of Pepin to the Pope, increased by the addition of a few places in Tuscany. Charlemagne had acquired a supremacy and a conceded authority which his coronation by the Pope rather recognized than created. The Patriciate, by the course of events, had grown into the imperial office; and the treaty of Charlemagne with the Eastern Emperor, Nicephorus, in 803, formerly designated the portions of Italy with which we are concerned, among the territories of the Western Emperor.

II.

Toward Charlemagne and his immediate successors the Popes stood in the relation of feudal dependence, analogous to that

* Savigny, p. 361.

held by other ecclesiastical nobles who were subjects of the Empire, although the Roman Bishop in point of ecclesiastical and spiritual dignity had, of course, the highest rank. The Popes were obliged to take an oath of fidelity to the Emperor, acknowledging him to be their lord and judge. Not only was their election incomplete without the imperial sanction, but they were held to account when charges were preferred against them. Thus an inquiry was instituted against Leo III. for executing certain Romans; and at the time when Lothar was crowned at Rome, in 823, Pope Paschal I., on the complaint of the abbot of the monastery Farfa, was obliged to restore to the latter all the property which had been unjustly taken from his monastery.

The Popes were constantly striving to release themselves from their subjection to the princes of the family of Charlemagne. The end they had in view was to free themselves from the need of procuring a ratification of their election from the Emperor; and they even sought to give currency to the idea that the imperial office was bestowed by them. Occasionally, an able man like Nicholas I. (858-867), favored by circumstances and strengthened by popular support, realized in a measure the Papal aspirations after independence and control. But, as a general rule, through nearly the whole of the ninth century, the Roman bishops were foiled in these attempts. They profited, however, by the conflicts in which the Frank princes were engaged with one another, and in which they were frequently induced by the interest of the hour to appeal to ecclesiastical arbitration and to advance their pretensions by obtaining episcopal unction. The disorders and divisions in the Frank Empire were rather fostered than hindered by the ambitious Popes, who, in the turmoil that followed the downfall of that Empire, gained, for a time, their long-coveted independence.*

* It was in the ninth century that the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals appeared—that collection of forged papers by which the prerogatives conceded to the Pope in that age, and even higher prerogatives than were generally conceded to him then, were ascribed to his predecessors in the first three centuries. Among these spurious documents was the pretended deed of Constantine, giving to Pope Sylvester his western dominions. The forgery is a clumsy one. For example, the

Their success was their worst misfortune. The next century and a half is the most disgraceful section in the whole history of the Papacy. The dangers to which the Popes were exposed in the midst of the wild factions of contending Italian nobles led them to parcel out a great part of their territory outside of Rome among feudatories, as a reward for services rendered and expected. The same weakening of the central authority, struggles for independence on the part of the vassals, and for ascendancy on the side of their liege, ensued here as among the nations north of the Alps. The easy subjection of the Popes to the Frank princes was exchanged for a galling servitude under violent and rapacious nobles. For a long series of years the Counts of Tuscany, and after them the Counts of Tusculum—two branches of the same house—disposed of Rome and the Papal office at their will. Three prostitutes, Theodora, and her daughters, Marozia and Theodora, made and deposed Popes, even placing their paramours and bastard sons in the chair of St. Peter. At length, in 933, Pope John XI., who was, perhaps, a son of the vile Pope Sergius III. by Marozia, was imprisoned by his own brother Alberich in the Castle of St. Angelo, and forced to act, even in spiritual things, as his passive instrument. Until the year 954, this Alberich, under the title of Prince and First Senator of the Romans, ruled with despotic authority over Rome and the adjacent territory; and, after the death of John XI., set up in succession four Popes, whom he restricted to the exercise of their spiritual functions. At his death all power fell into the hands of his son Octavian, a vicious youth of less than eighteen years of age, who, on assuming the tiara, set the fashion, which has since been copied, of adopting a new name, and called himself John XII. To protect himself against Berengar II., king of Italy, this profligate wretch invited the aid of Otho I., the German Emperor; but the interposition of Otho brought but a momentary relief from the frightful disorder and degradation in the

author of it conceives of the Western Empire as it was in the eighth century—as comprising only some provinces of Italy. The spurious character of this *document* is generally acknowledged. Yet Baronius, and some other Catholic writers, seek, against all evidence, to maintain the fact of such a gift. See Gieseler, *Church History*, Vol. II., p. 118, N.

affairs of the Papacy. Finally, the German Emperor, Henry III., appeared to reëstablish the imperial power in Italy; and at the Synod of Sutri, in 1046, he caused the Papal chair to be declared vacant, and the three rival claimants having been summarily set aside, one of Henry's own bishops was elected to the vacant place, under the name of Clement II. From this time the influence of Hildebrand becomes predominant. The Synod of Sutri marks an epoch in the record of the Papal dominion. The imperial power and influence are seen at their height.

III.

A great event in the progress of the Papal dominion in Italy was the famous bequest of Matilda, Countess of Tuscany, to the Papal See. This enterprising and gifted woman, the fast friend and supporter of Hildebrand, bequeathed her territories, comprising a fourth part of the Peninsula, to the Roman Church. Whether this gift was intended to include anything more than her allodial property, and what portion of her possessions was allodial and what held in fief, it is impossible to say. To dispose of territory held in fief would be utterly contrary to law, and to all the ideas of the time. But the ambiguous character of the bequest in these respects opened the way for the assertion of a claim on the part of the Popes to the whole, and contributed eventually to the long and bitter strife with the Emperors. Gieseler observes that, "because the feudal relations of these lands to the Emperor were at that time much relaxed, the Pope was inclined to regard them as allodial, while the Emperor, by virtue of his ancient right, laid claim to all landed possessions at least, as fiefs of the Empire."* Certain it is that the Popes were determined to incorporate the fiefs in their own kingdom, especially the most valuable of them, Tuscany, Spoleto, and Camerino.

In the early part of the twelfth century there appeared a new element of disturbance in the Papal kingdom of a portentous character. This was the newly awakened spirit of the Roman people. Heretofore, the populace of Rome had been

* Gieseler, *Church History* (Prof. Smith's ed.) Vol. I., p. 272.

of little account. Emperor, Pope, and nobles, in all their conflicts with one another, had united in keeping down the people, and reducing them to political insignificance. But now a new era had come. The aspirations of the Lombard towns after municipal independence and free government had spread southward. The popular feeling in Rome found an organ and a leader in the disciple of Abelard, Arnold of Brescia. He demanded that the clerical order, from the Pope downwards, should give up their claim to secular rule, and should possess no secular property. He was heard with enthusiasm, and his doctrine spread like a contagion. After he had been driven out of Italy by the anathema of the second Lateran Council, the Roman people renounced their allegiance to Innocent II., and, in 1143, set up a government of their own, placing supreme power in the hands of a Senate. They were strengthened by the arrival of Arnold with several thousand Swiss soldiers. In an unsuccessful attack upon the new government in the capitol, Pope Lucius II. was hit with a stone, and received a mortal wound. The people wished to restore the old imperial constitution, and accordingly invited Conrad III., and afterwards Frederic I., to take this imperial character and make their abode in Rome. Pope Hadrian IV. persuaded the Romans to banish Arnold, whose impractical and imaginative spirit had hindered him from succeeding in his plans. By the Emperor Frederic, who was bitterly hostile to republicanism, and was bent on humbling the Lombard towns, as well as desirous to receive the imperial crown, Arnold was delivered up to the Pope, who made such haste to destroy him, that the Romans, who rushed to the Piazza del Popolo to effect a rescue, found only his ashes.

We pass to the Pontifical reign of the ablest of the Popes, a man of great virtues, shaded by serious faults, Innocent III. All the circumstances, especially the minority of Frederic II., and the disordered state of the empire, facilitated the accomplishment of the ends which Innocent set before him. He drove the vassals of the empire out of the territory of Matilda, taking possession of the March of Ancona, the Dukedom of Spoleto, the Earldom of Agnisi, the Marquisates of Tuscany, Radicofani, Aquapendente, Montefiascone, and the rest, so

that his admiring biographer, Hurter, claims for him the honor of being the founder of the present states of the Church. More important was the concession which he extorted from Otho, one of the three competitors for the imperial crown, as the condition of supporting his cause, and declaring in his favor. On the eighth of June, 1201, Otho bound himself by a solemn engagement to protect, to the best of his ability, all the possessions, rights, and honors of the Apostolic See; to leave the Pope in undisturbed possession of the territories which he had won back, and to help the Holy See both in defending them, and reconquering those not yet gained. Under these possessions were embraced all the territory from Radicofani to Ceperano, also the Exarchate of Ravenna, the former Pentapolis, the March of Ancona, the Dukedom of Spoleto, the allodial property of Matilda, the Earldom of Bertinoro, together with the bordering territories, which the Roman bishops had acquired from the Western Emperors since the days of Louis the Pious. The provinces here enumerated comprise the principal territories of the modern Papal States. The violation of his agreement by Otho turned Innocent's friendship into bitter hostility, and ultimately led him to bring forward the young Frederic of Sicily (Frederic II.), and powerfully to support his pretensions to the Empire. This support was not given, however, until Frederic had renewed and ratified the concessions previously made by Otho. The equally perfidious violation of this treaty by Frederic was a leading cause of that long and dreadful conflict with the Popes, which ended in the complete overthrow of the house of Hohenstaufen.

In the progress of this conflict, the cities in the Papal kingdom wrested concessions from the Popes, by which they acquired for the time a large measure of municipal freedom and independence. It is remarkable that while the Lombard towns followed the Popes in their contest against the Ghibelline or Imperial interest, the immediate subjects of the Holy See were often found on the other side. This was owing to the fact that, although the Popes, out of hostility to the Emperors, and the desire to gain the victory over them, allied themselves to the freedom-loving cities, they were still at heart inimical to republicanism, and were imprudent enough to show their

real temper and policy towards their own cities, in case no pressing emergency compelled an opposite course. By the aid of Charles of Anjou, to whom they had given the crown of Sicily, they succeeded in recovering Rome from the imperial party, and destroying Conradin, the last of the Hohenstaufens. In 1275, they had the satisfaction of receiving from Rudolph of Hapsburg a full and most explicit ratification of the deed of surrender, which Otho and Frederic II. had given and disregarded.

This deed has been properly considered the **MAGNA CHARTA** of the Pope's temporal dominion.

IV.

It was one thing to acquire a title to these rich possessions, and quite another thing to get and to retain them. The turbulent cities, accustomed now to a good measure of self-government and strengthened by privileges granted by the Popes in times of distress, could not easily be brought into subjection. The factions of Guelfs and Ghibellines raged in them, and the result, as in other Italian towns, was the elevation to power of certain noble and distinguished families. Such were the houses of Polenta in Ravenna, of Malatesta in Rimini, of Varano in Camerino and in other places in the March of Ancona, and of Montefeltro in Urbino.

It was the repugnance of Boniface VIII. for the family of Colonna, whose overshadowing influence at Rome became intolerable to him, that finally led to "the Babylonian captivity," or the residence of the Popes for about seventy years at Avignon. Determined to get possession of their fortified places, Boniface sought means of capturing the apparently invincible strong-hold, Palestrina.* At length he applied for aid to a

* The truth of the story relative to the transaction with Guido di Montefeltro is denied by Cardinal Wiseman in his Article on Boniface VIII. (*Essays on Various Subjects*, Vol. III.) The story is given by many authors, including Sismondi (*Républiques Italiennes*, Tome III., p. 91). Sismondi's authorities are Dante, his commentator, Benvenuto da Imola, and two contemporary chroniclers, Ferretto Vincentino and Pipino, in Muratori (*Script. Ital.*, Tom. ix., pp. 731, 970). Dante (*Inf.* xxvii., 81) styles Boniface "Lo principe di nuovi farisei." It is represented

famous old soldier, Guido de Montefeltro, a former enemy of the Popes, but now reconciled and passing the evening of his days in a cloister. The veteran declined to take the field, told Boniface that the place could not be captured by force of arms, but advised him, as a means of obtaining it, to promise much and perform little. The Pope but too faithfully obeyed the

that Boniface had absolved Guido for his wicked counsel before it was given. This did not save him from hell, since

"No power can the impenitent absolve."

Dante makes Guido, in the midst of the flames, relate circumstantially the fatal seduction by which "the chief of the new Pharisees" misled him, having given him the promise of impunity. Another not at all flattering allusion to Boniface is in *Parad* xxvii., 22; and elsewhere (*Inf.* xix., 52). Dante condemns him to hell. In the last passage, the spirit in hell mistakes Dante for Boniface, who, at the date of the poet's vision, was not dead. It is the same Canto in which Pope Nicholas V. is doomed to a like fate, and in which, in allusion to the pretended gift of Constantine to Pope Sylvester, the poet exclaims:—

"Ah, Constantine! to how much ill gave birth,
Not thy conversion, but that plenteous dower
Which the first wealthy father gain'd from thee."

In regard to Ferreto, Muratori, as Wiseman truly states, adds a note to Ferreto's account of Guido, in which the critic questions the truth of the story. He observes:—"Probusi hujus facinoris narrationis fidem adjungere nemo probus velit quod facile confinxerint Bonifacii æmuli," etc. In the *Annali d'Italia*, Vol. XI., p. 648, the same critic expresses his doubt of the truth of the anecdote respecting Guido, though he quotes G. Villani (*Itor. Fiorent.*, lib. VIII., c. 6) to the effect that Boniface was troubled by no scruples when there was something to be gained. Muratori also suggests that the story of the advice of Guido may have arisen from the subsequent events,—namely, the breach of faith with the Colonnas. This last fact he appears not to reject. Although it is called in question by Wiseman, it rests upon strong evidence. In the proceeding before Clement VII., after the death of Boniface, the Colonnas averred that they had been cheated in the manner described. The proofs are given in Sugenheim, p. 208. The circumstances are stated by G. Villani, lib. VIII., c. 64. Villani wrote soon after the event. See also, Fleury, *Hist Ecclesiast.*, Tom. XVIII., p. 240. Considering the manner in which the anecdote, as to the advice of Guido, is given by Dante, even though his Ghibelline hostility to Boniface, as Muratori observes, impairs the value of his testimony,—and considering, also, the other authorities in its favor, we are hardly justified in rejecting it as false. It is believed by Sugenheim, by Milman *Latin Christianity*, Vol. VI., p. 228, by Schröckh, (*Kirchengeschichte*, Vol. XXVI., p. 531),—who supports his opinion by an argument—and by others. Schwab, in the Roman Catholic *Theologische Quartalsschrift* (No. 1, 1866), admits that Wiseman, as well as Toste, the Catholic biographer of Boniface, in their attempted vindication of him, are biased by excited feelings consequent on the injustice which they suppose him to have suffered.

iniquitous counsel. This perfidy still further exasperated the great family which he was seeking to extirpate. It was Sciarra Colonna who, in connection with William of Nogaret, the emissary of Philip the Fair, made an attack upon the person of the old Pope, then staying in Anagni, and inflicted such injuries that he died on the 11th of October, 1133. The Papacy, brought under French influence, was now transferred to Avignon.* Contrary to a common idea, the residence of the Popes in France did not result in the weakening, but rather in the temporary restoration of their power as secular Princes. This unexpected result was due to several causes. The local dynasties which had risen to power in Italy in the course of the last half of the thirteenth century, were divided amongst themselves; and the Pope could skillfully avail himself of their mutual jealousies and conflicts, by turning one against another. Moreover, the close connection of the Papal feudatories, the Kings of Naples of the house of Anjou, with their liege, gave him a strong ally. And finally, the Pontiffs in Avignon played anew the part of their predecessors who, in the contest with the Hohenstaufen Emperors, had taken the attitude of friends and protectors of the Italian municipalities in their pursuit of freedom. By means of Cardinal Albornoz, the able Spaniard, the Popes succeeded, while personally absent from Italy, in recovering and reuniting nearly the whole of their former cities and territories. They even succeeded in using for their own ends the eloquence and popularity of Cola di Rienzi. At a time when Rome was filled with anarchy and violence, through the nobles who sallied from the strong-holds which they had built in the city, to engage in bloody fights in the streets, this political and religious enthusiast became the author of a successful revolution, in which he installed himself as tribune, compelling the nobles to surrender their fortresses, and restoring order. Unhappily he quickly betrayed an unbalanced character, and by his costly pomps and shows disgusted the people, caused the Pope to declare against him, and was at length driven from Rome. Arrested a few years later by the

* Avignon was afterwards, in 1348, bought by the Papal See of Joanna, Queen of Naples and Countess of Provence. Venaissin was presented to the Pope in 1273, by King Philip III.

Emperor Charles IV., he was sent to Avignon, and having been detained for a while in custody by the Pope, he returned to Rome in company with Albornoz, and materially aided the latter in conciliating the popular favor. But his vanity and self-indulgence excited renewed hostility against him, and in 1354 he was assassinated.

Hardly were the Popes back again in Rome, before they threw away the great prize which the energy and sagacity of Albornoz had won for them. They set about the business of depriving the cities in their domain of the privileges which had been wisely conceded to them by Albornoz; and, in order to crush republicanism more effectually, they even attempted to rob the Tuscan towns of their independence. The result was that the Papal subjects broke off anew their allegiance, which Albornoz had regained with so much painstaking. If the Popes retained, and even recovered, their temporal power during their residence in Avignon, the effect of the great schism, lasting from 1378 to the Council of Constance in 1417, a period in which two and sometimes three Popes were struggling to supplant each other, was quite the opposite. In the cities of the Papal kingdom the old dynasties revived and new ones sprung up; towns and territories were ceded to nobles in fief, so that the exhausted papal treasury might have a new source of income; to the old Republics within their domain, as Rome, Perugia, and Bologna, the Popes found it necessary to grant a degree of republican freedom, that almost amounted to independence, and like privileges were even granted to cities that had never before enjoyed them. In short, the Papal kingdom was dissolved and broken up in this eventful period which was equally detrimental to the temporal and spiritual dominion of the Roman Bishops. The steps by which subsequent Pontiffs, beginning with Nicholas V., who became Pope in 1447, regained by degrees, through patient and prudent efforts, the inheritance which the folly of their predecessors had lost, we cannot attempt, in this brief sketch, to relate.

V.

As we approach the beginning of the sixteenth century, we come to a period of moral degradation in the Papacy,

having no example save in the tenth century, when harlots disposed of the sacred office. "The governments of Europe," says Ranke, "were stripping the Pope of a portion of his privileges, while at the same time the latter began to occupy himself exclusively with worldly concerns."* To found an Italian kingdom for his own family, to carve out principalities for his own relations, was the darling object of his ambition. This shameful era may be said to begin with Sixtus IV., Pope from 1471 to 1484. He conceived the plan of founding a State in Romagna for his nephew, or, if we may believe Macchiavelli's assertion, his natural son, Jerome Riario. Opposed in his schemes by Florence, he entered into the foul conspiracy for assassinating Lorenzo and Julian de Medici, which was concocted by the Pazzi. In the midst of the solemn service of the Mass, at the signal given by the elevation of the Host, a fierce attack was made upon them; but while Julian fell, Lorenzo escaped. The speedy execution, without the forms of a trial before an ecclesiastical tribunal, of the priests who had been engaged in this murderous attack, afforded the Pope a pretext for venting his chagrin at its failure by launching his spiritual thunders against Florence and its ruler. He joined Ferdinand of Naples in making war upon Lorenzo, whose consummate boldness and skill in drawing off Ferdinand from the alliance saved him from ruin. Next, Jerome coveted Ferrara, held in fief by the house of Este; and the Pope, in alliance with Venice, turned his arms in that direction; but the Pope, seeing that they were to gain nothing, deserted Venice and excommunicated her. Vexation at his inability to subdue this Republic hastened his death. Innocent VIII. "sought with a still more profligate vileness to exalt and enrich his seven illegitimate children:" and for this end carried on two wars against Ferdinand, King of Naples. But the crimes of Sixtus and of Innocent, shocking as they were, were less than those of the most flagitious of all the Popes, Alexander VI. To give riches and crowns to his five illegitimate children, and especially to his favorite son, Cæsar Borgia, he exerted all his energies. His court afforded a spectacle of

* Ranke, *History of the Popes of Rome during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries*, Vol. I., p. 45.

luxury and unbounded sensuality. Alexander sided with Naples against the invader, Charles VIII. of France, and then, for a price, deserted his ally. In 1495, he joined the Emperor and the King of Spain, in order to drive the French out of Italy. Not getting enough from Naples to satisfy him, he joined Louis XII. of France, granting the latter a divorce from his wife, and receiving, among other benefits, armed assistance for Cæsar Borgia, who made war upon the principal vassals of the Church and carved for himself a dominion out of their territories. To forward the interests of this monster of cruelty and perfidy, Alexander was ready to throw away even the show of truth and decency. At length the poison which the Pope had mixed for a rich Cardinal whom he wanted to rob, he drank himself by mistake, and died on the 18th of August, 1503.

Julius II. differed from his immediate predecessors in being free from their personal vices and in not aiming to exalt his own relations. His aim was to build up and extend the states of the Church. In this he attained to great success. He satisfied his family by obtaining for them, by peaceful means, the patrimony of Urbino. He expelled Cæsar Borgia from his dominion and seized upon it. He brought Perugia and Bologna under the direct rule of the Papal See. Unable to induce the Venetians to retire from the territories of the Holy See on the coast, he organized the league of Cambray, and compelled them to surrender this portion of the dominions of the Church. He gained possession of Parma, Piacenza, and Reggio, and of all the region lying between Piacenza and Terracina. He had established his sway over all the territories of the Church and consolidated them into a kingdom. He only failed in a second great end which he had set before him,—that of expelling the foreigners, or, as he expressed it, of “driving out the barbarians” from Italy. In truth, in reaching the object of his ambition, he had been obliged to bring in foreign intervention, and had done his part in paving the way for the great evils that were destined to flow from it.

In their efforts to preserve the fair inheritance which Julius II. had left to them, his successors were obliged to involve themselves in the intrigues and conflicts of European politics, and especially in the long contest between France and Austria

for power and predominance in Italy. In particular did the acquisitions made by Julius II. help forward the Protestant Reformation. The Papal control over Parma, Piacenza, and other Lombard towns, Charles V. regarded as a usurpation; and, at the critical time of the Reformation, he was not disposed to strengthen his antagonist by stifling the Lutheran movement. In like manner, the Popes were willing to use that movement as an element of discord and weakness in the Empire of Charles. At the moment when Charles was gaining his great success against the Reformers, in the Smalkaldic war, about the time of the battle of Mühlberg, Pope Paul III. sent a message to the King of France "to support those who were not yet beaten," that is, to aid the Protestants. Francis, the Pope, and the Protestants were found, on occasions of great importance, in virtual alliance. The Protestant cause was saved by the mutual jealousies and selfishness of its enemies. The separation of England from the Catholic Church was occasioned by the refusal of Clement VII. to grant the application of Henry VIII. for a divorce,—a refusal that was due to the political relations then subsisting between the Pope and the Emperor.

To Julius II. belongs the distinction of founding the Papal kingdom as it has continued down to a recent day. It was not, however, until 1598 that Ferrara was brought under the immediate sovereignty of the Holy See, and not until 1649 that the Dukedom of Urbino was in like manner absorbed into the Papal kingdom. By the treaties of 1815, Austria gained a small strip of Papal territory situated on the left bank of the Po.

VI.

The Papal dominion in Italy felt the shock of the French Revolution, which caused all thrones to tremble. In 1790 the French National Assembly incorporated with the French kingdom the Papal counties of Avignon and Venaissin. As the Pope joined in the war against France, Napoleon, in 1797, conquered his states and obliged him, in the peace of Tolentino, to renounce Avignon and Venaissin forever, give up the Legations of Ferrara, Bologna, and Romagna to the new Cis-Alpine Republic, surrender the finest works of Art to be

transported to Paris, and to pay the costs of the war. The republican feeling spread as far as Rome, and in 1798, a Roman Republic was proclaimed by the insurgent people. Pius VI. was carried from Rome as a prisoner and died in Valence, in France, in 1799. During the absence of Bonaparte in Egypt, Italy was overrun by Suwarrow at the head of the allied army. It is needless to recount here the particulars of the prolonged conflict of Pius VII. with Napoleon. In 1809, a decree of the French Emperor united the Papal States with his Empire. In 1814, after the allies had entered France, the Pope returned to Rome. The reactionary policy at once began to prevail, and the French system of law and administration, which had proved so beneficial to the Papal States, was overthrown. At the Congress of Vienna, the Pope entered a protest against the cession of the little tract of territory on the Po to Austria, as well as against the retention, by France, of Avignon and Venaisin, which, as we have said, had been formally given up. The maladministration of the Papal government, especially the restoration of the confiscated ecclesiastical property, brought the finances of the kingdom into irretrievable ruin. Up to the accession of Pius IX., there was no sign of any disposition to vary from a blind, stubborn, and liberty-hating conservatism. Efforts at rebellion—as those at Bologna in 1831—had been suppressed by Austrian soldiery. The government of Gregory XVI. obstinately set itself against every enterprise looking towards political and social improvement, and evinced its hatred of freedom by incarcerating thousands of political offenders.

The accession of Pius IX., in 1846, to the Papal Chair, inspired the warmest hopes. He set free six thousand political prisoners. He earnestly set about the work of improving and liberalizing the system of government. He was hailed as the chief of the liberal party in Italy. The Revolution in France, in 1848, was followed by the grant, from the Pope, of a Constitution embracing liberal provisions. The insurrection in Lombardy, against the Austrian rule, led to the breach between the Pope, who refused to engage in a war with the Austrians, and the Radical party; and this party gaining the ascendancy, after the assassination of Rossi, in 1848, the Pope

was obliged to fly from Rome. The Roman Republic was overthrown by French troops, and the Pope, under their protection, returned to Rome, in 1850.

Of late, the progress of the new kingdom of Italy has given promise that the yearning for Italian unity will be realized, and that the temporal rule of the Pope must give way to the demand of a nation. Upon the evacuation of the States of the Church by the Austrian garrisons, immediately after the victories of the French and Sardinians at Magenta and Melignano, in the summer of 1859, several of those states at once revolted from the Pope and proclaimed Victor Immanuel king. The Papal government succeeded in reconquering them, with the exception of Bologna, Ferrara, Ravenna, and Forli. After the peace of Villafranca, the French Emperor denied the application of the Pope for aid in recovering these legations; and their formal annexation to the Sardinian kingdom took place in 1860. The attempt of Lamoricière, the French General in the service of the Pope, to recover them, not only failed, but led to the further annexation of Umbria and the Marches of Ancona to the Italian kingdom. Thus there was left to the Pope only the comarca of Rome, Civita Vecchia, Velletri, and Frosinone, having an aggregate population of about half a million of inhabitants. The Italian statesmen probably expect that the retirement of the French garrison from Rome will be attended with the same result that followed the evacuation of the Legations by the Austrians in 1859. The people will rise, overturn the government, and invite Victor Immanuel to incorporate them among his subjects and establish his court at Rome.

After this historical survey we are prepared to consider what have been the character and effect of the Popes' secular rule. And first, in respect to the States of the Church themselves, there can be no doubt that the government of the Popes has been, on the whole, an exceedingly bad government. On this point there can be no serious question among enlightened men. The exceptional periods, when there has been an improved administration, have been short and far between. Since the French Revolution, the great Powers, in-

cluding such as are most loyal to the Catholic Church and the Supreme Bishop, have repeatedly used their endeavors to procure reforms. But they have been met by a stiff refusal to depart from the old system. It is supposed that the election of Pius IX. was owing to the conviction that the gross misgovernment at Rome could not long continue; and that his liberal measures at the outset of his reign were due to this feeling. Now the vices of the Papal rule are not accidental; but they appear to belong inseparably to a government of Priests like that which the Pope has been so long endeavoring to prop up by foreign bayonets. The settled disaffection and hostility of his subjects are well justified by the inherent and ineradicable vices of a priestly administration.

The effect of the Pope's temporal sovereignty on Italy has likewise been in the highest degree disastrous. The maintenance of their temporal power has led them to bring in foreign domination, the great curse of the peninsula, and to keep Italy divided. Macchiavelli, who inscribed his *History of Florence* to Clement VII., says that "all the wars which were brought upon Italy by the barbarians"—that is, foreigners—"were caused for the most part by the Popes, and all the barbarians who overrun Italy were invited in by them. This has kept Italy in a state of disunion and weakness." At this moment, the Pope's temporal dominion is the one great hindrance to the realization of Italian unity.

When we inquire as to the influence of his temporal rule upon his character and influence as a spiritual ruler, it is an open question whether his position as secular Prince did not, in the middle ages, protect and strengthen the Papacy in general. If it did, and if the Papacy in these times is acknowledged to have been, on the whole, a beneficial institution, being a counterpoise to the spirit of irreligion and barbarism, then we must admit that the temporal power was relatively a good thing. However this question may be answered, it is clear that the secular power of the Pope has had a corrupting and pernicious influence upon the character of his spiritual administration. Bellarmine, and other great Catholic theologians and casuists, have explained the consistency between the spiritual office of the Pope, and his position as a secular Prince;

and have held that, in entire consistency with religion, a foreign prince or state may wage war with him in his character as an earthly sovereign. But as a matter of fact, as is well known, the Pontiffs have never refrained from using the spiritual weapons in their hands, as the excommunication and the interdict, for the furtherance of the temporal interest. They have turned the awful powers of discipline which are attributed to them, for the furtherance of their political schemes. The inevitable effect must be, and has been, to degrade the spiritual function, and rob it of no small portion of the reverence which it might otherwise excite and maintain. Of the influence of the secular dominion exercised by the Popes, and of the count which it creates, on their own personal character, history is an outspoken witness. The covetousness, the ambition, the luxury, the open and shameless licentiousness, the atrocious crimes, which are chargeable on too many of the Popes—offenses which have moved the indignation of Catholic historians like Baronius, and poets like Petrarch and Dante—have commonly grown out of the temptations incident to the temporal sovereignty. By the occupations and pleasures which cluster about it, Pontiffs who are by no means to be counted among the worst, have been drawn aside from the proper work and character of Christian bishops. Father Paul, after praising Leo X. for his erudition, his humanity, his liberality, his love of letters and arts, adds with fine satire, that “he would have been a perfect Pope, if with these qualities, he had united some knowledge of the affairs of religion, and a somewhat greater inclination to piety, for neither of which he manifested much concern.”* Dante’s indignant protest against the temporal power of the Roman Bishops, is familiar †:—

“Laws indeed there are
But who is he observes them? None; not he,
Who goes before, the shepherd of the flock,
Who chews the cud, but does not cleave the hoof.‡
Therefore the multitude, who see their guide
Strike at the very good they covet most,

* *istoria del Concil. Trident*, Lib. I., p. 5.

† *Purgatorio*, XVI., l. 100—115 (Cary’s translation).

‡ The allusion is to an unclean beast in the Levitical Law. (See *Levit.* XL, 4).

Feed there, and look no further. Thus the cause
 Is not corrupted nature in yourselves,
 But ill-conducting, that hath turn'd the world
 To evil. Rome, that turn'd it unto good,
 Was wont to boast two suns,* whose several beams
 Cast light on either way, the world's and God's.
 One since hath quench'd the other; and a sword
 Is grafted on the crook; and so conjoin'd,
 Each must perforce decline to worse, unawed
 By fear of other."

But can the temporal power be given up, and the spiritual power be left intact? The affirmative is declared by some Catholic writers and statesmen. It is proposed that the Pope should surrender his temporal authority, but continue at Rome the exercise of his spiritual functions, receiving an abundant revenue, together with an abundant income for each of the cardinals. On the other hand, the Pope and his party stoutly contend that the temporal sovereignty is essential to the full exertion of his spiritual functions, and therefore cannot be given up. It must be allowed that cogent arguments may be brought forward on this side of the question. In the first place, as the Pope declares in his recent "Allocution," if he is not to be a Ruler, he must be a subject of one of the Catholic Powers; and, if a subject, he is constantly exposed to the suspicion of being warped or managed, in his spiritual government, by the power to which he is thus, in a civil relation, subordinate. The experience of the Papacy at Avignon, and the immense loss of prestige and influence consequent on the relation of the Popes, at that time, to the French Kings, is one of the facts which lend a strong support to this plea put forth by Pius IX. On the contrary, the force of his argument seems to be neutralized by the consideration that, in the present state of the world, the Pope, as a temporal ruler, is incapable of sustaining himself, and is obliged to lean for support on a foreign power. If it be said that the surrender of his States is to compromise his independence, the reply is that his independence is lost already. There is still more weight in an additional argument, which is also touched upon by the Pope in the late

* The Emperor and the Bishop of Rome.

"Allocation," that on becoming a subject he would at once be involved in a conflict of duties, or would be fettered in the promulgation of doctrine and the administration of discipline. The great question of marriage, which is now a prominent subject of contention between the Pope and the Italian King, affords a fair illustration. In the kingdom of Italy, and wherever the French law is in vogue, marriage by the civil contract alone is valid. To this law and practice the Pope is, of course, vehemently hostile. Marriage is a sacrament of the Church, and the sanction of the priest is held to be indispensable. The control which this doctrine gives to the priesthood is one of their greatest prerogatives, and no wonder that it is prized and defended to the last. Now, suppose the Pope to become a subject of Victor Emmanuel. It is easy to see that his freedom to fulminate anathemas against the authors of the statute which abolishes this high prerogative, and against such as venture to take shelter under the law of the land, might be inconveniently restricted; and that conflict between the secular and ecclesiastical rulers would almost inevitably spring up. And this is only one of the subjects on which variance and strife might easily arise. On a review of the whole question, we are inclined to agree with the Pope and his party in the opinion that the loss of the temporal power carries with it a partial loss of the spiritual. If the spiritual power could survive the surrender of the temporal, in undiminished vigor, the former might be enhanced, and the Catholic Church strengthened by the purifying influence flowing from the change. The Pope would stand forth in the simple character of Supreme Bishop, free from the entanglements of secular rule. But, as we have just intimated, it is doubtful whether his freedom, as a spiritual Prince, would not be seriously impaired by the loss of his earthly kingdom.

Will the Pope be dethroned? If we looked solely at the past, we should give a negative answer to this question. We should say that if he be driven from his kingdom, he will regain it. Many times have the Popes been expelled from Rome. They have seen their dominions pass into other hands, and have wandered forth as fugitives and exiles. Often have they witnessed emergencies which, in outward appearance, were

more threatening than the peril in which they are just now involved. The bark of St. Peter, to borrow their own favorite simile, has frequently been tossed by the tempest, but has never been submerged. It has floated in safety in the midst of the rude blast, and at length the billows have been composed to rest. But times have changed. There is, even in the Roman Catholic part of Christendom, a decline of faith in the Papal pretensions. The main point is that the Papacy no longer enjoys in Europe the popular sympathy which was once its firm support. In the middle ages, the Papacy was popular, sometimes even demagogical. In modern times, it has attached itself with blind, unyielding tenacity to the despotic principles and organs of the reactionary anti-republican party in Europe. It vainly struggles to stem the tide of political sentiment which, notwithstanding occasional fluctuations, has been steadily rising since the commencement of the present century. The prospect, therefore, is that the Pope will be forced to yield up what remains to him of his Italian kingdom. If he could permanently change his residence, the problem would admit of another solution. He might become the master of some other province, or establish himself on some island of the Mediterranean. But it is only as Bishop of the Roman Church that he can pretend to Episcopal supremacy. Forsaking that Church by his own voluntary act, could he longer claim the prerogatives of Peter? If a theory could be devised for escaping from this difficulty, still the abandonment of Rome for a long period would bring upon him a great loss of consideration.* The peculiar glory that lingers over the eternal city, and over the Papacy as identified with it, would be lost.

The separation of Italy or of France, or of both, from the Papal See, would be an event which would be hailed by Prot-

* The Catholic theologians hold that the Bishop of Rome may reside away from that city, if he chooses. As long as he is Bishop of Rome, he is Supreme Pontiff. Says Perrone:—"Fieri potest, ut summus pontifex resideat Viennæ, Mediolani, Berolini, aut Petropoli; nunquam vero potest fieri, ut simplex episcopus Viennensis aut Petropolitæ sit summus Pontifex; ubicunque ille resideat, semper erit pontifex maximus, ut possit dici ac vere sit in primatu Petri successor." *Perrone*, T. II, § 604. (Quoted in Hase, *Handbuch der Protestantischen Polemik*, etc., p. 242, n.)

estants with joy. Such an event would open to the seceding kingdoms the possibility of religious reforms which are now precluded. The policy of toleration is now too firmly established, to render it possible in either of the countries just mentioned, for Protestantism to be suppressed by the tyranny of an establishment, in case they were to break off their connection with the Roman Church. Unhappily, in France, the Ultramontane party is now in the ascendant. The old principles of Gallican freedom, for which Bossuet, and a body of great men before and after him, have contended, have lost ground and find but few advocates. In Italy, the prospect is more hopeful. It is not improbable that the prolonged and irritating conflict there between Pope and king will ultimately lead to an open renunciation of the ecclesiastical, as well as civil, pretensions of the Pope. Since the modern nations of Europe emerged into a distinct existence, the feeling of national rights and of national independence, as opposed to foreign ecclesiastical control, has been steadily growing. A regard for the interest of the nation has outweighed the influence of religious affinities. Since Philip the Fair summoned together the estates of his realm to aid him in his opposition to the tyrannical measures of Boniface VIII., the nation has generally been the uppermost thought, as compared with the Church, in the policy of European rulers. The hostility of France to the Austrian house of Hapsburg brought the former to the assistance of the Protestant cause in the thirty years war. Now we find Prussia and Italy in alliance against the same Catholic empire. The Papacy is not so strong that it can afford to set itself against the national feeling and real welfare of any Catholic people.

At the same time we have little confidence in the permanence of any triumph that is achieved over the Papal system, unless that triumph results from the power of enlightened religious convictions. In the last century, in Europe, the Papacy—we speak of it as a system of spiritual rule—was at a low ebb. It seemed as if there were none so poor as to do it reverence. The Emperor Joseph II. of Austria introduced into his dominions reforms that fell little short of an utter renunciation of Papal control. Everywhere the bonds of hier-

archical rule were loosened. But the motive underlying these changes was, to a large extent, religious indifferentism. When religion revived, religious feeling flowed in the old channel. In France, the Catholic Church is stronger than it was fifty years ago. It is on a believing, and not on a free-thinking, Protestantism that we must depend for a success that is to be enduring. It is requisite that deep and enlightened convictions of Christian truth, and a true love of the Gospel as understood by Protestants, should spread among the people of Catholic countries. The Church is founded not on Peter as an individual, but on Peter as a warm and sincere confessor of the faith that Jesus is the Son of God and Saviour of the World. With the progress of this faith, unencumbered by the traditions of men, the decline and fall of the Papal system are linked. Political changes may be valuable auxiliaries, but it is easy to overestimate their importance.

Most Protestant Christians sympathize with the progress of the Italian kingdom, and hope to see the Pope lose his temporal power. This is not true of all, however; and among the dissenters from the popular view is the illustrious scholar and statesman, Guizot. The publication, during the present year, of the fourth edition of his remarks on "The Christian Church and Christian Society in 1861," indicates that his opinions on this question since that time have not changed. At the foundation of his interesting discussion is the proposition that every blow struck at one of the great Churches is a blow struck at all and at Christianity itself. The Roman Catholic and the Protestant have adversaries in common, who are far more distant from both than the Catholic and Protestant are from one another. The Catholic and Protestant profess the same Christian faith, important as the points of disagreement are between them. The adversaries attack this faith, and their attacks at the present day are mischievous and formidable. It is, therefore, suicidal, as well as wrong, for Protestants to join hands with indifferentism and irreligion, for the sake of weakening their ancient theological antagonist. Guizot proceeds to argue that the temporal kingdom of the Pope cannot be wrested from him without a violation of international law and public morality. He sees in the authority which it has become fash-

ionable in France to concede to "universal suffrage" the rising of a new despotism which is held to be stronger than the obligations of treaties and the settled principles of international right. Moreover, the attack on the Pope's temporal kingdom he considers an infringement of religious liberty. The temporal power is a condition of the exercise of the spiritual. It is the guaranty of the independence of the Papal office. The great body of Catholics so regard it. The temporal power grew up in connection with the spiritual, as a part and a fruit of the latter. Besides, he thinks that the policy of the Italian kingdom is principally dictated by political ambition. If the Pope be driven from Rome, Guizot thinks that this event will not give more than a momentary success to the Italian movement. The Roman Catholic population, the world over, will be roused to a sense of the injury done to their chief and thus indirectly to themselves. The consequence will be that widespread and increasing agitation will lead to positive measures for the restoration of the Pope to his rightful throne.

Guizot does not confine himself to an expression of his reasons for not approving the Sardinian movement. He indicates what he believes to be the real need of Italy, and the way in which it should be met. Italy needs independence and liberty—independence of foreign control and liberty within. Both of these ends he holds it possible to secure by peaceful means, apart from all revolutionary measures. The abridgment of liberty in the Italian States he attributes, to a considerable extent, to the revolutionary ferment. But Italian unity, in the sense in which the phrase is taken generally, he believes to be at once unnecessary and impracticable. His plan would be to establish a confederation, embracing all the States of the Peninsula as they existed prior to the revolutions which have so enlarged the borders of the Sardinian kingdom. In a confederacy of this kind, he conceives that all the unity that is desirable or attainable could be realized. For the strength of the various parts composing such a body, he would wish that they should be nearly equal to one another, no one State being much beyond any of the rest in power and resources. It is evident that Guizot has little faith in political changes which are due to revolutionary agencies. He uses strong language

when condemning the action of the Italian Government in confiscating ecclesiastical property, and in reference generally to their treatment of the Catholic Church. Yet he does not omit to express satisfaction that he is a Protestant, and regret that the authorities of the Roman Catholic Church do not see the advantage, as well as duty, of coming out in favor of full religious toleration.

We must confess ourselves not convinced by this reasoning. The fact is obvious that the Papal civil administration is not only distasteful to the subjects of it, but is extremely bad—inherently bad. It is a fact equally obvious that the condition of Italy, partly in consequence of the Papal kingdom, has been deplorable. The discontent of the people is owing to misgovernment. So we cannot but think that their desire to become a nation is legitimate and laudable. Nor does Guizot's scheme of a confederation, even were it within reach, seem to promise good. If it is to be united by no bond stronger than the bands which held the Greek States together, or which lately connected the members of the Germanic body, it would prove to be a rope of sand. If, on the contrary, it were a bond like that of the American Union, Italy would be to all intents and purposes a single nation, and that member of the nation over which the Pope presides would inevitably prove to be refractory and unmanageable. The Pope, if he were to belong to such a confederacy, would be bound to abide by its policy in respect to foreign nations, not to speak of domestic affairs, and would be as far from a situation of independence as it is claimed he would be were he a subject of the Italian king.

Our conclusion is that the "logic of events" is hurrying the Pope to the coerced surrender of his temporal power, and that a portion of his spiritual power must go with it. Whether this great change will take place speedily, and in consequence of the progress of the new Italian kingdom, it is impossible to say. The effect of an exile of the Pope from Rome, growing out of a refusal on his part to acquiesce in the absorption of his territory in the new kingdom, may be such as Guizot describes. Disturbances may arise which will lead, as when the

late Roman Republic was overthrown, to the regaining of his throne. Even when Victor Immanuel establishes himself at Rome, it will be too early to say that the Pope's temporal power is gone forever. So unsettled is the political condition of all Europe, that a confident judgment on this point would be premature.

ARTICLE II.—THE VALUE OF LINGUISTIC SCIENCE
TO ETHNOLOGY.

THE science of ethnology, or the genealogical history of human races, is now receiving important contributions from three different branches of scientific inquiry—from the study of physical structure and characteristics (including craniology and comparative anatomy), from archæology, or the study of the remains of ancient art and handicraft, and from linguistics, or the study of languages. All are the birth of the current century, or have, at least, only begun to attain their present development and scope since its commencement; and by their aid our knowledge of the movements and fates of humanity in ante-historic times is making advances more rapid than could have been looked forward to as possible fifty years ago. But, at the same time, our apprehension of the difficulty of the problem set before the ethnologist has grown even faster than our command of the means of its solution. Our views of the history of our kind are undergoing, or seem likely to undergo, a revolution analogous with that which has come upon our views of the history of the earth, our dwelling-place. Until within a very recent period, the growth and structure of the earth-crust were universally regarded as a matter altogether simple and comprehensible, the result of a few *fiats*, succeeding one another within the space of six days and nights; now, even the school-boy knows that in that brief story of the Genesis are epitomized the changeful events of countless ages, and that geology may spend centuries in tracing them out and explaining them in detail, without ever arriving at the end of her task. In like manner has it been supposed that the first introduction of man into the midst of the prepared creation was distant but six or seven thousand years from our day, and we had hoped to be able to read the record of his brief career, even back to its beginning; but science is now accumulating so rapidly, and from so many quarters, proofs that the current estimate of his existence must be greatly lengthened out—

even, perhaps, many times multiplied—that universal acceptance of this conclusion also is not, it appears, much longer to be avoided. And if thus driven to the acknowledgment that man, though the youngest of the animal creation, has trodden the earth for ages—ages which may well seem interminable to the historian, brief as the geologist will deem them—we cannot but feel how immensely diminished is our reasonable hope of attaining definite and certain knowledge respecting even the main facts of this prolonged history, how helpless we stand in presence of a past so remote, how feeble is our power of penetration into its dark depths.

These considerations, however, render even more indispensable than before the cordial and effective coöperation of all the classes of inquirers who are directing their efforts toward the common end. Hitherto, it must be acknowledged, they have not worked together in entire harmony. As is but natural between departments of science of so recent and hasty development, each, while confident of its own value and authority, distrusts those of the rest; physicists and linguists, especially, showing too much disposition to misunderstand and disparage each other's methods and results. Within the limits of each, moreover, division of opinion yet prevails upon points even of prime consequence—which is not without its effect in weakening the confidence of outsiders. A complete mutual understanding, and the full harmonizing of conflicting claims and views, it is obvious, can only be attained when the methods of each department are perfected, and its main results firmly established; but it ought not to be difficult, even now, to bring about a better state of things in these respects than actually exists. We propose, then, after making such an inquiry into the nature of language as shall show us what is its competence as a witness in ethnological questions, to compare briefly its advantages with those of physical science, laboring especially to direct attention to the deficiencies of both, and to the need in which each stands of all the aid which it can derive from the other.

How and how far language shall be accepted by us as a proof or indication of race, must depend upon our view of what language is, and what its relation to the beings who

use it. Respecting this point, fundamental as is its importance, there still prevails no small difference of opinion, not only among scientific men generally, but even among professed linguistic students. One very distinguished naturalist, for example, holds that language is to man what his song is to the bird, what their roar, growl, bellow, are to lions, bears, oxen, and that resemblances of language no more indicate actual genetic connection among different tribes of men than resemblances of note indicate the common descent of the different species of thrushes, or of bears, inhabiting different parts of the world. Substantially the same view—namely, that language is the immediate and necessary product of physical organization, and varies as this varies; that an Englishman, a Frenchman, and a Chinaman talk differently because their brains and organs of articulation are unlike one another, and all Englishmen, or all Frenchmen, or all Chinamen, talk alike because their nervous and muscular systems minutely correspond—has been distinctly put forward by at least one linguist of the highest rank and reputation; and others, not less respected, teach impliedly the same thing, by holding that language is beyond the reach of the conscious agency of men, that human effort can neither make nor change it. These doctrines would rule out language altogether from any share in the solution of ethnological questions: it would become simply a physical characteristic, one among the many which by their common presence make up man, and by their variations make the different varieties of men; and it would be for the physicist alone to determine, here, as in the case of the other physical characteristics, how far the common possession of the quality indicated specific unity, or the difference in its form indicated specific variety. That, however, those who think thus totally misapprehend the nature and value of language is, in our view, undeniable, and may be proved by a brief and simple argument, which will bring the truth of the case plainly to light. Let us take a little specimen of language, and examine it, to see how we came into possession of it, and by what means it acquired and maintains its existence as language.

We select the brief phrase, *men like money*. There are hundreds of existing languages into which this phrase can be

translated, or which have their own means of expressing the same mental judgment, and not another one of them would express it in this way. What is the reason why we use this particular expression, instead of any one among the hundreds of others? Was it because of some peculiarity in our physical organization, whereby, when we saw men walking about us, and distinguished them from other walking creatures, from horses and dogs, from women and children, we were impelled to apply to them the name *man*, instead of *mann*, *homme*, *homo*, *anthrōpos*, *hombre*, *kanaka*, and so on? Most obviously not: it is because we got the word from those about us who were already employing it as the sign of the idea. It cost the guardians of our childhood a little effort at teaching, and ourselves a little effort at learning, to put us in possession of it. It was a task imposed upon our memory so to associate this particular combination of sounds with the conception of a man, that, when the latter was formed in our minds, the other came along with it; that, when any one uttered the word, the conception would immediately stand before us. Very likely, when we first began to use it, our articulating organs were not sufficiently trained to utter the whole of so difficult a combination, and we said *mā*, learning only later to add the final nasal. Not less probably, we were yet longer in mastering the irregular mode of formation of the plural *men*, and for a year or two we said, often or always, *mans*; but this, too, was a difficulty which we at length overcame, conforming our own usage to that of correct speakers about us.

Now there is not a single one of the many hundred words for *man* which are current in different communities on the earth, that we could not have learned to associate with the same conception, to understand and to employ as sign of that conception, as easily as this one. There is not a human being on earth, be he of what race he may, who could not have acquired this sign, as readily as the one which he now actually uses. The whole matter is one of conventional usage, determined by the custom of the people among whom one's lot is cast. Each one is a living proof of this. There is hardly a person among us who does not know other signs besides *man*, which he can substitute for this upon occasion. Here, we all say

man, because the usage of the community requires it: if we went to France, we should say *homme* for precisely the same reason. And we might live so long among those who say *homme*, and away from those who say *man*, that the former should be to us the more closely associated and naturally suggested sign of the two; we should begin, as we say, to think in French instead of in English. Had we commenced the process of substitution early enough, before we had gotten the English sign so thoroughly learned that nothing could ever drive it out of our memories, we might have forgotten this and all other English words, and learned to talk French as if we were Frenchmen. Any child of English-speaking parents can be made to speak French as its mother-tongue, by simply giving it a French nurse, and taking care that it learns no English. Children of Americans resident in foreign parts grow up bilingual, learning one way of expressing any given conception in their home, another out of doors. Of the thousands and millions of foreign immigrants who land upon our shores, the multifarious dialects disappear after the first generation, except where the incomers gather together in communities, and keep up a linguistic usage of their own for a shorter or longer period.

The word *man*, then, is no physical product, no result of an impulse in any manner dependent on peculiarities of our corporeal structure: it is an arbitrary and conventional sign for a certain idea; we have acquired and we employ it because it was usual in the community of which we form a part, and with whom we wish to communicate; we learned it of our predecessors, and shall teach it to those who come after us; its existence as an item of speech is kept up only by men's usage, by a historical tradition.

The same thing is true of the words *like* and *money*, and of every other word composing our language or any other language. Every spoken tongue is a congeries of signs for thought, deriving their significance from the intelligent consent of speakers and hearers, and sustained in currency by the same means.

But, it will be asked, is there then no reason why any word means what it does, save the arbitrary will and conventional

assent of the language-speakers? Has its etymology nothing to do with its significance? We answer—as regards its present use, nothing; the etymological reason for a name was of force only at the time of its selection and adoption. The distinction here indicated is an important one, and is too apt to be lost sight of by those who are engaged in the study of language. No doubt there was a reason why each constituent of every spoken language was assigned to the office which it now fills; it had to win its way to general acceptance and use before it became a part of language, and the etymological ground was the principal one which procured its currency; but, when that currency was once attained, when the mental association which binds together idea and sign was once formed, the etymology was no longer of consequence, and was dropped out of memory. What child asks after the derivation and ground of significance of the words he learns? It is enough to him that others use them, and that, if he would converse with those about him, he must do the same. And if he asked, in how few cases would he get an answer, in how excessively few a satisfactory one! If the actual use of a word were in any degree dependent on its etymology, then every human being would have to be an etymologist, able, on challenge, to render a reason for the word that comes forth from him. But it is not as we speak, it is only as we turn and reflect upon what we have spoken, that we recognize its reasons—and then only very fragmentarily. Of the vocables composing our language, the larger part can have their history and mutations of form and meaning traced back a little way; some small portion, by the most skilled and learned linguists, almost to the beginnings of human speech: but all as a matter of curiosity, of scientific interest, not as bearing in any direct manner on the practical use of speech. The student of physics learns to call a certain force *galvanism*, and it is doubtless a satisfaction to him to know that the name commemorates the Italian physician who took the first steps toward discovering this force: but the information is not essential; he would say *galvanism* all the same if he had never heard of Galvani; as, indeed, thousands actually do. How many of those who talk about *electricity* know that it literally means ‘the quality of being

like amber,' and has no more pregnant reason than the accidental fact that the first recognized manifestations of this so potent element were noticed in connection with the rubbing of amber? But it is not put within our option to declare the reason insufficient, and to insist that we will have a new name for *electricity*, more truly descriptive of its character. Conventional usage is the all-sufficient authority for the term. Our etymological researches bring us, now to a suitable and dignified reason for the present meaning of a word, now to one wholly trivial and accidental: in either case alike, without altering our practice as regards its employment.

Let us look for a moment at the history of the words in our illustrative phrase, *men like money*. The first word, *man*, is one of wide currency in the family of languages whereof our own is a member. It is generally traced back to a root *man* (of which our *I mean* is the slightly altered representative), signifying 'thinking.' The name, then, designates man as 'the thinking animal,' and no more distinctively characteristic title, certainly, could be found for him; if the etymology be a true one—and no reason can be brought against it except the inherent unlikelihood that so penetrating and metaphysical a consideration should have been made the foundation of a name for the human race at so early a period—it is worthy and satisfying. But why does the root *man* designate 'thinking?' this is an intellectual act or condition, and the names for such are, as the whole history of language teaches us, wont to be derived from those of physical, sensible acts. We do, in fact, find that *man* is the secondary or derivative form of a more primitive root *mā*, respecting the meaning of which there is some doubt whether it be 'measure' or 'make;' the process of thinking was conceived of as a process of production, reproduction of what had been experienced, or as a measuring, a going over and estimation of a train of ideas, from point to point. If, now, we go a step farther, and ask why *mā* meant 'to make' or 'to measure,' we can extract from the etymologist no answer; the fact is to him an ultimate and absolute one. He can point out certain general considerations which throw a degree of light upon the process of root-making, but

he can almost never tell why, in a given root, such a meaning is combined with such a form.

The second word of our phrase, *like*, has quite a different history. We use it either as verb, adverb, noun, or adjective, but a very little study shows us that the adjective, with the meaning 'resembling, corresponding,' is the primitive word from which the uses of the others are derived. It seems not easy to get from such an adjective a verb having the signification 'to be fond of,' but the work was accomplished by means of a series of transitions of meaning and usage, somewhat thus. To form a verb from an adjective or substantive is a simple and familiar process in language, and the verb *like* first meant 'to resemble, to correspond with, to be adapted to.' By but a slight modification, it came to be used in such impersonal phrases as "it *likes* me," i. e. 'it is adapted to me, suits me, pleases me:' this use is not uncommon in old English. Then, just as "if it please him" has been, by a blundering construction, turned into "if he pleases," so "it likes me" has been turned into "I like," that is to say, 'I choose, I prefer.' The farther conversion into a transitive made the verb which we now so familiarly use, while we have forgotten and dropped out of employment all its former applications. It has been a historical process, one mode of use suggesting and leading to another, under government of the usual laws of mental association. The sign was at no one step so divorced from its former application as to be unintelligible to those who had been accustomed to employ it, distant as may now appear its point of arrival from its point of departure. As for the origin of the adjective *like* itself, it is lost in obscurity, a theme of conjecture and dispute to the etymologists, but the subject of no confident knowledge.

Quite unlike the history of either of these words has been that of the last word in our phrase, *money*. It is of French origin, brought into England by the Normans of William the Conqueror. The French language derives it, along with most of its other stores of expression, from the Latin, where it has the form *monēta*, and signifies primarily the *mint*, the place where money was coined, and then, by transference, the coin-stamp, mint-mark, and the coin stamped or minted. But why does *monēta* mean 'mint' in Latin? For this reason: the

Romans thought they had reason to be grateful to their goddess Juno for certain *monitions* which she had given them in crises of their history, and they accordingly built a temple to *Juno Moneta*, 'Juno the Monisher.' In the said temple it chanced that, for reasons of state convenience of which no one is now cognizant, the Roman machinery for stamping money was set up; it was made their place of coinage, their *mint*. Hence the names for mint, and coin, and money, in most of the tongues of modern Europe: they go back to a bit of popular superstition, and to the accidental location of a machine for stamping metal, in a community which was at the time one of the most insignificant in Europe. A more trivial reason for such a wide-reaching linguistic fact could not well be found. If we are curious to ask farther why Juno, for the kind warnings she gave, was entitled *Monēta*, we are brought back to the same ultimate root which we found at the basis of *man*: the Latin verb *moneo*, 'to warn,' is but a causative of the root *man*, 'to think,' and means 'to cause to think, to remind, to admonish.' So that *man* and *money* start from the same beginning; the one an ancient derivative, arrived at by a single consciously taken step; the other having to pass through a long chain of accidental circumstances and arbitrary transfers, before arriving at the meaning assigned it in our usage.

These instances will be enough to illustrate what we mean by asserting that the etymology of a word is not the reason why we employ the word as we do, but rather the explanation of how the word came to be introduced into usage: prevailing use, convention, is the only and the adequate foundation of practical language.

But we have looked hitherto at only one side of the history of the words chosen as an example—namely, at the history of their meaning. Their form has also a history, which must not be left altogether out of view, if we would understand the nature of language. We will take up first *money*. The Latin word, as noticed, was *monēta*. This the modern languages of southern Europe, descended from the Latin, have variously changed. In Italian, indeed, it remains *moneta*; but the Spanish has turned its *t* into *d*, making it *moneda*, by a phonetic modification which is of frequent occurrence in many

tongues; the Portuguese leaves out the *n*, saying *moeda*. The French has applied one Procrustean rule to the forms of all Latin words; the syllable which was in Latin accented has become the final syllable of its French representative—the effect of a lazy habit of utterance, which, when the climax of the word had been reached, was unwilling to take the trouble of enunciating the rest. By this means, *monēta* became in French *monnaie*. When, however, by reason of the conquest, French words were imported into English, they became part of a language whose prevailing habit it was to accent the first syllable of its disyllabic words; and hence, our words of French derivation have from the beginning been conforming themselves to this prevailing analogy, and shifting their accent from the latter to the former syllable. In this movement, *mney* has borne its share, and it accordingly exhibits, as compared with its French original, a difference of accent as well as of vowel sound.

Let us next return to *men*. In this word, the most striking peculiarity is that it denotes the plural number by a change of vowel, being one of the very small number of nouns in our language—such as *goose*, *geese*, *mouse*, *mice*—which do so. The *e* of *men* is significant; *men*, in our usage, can be only plural; *man* can be only singular. This, however, was not the case at an earlier period in the history of our tongue. In the Anglo-Saxon, from which the modern English is directly descended through a series of transitional steps, each of which is attested by contemporary documents, the change of vowel from *a* to *e* was not indicative of a change of number. Of the four cases of the plural, only two, the nominative and accusative, had *e* for their vowel; the two others, the genitive and dative, had *a*; they were *manna* and *mannum*; moreover, the dative singular, *men*, had also an *e*. The origin of the difference of vowel was, in fact, altogether euphonic; the dative singular and the nominative and accusative plural originally had endings which contained a soft or palatal vowel, and this, by a reflex action, assimilated the vowel of the word itself, softened it, turning it from *a* into *e*. The endings had disappeared already in the Anglo-Saxon, but their euphonic effect still remained. This accidental discordance, then, be-

tween the cases of most frequent use in the two numbers, the nominative and accusative, came to present itself to the consciousness of those who used the words as their prominent and essential distinction, and, as the genitive and dative cases went out of use, their office being supplied by prepositions, *of* and *to*, the difference of vowel became at last, in a few words, the sign of number. It is just as if, since we pronounce *nätional* the adjective derived from *nätion*, we should finally come to omit, as unnecessary, the suffix *al* of the former, and should let *nätion* and *nätion* stand over against one another, as corresponding adjective and substantive.

We will dwell but for a moment upon the second word, *like*, just long enough to notice that, while it is not distinguished in form by us from the adjective whence it is derived, it formerly had its own characteristic ending as a derivative verb. In Anglo-Saxon, as a third person plural, it was *liciath*; and the ending *ath* was still earlier *and*; and this, again, in the most primitive form to which we can trace it, was *anti*: the ending was by origin a pronoun, meaning 'they,' first appended to verbal roots, then compounded with them, then gradually worn down to a simpler and simpler shape, and at length cast off altogether. It exemplifies a tendency which is active in every language, through every part of its history—the tendency to reduce words to a simpler and briefer form, to economize the labor expended in uttering them, to get rid of whatever in them can be dispensed with without detriment to intelligibility. It is the same tendency which makes the sailor say *bos'n* instead of *boatswain*, and *to'gal'nts'ls* instead of *topgallantsails*, and under whose influence we have reduced *breakfast* to *brëakfast*, *forehead* to *för'ed*, *fourteen-nights* to *fört-night*. A "tendency in language" we call it, but its seat is evidently in us, the users of language; it is we who change our words, both in sound and meaning, in a manner to suit our needs and our convenience. The material of speech is accessible to no change whatever not proceeding from the voluntary action of those who speak it. It is wholly in their power and subject to their will. Every word has its form and meaning by our conventional consent; if we choose to maintain both unchanged, nothing can touch them; if we choose to alter

either or both, nothing can maintain them. It is not, indeed, in the power of any individual arbitrarily to make or to modify language, but this is because no individual can make general usage. Language is the property of the community, their means of social interconsequence, and only such changes as they assent to and adopt can take place in it. I may shut myself up in my study and better my native tongue as much as I please, making it the richest and most melodious in the world, according to my own private idea of wealth and melody. I may revel in my creations till I have well nigh or quite forgotten my former English tongue; but when I come out into the world, no one will understand me; the community will turn its back on me, as an unintelligible humorist, if it do not laugh at me for a fool. But if my wife and I are thrown on a desert island together, we may agree to institute as radical a reform as we please in our ways of talking, and our children will learn them, and know no other speech; a community will grow up around us whose language will have been formed by our sole and arbitrary will. A parcel of thieves band themselves together, and agree to adopt and use a whole list of manufactured expressions, instead of those in ordinary use by the community, for the express purpose of being understood by one another alone; and so comes into being an *argot*, a thieves' slang, which becomes the native tongue of the pick-pockets and burglars of the next generation, they knowing naught of the honest vocabulary which their fathers rejected, or knowing it only as we might know so much Greek or Latin.

Necessity of mutual intelligibility is thus the sole and efficient restraint upon that indefinite variability of language which might seem otherwise the necessary deduction from our thesis that language is changed by human action, and by that only. All word-making is done under the supervision and control of the community, and they will accept nothing which is uncalled for, or which shocks their idea of linguistic propriety. If you will discover a new force, like Galvani, you may give it a new name; but if you assume to christen over again electricity or heat, you will be laughed at for your pains. If you are the first finder of an asteroid, you have the

right to determine how the world of astronomers shall call it; only you must select the name of some paltry feminine object of Greek or Roman superstitions worship or mythologic story-telling; for that is the condition under which your freedom of choice is given; if you denominate the new planet "Washington" or "Lincoln," your authority in the matter will be taken from you. This is one reason why all linguistic change is gradual, and generally almost insensible while in progress; why it seems like the working out of general tendencies. Every change, proceeding first from an individual or from individuals, must make its way gradually through the community, and receive sanction as language by being made current in their use. Moreover, the growth of human knowledge and human circumstances, which are the main provocatives to change in speech, go on gradually; language, which is a thing of practical use, has only to keep up with them, and its duty is done. If a branch of science, or art, or handicraft, like geology or photography, grows up suddenly, in a brief space of time, its technical vocabulary grows as rapidly.

Thus language, like the steam-engine, is a work of the inventive powers of men, while, at the same time, it were as idle to talk of an individual having invented language as the steam-engine. The invention of this complicated structure may be said to have begun when, in the early ages of human history, men learned how to make and use fire. Another step was the devising of wheels; another, the discovery of the metals, and how to work them; and so the work went on, each acquisition and the practice of its use leading to another; till such mastery was obtained over materials, and such skill in the utilization and management of natural forces, that at last it was only one step more, and a step within the compass of one man's capacity, to convert steam into horse power. So the invention of language began with the existence of human beings, and every generation has borne a share in the work, adding thereto, curtailing, shaping, perfecting what it received from its predecessors. To set a man who had never learned to speak a tongue like ours to inventing one, would be equivalent to setting a Fijian or Fuegian, who never even made or saw a wheel, to inventing a locomotive.

We have now, we think, taken sufficient notice of the main facts of language to be enabled to form an intelligent opinion as to what it is. Analogy between it and the song of the bird or the growl of the bear there is none. Nature has given to the bear not only the disposition to make a noise when provoked, and the organs wherewith to do it, but also the precise tones which he shall use; and he cannot change them. No matter in what company Bruin is brought up, he will growl and snarl like his father. But the language of the human being depends solely upon the company in which he grows up, and not at all upon his parentage. It is easy to see what in man is to be compared with the utterances of the lower animals. Stir up the bear with a stick, and he will tell you, if you are skilled in bear-noises, of what family, and even of what species he is. Apply the same stick vigorously to a child, of whatever race, or tickle him with the end of it, and his cry or laugh will betray that he is a human being. But try to talk to him, and, unless you and he have been members of the same community, you can neither say what he shall understand, nor can he reply. Nature has given to man the need of speech, as the need of clothes and shelter; and organs to talk with, as well as hands for building houses and weaving and sewing cloth; and ingenuity to direct him in the one process as in the other two: and he makes his own language, as his own dwelling and dress. Language, clothing, and shelter, are almost equally characteristic of man, distinguishing him from all the inferior races of animals; only language is infinitely the most important possession, the most deeply grounded in our peculiar and superior endowments. We may sum up its value in a word, by saying that it makes us *social* beings; society, culture, progress, depend absolutely upon it.

The impulse to speak, then, and the capacity to speak, are parts of man's nature, wrought by the Creator's hand into his very being, and inseparable from it. But every human language is a work of man's own making, an instrument wrought out by him in the normal and natural exercise of powers with which he was divinely endowed. This is a view which we cannot avoid holding, whether we believe the historical beginnings of speech to have been, like the rest, made by man, or

to have been miraculously placed in his mouth at his creation. For, even supposing them the latter, they have been so developed, and extended, and overgrown by man's later action, that they are covered up and have disappeared untraceably in the products of this action; it matters little to our present purpose whether we allow nineteen-twentieths of his speech to have been man's free work, or claim for him the other twentieth also. In either case, a human language is an institution, as much so as any other body of usages which goes to make up the sum of acquired knowledge and culture. Every part of it is a historical product; made what it is, not by peculiarities of physical constitution, but by circumstances in the external and internal history of those who speak it; its totality represents the sum of knowledge, and of dexterity in the use thereof, to be found at any given time in the possession of the people that employs it; and it varies in content just as this varies in extent. Its study is a historical science, not a physical.

From the exposition thus given, it appears clearly what language does, and what it does not, prove respecting race. We neither produce nor inherit our native speech; we learn it, just as truly as, when grown up, we learn a foreign tongue; there is no difference in the two cases, save a difference of time and circumstance; our earliest knowledge is acquired, our first and firmest habits of thought and expression are fixed, along with the language we first master, and they exercise over our minds the control which such habits always possess; but no other. The untaught child among us will make the Chinese, the Choctaw, the Kamchatkan his "mother-tongue," just as readily as English. Our speech, then, does not show primarily and necessarily of what parentage we came, but of what community we grew up members. Those to the use of whose linguistic institution we were educated need not have been of our kith and kin. Not only may individuals, families, groups of families, of almost every race on earth, be, as at present in our country, turned into and absorbed by one great community, and made to adopt its speech, but a strange tongue may be learned by whole tribes and nations of those who, like our negroes, are carried away from their homes; or who, like the

population of Ireland, have lived long under a foreign yoke; or who, like the Celts of Gaul and Spain of old, have received laws, civilization, and religion from conquerors and colonists of a superior race (the Romans). Of the unnumbered and innumerable dialects which have disappeared from off the face of the earth, leaving no issue, but a part can have become extinct by the utter destruction of the individuals who had spoken them; it must more often have been by their dispersion and absorption into other communities, of other speech. Thus the Goths, who constituted a great nation during the early centuries of our era, with a literature of which important fragments have come down to us, became in the course of their wide wanderings and conquests so scattered and enfeebled that they lost at length their national existence, and their language has no living representative. Mixture of tongues, replacement of one by another, to a greater or less extent, are going on wherever upon the earth the confines of two forms of speech meet. But mixture of language is not necessary proof of mixture of race, as our own tongue clearly shows. We can trace the genesis of a very considerable part of our vocabulary to the banks of the Tiber, but no appreciable part of our ancestry is Latin. We obtained our Latin words in a strangely roundabout way: they were brought us by a tribe of Scandinavian adventurers, the Normans, who had learned them by a brief residence among a mixed people, the French, chiefly of Celtic blood; and these, again, had derived them from another heterogeneous compound of Italian races, among whom the Latin tribe was, numerically, but a feeble element.

Such are the drawbacks, of undeniable importance, to the force of linguistic evidence of race. They must be borne ever in mind by one who is pursuing investigations and laying down conclusions in linguistic ethnology. They drive him to seek for other tests of descent, which shall serve to check and control his own results; and they make him court and welcome the aid of the physicist, as well as of the archæologist and historian.

But, on the other hand, their consequence, and their power to invalidate linguistic evidence, must not be overrated. They concern, after all, what are exceptions to the general rule. It

still remains undeniably true that, upon the whole, language does indicate race. Those among whom one is born, of whom one learns to speak, are usually of one's own kindred. Nor do they place linguistic evidence at any marked disadvantage, as compared with physical. They are mainly the effect, on the side of language, of the grand fact which comes in to interfere with all ethnological investigations—that human races do not maintain themselves in purity, that men of different descent are all the time mingling and mixing. Fusion and replacement of languages are impossible, except as men of different native tongue are brought together in the same community; and, in that case, the resulting language is likely to be as faithful and intelligible a witness of the mixture as the resulting physical type. That the modern French people is made up of a congeries of Celtic, German, and Italian elements is to a certain extent—although it is only the aid of recorded history that enables us fully to interpret the evidence—testified by the considerable body of Celtic and Germanic words mixed with the Latin elements of the French language; but no physicist could ever have derived the like conclusion from a study of the French type of structure. It is true that, as we have seen to be the case with the Latin, the propagation of a language may greatly exceed that of the race to which it originally belonged. The Latin has swept away the primitive tongues of a great part of southern Europe, and has leavened the speech of all civilized nations, in the Old world and the New; but we are not to infer that such things have happened over and over again in the history of the world; it is only a superior culture, and the possession of a literature, that can give a tongue such extensibility. The Persians, the Mongols, have at periods exercised sway over an empire not less extensive than the Roman, but their languages never greatly surpassed their primitive bounds. The German tribes, too, conquered in succession nearly every kingdom in Europe; but it was only to lose themselves and their dialects almost undiscoverably in the communities and languages into which they entered. Nay, even the wide-spread Greek colonies, and the excellence of Greek culture, were not able to make the Greek the tongue of many nations. There was an organizing and assimilating force in the

Roman empire which the world has seen paralleled nowhere else. And, connected with culture and literature as such movements must be, they cannot but leave their witness in recorded history, and find there their explanation. Nor can there be anywhere such an inpouring and assimilation of nationalities as is going on among us, except under such circumstances as we present: the Tatars, the Yukagiris, the Fijians, the wild and uncultivated races of the earth generally, are simply maintaining their race by growth of generation from generation, taking in no immigrants, sending out no emigrants. Culture makes a wide difference in the linguistic history of those portions of mankind over which its influence is extended, and it would be the height of folly to transfer to barbarous races and periods conclusions drawn from the history of cultivated nations and tongues. The further we go back into the night of the past, the greater is the probability that the limits of race and of speech approximately coincide, and that mixture of either is accompanied by that of the other. And if a race may sometimes change its tongue, while yet retaining in its physical structure evidence of its descent, a race may also undergo a modification of physical type, and still offer in its speech plain indications of its real kindred. If the talk of our colored citizens does not show that they were brought from Africa, neither do the shape and bearing of the Magyars show that they came from beyond the Ural, nor those of the Osmanli Turks that their cousins are the nomads of the inhospitable plateau of central Asia. This is the grand drawback to the cogency of physical evidence of race, and it fully counterbalances those which affect the cogency of linguistic evidence, rendering the aid of the linguist as necessary to the physical ethnologist as is the latter's to the linguistic ethnologist. Physical science is as yet far from having determined the kind, the rate, and the amount of modification which external conditions, as climate and mode of life, can introduce into a race-type; but that, within certain undefined limits, their influence is very powerful, is fully acknowledged. There is, to be sure, a party among zoölogists and ethnologists who insist much upon the dogma of "fixity of type," and will have it that all animal species, and all human races, are original and underived; but the general tendency of

scientific opinion is in the other direction, toward the fuller admission of specific variability. The first naturalists are still, and more than ever, willing to admit that all the differences now existing among men may be the effects of variation from a single type, and that it is at least not necessary to resort to the hypothesis of different origins in order to explain them. In the fact that Egyptian monuments of more than three thousand years' antiquity show us human varieties, and canine varieties, bearing the same characteristics as at the present day, there is nothing to disturb this conclusion; for, on the one hand, a period of three thousand years is coming to be regarded as not including a very large part of man's existence on the earth; and, on the other hand, such a fact only proves the persistency which a type may possess when fully developed, and is of very doubtful avail to show the originality of the type. Something analogous with this is to be seen in language. The speech of our rude Germanic ancestry of the same remote period, had we authentic record of it, would, beyond question, be found to have possessed already a general character clearly identifying it with Germanic tongues still existing, and sharply sundering it from Greek, from Slavonic, from Celtic, and all the other Indo-European branches; yet we do not doubt that the Germanic type of speech is a derived, a secondary one. In settling all these controverted points, in distinguishing between original diversity and subsequent variation, in establishing a test and scale for the possibility and the rate of physical change, the physical ethnologist will need all the assistance which historical investigations of every kind can furnish him; but the greater part must come to him from the students of language.

The superior capacity of the remains of language to cast light upon the affinities of races in a host of instances needs only to be illustrated by an example or two. What could have impreguably established the ethnological position of the ancient Persians like the decipherment of the inscriptions of Darius and his successors, which prove that they spoke a dialect so nearly akin with those of Bactria and India that it can be read by the aid of the latter? What could exhibit the intimate mixture of races and cultures in the valley of the

Euphrates and Tigris, and the presence there of an important element which was neither Indo-European nor Semitic, except the trilingual inscriptions of the Mesopotamian monuments? What a pregnant fact in African ethnology will be, if fully and irrefragably proved, the relationship of the Hottentot dialects with the ancient Egyptian! What but the preserved fragments of their speech could have taught us that the Etruscans had no kindred with any of the other known races inhabiting Europe? And when would physical science ever have made the discovery that the same thing is true of the Basques, in the Pyrenees, whom yet it has had all the opportunity to study which it could desire?

It is unnecessary, however, to rehearse in detail instances in which the problems of ethnology are soluble only by the evidence of language. Others could doubtless be brought up, in which the advantage should seem to be upon the other side. In many respects, the merits and defects of the two kinds of evidence, linguistic and physical, are pretty evenly balanced. But there are others in which the testimony of language has a greatly superior practical value and availability. Thus, in the first place, as regards its clearness and openness to general apprehension. The differences of languages, their varying and peculiar characteristics, are upon a scale almost infinitely greater than those of human races. They are equal to those which prevail throughout the whole of the animal kingdom, from the lowest organisms to the highest, instead of being confined within the limits of the possible variation of a single species. Hence, they can be much more easily and accurately apprehended and judged. Linguistic testimony can be readily collected, laid down and described with authentic fidelity, and weighed coolly, with little risk of error from subjective misappreciation. It is accessible to a greater number of minds. Exceptional capacity, special opportunities, and a prolonged period of training, are needed to make the authoritative and reliable student of physical race-characteristics. How many of us, who, in nine cases out of ten, would recognize an Irishman at sight, could be trusted to make a faithful and telling description of the Irish type, such that, by its aid, a person not familiarized with the type by long experience could recognize

it upon meeting it? But the peculiarities of the native Irish tongue are capable of being made plain to the dulllest apprehension. A few pages or phrases, or even a few words, brought back by a traveler or sojourner in distant lands from some hitherto unknown people with whom he has made acquaintance, are likely to be of far greater avail for fixing their position in the human family than the most elaborate account he can give of their physical characteristics.

Again, individual peculiarities almost wholly disappear in speech. To separate that which is national and typical from that which is individual and accidental is one of the great difficulties of the physicist. Two persons may be readily culled from two very diverse races, who shall be less unlike than two others that may be chosen from the same race. But words and phrases taken down from the lips of a single man, or written or engraved by one hand, can be no individual possession, but are the property of a whole community.

The grand advantage, however, of linguistic evidence respecting races is, that it tells so much more about them than lies within the reach or scope of the physical inquirer. Every part and particle of language is instinct with history. Think of what is involved in the presence of the word *money* in our vocabulary!—not only the special circumstances which, as shown above, led to the use of the word in its Latin form and sense, but the extension of Roman empire and culture, the transfer through this means of Roman speech from land to land, and from people to people—the incursion and conquest of the Normans. Not that all this can be read in the word alone, without help from recorded history; were it so, we should need no historical documents but language, to illustrate all the fates and feats of man; but a great deal of such knowledge is to be won by studying the history of words. Taken in the least significant way, the mere presence of the word *money* in our speech, and its recognized Latin derivation, furnish an indication of the grade of our civilization, and a hint of the source whence it came. How many tongues in the world have no such word, because their speakers have no minted medium of exchange, and need speak of none! Language is an outward picture of the internal life of a commu-

nity; in it their capacities are exhibited, their characters expressed, even their outward circumstances reflected. Language, as being an institution, is itself an important test of national endowment, like political constitution and jural usages, like national art; it is the result of the collective sense and ingenuity of a people, directed immediately toward the production of a means of communication, never having consciously any other object in view than the satisfaction of the need of the moment, the expression of the conception which is pressing for utterance, but arriving thus unconsciously at the possession of a systematic and organized body of speech, the instrument and aid of thought, of reason, of intellectual and moral cultivation. Even where it fails to show strict ethnic descent, language shows race-history of another sort—the history of the sway which, by dint of superior prowess or superior civilization, certain races have gained over others. The spread of the Latin has swept away and obliterated some of the ancient landmarks of race, but its present ubiquity illustrates the unparalleled influence which Rome has exercised upon the condition and destinies of all mankind.

These considerations, it is believed, will guide us toward a correct understanding of the relation of linguistic study to ethnology, and of the comparative merits of the linguistic and physical methods of investigation. Discord between them, or question as to rank, there is, or should be, none. Both are legitimate and necessary modes of approaching the solution of the same intricate and difficult question, the origin and history of man on the earth—a question, as already remarked, of which we are only now beginning to understand the intricacy and difficulty, and which we are likely always to fall short of answering to even our tolerable satisfaction. Recorded history, with the help of linguistic, physical, and archæological study, takes us here and there, with a step not too firm and confident, back into the darkness of the past; where history fails us, the others undertake our guidance alone, the one throwing a brighter light here, the other there, yet all together furnishing but a faint illumination. Linguistic science already sees and acknowledges that she cannot cast even the dimmest ray back of the very beginning: the student of languages is compelled,

however unwillingly, to confess that, as to the unity or variety of the human race, he is not, and never can be, authorized to claim a right to decide; he can already say that, on the one hand, if the races of men are of different descent, languages could not be expected to be more diverse than they in fact are; and that, on the other hand, if all mankind are of one blood, their tongues need not be more alike than we actually find them. Whether physical science will not be finally brought to a like confession of incompetence, is at least very doubtful: as yet, its methods are in a far less developed condition, its conclusions less assured, than those of its sister branch of ethnological inquiry. But, whatever resources it may hereafter display, it cannot well be doubted that, in making out the ethnic story of the human race, the greater part must be borne by the study of language; this alone can convert what would otherwise be a barren classification into something like a true history.

ARTICLE III.—THE LATE INSURRECTION IN JAMAICA.

The West Indies, By Rev. Dr. UNDERHILL. London: 1862.

The Light and Shadows of Jamaica History. By Hon. RICHARD HILL. Kingston, Jamaica: 1859.

The Ordeal of Free Labor in the British West Indies. By W. G. SEWELL. New York: 1862.

The Present Crisis, and How to meet it. By Rev. Mr. PANTON. Jamaica: 1866.

Reflections on the Gordon Rebellion. By S. R. WARD. Jamaica: 1866.

Report of the Jamaica Royal Commission. London: 1866.

Jamaica Papers. Published by the Jamaica Committee. London: 1866.

Report of W. Morgan, Esq., on his Mission to Jamaica. 1866.

THE island of Jamaica is divided into three counties and thirty-two parishes. Each parish has a vestry and presiding officer, called the Custos. The vestry, which is composed of the leading men of the parish—members of the Established Church—perform certain ecclesiastical duties, and hold courts for the trial of minor civil and criminal causes. Petty officers of government, and volunteer companies of soldiers, are maintained in each parish, who are invariably colored men.

The parish of St. Thomas, in the east, was the seat of the disturbance of October, 1865. The most fertile and densely populated portion of this parish is the valley of the Plantain Garden River. Here are the richest lands and largest sugar estates, the smallest number of freeholders, and the most degraded population in the island. The Court House, a large stone building with a wooden roof, stood on one side of the market place at Morant Bay, on a river of that name, about thirty-two miles from Kingston.

In the autumn of 1865 writs of ejectment were served on squatters at Stony Gut, a village of blacks, a few miles from the Court House. Paul Bogle, a small freeholder, a black man of note in his little circle, and a minister of the native Baptist Church, determined to resist the officers. For this purpose he organized a small company of laborers from the neighboring estates, and officered them by freeholders. At a court held on Saturday, the seventh of October, some disturbance arose. A man was arrested, and subsequently rescued from the police, who were beaten, and forced to retreat. The following Monday the police went to arrest the rioters, but were again attacked and repulsed. Three of their number were made prisoners, and released upon taking the oath to "join their color, and cleave to the blacks." Threats were uttered by the rioters of their intention of going to the Bay to kill all the white men and all the blacks who would not join them. When the Custos, Baron Ketelhodt, heard of this, he ordered a volunteer company to be present at the vestry the following day, and sent to Governor Eyre for troops.

On the 11th of October the vestry assembled at the Court House, and proceeded with their regular business for several hours without interruption. Some of the members, anticipating no disturbance, had left for home, when, at three o'clock in the afternoon, an alarm was given that a crowd of negroes were coming. It was a mob of two or three hundred men, women, and children armed with clubs, stones, and machettes—an implement resembling a cutlass, and used in cutting canes. They approached the Court House and commenced an attack by throwing stones. The soldiers who were stationed around the building fired a volley and killed several persons, when the mob retreated, but seeing the troops defenseless rushed in and overpowered them before they could reload. The troops broke; a few retreated into the Court House—the rest were lost in the crowd. A fight then commenced, which lasted several hours. Suddenly a cry was heard, "Go and fetch fire! Burn the brutes out! If we don't we will not manage the volunteers and Buckra." A school-house near by was fired—the flames spread to the roof of the Court House. The inmates fled; one or two made their escape, but the greater portion

were overtaken by the mob, and brutally beaten until long after life was extinct. The next morning a crowd of negroes were gathered about the physician, Dr. Major, who was caring for their wounded, when an armed cutter, with 100 regulars from Kingston, appeared in sight. The terrified negroes fled, leaving the doctor the only man on the shore to receive the troops. Most of the negroes had returned to their homes, but some had fled eastward, where they were joined by others from the estates. They plundered the houses of planters, broke open stores, stole property of every description, drank all the rum they could find, and killed a few white planters who were especially hated by their laborers. The disturbance lasted three or four days, the rioters moving slowly eastward from Morant Bay to Elmwood, a distance of thirty miles. They did not spread westward, but confined their fury to the sugar estates on and near the Plantain Garden River District. Not a woman or child was injured, nor a single house burned. The same day Governor Eyre received information of the massacre. He immediately ordered troops by water to Port Antonio, and sent others across the mountains to hem in the insurgents at the various gaps and passes. These movements were well planned and promptly executed. No resistance was anywhere offered to the soldiers. The frightened multitude fled at their approach: yet, as soon as the troops arrived at their several stations, they commenced indiscriminately whipping and killing men and women, burning houses, ravaging the country, sometimes under the direction of courts martial, often without. The inhabitants of the island, colored as well as white, terrified lest the insurrection should spread over the island, urged on the soldiers in their work of destruction until their barbarity and inhumanity exceeded that of the negro mob. Governor Eyre, though he had no direct control over the troops, advised their movements, and knew and approved of their operations. The cooler judgment of those removed from the scene of action is that the soldiers and police, with such aid as would have been rendered, could have repressed the revolt, arrested the ringleaders, and delivered them to the proper tribunal for trial and punishment. The execution of justice by the ordinary civil tribunals would have made a more powerful impression on the negro than the inhuman treatment he received, and the cruelties he witness-

ed, betraying as they did the terror of the white man.* But this is not the view of the people of Jamaica, either then or now.

* A stranger, unacquainted with life in Jamaica, does not appreciate the immense disproportion of the white to the black population;—the distance which separates one family from another, and the insufficiency of the military force for their protection. He cannot understand the terror which made the people think measures prompt and energetic, which were only cruel and barbarous. The writer of this Article rode with his party for some weeks daily among the St. Andrews mountains, only three or four months after the insurrection. The women and children watched for our coming, and at the first sound of approaching horses rushed to the roadside to exchange a pleasant greeting. "Good day, massa! Good morning, sweet missus," were their salutations, while they dropped at the same time a short, quick, spasmodic little courtesy, and looked up with glad faces, and a brilliant display of ivories. We traveled through the mountains of Port Royal, and the high lands of St. Ann's. Here we missed the welcome of familiar faces, though our greeting was always cordially and cheerfully answered. We entered the houses, begged a drink of cocoanut water, or a sweet orange, inquired into the mysteries of cassava bread making; and examined into the simple and homely domestic arrangements. So on leaving Kingston for Morant Bay, and driving along the sea-coast, we noticed no especial difference in the appearance of the people until we crossed the Yallahs, a river a few miles west of the Morant. Here we were struck at once by the scowling face, the sullen, averted look, or the angry, defiant gaze of the women; we realized that we were among those who had suffered bitter wrongs, who had neither forgotten nor forgiven injustice and cruelty, and whose muttered words seemed to threaten vengeance on every white man and woman. We visited also the houses of the planters in the neighborhood which had been pillaged by a furious mob, and to which the owners had just dared to return. We saw marks of the machette on the windows, walls, and furniture. We heard accounts from the planters of their escape in the darkness, while the yells and shouts of the savages sounded but a few yards from their flying foot-steps;—of mothers, with young infants and sick children, spending days and nights in the bush, in heavy rains, without food, not knowing where to seek for shelter. We spent several days with one who was himself in the Court House at the time of the attack and massacre, and whose life was spared because he was a surgeon and physician, and the blacks had need of him. The horrors of that scene, and the terrors of the few succeeding days we would not repeat if we could. It is sufficient that we hardly needed the warning not to drive out far after dark, and certainly, as we recrossed the Yallahs, it was with a feeling of relief and satisfaction that made us somewhat appreciate the feelings of fathers, mothers, and children flying in scattered groups for their lives but a few months before. We would not be understood to approve the measures used in quelling the insurrection. Nothing but the wildest terror can explain the wholesale and indiscriminate hanging and shooting. No wonder that we feared these dark, revengeful faces. No wonder that the memory of houses burned, husbands and sons murdered, and wives and daughters cruelly whipped, should still rankle in their hearts, and look out of their eyes. Their huts have been rebuilt, but in their midst are the graves into which hundreds of their kindred were thrown, heaped high by the whites as a warning to them and their descendants.

THE CASE OF GEORGE W. GORDON.

George W. Gordon, whose trial and execution excite so much interest in this country and in England, was a colored man,—his father a Scotchman, overseer of an estate in the times of slavery, his mother a colored woman. He had a good education, considerable ability, but was a demagogue and reformer by nature. He was a Justice of the Peace and member of the vestry of St. Thomas. Two or three years ago he urged upon that body the amelioration of the condition of the poor and prisoners of the parish, but without success; his appeal to the Governor was rejected, and he himself removed from office. He then carried his complaint to the Colonial Secretary of England, where it was sustained, and the needed change ordered, but he was not reinstated in his offices.* He owned several estates, one in the Plantain Garden River District, but was insolvent for a very large amount, "his admitted liabilities being over £35,000." He was a member of the Assembly, and belonged to the Native Baptist Church; preached frequently in their meeting-houses, harangued the negroes on political subjects, and by this course rendered himself unpopular with the whites. His counting room was in Kingston, the only place in the county which was not under martial law. He was believed to have instigated the rebellion, but after he heard of this charge, though urged by his friends to escape, surrendered himself to Governor Eyre. On Friday, nine days after the massacre, and when the rebellion was entirely suppressed, he was sent to Morant Bay,—tried on Saturday and hung on

* The feelings that existed between Gordon and Governor Eyre may be understood by the following note from the *Daily News* of Sept. 8th:—

"St. Andrews, Oct. 8th, 1864.

"On the last occasion, Mr. G. W. Gordon replied, declining the invitation of His Excellency, then Lieut.-Governor. Mr. Gordon did not expect to be further troubled. The Governor must remember that he untruthfully charged Mr. G. W. Gordon with being guilty of willful and deliberate misrepresentation, which charge has never been purged. Does His Excellency think Mr. Gordon is so mean spirited as ever to eat with a man who has thus acted towards him, without having first obtained an explanation. Mr. Gordon considers his invitation for dinner to be a breach of the conventional rules of good society, and he therefore declines it."

Monday. The Court Martial consisted of two second lieutenants in the navy, and an ensign of the army. His counsel was denied access to him, and a letter of advice, written by his counsel, was detained by the General in command. The evidence introduced was entirely insufficient to have convicted him before any civil or military tribunal—it was hardly sufficient to justify his apprehension for trial; but his death was deemed necessary to strike terror into the negro, and give confidence to the white man. It was shown on his trial that he had a lawsuit with the Custos, with whom he was not on friendly terms. That he invariably attended the vestry-meetings—the one at which the riot occurred being the only one from which he had been absent. Gordon excused his absence on the ground of sickness, and referred to his physician; but Dr. Major was “not at the time either in Court, nor on the Bay,” and was not summoned. Conflicting evidence was offered as to his speeches made at public meetings called to petition the Queen for a redress of the wrongs of the negro, held several months before. The Commission have found “that the evidence, oral and documentary, was wholly insufficient to establish the charges upon which the prisoner took his trial,” and that “there was not any sufficient proof either of his complicity in the outbreak at Morant Bay, or of his having been a party to a general conspiracy against the government.” The Commission also find the evidence “decisive as to the existence of such a conspiracy.” Governor Eyre, General O’Connor, and General Nelson knew and approved of the trial and execution. Notwithstanding this, however, the general belief in Jamaica, of both friends and enemies of Gordon, is that he was cognizant of an intended outbreak.

As soon as news of the insurrection was received in England, deputations from The Friends, and the Jamaica Committee, and a Royal Commission appointed by the Queen were sent to Jamaica “to make full and impartial inquiry into the origin, nature, and circumstances of the disturbances, and with respect to the measures adopted in the course of their suppression.”

They have returned and made their reports. The Ministry have mildly censured Governor Eyre and removed him from office. The Jamaica Committee have instituted legal proceed-

ings against him for murder; large sums have been contributed both for the prosecution of the trial and the defense of Governor Eyre. On the one side are John Stuart Mill, Mr. Bright—and those who supported us in our struggle with slavery; on the other—Carlyle, Tennyson, Kingsley, Ruskin, and our opponents in the war. The Secretaries of the past and present English Ministry take no active part, though sympathizing strongly with the accused.

Governor Eyre stands charged with murder, but it must be confessed that he acted not on his own responsibility, but in his entire course followed the advice of the Executive Council of the Island, and the proceedings were known and approved, with very few exceptions, by both the white and colored population, and ratified by the Assembly. His acts were but the expression of the public feeling of the ruling class in Jamaica—the summing up of long years of injustice and cruelty, against which the blacks at last arose in rebellion and insurrection.

SLAVERY IN JAMAICA

The Jamaica slaves were overworked and cruelly treated. Statistics show that for many years prior to the abolition of the slave trade, in 1807, nine thousand slaves were annually imported to repair the waste of human life: while, since emancipation, the freedmen have rapidly increased. The laws prohibited the spiritual and mental education of the slaves. The Sabbath was the market day and a holiday. Marriage was forbidden. Each slave had his little patch of ground, for the cultivation of which he was allowed every other Saturday, and from which he was obliged to derive his entire support. He received two suits of clothes a year, and medical attendance in sickness.

uring the time of slavery the English government, by a heavy differential duty imposed upon foreign sugars and coffee, protected the products of Jamaica, and gave them the monopoly of the English market; but, a few years after emancipation, finding that these could be raised at less cost by slave than by free labor, she changed her policy to one of free trade. The discriminating duty in favor of sugar, the product of free labor, was gradually reduced until all sugars paid the

same duty. The price was consequently reduced one-half to the English consumer, and the profits of the planter were greatly diminished. But even before this change Jamaica had begun to decline. The abolition of the slave trade had cut off her supply of laborers; her rich lands were exhausted; her exports steadily decreased; her laboring population was wasting away; many plantations were abandoned; and the whole Island was heavily mortgaged to English creditors.

Then came the act of emancipation with its apprenticeship system, intended as a preparation for freedom and the giving of full liberty to the apprentice.

In the act of emancipation the rights of the planter to property in his slave was recognized, and £6,000,000 were paid for three hundred and eleven thousand slaves, or nineteen pounds for each slave,—not half their market value. The greater part of this sum was retained in England in payment of debts, and the Jamaica planter was left without laborers, with impoverished lands, with diminished profits, and estates encumbered to their full value. The slaves were freed in opposition to the wishes of their masters, who strove by every means in their power to retain them in a state of bondage. By the act of emancipation the hours of labor were limited to eight a day; but the planters required of the freedmen the same amount of work as that exacted of the slave in fifteen hours, and offered him only half the price paid for a hired slave. Such a course produced great dissatisfaction, and the negroes refused to work. In order to force them to work on the planters' own terms, a series of laws was passed, many of them most severe and cruel. Among them was the Ejectment act, by which planters could eject the negroes at a weeks' notice from the homes in which they had been born, root up their provision grounds, and cut down their fruit trees, and a police law under which they might be arrested for trespass if they remained an hour after the expiration of the weeks' notice; a heavy stamp duty upon the transfer of small parcels of land; an import duty on corn food, largely used by the slaves, which was raised from three pence to three shillings a barrel; an increased duty upon shingles for their huts, while on staves and hoops for sugar hogsheads it was reduced; a discriminating tax imposed on sugar and coffee unfavorable to

the small negro grower and favorable to the large producer ; a law requiring a license from the vestry to sell these articles at retail, while no license was required for selling at wholesale ; and others of a similar character, some of which were so barbarous that they were disallowed by parliament.

Many of the freedmen returned for a while to work, but the ill-treatment received caused them again to leave the estates and squat upon abandoned plantations. The planters refused to sell or lease the land except at exorbitant prices, and it is only as estates have been thrown into market by creditors and sold in small parcels, that the negroes have been able to purchase the little plats which they now cultivate all over the Island.

RELIGION.

The established Church is maintained at a great expense, \$160,000 a year being appropriated for its support. This is divided among Bishops, Arch-Deacons, Rectors, and Curates, the lowest salary amounting to \$1,700 a year—and this while the daily wages of their congregations do not average over twenty cents! There are churches of other denominations throughout the Island ; the Baptists predominating. For many years after emancipation, great efforts were made by the English Missionary Societies for the evangelization of the negroes. For a while the work seemed to prosper—churches were built and money contributed ; as the societies became self-supporting, foreign help was withdrawn—but of late years the attendance has greatly fallen off and contributions have diminished. In many parts the Baptist Churches are under the care of native preachers, who are often men of bad immoral character, or, at best, but blind leaders of the blind. Revivals, as they are called, were of frequent occurrence, the negroes resorting in large numbers to some station and holding a series of gatherings somewhat of the nature of Camp Meetings. Good results apparently followed, and many were added to the church, but as the control of the Missionary was withdrawn, and his influence lessened, the charge of these meetings passed into lay hands. The negroes remained, at times for weeks together, listening to the preaching, and praying, singing, dancing,

stealing the crops from far and near, and only dispersing when there was nothing left to steal. There is probably no Protestant state of the same population with more preachers or so large a proportion of church members, and yet ignorance, lying, thieving, and immorality prevail to an alarming extent. It is not that gospel truth is inadequate, but it is the manner in which the truth is proclaimed that is at fault. A belief in Obeahism, brought by the slaves from Africa, is on the increase. The Governor, in a message to the Assembly in 1858, said, "In many of the country districts the people are abandoned to the spells and debasing influences of Obeahism and Myalism." Charms are frequently attached to cabins and churches to protect them from the evil influences of the Obeah; and pulpits of the native Baptist churches have been removed to search underneath for the Obeah, who was supposed to have checked the progress of the revival.

The Obeah man was believed to be invulnerable. To show the absurdity of this belief, Col. Hobbs of the British army, during the insurrection, ordered an Obeah man to be set up as a mark upon a hill, and a volley to be fired at him from an opposite height. The commission report that "he was visible from the surrounding heights, where many of the natives were concealed," and add, "the effect was very good."

EDUCATION.

No system of education has ever been adopted. Immediately after emancipation, the freedmen were eager to learn. Schoolhouses were built and well filled, and the friends of the negro in England were full of hope for the future. But it was only for a time. The teachers were generally ignorant, and the children, though learning quickly, forgot as readily.

The present condition of the schools is shown by the report of the inspector for 1864. One-sixth of the children attend school, \$16,000 a year being appropriated by the government for their support, or about fifteen cents for each child. "Most of the teachers never entertained the idea of intellectual culture, or of training the minds of their pupils. Two-thirds of

these teachers have never received the slightest preparation for their work, and are totally incompetent to discharge aright the duties committed to them. The teachers are generally colored, and are often of bad character."

SOCIAL LIFE OF THE NEGRO.

The negro buys, hires, or squats upon a parcel of ground, of three or four acres, near a running stream, builds a thatched hut of one, two, or three rooms, usually with no floor but the earth, and without windows or chimney. The furniture corresponds to the house. Dr. Underhill estimates the average value of house and furniture at \$80, but this estimate is considered much too high. The little plot of ground yields all he needs for food, and the surplus borne on the heads of the women to market, or a few days' work on a neighboring plantation, supplies his scanty clothing. Marriage is still the exception—probably less than half of the children are born in wedlock. Petty thefts are so common and annoying, that few gentlemen attempt to raise fruits, vegetables, or poultry, for their own tables, but are limited to the few articles which they purchase of the negro. Crimes of a greater magnitude are rare. The laws of Jamaica give the negro, with few exceptions, the right of voting, and of being elected to the highest offices in the state, but the negro has been too ignorant to value this franchise, and Gov. Eyre reports that "representation exists only in name, for the whole forty-seven members of the Assembly were returned by one thousand four hundred and fifty-seven votes, out of a population of 436,000." If colored members were elected, they were generally the lowest demagogues, who purchased their seats by bribery, and used them only for their own advantage and that of the upper classes. Unlimited suffrage has proved a failure in Jamaica. It has raised only the most depraved to places of trust. Mr. Morgan, an eminent solicitor of Birmingham, one of the deputation sent by the Baptist Missionary Society to Jamaica, and a strong friend of the negro, "deplores the jobbery which has made it necessary to destroy the oldest of the representative systems of government, except England."

DIFFERENT CLASSES OF NEGROES.

1st. Those working regularly on the estates, living and depending on them for support.

2d. Those having no regular employment.

3d. Those who own and live upon their small farms.

The first class is found only in those portions of the islands where sugar estates are still worked—they live to a great extent in barracks, men and women herding together. They are extremely ignorant and degraded, retaining the vices of slavery, without gaining the virtues of freedom.

The second class have thrown off their dependence on the estates, but are more lazy than either of the other classes—not being obliged to work with the first, nor stimulated to labor with the third; owning no land, they are shiftless and improvident, and paying their rent irregularly or not at all, they are forced to wander from place to place, working occasionally, and stealing when too lazy to work. They are a curse to the land, and dangerous alike to white and black. Unless this system of petty thieving can be checked, the industrious will be discouraged, and idleness and profligacy must increase.

The third class are the most numerous—nearly three-quarters of the whole black population. Their small farms are scattered all over the island, excepting among the large sugar estates. They raise a little sugar, coffee, and pimento, and own many small sugar mills. Their cabins are more comfortable, the marriage relation is more respected, thefts and petty vices are less frequent, they wish to educate their children, and have some desire to improve their condition in life. They are the small farmers, and upon their elevation the island must depend for its future wealth and prosperity. They have elevated themselves in spite of unfavorable laws and influences, receiving aid from the Baptist, Wesleyan, and Moravian Missionaries, many of whom have labored with great fidelity and devotion for the welfare of the people.

The first class, we have said, live upon the sugar estates. These estates are managed by attorneys or overseers for absentee proprietors. The laborers are overworked and ill

paid—the wages are often withheld, or paid but in part, large deductions being made for alleged unfaithfulness. If the negro appeals to the court for justice, the judges themselves are planters or overseers, and may in the next case change places with the defendant. The Royal Commission reports that “these courts are additional incentives to the violation of the law from the want of confidence felt in them.” It was on these estates that the insurrection commenced and spread, and it was these men and women, degraded and brutalized by neglect and oppression, whose savage nature broke out into acts of violence, plunder, and bloodshed.

In 1861, there were 13,816 whites, 346,374 blacks, 81,074 colored; total, 441,261, i. e., thirty-two blacks to every white. The influence of the whites upon the blacks has consequently been small, and they are far inferior to the negroes of our Southern States. The blacks are envious of the colored people, and the colored people of the whites.

The colored population steadily increased even while the blacks and whites were diminishing. Many of the offices of government and of the judiciary are filled by them, they are heard in the pulpit and at the bar, are consulted as physicians and surgeons. Among the most celebrated and talented men of Jamaica are the Hon. Richard Hill; Hon. P. Moncrief, Judge of the highest Court; Hon. E. Jordan, C. B., Governor's Secretary and Mayor of Kingston; Hon. A. Hyslop, Attorney-General and Member of the Executive Council; and Dr. Scott, of the Royal College of Surgeons, Edinburg; all of whom are colored gentlemen. In many families of the highest respectability the master of the house is white, the wife colored, and many of the colored ladies are highly accomplished and fitted to adorn any station.

CAUSES OF THE INSURRECTION.

Four or five years ago a general revival occurred during the planting season. The educated and pious ministers refused to attend and advised the members of their churches not to be present. Many, therefore, left the church, and gave themselves up for weeks together to the religious excitement. The cultivation of the field was abandoned; and a long drought occurring just at that time, want and distress were the result.

At the same time the attention of the negroes was called to the oppression under which they suffered by a series of what were called "Underhill Meetings." In 1865, Dr. Underhill had addressed a letter to the Colonial Secretary of Great Britain, in which he had set forth the grievances of the negro. This letter was sent back to Gov. Eyre, and by him copies were forwarded to the Custodes of the various parishes. Wherever this letter was read and discussed at the different vestry meetings by the planters assembled, Dr. Underhill's statements were denied, or if the sufferings of the negro were admitted, they were attributed solely to his laziness and his refusal to work for wages. In St. Ann's the people sent a petition to the "Missus Queen" herself, complaining of their wrongs, and asking redress. In reply they were counseled to industry, to submission to the planters, and loyalty to the government. This answer was read with comments from the pulpits, and printed and posted generally throughout the parish. Such being the only results of the efforts made to obtain redress, meetings were called by Mr. Gordon and others, who espoused the cause of the blacks, to consider this answer and advice. These meetings were attended by excited crowds who had never been taught to respect the laws, and a strong feeling of discontent and disregard of authority manifested itself and gradually grew. In such a state of excitement and disaffection, it needed but a spark to kindle a general insurrection. That spark was the attempt to eject negroes from lands upon which they had squatted; but the injustice of the laws, the insufficiency and inefficiency of all efforts to educate and christianize the blacks, and the spirit of distrust and hatred existing between employer and employed, had long been preparing the people for this final outbreak.

The whites knowing the deep grievances of the negro, his secretive disposition, his excitable and impulsive nature, the fewness of their own number, and their defenseless condition, might well fear a general uprising and massacre, which only the most prompt and efficient measures could hope to check. In such peril, cowardice was mistaken for boldness, cruelty for bravery, and revenge for justice.

The act of emancipation was fatally defective towards the

slaves, in nominally [freeing them, but leaving them, without protection, to the care of their former masters. The English Government has made but little inquiry into the affairs of the island—has refused to receive petitions from the negroes, or referred the petitioners for justice to the very persons of whose injustice they complained.

The Established Church, with large funds at its disposal, and eighty ministers, has accomplished but little in the christianizing of the people. Some of its ministers are at the same time planters, and against them the fury and hatred of the mob were especially directed. The native Baptist Church furnished the leaders and inciters of the insurrection.

Jamaica, the Queen of the Antilles, is about 140 miles long by 40 broad. For richness of soil, for beauty of scenery, for the agreeable temperature of its climate, and the healthfulness of most parts of the island, it is unsurpassed. It produces readily almost every product of the torrid and temperate zones, it yields two crops a year of most of our annual plants, and many of its trees bear at the same time the bud, blossom, and ripe fruit. Manure is never used, and some of the sugar and coffee plantations have for over a hundred years annually yielded their crops without any return to the soil.

Yet, with all these advantages, Jamaica abounds with "ruinate estates" and abandoned "great houses." Her exports have decreased four-fifths, her white population is diminishing, theft and other crimes increasing, attendance on church and school falling off, the superstitious and idolatrous practices of Africa spreading, and "poor Jamaica" seems given up by her discouraged inhabitants to utter ruin. A ray of hope comes to them now in the change of government, which has just been instituted. The Assembly, the originator of the unjust laws, which were injurious alike to white and black, soon after the insurrection, by an act of political suicide, surrendered their powers and charter to the British Government. This surrender was accepted by Parliament, and Jamaica is now a Crown Colony, with a Governor and Council appointed by the Queen, who have almost despotic power, subject only to appeal to the Colonial Secretary and Parliament. The new Governor, Sir J. Grant, who has just arrived in the Island, and

taken the reins of government, has a difficult task to perform, but if he is successful, Jamaica will again become the seat of wealth and power.

It is now about thirty years since the British Government abolished slavery throughout its dominions. Of the 700,000 slaves then enfranchised, more than one-half were owned in Jamaica. The most of those who were in bondage have passed away, and a new generation has grown up. Sufficient time has therefore elapsed to enable us to form a just estimate of the effects of emancipation on the various classes of inhabitants, and on the industry and commerce of the island.

Many honest observers have given their views on the subject, who differ as widely as their points of observation and the characteristics of their minds. Captain Hunt, a prominent member of the Anthropological Society of London, sees in the freedman of Jamaica a proof of the impossibility of educating and elevating the race. Mr. Sewell of New York, who visited the island in 1859, though not taking the extreme view of Captain Hunt, reports the negro as hopelessly lazy, and that licentiousness, theft, lying, and drunkenness everywhere prevail.

On the other hand, Dr. Underhill, of the Baptist Missionary Society, who visited the island two years later, regards the present condition of the negro as satisfactory, evidence of his capacity to rise morally, mentally, and physically. Mr. Morgan, the "Friends," and the writers in the Anti-Slavery Society Reporter of London, strongly corroborate his views. This testimony, which at first sight seems so conflicting, may perhaps on examination be reconciled. Captain Hunt and Mr. Sewell look only at the present condition of the negro, forgetting his antecedents and the state of extreme degradation from which he has risen. Dr. Underhill not only recalls his past history, his sufferings in bondage, but shows that, without aid or help from the white man, and in spite of oppression and injustice, the freedmen have struggled to a point which is low enough indeed, but one which is far above the condition of the slave.

"Poor Jamaica!" Her island princes are ruined, her "great houses" are deserted, her immense estates are broken up, her exports are greatly diminished, her warehouses are vacant. The descendants of those who rode through her streets, their

horses shod with silver, walk through the land in poverty. Many of her largest "sugar works" are abandoned, and the busy slave is superseded by the idle vagabond!

But there is another side to the picture. The immense estates are broken up, but little farms are cultivated by free-men; the great houses are abandoned, but the slave barracks, where men and women herded together, have given place to thatched cottages, which husband and wife and children call home. The exports of sugar and coffee grown by rich planters are diminished, but many a little mill worked by hand turns out its hoghead of sugar;—and many a barrel of coffee, with baskets of oranges and bananas, and bags of cocoa gathered by wife and children, find their way to market. The imports for home consumption too are increased. Where once large cargoes of corn meal, the principal food of the slave, were imported, ship loads of salt fish, butter, lard, gay cottons and woollens, and "yankee notions," are eagerly purchased by negro customers. Where, in times of slavery, the Sabbath was the legal market day, and all religious teaching forbidden, now are gathered large congregations, attentive, interested, and well dressed.

We do not deny the laziness and profligacy of the negro, but we believe that other influences may stimulate him to industry and virtue besides the lash and branding iron. We do not deny his propensity to lie and steal, but consider these rather as faults common to our fallen humanity, unchecked by religious teaching, and encouraged by fear and cruelty. Slavery and not emancipation is responsible for the present degraded condition of the negro; while to the negro himself, and the faithful efforts of the missionary, belong the credit of his improvement and his efforts for further advancement.

The ruin of Jamaica has been caused not by the freeing of the slave, but by the efforts on the part of the planter to retain the freedmen in ignorance and servitude, to withhold the rights and privileges of freedom, and the neglect on the part of the government to protect and support the freedmen in their rights. The history of Jamaica plainly teaches that the slaveholder is not a safe custodian of the rights of freedmen.

ARTICLE IV.—UNITED STATES SANITARY COMMISSION.

History of the United States Sanitary Commission; being the General Report of its work during the war of the Rebellion. By CHARLES J. STILLE. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1866. 8vo. pp. 553.

IN the early period of the war for our national life, before the struggle had reached the crisis of sacrifice and of determination, and we may add before we had been called to the deepest discouragement and the darkest gloom, a timely pamphlet was issued by the author of this volume, entitled "How a free people conduct a long war." It was not only one of the most timely, but also one of the most useful of the multitude of tracts and essays, discourses, reports, and speeches which the war occasioned. It was instructive, inasmuch as it brought to mind from the researches of a student of history a series of facts not over old indeed, but still not freshly remembered, which occurred during the campaigns of England in Spain under Wellington. These facts were altogether fitted to encourage our people under the many reverses which they had not then learned patiently to endure, and to school their patience for those more trying and disastrous calamities which were still in reserve for them. The source from which it came gave it some importance, as it signified that a cultivated scholar, a man also of elegant pursuits and retired leisure, was not indifferent to the stern struggle to which the loyal men of the nation had been compelled to arouse themselves, and that the circles with which he was connected, and others like them, many of which, till then, had seemed to stand aloof from any hearty commitment to the good cause, were beginning to be stirred by the mighty movement which was destined to convulse the whole nation in agony for its life. The elegance and simplicity of the diction, the fullness of the knowledge, the aptness of the illustrations, the coolness and

candor of the reasoning, and the steady courage with which the writer dared to forebode additional reverses, disasters, and disgrace before victories, triumphs, and final glory, elevated this brief essay quite above the rank and place of ordinary political or popular pamphlets. It soon attracted attention, and the modest author was surprised to find himself famous, and to learn that an essay, prepared for a private circle of literary friends, and given to the public at their importunate solicitation, was read with avidity by thoughtful men everywhere, and was stimulating the courage as well as animating the hopes of loyal hearts all over the country. The first pamphlet of Mr. Stillé deserves to be remembered in the history of the war, as well for the excellent and timely service it rendered, as for the example which it furnished for other scholarly men to serve their country with their pens. Among all these writers we may say that, in one sense at least, Mr. Stillé was *facile princeps*.

Now that the war is finished it has been both his duty and his pleasure to write in another way and at greater length, how a free people can conduct a long war, not merely by the use of the ordinary appliances of struggle and endurance, but by extraordinary measures and arrangements such as were befitting the extraordinary conflict in which they were called to engage. It was befitting that the writer who so early in the conflict employed his pen to inspire the courage and to strengthen the patience of the American people for the struggle to which they were called, should celebrate the triumphs of its close by writing "an account of the practical working of the most successful method of mitigating the horrors of war known in history." For this service he was fitted, not alone, nor chiefly for the reasons already suggested, but also by his earnest and active interest in every enterprise that was required for the aid of the government, and most of all by his connection with the Sanitary Commission itself. He was elected a member January 15, 1864, the latest but one of all who belonged to it. The Commission was constituted June 9th, 1861. All that was characteristic in the principles of its organization, and important in the methods of its working, had been devised and tested before he was connected with the association. The days

of its sharpest trials and its most signal triumphs had gone by when he was admitted to its counsels. His connection with it gave him all the advantages of the most intimate knowledge of its aims and its achievements, without laying him open to the charge of extolling measures which he had himself originated, or defending a system for which he was directly responsible. It gave him the position of a friend who is admitted to the most confidential relations with the party whose cause he is to expound, without disqualifying him from acting the part of a critic and judge, so far as he is in honesty summoned to the duty of impartial censorship.

Two principal reasons are given in the preface why the Sanitary Commission was induced to prepare a formal history of its growth and achievements. One was the natural and worthy desire which was sanctioned by duty to render deserved honor, first of all, to the countless and nameless men and women among the American people who sustained this society by the vital breath of their ardent benevolence and their enthusiastic sympathy, as well as to the individuals who were conspicuous in its manifold positions of sacrifice and duty. The other was that the men of other countries and other times might be furnished with an instructive and encouraging example of what may be done to alleviate the horrors of war, as well as to supplement and render more efficient the agencies which every civilized government may be expected to provide. Both these reasons are good. Among the many remarkable features of this most remarkable war, none is more unique than the rapid growth, the gigantic stature, and the hundred-armed service of this organization. To allow it to pass out of existence without some testimonial in its honor would have been indecorous and ungrateful, not only to the noble souls who gave it being and sustained its life, but to the kind and considerate Providence of Him from "whom all good counsels and all just works do proceed." To allow its instructive lessons for the future to be lost would have involved unfaithfulness to the duty which we owe to our fellow-men, whether of this or another generation.

The plan of the Commission contemplated the preparation of three distinct parts, as follows:—*First*: A General History

of the Commission's origin, purposes, and methods of operation. *Second:* A Narrative of its Special Relief Service. *Third:* An Account of the organization and practical working of its supply system. To Mr. Stillé was assigned the duty of preparing the general history, and this history is "published by the Commission as the official report of its operations during the war." It will be understood that the opinions expressed are not merely the opinions of the writer, which may be supposed to have been derived indirectly from, and in part sanctioned by his associates, but that they are deliberately uttered and expressly authorized by all his colleagues. The responsibility for the opinions themselves, whenever their correctness may be questioned, as also for the expression of them whenever the wisdom or propriety of so doing may be discussed, rests not alone with the author of this volume, but with the Commission, whose organ and reporter he has consented to become. Three chapters of this work were contributed by officers of the association. The chapter on "Contributions from California and the Pacific Coast" was prepared by Rev. Dr. Bellows, its President; that on its "Financial System and History" by Mr. George T. Strong, the Treasurer; and that on its "Bureau of Vital Statistics" by Dr. B. A. Gould, its Actuary. The remaining sixteen chapters were written by Mr. Stillé. They are all worthy of his pen. The style is uniformly clear, copious, and natural; rising into requisite animation, and even glowing eloquence whenever the occasion requires, but never departing from the dignity and taste which seem native to his mind. The excellent English in which this report is written is not however its most meritorious feature, however rare such a feature may be, and however great the charm which it will lend to the driest narrative, and the barest detail of uninteresting facts. Those however who might naturally expect or fear to find in this volume nothing but such a narrative or detail, will be happily surprised to find in the first page, and even in the first sentence, the promise that the facts of this report will be treated in the spirit of an enlarged and humane philosophy. In the first few pages which the author writes he shows not only that he fully appreciates the office and teachings of history, but that he does justice to the peculiar characteristics of

our late war, as more completely sustained and directed by popular sentiment, than any war which had previously been waged. This circumstance, as he well observes, seemed to require the interposition of popular sympathy and benevolence upon a scale which had never before been possible. From the starting point furnished by these comprehensive principles, he proceeds to show by what steps this popular enthusiasm was conducted to organize and sustain the Sanitary Commission. Such an organization he recognizes to be distinctively American. No other people than the American people would have undertaken such an enterprise as this, and no other government than the American would have allowed an organization like this to attain to such gigantic proportions, or to exercise so many of the functions which, in other countries, are reserved to the organs of the government alone. The author observes very justly that the war was not only maintained by unprecedented popular enthusiasm, but that it was also "a war, the origin, progress, and methods of which were all peculiar in this, that they were all modified and controlled by the great popular ideas which lie at the basis of American civilization."

The expectations awakened by these evidences of a sagacious insight into the spirit and essential character of this organization are fulfilled in the subsequent treatment which the author gives to his theme. Every part of his report, even the narration of facts and the detail of statistics, is elevated and made instructive by thoroughly philosophical aims and by an enlightened comprehensiveness of all the bearings of the theme. It is professedly a report of facts, a narrative of events, a recital of actual occurrences, a history of actual sufferings and of pressing wants, as well as of efficient and timely relief and abundant and grateful supply; but the history of all these is so arranged and methodized as to make a strong impression of the necessity of the organization, and of the practicability of its workings. In this way it furnishes a convincing argument for the wisdom of the plan upon which it was organized and administered, as well as for the reasonableness of the intense enthusiasm and the enormous contributions which it elicited in its support. It also furnishes a sufficient answer to the very natural inquiries whether such organizations are practicable in

every war in which a civilized and Christian people may consent to engage, and to the question that is still more important, whether they are likely to be always necessary. It shows abundantly that there is ample room and opportunity for the operations of such a voluntary association in connection with almost every conceivable kind of war,—that such a society can perform services which no government can render,—even with the amplest appliances and after the longest preparation,—or if it should propose to do so, it could not redeem its promises or fulfill its desires.

The report is not only sagacious and enlarged in its philosophical spirit, but it is thoroughly Christian and humane. Indeed it could not easily be otherwise, for the theme implies the Christian obligation and privilege of healing the sick, of visiting the prisoner, and ministering to the relief and comfort of the suffering. The pictures of suffering which must be delineated are each of them an argument to pity and compassion. Every one of the distressing details of horror are appeals to the nobler sensibilities. The touching tales of that timely relief, and those tender and self-denying ministrations, which transformed the charnel houses of horror into temples hallowed by angelic visitations, the very ante-chambers of hell into the very porches of heaven, are all Christian arguments and appeals to our nobler aspirations and our better natures. They carry us back to the Christ of the evangelists as the great exemplar of this self-sacrificing benevolence, and the effectual inspirer in man of this humane compassion. They are practical commentaries upon all that was so novel in his teachings, and that was so strange in his doctrines, when uttered in the ear of the old civilization. The report justifies, by the irresistible argument of actual success, the special application which was made of this example and these teachings in bolder enterprises and on a grander scale than had ever been attempted before. It redeems for ever from the charge of Quixotic and romantic sentimentalism a series of measures to relieve a mass of horrors that by its very enormonsness had hitherto deterred the mind from dwelling upon it even in thought, and triumphantly shows that there is no form or mass of human suffering which may not be greatly softened, provided that the love that

feels is guided by the practical wisdom that is patient, orderly, and forecasting.

The descriptive portions of this report are well managed. Without digressing too often, or wandering too far from the onward course that was prescribed by his theme, the author has interwoven many very interesting sketches of stirring incidents, and some choice fragments of personal and individual history. While the report proposes to be anything rather than a narrative of striking incidents, or a continuous narrative of the great events of the war, its principal topics are treated in such a way as incidentally to furnish opportunities for many fine sketches, which picture vividly to the imagination some of the most eventful scenes of the war.

The report, as would naturally be expected, is an argument for the necessity of the society. It is also a defense of its action in circumstances of no little delicacy, as well as a vindication of it from the criticisms and assaults of its opponents. It makes no secret of the fact that it came into being against the opposition of the medical bureau, and that during the entire period of its most efficient and successful activity it was regarded with coldness by the higher officials in the War Department. While, as the report contends, the actual usefulness of the Commission compelled, from the highest officers in the field, the most cordial recognition of its services and its necessity, it was looked upon with frigid reserve by those who directed operations in the Cabinet. This opposition is explained by the circumstance that its existence, and its very opportunity to act with efficiency, as well as the enthusiasm with which it was sustained by the country, were all standing reproofs of the defects of the government in ability or zeal, or in both. It must naturally therefore excite the jealousy, and provoke the displeasure of those whose skill or humanity were called in question. We are not in possession of that knowledge of the facts which would qualify us to pronounce between the two; but it would seem impossible for any government, with the limited experience of the medical staff with which ours entered upon the war, with the necessarily inadequate medical and sanitary appliances which it had at command, with the frightfully rapid enlargement of the scale of operations, and the

desperate character of its struggles with foes at the North and in Washington, in Great Britain and at Paris, as well as in all the Southern States and at Richmond,—it would seem to be impossible for any government so pressed, beleaguered, and betrayed to dispense with the assistance of a voluntary organization composed of a few men of acknowledged ability, single-mindedness, and supreme devotion. The soldier in the field and the regular medical staff both required this assistance. That it was needed was abundantly proved by the overwhelming evidence that, in spite of all that this society and the government accomplished together, the amount of untold misery that was unrelieved is frightful to think of. It was easy for military officials, hardened by routine, and steeled by the very exercise of command to an inevitable indifference to suffering, to think and say that the provisions of the government were generous and ample for every exigency, and that all attempts to contribute assistance from any other quarter would result only in disorder and demoralization. The War Department itself, impersonated as it was in a man of impulsive temper and iron energy, whose whole soul was intensely occupied with devising expedients against impending peril, and striking effective blows, at any sacrifice of money and life, could not be blamed for being impatient with any organization which was constantly reminding the people of the suffering which the war was occasioning, and turning their thoughts and feelings in other channels than those of heroic endurance.

Now it was inevitable if a truthful report should be given of the history of this Commission, that its relations to the government should be frankly recorded, and that the feelings with which it was regarded by civil and military officials should be fully acknowledged, however hostile these might be. It was right that the defender of the Commission should explain the grounds of this hostility, even if his explanation involved direct censure of the government. How far this censure should be carried would however be a question of propriety and taste. It scarcely seems necessary for the satisfactory adjustment of any questions that might arise, or for the vindication of the Sanitary Commission against any unfavorable censures of its opponents in high places, that its report should record so

minutely the influence which the society exercised on the appointment of Surgeon-General Hammond, or should turn so far aside to pronounce an elaborate eulogium upon his services before these services were interrupted by his arrest by his superior officers, and were finally and irrevocably terminated by the decision of a court martial. Dr. Hammond doubtless deserves all the good that is said of him in this report. He may have been the object of a jealous and unreasonable hostility, and perhaps the innocent victim of an organized conspiracy. In such a case it would be both the duty and the glory of his friends to defend him to the uttermost on every suitable occasion, and against every antagonist; but we submit that the occasion furnished in this report was not entirely suitable to the expression of confidence in Mr. Hammond, which is here indirectly conveyed. We know nothing whatever of the merits of the case, but it appears to us that while the government of the country has no right to be exempted from criticism touching any of its public acts by any individual, either in speech or through the press, it ought not to be exposed to it, from an organization like the Sanitary Board, upon such a matter as the procedure of a court martial.

We ought not to omit to notice the value of this report as an instructor for other nations and other times. The experiments which were made by the Sanitary Board were too unique, too costly, and too numerous to be forgotten, either in respect to their occasions or their results. Christian civilization never before confronted the same problems. It never dared before to wrestle with difficulties hitherto deemed unsurmountable. It never before exercised its invention, its courage, its patience, its self-abnegation, to prove what could be done by organized efforts and on a gigantic scale to mitigate such horrors and to soften such sorrows. It never before had the opportunity of a cause so glorious by which to test a determined enthusiasm so unconquerable. The practical lessons which were learned in these novel experiments, as to methods of organization and rules of detail, ought not to be lost. They ought to go everywhere through the world wherever shall go the impression of the example of the nation struggling for its life. These special lessons in the new art of organizing and directing voluntary

efforts to alleviate the necessary horrors of war, are quite as useful as the special lessons in the old arts of attack and defense that are taught by every battle-field, or that can be gleaned from the strategy of Jackson, Sherman, and Grant. Some of these lessons have already been turned to a profitable use by other nations. In the brief campaign of Prussia, which has just closed with results so splendid and decisive, no inconsiderable use was made of the example of the Sanitary Commission. Every regiment and almost every company had its adjuncts of voluntary servants besides those who were set apart by the government for special duty on the battle-field and in hospitals. Had this report been published before that campaign commenced, it would have rendered essential service in directing the details of this benevolent work. It is the one admirable feature of it, that its author was fully alive to the duty of recording the results of every experiment that was made. He gives the history of every new department of effort which was devised, of the need that suggested it, and the character and success of the supply that was furnished to meet the exigency as soon as it was discovered. It is not extravagant praise to assert that he has amply redeemed the promises which he proposed, to preserve for other generations and other nations the fruits of experience which this society had so abundantly gathered.

That this report will serve the cause of humanity and civilization in another way we cannot doubt. Wherever it may be circulated and read it will leave impressions that cannot and will not be set aside, that the people who originated and sustained this organization were in the main animated by the noblest motives in prosecuting the war for national existence to which they were called. It has before been unheard of in history that in a civil war of gigantic dimensions, the friends of the government, while engaged in a doubtful struggle for its very life, have at the same time devised and executed so broad, so wise, so costly, and so humane an organization for the relief of the suffering which the war occasioned, and have extended its beneficent operation to friend and foe alike, both upon the field and in the hospital. Let the revilers of the North, and of the friends of the war, ponder this report on the one hand, and

on the other the report of the committee appointed to examine the condition of Northern prisoners sent back from Andersonville, and in the light of these documents judge between the North and the South; or without any comparison of the two sections of the country form a candid estimate of the motives and spirit of the upholders of the government.

The growth and development of the Sanitary Commission from the apparently chance thought of two or three active-minded philanthropists into an association which penetrated every part of the country by its widely-spread ramifications—which enlisted in its service the zeal and activity of tens of thousands of the best minds and hearts; which gathered in its voluntary contributions by millions, which made itself felt everywhere as a power to direct and to bless,—has something marvelous and almost romantic in its story, aside from the substantial and never-to-be-forgotten benefits which it conferred. Its germ was in the humane devisings and bold enterprise of Florence Nightingale. The horrible exposures and sufferings of the English troops who were sent to the Crimea awakened to energetic action her benevolent yet practical spirit, which had been schooled to all good in the Christian house at Kaiserswerth. The results did not terminate with the English nation, but ripened into the Sanitary Commission of the American people. In the history of the dreadful sorrows of the Crimean war the American people were forcibly taught the evils which were involved in war. In the timely and efficient relief which Florence Nightingale successfully applied, they learned that these evils were not without remedy.

How far that little candle throws his beams,
So shines a good deed in a naughty world.

Under the excitement which attended the first rush of volunteers to the field to the defense of Washington, two men had a casual conversation in the city of New York, which resulted in the call of a general meeting of ladies to devise some plan for rendering efficient service to the newly enlisted troops. The first efforts of the friends of the movement were discouraged by the army-surgeon who was in charge of the Medical Department at New York. But the committee who conferred with him were more confirmed by the revelations which he

made of a deficiency in the resources of his own department than they were repelled by his official discouragement. The movement would not be repressed. Its efforts were directed first of all to the preparation of lint, and forthwith all the old and "young maidens" of the land, and with the latter of course all "the young men," were engaged in "scraping lint" in every part of the country. To provide a small army of army-nurses was the next thought, and a host of women, many not over fair or young, were heard of as willing to go, many, doubtless, as good, if not as wise as the fair saint of the Scutari hospitals—as strong minded, if not as wisely skilled, as was Florence Nightingale. The subject of a permanent organization was soon pressed upon the attention of the Medical Bureau and the War Department. But it met with little encouragement from either. The committees were courteously but decidedly "bowed out" of these official purlieus. But the committee were not discouraged—for how could they be with such a host of ladies fair at home pressing them on—determined not only to have a hearing at Washington, but to have a hand in the war. They returned to the charge. Having received a somewhat reluctant indorsement from the Acting Surgeon-General to a very modest plan of action, they addressed a letter to the Secretary of War proposing the organization of a mixed commission, representing several sorts of people, who should act with the government in directing and rendering efficient the volunteer agencies of the people, in the way of sanitary measures, especially those of a preventive sort. After some delay and unexpected opposition, the order was issued on the 9th of June, 1861, appointing ten gentlemen, with such others as they might choose, as "A Commission of Inquiry and Advice in respect of the Sanitary Interest of the United States Forces." The first duty to which its efforts were directed was the inspection of camps and hospitals by agents who were supposed to be acquainted with the last and most approved principles of sanitary regimen and precaution. This inspection brought home to the ears of the government and the people startling but wholesome truths in respect to the sad condition of things, which received its terrible confirmation in the appalling disaster at Bull's Run. As the result of this incipient effort an

entirely new plan for constructing and managing military hospitals was adopted by the government. Towards the close of the first year, the secretary of the Commission, Mr. Frederick Law Olmsted, presented an elaborate report, in which he brought before the government and the country a full and detailed exhibition of the defects and evils which had been observed in all the arrangements which affected the health of the army, which was itself a convincing argument for the necessity of the Commission, and its competency to do the work for which it existed. There soon followed a reorganization of the Medical Bureau, and the appointment of a Surgeon-General, who was in full sympathy with the Commission, to whom indeed, he indirectly at least, owed his appointment. The next service to which the Commission was attracted was the Hospital Transport Service at it was called. This included a great variety of arrangements to facilitate the comfortable transportation of the soldiers to the field, and especially to aid them when returning wounded and sick in search of a hospital. Temporary homes were provided, at which they might rest and be fed for an hour or for days. Floating hospitals, with nurses, medicines, and delicacies were carried up and down the rivers and along the coasts as near as possible to the scene of conflict. Along the transit to these by ambulances or rail carriages, convenient stations were selected where food might be administered to those exhausted by traveling, and assistance proffered to those who needed a friendly arm. Finally, the so-called hospital cars were fitted up, which were controlled by the direction, and used for the service of this society. The attention of the society was directed very early to the collection and application of hospital supplies, which should be supplemental to those provided by the government, and these services were from the first to the last most efficiently rendered. The occasion for them was more and more apparent, the need of wisdom and care in rendering them was still more manifest, and the value of such services in the hands of a volunteer association was until the end of the war most effectually demonstrated. The distribution of these supplies, in such a way as not to embarrass the discipline of the army, and to demoralize the soldier, led to very extensive and elaborate organizations. Two separate corps were organized to afford

prompt relief upon the field of battle—one principal and the other auxiliary, each separately organized and appointed to definite duties. The work of each of these corps is described in one of the most interesting chapters of this volume. The need of a Special Relief Service was suggested to the watchful eyes of the servants of this society by the sad condition of those who, in a general way, might be called straggling soldiers. Its duties were most miscellaneous, but its usefulness was not inferior to that rendered by any other corps. It distributed clothes to the needy; it procured special delicacies for the sick; it accompanied discharged soldiers to the pay-offices; it received and forwarded money; it answered letters of inquiry; it obtained certificates for arrears of pay; it distributed reading matter through the camp; it telegraphed to the friends of soldiers very ill; it furnished special delicacies to feeble soldiers in the barracks; it rendered most timely and grateful aid to those who were returned as prisoners from the enemy. The civilized world knows how horrid was the condition of thousands of such, and how awfully pressing was their need of instant relief. It established a directory for the inmates of all the hospitals by which the place of every soldier who had been or was still in the wards could be traced out for anxious and helpless friends, and his condition or his death could be accurately determined. This directory recorded the names of more than six hundred thousand. The Commission also established a Bureau for pension and other war claims. Last of all it employed special detectives to guard itself and the soldier against impositions of every conceivable description.

As the Commission was enlarging the area of its operations, it was charging itself with increased pecuniary burdens. It was only the almoner of the people, but it had also taken upon itself the duty of acquainting them with the wants which required relief. The history of its necessities and of their unexpected relief, especially of the generous and unlooked for interposition from California, is itself almost a romance, and the tale loses none of its interest as told by the somewhat exhilarant President of the society, in a chapter which seems to have been inspired by the stimulant atmosphere of the Pacific Coast. The more sober but very interesting chapter from the Treasurer upon the

Financial History of the Society explains the history of the collection of nearly five millions of dollars in cash by the Parent Society in addition to uncounted values in supplies.

Last of all the Commission, acknowledging its general responsibility to serve and instruct the race by the information which it had accumulated, and the inquiries which it was in a condition to prosecute, was prompted in the last year of its active operations, to establish a Bureau of Vital Statistics, the lessons of which are not only most valuable for sanitary uses, but inculcate important moral lessons. Among the many services of this Bureau was that of vindicating the honor of our native born citizens from ignorant and malignant aspersions, by showing that the number of naturalized citizens who served as soldiers was only about one-tenth of the whole.

On the review of this history, as presented in this report, and as familiarly known to so many of the American people by their direct and personal contact with more or fewer of the operations of this society, it would be folly to assert that the Sanitary Commission committed no mistakes of judgment or administration. Serious complaints have been urged against it in both these particulars, but such are always made against an organization so vast and complicated as this. But the fact that these complaints were not prosecuted with formality or effect goes far to prove that the occasion for them was comparatively slight, or at least that the good accomplished was immense, compared with the mistakes which were committed.

It seems trite to observe that the efficiency and success of this society were owing very largely to the wisdom and zeal of the individual men who directed its counsels and executed its plans. That philosophy of history is as weak as it is heartless, which regards every great organization of this kind as the product of necessary social forces which account for its existence and measure its workings. No fact could possibly be better established than that the Sanitary Commission owes its being to the enterprise and zeal of a very few individual men. To the same men are to be ascribed its surprising efficiency, its wisely directed plans, and its vast proportions. Had it not been for the enthusiasm of the American people, all these had indeed

been in vain, but without the direction and skill, the perseverance and ingenuity, the eloquence and faith of those individuals who constituted the Commission itself, this enthusiasm would have exhausted itself in countless unsuccessful suggestions, or would have been exhausted by a succession of spasmodic but disappointing exertions. All honor deserves to be rendered to these men. Their names are well known to the American people, and will not soon be forgotten.

But these do not merit, and they would be the last to claim the sole honor for the blessings which this society has rendered to suffering humanity, and the new and noble example which it has given to mankind. The many efficient servants of this society; the noble men and women who served in stations more or less conspicuous with heroic devotion and patient self-denial even unto death, share with them in the praise. Some of the most conspicuous of these are properly named in this volume. One of these was well known to some of our readers by personal acquaintance, and to others by his distinguished reputation as a scholar. The subjoined extract from this report shows what he was in the love of his country and his fellow man:

"Professor [Henry] Hadley, Hebrew Professor in the Union Theological Seminary at New York, a student, a man of quiet and retiring habits, utterly unpractised, from the nature of his life and tastes, in the toil and drudgery of personal ministrations to the suffering, nevertheless thought it his duty to devote his time and strength to this peculiar service. With this intention, he went to the James River in June, and enrolled himself as a member of the Auxiliary Relief Corps. He gave himself up to his new duties with all the earnestness and energy of his nature, and his feeble body not being able to meet the demand made upon it by his heroic spirit, he soon sank into an early grave. His life was characterized, while in the service of the Commission, by quiet and incessant work. *He never went to the front* to gratify a curiosity so natural to those who, for the first time, visit an army engaged in an active campaign. He toiled on unwearingly in the sad hospital, for he had come to help the helpless, and not to witness 'the pomp and circumstance of war.' He thus endeared himself to all who had been the objects of his merciful care. When he was borne, sick and dying, to the steamer, the greatest interest was manifested in his condition by those whom he had nursed, and who were then convalescing. They eagerly inquired after the welfare of the 'Sanitary man,' as they called him, their grateful hearts pouring out blessings upon him who had been to them the noblest type of practical Christian love and sympathy. The death of such a man in such a cause not only invests his memory with peculiar tenderness and reverence, but it hallows and ennobles the cause, the success of which rendered necessary so precious a sacrifice."

Those who had known Professor Hadley as the retired scholar, absorbed and satisfied with his favorite studies, and as the shy recluse, apparently sympathizing but little with the cares and interests that move the mass of men, could not have believed that there slumbered within, a soul that would be moved so profoundly by the call of his country, or that would respond with such prodigal self-sacrifice to the sorrows and sufferings of those who had gone to fight for him upon the field. But the friends who knew him familiarly during the war can testify to an earnest and growing interest in the great struggle which would not and could not be restrained till it manifested itself by personal sacrifice and labor in the good cause. At first he could with difficulty be restrained, all unfit as he was, from bearing arms in the ranks. He would not be deterred from serving in the hospital during the summer vacation under southern heats, and before he was aware the powers of his life were expended beyond recall. With a similar zeal hundreds of thousands of co-laborers toiled and sacrificed in the service of the same society in all the manifold ways of self-denial and efforts which were possible. There were tens of thousands to whom for years its interests were uppermost in thought, who day by day went to its subordinate bureau with all the fidelity of salaried agents, and there planned and purchased, and dispensed and labored as those who serve upon wages—sustaining their own zeal, and inspiring that of others with unflagging energy.

What would the Sanitary Commission have been, or what could it have done without these myriads of coadjutors? Its wisely conceived organization, its sagacious counselors, its far-seeing plans, and its persistent energy had all been in vain without the aid of these noble souls who at first responded so promptly to its calls for help, and then urged it forward to astounding activities as by an impetuous wave of public zeal, and at last made it the popular idol of even the fashionable and frivolous, brought to its service the pleasure-seeking and the idler, and forced the miser and the money changer to pour their contributions into its treasury.

As we review the excitements of the struggle through which we have passed, in the facts recorded in this report, we are

more than ever impressed with their importance in the education of the present generation, and with the honorable record which they have left behind. When the impression of these events shall become less vivid, and the fresh remembrances of them shall begin to fade, these reports of the organized and organizing beneficence of the Sanitary Commission will serve to bring up to another generation a definite and trustworthy picture of the self-denying and Christian zeal of those who fought the great battle for the nation's life. But they need not speak to another generation. They ought to present an argument to other nations which it will not be easy to set aside, for the purity of the motives and the unselfishness of the spirit which animated the defenders of the Union. It has been common in other times for patriots and partisans to do and to dare, to sacrifice and to die, to struggle to the last with fervent zeal and embittered hate. Those who sought to destroy the Union quite surpassed those who sought to defend it in all these manifestations of ardor and determination. But the people who sustained at the same time a national organization of humane beneficence for the service of friend and foe, and carried it upon the field of battle and into the deadly wards of the hospital, with such considerateness and wisdom, with such patience and unweariedness as this report records, cannot be charged with selfishness in their patriotic aspirations, nor with malignity in the spirit with which they used the sword which they were so reluctant to employ, and which they wielded at first with such awkward and ineffectual handling. If we desire to be understood by other nations, we can do no better or wiser thing than to send abroad such a report as this. No intelligent foreigner can read it without understanding the American people better, and judging us more favorably. The friend of his country can do nothing more effectual for its vindication, or its honor, than to distribute this report freely abroad. If the government should do the same, it would for once wisely spend the funds which are so often squandered in printing and distributing the so-called public documents.

ARTICLE V.—DIVORCE.**PART I.—DIVORCE AMONG THE HEBREWS, GREEKS, AND
ROMANS.**

IN the present Article we shall attempt to give an account of the law and practice of divorce among the Hebrews, Greeks, and Romans, those three nations, to one or another of which we owe our religion and most of the leading elements of our civilization. The subject has an important practical bearing. It is intended as an introduction to an inquiry into the meaning of those passages in the New Testament, where the matter of divorce is taken up. Christ, by a few words on this subject, has turned legislation and usage into a new channel; he has in those few words, by a higher conception of marriage than was entertained before, thrown in a very important element into Christian civilization. It is our object to answer the question why Christ acted thus in some sense as a legislator, and what the world's need was that it should be taught a higher morality in this respect. Having looked at this point as briefly as truth and the importance of the subject will permit, we propose on some future occasion to discuss the passages of the New Testament touching on divorce and the questions to which they naturally give rise. Then, if it is permitted to us to continue our inquiries, we shall treat of the practice and views of the early Christians, and of the state of opinion and law in Catholic and Protestant countries. Finally, we shall ask what ought to be the aim of legislation among us, and how the Christian Church ought to act in endeavoring to enforce the commands of Christ within its own pale. Our aim is to do good and to serve the truth. We are not indeed so conceited as to hope to produce a great effect of ourselves, but believing that an irreligious liberty is creeping even into the church with regard to the marriage tie, believing also that nothing more helps on, and is helped on by, general laxity of morals than undue freedom in regard to divorce, we feel con-

strained to contribute our mite to the correction of a public opinion and practice which are threatening serious evils both to Church and to State.

DIVORCE AMONG THE HEBREWS.

The ideal of marriage, as we find it in the first records of the Hebrews, is a peculiarly beautiful one. "For this cause shall a man leave his father and his mother and cleave to his wife, and they twain shall be one flesh." Here the union of one man with only one woman is thought of, and polygamy in fact is inconceivable, for how can so close a union as the being one flesh with a wife admit of the same union with another. It is again an indissoluble union; for if the parties are one flesh, nothing but a violent process of nature or of crime, something like amputation, can separate them. And what is deserving of equal notice, is the separation of the man from his father and mother contemplated in this text. A patriarchal age would naturally regard the filial and parental as the closest of all ties. Here is a still closer tie, involving a greater "cleaving" to the wife, a formation of a new family with new rights and interests, an emancipation from parental control.

The ideal presented in these words remained in the Hebrew mind until Christ came into the world. Polygamy and freedom of divorce obscured, but could not obliterate it. Polygamy was permitted, or rather endured, under some restrictions, but one wife was the rule, as shown by various passages of Scriptures. In the Psalms, and in the Prophets, only one wife is spoken of; the prophets are nowhere mentioned as having more than one; the same is true of Moses and of Isaac; even Abraham looks forward to the necessity of having a servant for an heir, until at the instigation of Sarah he takes Hagar as a kind of substitute for her; wealthy men, like Nabal and the Shunamitish woman's husband, are monogamists; and perhaps the law laid down a similar rule for the high priest.* Probably a great part of the private persons among the Jews had but one wife, and polygamy was chiefly confined

* This opinion, thrown out by Saalschütz (*Mos. Recht.*, p. 748, ed. 2), will not bear much weight.

to the king and a few others. Even the kings were forbidden to multiply wives greatly, and Jehoida, the high priest, must have intended to restrict King Joash, when he furnished him with only two. Still polygamy existed legally, and was not put down by the moral sense of the nation. It took, we may add, through the prevalence of slavery, the form of a looser connexion with a woman of inferior condition, a form between concubinage and marriage. The woman in Judges, chapters xix., xx., is constantly called a *pillegesch* or concubine, and yet the Levite is spoken of as her husband, and her father as his father-in-law. She was a Hebrew free woman apparently, but that relation, for the most part, was entered into with a domestic or a slave.

Marriage began with the betrothal, but no covenant or formality is known to have existed. The condition of marriage, however, is spoken of as a covenant. Thus Malachi says: "Yet is she thy companion and the wife of thy covenant;" and Ezekiel: "I swear unto thee, and entered into a covenant with thee, and thou becamest mine." In numberless instances the word *zanah*, to play the whore, is transferred to signify a breach of the covenant-relation between God and the people by the crime of idolatry. Closeness of union and tender care, conditioned by fidelity, belong to both relations, that between husband and wife, and that between God and the people. Did the notion of a covenant belong to both independently, or was it transferred from the theocracy to family life? We are unable to give a satisfactory answer, but apparently it originated in the theocratic union, and passed to the conjugal. However this may be, there is a sanctity thrown around marriage by this manner of speech and thought, such as few other expressions could give forth. If adultery is on a level with apostasy from God, how great must be its guilt; and if the man is to the woman as God to the people, what but a breach of that covenant in one vital respect should dissolve the union. To which we may add that as God had but *one* people, the standing simile would be apposite only if, as a general thing, one man had but *one* wife; and that the relentless severity of the Jewish law towards the adulteress corresponds to the penalties

it denounces against going away from Jehovah to the worship of a false god.

In Hebrew marriage, gifts were given or a price was paid by the bridegroom, and this corresponds to the purchase of the wife, which was practised over a large part of the world in ancient times, as in Greece, among the Hindoos, and among the Germans, and of which many instances are still to be met with in barbarous or half civilized tribes. In the first case where these presents are spoken of, the largest share went to the bride, Rebekah, her mother and brother also receiving "precious things." In the case of Jacob, as he had nothing to pay, service was rendered as an equivalent. The other references to this usage are few; fewer, we conceive, than they would have been, if it had played the same important part which belonged to it in the marriage usages of other nations. A distinguished writer on Jewish antiquities tries to show that the custom among the Jews amounted to nothing more than the giving of presents for a favor received, which presents went in good measure to the bride; but the prevailing opinion is against him, and the analogy of other nations is able to show a softening down of an original purchase from the father into a portion conferred upon the bride herself.

Hebrew marriage, thus far, appears quite informal and primitive, but yet penetrated with a religious spirit, and placed, as it were, under the especial protection of the covenant keeping God. Nevertheless as the bad usages of polygamy, slavery, and blood revenge were endured among the people, so when it received the law, a freedom of divorce prevailed which could not be corrected without hazarding the overthrow of the polity. It was therefore endured, and in some degree restricted.

The leading passage relating to divorce is found in Deut. xxiv. 1—4. It assumes a certain loose practice in regard to divorce, and tries to reduce it to a formal shape, precisely as the Emperor Augustus attempted to give legal form to divorce among the Romans by his legislation. Let us notice the parts of the passage in their order.

1. It is supposed, as the basis of the law now given out, that husbands who had found "some uncleanness" in their wives had been in the habit of putting them away without ceremony,

or of sending them home as they would hired servants. Here two things deserve consideration. *First*, the right of divorce among the Hebrews was altogether one-sided. The wife had no right of divorce whatever. If her husband committed adultery with a married woman he might be put to death; but it does not appear what protection she had against ill-usage on his part. Probably her vindication in this case was left to her friends. In the second place what do the words "some uncleanness" denote? This passage, as is well known, was the subject of controversy between the schools of Shammai and Hillel; the latter understanding it of anything offensive or displeasing on the part of the wife, the former giving it an ethical sense, according to most modern writers, as if it were to be confined to an act of immorality like adultery. Wiener, however, says that the Gemara makes the view of Shammai less strict: even public violations of decorum might furnish ground for divorce according to his doctrine. Josephus interprets the law according to the views of Hillel: "He who wishes to be separated from his wife," says he (*Antiq. iv.*, 8, 23), "for any reason whatever [St. Matthew's 'for every cause']—and many such are occurring among men—must affirm in writing his intention of no longer cohabiting with her." This is the extreme of license which an immoral age would defend by the passage. On the other hand the opinion attributed by most modern writers to Shammai is wholly untenable, as moral uncleanness or adultery was punishable by death. Knobel, in his commentary on Deuteronomy expresses him as follows: "*Ervath dabar* is used of human excrement in *Deut. xxiii. 13*, and is properly a *shame* or *disgrace* (*Is. xx. 4*) *from a thing*, that is anything which awakens the feeling of shame and repulsion, inspires aversion and disgust and nauseates in contact, for instance, bad breath, a secret running sore, etc." Then he adds, "in the time of Christ the expression was in controversy. The school of Shammai took it as being the same with *debar ervath* [a thing of uncleanness or disgust], and understood it of unchaste demeanor, and shameless lewd behavior. The school of Hillel, which the Rabbins follow, explained it as *something disgusting or any other cause*, and thus depended a looser view. . . . Both were wrong in this, that they built up a gen-

eral principle upon the words, whilst the author only speaks of the commonest cause of divorce at his time."

2. It is required of the husband, by this statute, that he write a bill of divorcement, and give it into the hand of his wife, before sending her away from his house. The law requires no special form for this "*writing of separation*," and whether any form in particular was customary we have no means of knowing. The essential point which the law aims to secure are first a *formal writing*, by which any passionate haste would be prevented, and secondly, *notice to the woman*, so that it should appear to all persons that she was not an adulteress, nor a runaway from her husband's house, but was free to contract a second marriage. If the reasons for the divorce were added in the bill this would be an additional protection to the wife, as the husband would be slow to put down in a permanent form pretexts which might be false or frivolous.* It has been suggested also that at an age when writing must have been infrequent, the inability to prepare a written document would secure a greater degree of deliberation, as the husband would need the help of some Levite or other educated person, of whom he would stand in a certain awe, if conscious of the frivolity of the reasons for a divorce.

How far this statute went into general use, we have no means of knowing. Two passages, one in Isaiah (l. 1), and one in Jeremiah (iii. 8), refer to the bill of divorcement to illustrate God's treatment of his rebellious wife, the people, and as the illustration must have been well understood, it is fair to suppose that such bills were then in common use. The passage in Jeremiah however suggests a difficulty. God put backsliding Israel away and gave her a bill of divorce on account of her adultery. May we argue from this that the penalty of death for this crime was now softened down, on account of the great corruption of manners, into repudiation. The passage in Ezekiel (xxiii. 45, 46), where judgments by righteous men in cases of adultery are spoken of, proves the contrary. Jeremiah adapts his simile to the facts of the case.

* In the forms given by Selden, Uxor. Hebr. iii., 24, no mention is made of any reasons.

The adultery of Israel was the abandonment of Jehovah for the idols of the heathen, and his repudiation of her was the captivity of the northern tribes. The very verse of the prophet where these words occur shows us the freedom of his illustrations. The treacherous sister of Israel, Judah, feared not when she saw the casting out of her sister, but went and played the harlot also. Here then we have two sisters contemporaneously the wives of one husband, a thing directly against the law of Moses.

3. The divorced wife may now contract marriage with another man, but if separated from him by death or divorce may not return to her first husband. As Jeremiah says the land where this should occur would be "greatly polluted." Here protection for the woman and for public morals are secured at once.

As for the woman, the great freedom of divorce which law and usage gave to the man made it all the more important that her interests should be protected. She was always the passive party, having no right of divorce on her side. If such freedom on the part of the man was right, it was right also that she should be permitted to marry again. If it was in itself an evil, endured but not encouraged, it was in a certain sense right that another similar evil should counterbalance it and deprive it of some of its baneful effects. Marriage ought to be equally sacred for both parties, and under equal sanctions for both. When there is a letting down of those strict rules which our Lord has made known for his Church, bad law cannot end, with any equity, in granting the husband certain liberties, unless it grants a compensation to the wife. This compensation was remarriage after divorce. The need of such protection was increased by the institution of polygamy, for it would often happen that the husband, when he took to himself a second wife, would become disgusted with the old one, and her feelings, when she felt herself to be put in the background, would not contribute to domestic peace. Or he might find himself unable to support two, and thus disgust would ere long end the connexion with one of them or the other.

As for the protection of public morals, it is evident that the power of return to the same husband might wholly destroy the

sanctity of marriage and bring it down almost to the level of *polyandry* on which a few of the most degraded nations of the world now stand. Marriage between one man and one woman must be once for all. That is to say there is nothing in the mere act of divorce, according to this Hebrew law, to prevent reunion of the parties, and very likely such things occurred, but a practical dissolution by marriage to another man forever prevented a union with a former husband, as something polluting and almost adulterous. So enormous a transaction as that between Cato the younger and Hortensius, when the former lent his wife Marcia to the latter and took her back again after the orator's death, would have been altogether contrary to Hebrew law, and probably an abomination to Hebrew feeling in the worst times.*

It is only seldom that the law of Moses makes mention of divorce. The two other passages where it is spoken of show an intention of a humane legislator to protect a woman in circumstances where she was peculiarly exposed to injury. One of these is Deut. xxii. 28, 29. The substance of it is that a man who deflowers an unbetrothed virgin, besides paying a fine to her father, shall take her for his wife without the power "to put her away all his days." The other (vv. 13-19 of the same chapter) contemplates a newly married man's spreading an evil report concerning his wife's antenuptial chastity. If on solemn investigation it was found that his words were false, he was to be chastised, to pay a heavy fine to his father-in-law, and, as in the former instance, to have his liberty of repudiating her taken away. In these cases the interests of morality and those of his wife are both looked after. Yet it may be asked whether such a law, implying a grievous breach between the married pair, would not expose the wife to intolerable cruelties from one who could never get rid of the detested object. We can only answer that the law allowed no such cruelty, that her family friends could act as her defenders, and that on his death she could not, it is probable, be stripped of the use of some portion of his property.

* It does not appear that Cato ever divorced his wife, which only makes the transaction more enormous. For a critique of this affair see Drumann *Gesch. Roms.*, iii., 701.

We have no means of judging whether the sentiment of the Hebrews changed in the course of time on the propriety of divorce. There is, however, one memorable although very obscure passage in the last of the prophets (Malachi ii. 11, 16), which goes to show that indiscriminate divorce was then regarded by good men as wrong and offensive to God. The prophet, after rebuking intermarriage with heathen women, and threatening the divine vengeance against those who should commit this sin, passes on to a second sin, that of "covering the altar of the Lord with tears, with weeping, and with crying out," which, as appears from the next verse, where the sense is more fully brought out, is to be understood of the complaints of injured and divorced wives—divorced perhaps for the sake of the heathen women just before spoken of—uttered in the temple to the Lord of Hosts. God no longer regards the offerings of such men, because they have dealt treacherously or unfaithfully each one against the wife of his youth, who is his companion and the wife of his covenant. The next words are among the obscurest in the Bible, and if we could make them plain, they would require too long a comment for this place. Then the prophet adds: "therefore take heed to your spirit and let none deal faithlessly against the wife of his youth. For the God of Israel saith that he hateth putting away, for one covereth violence with his garment, saith the Lord of Hosts." The marginal rendering of our version—"the Lord God of Israel saith if he hate her put her away," which was given by Jerome and adopted in Luther's Bible, would now have, we suppose, few defenders. Ewald's version (in his *Prophets*) follows the Septuagint in making the sentence conditional: "when one out of hatred puts away, saith Jehovah God of Israel, he covereth his garment with violence." In this version no good sense is elicited; the rebuke against divorce in the preceding context is not confined to cases where the husband hates the wife; and the conditioning clause which this rendering assumes is strangely divorced from the conditioned. Hitzig in his commentary translates: "he hateth putting away, saith Jehovah (i. e., Jehovah saith that he hateth), etc., and him who covereth wrong with his garment;" Köhler, a more recent commentator (in his *Prophets* after the exile,

part 4), "for I hate putting away, saith Jehovah, etc., and crime covereth his garment" (who doeth this); DeWette in, his version: "for I hate putting away, saith Jehovah, etc., and him who heapeth crime on his wife." Nor is Hitzig reluctant to adopt the translation *wife* instead of *garment* at the end of the passage.*

Hitzig well remarks on the passage, "that the putting away of the wife was indeed permitted (Deut. xxiv., 4), but was not on the whole a thing which God could look on with complacency, and in the case before us it had in it something hateful not merely on account of its frequency. Perhaps we have here the beginning of the stricter doctrine of the New Testament." The beauty and noteworthiness of the passage consist in the deep moral and religious feeling which pervade it. The wife and husband are bound by a covenant. To put a wife away is to break that covenant, to act treacherously or faithlessly. This is what God hates. We have thought while studying this passage how our Lord must have pondered over it, and how two places of the ancient scriptures, one at the beginning, one at the end, coincide with his views of divorce, while the law and practice of the Jews spoke only of the hardness of their hearts.

It only remains to inquire what was the usage of the Jews through their history, and a very scanty answer is all that can be given. What the moral sense of the nation allowed when the law was given is gathered, as we have seen, from the law itself. This passage of Malachi goes to show that even in a reformed age, among the returned exiles, the practice of divorce was not infrequent. Examples however do not occur. In the time of Christ it must have been not uncommon, although nothing can be argued in regard to the morals of the nation from Herod the Great and his family. Josephus tells us (in his life, §§ 75, 76) that he was thrice married. The first wife and he separated, he does not tell us how or why. The second he put away, "not being pleased with her character,"

* A condensed exposition of this passage is given by Keil in his Commentary on the twelve minor prophets, just published. He adopts Köhler's views in almost all cases.

after she had borne him three children. Then he took a third, whom he praises highly. The probability is that multitudes of his countrymen, especially the more heathenish part of them, made no scruple of dismissing their wives at pleasure.*

DIVORCE AMONG THE GREEKS.

There is a great contrast between the destinies of the conception of marriage as it appeared in the Hebrew mind and in the Greek. In the former race, most beautiful and elevated at the outset, but long encountering inveterate oriental practice, and failing in a great measure to be realized, it is at last purified and brightened by Christ, so as thenceforth to enter into the thought and life of the world. Among the Greeks, on the other hand, simple and severe at first, as it was among the other western nations, averse to polygamy, perhaps regarding divorce with disfavor, this conception became obscured and degraded as they advanced to their acme of refinement. The mythology which was elaborated in the earliest epic period by the poets reflects already the morals of a corrupted race, for they who could listen eagerly to rhapsodists narrating the adulteries of Zeus or Hephæstus, must have been defiled themselves, and must have grown more so from familiarity with such examples. Still a simple unsensual mode of life, and original tradition guarding the sacredness of the family union, may have in part for a long time counteracted the influences of mythology. But when we come to the historic ages of Greece, the case is widely different. At Sparta, notwithstanding the severity of the institutions, the sanctity of married life was not respected. It was reputable and customary there for men to give over their wives to their friends, and a king, for reasons of State, was allowed to have two wives in two separate establishments.†

* The authors whom we have principally relied upon are Saalschütz (*Mosaisches Recht*), Selden's *Uxor Hebr.* in Vol. II. of his works, Winer's *Realwört.* and leading commentators. Selden, from the mixture of the Rabbinical and scriptural, is very wearisome and confusing.

† See what Xenophon, in his *Lacedæmonian polity* near the beginning, says of this and of a still more disgusting practice, with no reprehension, and ascribing the

At Athens, the maid was reared in seclusion to protect her from the evil without. She thus became an unfit companion for the man who enlarged his mind by taking part in public affairs. Was it strange, when as a matron she came to have a larger liberty, that she should abuse it? Or was it strange that the *hetaera*, conversant with men and used to please men, should usurp the wife's influence? But it was strange, sadly strange, that the corruption seized on youthful beauty as its instrument, that a frightful unnatural crime, punished with death in Christian hands, fastened itself on the intimacy of older with younger men, and if not without rebuke, yet swept abroad so widely, as to be the greatest disgrace of the Greek civilization. The study of morals and revival of moral feeling in the schools of the successors of Socrates could not stem the corruption.* The later Greeks of the Macedonian and Roman periods, if we judge of them correctly, were more enervated, more immoral, where they had opportunity, than before, both outside of Greece and within it. Marriage came to be regarded only as a convenience or as an evil; population fell off; whatever Greek virtue of the political sort had existed in great measure left the race.

Aristotle remarks in his politics that the old Greek laws and usages were very simple and barbaric, and gives as an illustration that they carried weapons habitually, and bought their wives from one another. This custom of purchasing the wife, of which we found traces among the Hebrews, sprang out of the view of the child as the property of the parent: the father had a right to the services of his daughter until she passed beyond his control. This usage is often alluded to in Homer. The word for the purchase money is *hednon* or *hedna*, but inasmuch as the word may have had the wide signification of a gift or present at first, and as the father would naturally give a part of this wife-money to his daughter as an outfit, it occurs

licenses to Lycurgus. This scholar of Socrates can have had no moral but only a political view of marriage.

* Beautiful passages in Plato's Laws show that he was awake to the importance of purity in the family relations. A passage in the eighth book, where he would have law attempt to secure in the new city a degree of purity which he regards as almost chimerical, is well worthy of notice. (p. 841, D.)

also in the sense of a present from the father to the daughter, and in that of a present from the betrothed man or from other friends. Thus an epithet applied to maidens can be translated *cattle-finding*, because by the husbands whom they won they procured cattle for their fathers. So also it is said of a Trojan ally who was slain by Agamemnon, that to obtain his wife he first gave a hundred cattle, then promised a thousand head of sheep and goats besides. Sometimes the father waived his right of purchase money for his daughter; Agamemnon is willing, if he can propitiate the angry mind of Achilles, to give him either of his three daughters without getting any *hedna* on his own part, and he will give large presents in addition. When a wife had been unfaithful to her husband, he could claim the price he had paid for her; and when for some other cause he had put her away, he was expected to pay back the amount of the gift or dower granted to her by her father. These usages may have differed little from those of many other nations.

In Sparta, after betrothal, marriage was consummated by a kind of mock robbery. At Athens betrothal was universal in legitimate marriage, and a dower regularly but not necessarily went with the bride. She might have none, and yet be a lawful wife, whereas under Roman law the dower was so much more essential, that the civil law has been thought to entertain a presumption against marriage without dower as being no more than concubinage. That religious ceremonies attended the marriage festival is undoubted, but no public priest's services can be shown to have been thought necessary. As women and children were always minors at Athens, the wife passed from under her nearest relative, as her *kyrios*—her guardian or law representative—into the hands of her husband, who sustained the same capacity. Yet it may be added that as parental power was not so extensive at Athens as at Rome, so it was with marital power also. After the death of the husband or the divorce of the parties, the wife fell under the authority or guardianship of her next blood relative.

Divorce at Athens was easy and frequent. It took two shapes, to which two words in general corresponded, being called *sending away* or *out of the house* (*apopempein* or

ekpempain), when the husband repudiated the wife; but *quitting and going away* (*apoleipein*) when the wife separated herself from her husband. In the first case, little if any formality seems to have been required, although we may perhaps argue from the instance of a leading Athenian mentioned by the orator Lysias, that the husband usually made known his intentions before witnesses called in for that purpose.

There are several instances of this kind of divorce mentioned in the private orations of Demosthenes, which demonstrate what a bare matter of convenience marriage was at that time, and how destitute of a moral element. Timocrates, having found a rich heiress with whom he could connect himself, sends away his wife, who without the interval of a day is married to Aphobus, one of the guardians of the orator Demosthenes during his minority. Protomachus, a man in needy circumstances, having the same chance, persuades his friend Thucritus to take his wife from him; her brother betroths her to this second husband, and the plaintiff for whom the oration is written is her son. In a third case, Polyeuctus adopts his wife's brother, gives him his own daughter for his wife, and then, some quarrel having arisen between the parties, takes her away and gives her to Spudias. Then a suit concerning dower was brought by the former husband against the father and the new husband. In this case, if Leocrates and his wife did not agree to separate, the latter must have initiated the steps for the divorce, for it nowhere appears that the father or previous *kyrios* of a married woman possessed this power. In all such cases, notice in writing of the divorce was probably lodged with the archon or judicial magistrate.

The other description of divorce was when the wife left her husband,—when she began the proceedings. In this case, she was required to appear in person before the archon at his office, and there present a writing in which the reasons for her separation from her husband were set down. If both parties were agreed about the divorce, that might be the end of the affair. She returned to her nearest relatives, and her husband was obliged to pay over any dower that might be in his hands. If the parties were not agreed, a suit might arise, and the same seems to have been true when the husband began the proceed-

ings, but nothing is known of the judicial process in either case.

It was when Hipparete, wife of Alcibiades, and daughter of one of the first men at Athens, stung by the outrageous licentiousness of her husband, had gone to the archon to take the above-mentioned legal steps for a divorce, that Alcibiades collected a band of men and dragged her away from the place of justice. He may have done this for the sake of her great dower of twenty talents. At all events, according to Plutarch, he quashed the proceedings, for she lived with him until her death. The same writer adds that the law required the presence of the woman desiring a divorce at the place of public justice, in order that it might be in the husband's power to come to terms with her and keep her with him.

Suits were doubtless very frequent in regard to the wife's dower, which was either paid over to the husband before weddings or retained by her *kyrios*, subject to the stated payments of interest. If paid over, security was taken on her behalf upon her husband's property, and he was also bound personally for it. If he delayed to pay it over after the divorce, eighteen per cent. interest was due for the time of the delay. More might be said on this matter, but the legal consequences of divorce do not fall within our subject. It is needless to add that she was free to marry again as soon as the divorce took effect.

We have confined ourselves chiefly to Athens, partly because it is a fair sample of the more modern civilization of Greece, and partly because the materials are exceedingly scanty, or fail altogether for the greater number of the Greek States. Legislation, however, made various experiments. We give one example. Among the laws of Thurii in Magna Græcia, according to Diodorus of Sicily, there was one giving leave to women to put away their husbands and to marry whom they liked. An old man, thus deserted by a young wife, proposed and carried an amendment of the import that whichever party, husband or wife, initiated the divorce, the said party should be forbidden to marry one younger than the former partner, whereupon the woman returned to his bed and board again. We put no great faith in the story, much less in

the ascription of the law to Charondas. We give it only as a specimen of the legislation that was going on, wherever free Greeks could govern themselves, and which, although in general starting from the same conceptions of marriage, and making divorce exceedingly easy, yet without doubt would exhibit, if it had been preserved, various peculiarities in different parts of the Greek world.

It is probable that after the Macedonian conquest these differences of legislation, where Greek States were autonomous—and that they were so to some extent even in Roman times is well known—were obliterated, and that a general average conception of the family relations, having almost nothing of morality in it, pervaded the whole race. The Greeks still adhered to monogamy, still allowed concubinage with scarcely a frown, still granted almost unlimited freedom to the separation of man and woman.

It is pleasant in this state of public feeling to know that a few voices were lifted up in favor of a somewhat better practice. The testimony of Plato in his laws is worthy of mention. He would take away from the parties interested the license of separation, and place divorce under the control of State authorities. If, says he, through infelicity of character a man and his wife cannot agree together, let the case be put into the hands of ten impartial guardians of the law, and tell of these women to whom the matter of marriages is committed. Let them reconcile the parties if they can; and if not let them act according to their best ability in providing them with new spouses. If the philosopher means that the new yokes are to be laid on by force, it would most probably act as a restraint on divorce, and check the desire of separation, but whether it would do any other good might be reasonably doubted. This is about as far as the gospel of beauty could go. Plato's own view of marriage is certainly far from being the most elevated one, as his Republic testifies. It needed a gospel of holiness to put the Greek mind on a better track in regard to marriage and divorce.*

* The principal authorities besides passages of authors, and especially of Demosthenes in his private orations, are the writers on Attic law, especially Meyer

DIVORCE AMONG THE ROMANS.

The Romans had more of the moral and the religious in their character than the Greeks, as is manifest from that strong sense of justice and love of established form which pervades their law, and from that ancient fear and superstitious worship of the gods which ran down in the end into the merest formality. Their early institutions, more than those of any western nation, partake of patriarchal life. The closeness of the family tie, the *septs* or *gentes* of the patricians, and the vast powers of the *housemaster* over wife, children, and slaves, which it took ages to undermine, all point in that direction; and their peculiar veneration for ancient form in all things is of the same source. In fact so essential is the early constitution of the household to the Roman State that State life, as it first shows itself, may be said to have grown directly out of family life.

Roman marriage in its earliest forms was for the wife a passing out from her natural family, where she was under the absolute control of its head, into the family of her husband, whose control was nearly the same as that of her father or grandfather. She was now said to be in his *hand*, and the marital power was known by the name of *manus*. There were three forms known to early Roman times by which the *manus* was acquired by the husband. Of these, without entering into the province of Roman archæology, it seems necessary to say a word for the better comprehension of the subject. The oldest of these, *confarreatio*, which was exclusively patrician, was celebrated with special formalities by public priests in some sacred place before witnesses, and the *manus* was acquired by the same act by which the marriage was solemnized. This may be called religious marriage. The two others arose, as it seems, in plebeian life. Of these the earlier was probably *usus*, a kind of prescription, in which, when the bride, after the regular betrothal and nuptials, had cohabited with her husband for a year without an absence of three successive nights, the *manus* or marital power was fully secured. Here the marriage and

and Schömann's *Attische Process*, page 408, onward, Platner's *Process*, part 2, page 245, and the writers on archæology, especially K. F. Hermann.

the *manus* originated in two acts widely separated in point of time. The remaining form of originally plebeian origin—*coemptio*—was a kind of fictitious sale, much like that used in adoption and emancipation, and here two contemporaneous acts gave legal existence to the *manus* and the marriage. These may be called forms of civil marriage. This last form had become obsolete before Gaius wrote his institutions in the second century of our era. The two others were in a state of decay under the earlier Roman emperors.

At an early date, we have no means of knowing when, but long before Cicero's time, and before the age of the comic poets, a free kind of marriage without the *manus* came into vogue. It was preceded by betrothal and nuptials with religious ceremony. The connexion was legitimate, jural, and respectable. In fact, had it not been so, there would at length have been no marriage at all, for this became in the end the universal form among the Romans. Its essence consisted chiefly in these particulars; that the union between the woman and her natural family was not sundered, and that the husband acquired no *manus* and no rights over any part of her property except the *dower*. The motive which gave rise to this kind of marriage may have been the unwillingness of the woman's father to lose control over her and her property in favor of one who was suspected or imperfectly known. It is one, and perhaps the earliest, of a series of innovations, by which patriarchal, patrician Rome surrendered its ancient iron habits under the humanizing and loosening influences that followed in the track of civilization and of empire.

The two kinds of Roman marriage differ greatly when the power of dissolving the marriage union is considered. In the forms by which the *manus* was acquired the wife had no rights over herself or next to none, while the husband could dismiss her from his house at his pleasure. In the free form of marriage, the husband and the person who exercised the paternal power over the married woman, or she herself, if she was *sui juris*, had concurrent right to effect the separation of the parties. Of such authority exercised by the wife's father the comic poets of Rome furnish us with instances, but in process of time, if he took this step where there was a harmonious union

and perhaps a family of children, the husband had a legal remedy against him.

The husband himself, moreover, was to some extent controlled by a very remarkable Roman institution, which derived its sanction from old custom rather than from positive law,—a family court, consisting of the blood-relations of both parties, together with the husband himself. Such a court was also assembled to try great crimes of children, and yet there was not the same necessity for assembling it, according to Roman feeling, as where a guilty wife was to be brought to trial. And on the other hand, where a husband had neglected to call such a court before inflicting penalty on his wife, his neglect was not punishable as a wrong, but rather as an offense against good manners. It is recorded of one Lucius Antonius (about the year of the city, 440), that he was removed from the Senate by the censors for having repudiated his wife without taking counsel of friends, but the same stigma might have been put upon him for expensiveness, or other conduct not exactly illegal. In the freer kind of marriage, as the husband acquired no power over his wife's person, the head of her natural family must have called such a court, if any were assembled.

Divorce, according to a tradition preserved by Dionysius, was regulated by law from the time of Romulus onwards. He says that it could take place for violations of the law of chastity and for drinking wine,—sentence of the husband and the relations being necessary for its validity. Plutarch's statement is that the wife could not separate herself from her husband, but that the husband could repudiate his wife for three crimes—poisoning the children, making false keys, and adultery. Wine bibbing on the part of the wife we know from other sources to have been a grave offense. He adds that a man putting away his wife on other grounds forfeited his property, half of which was to be consecrated to Ceres, and half to go to the injured partner.* But these traditions can be of no historical value. They only show that divorce in the olden

* Dion. Hal. ii, 25, Plut. Romulus, § 22. Plutarch adds that a man who sold his wife, which in plebeian marriage forms may have been practised, was devoted to the infernal gods.

times was in some way restricted, and that family courts were of great antiquity.

A more reliable, yet no doubt confused, tradition declares the first divorce at Rome to have occurred about the year 520 of the city—that is eighty years after the divorce of Lucius Antonius already mentioned—and under the following circumstances: Carvilius Ruga greatly loved his wife who was barren, but inasmuch as the regular question of the Censor, at the time of the *census*, required him to declare, on oath, that he had, or would have, a wife *liberorum querendorum gratia*, under pretence of avoiding a false oath, he terminated the marriage state by repudiation.* It is impossible to believe that no divorce occurred at Rome for more than five hundred years from its foundation, and yet there is no good reason for rejecting the story altogether. Various have been the attempts to explain it or to reconcile it with the probable state of facts. It may have been the first divorce in which a family court was not called, or the first in which no fault on the part of the wife could be alleged, and in which, without her consent, the husband terminated the union.

This was just before the second Punic war. The victories over Carthage, the extension of the Roman empire in Greece, and the East, conspired with internal political changes, and with the decline of religious fear, to hasten on a corruption of manners and of morals, a luxury and an avarice greater perhaps than any other nation ever reached. Rome was built on family discipline, on economy, thrift, and order, rather than on domestic affection. The Roman matron, austere by the discipline of life, was not much loved,—she was the house mistress simply. As soon as the old rigor of family life passed away, everything in morals fell, and marriage was poisoned at its foundation. At the same time the increasing prevalence of the free form of marriage put it into the power of the wife's nearest relations to dissolve the union for her, and her own position became increasingly independent. Thus a step which

* It is preserved by A. Gell. iv., 8, xvii., 21, Valer. Max. ii., 1, and by other writers. For explanation of it we refer to Rein's Röm. Privatrecht, p. 208, and to an essay in Savigny's miscel. works, Vol. I., No. 4. He violated public feeling, and his conscientious scruples were a mere pretext.

only the husband could take under the old forms attended with the *manus*, could now be taken almost as freely by the wife; and a step which, in the older forms, needed a solemn formality in order to be valid, could now be taken with almost no formalities at all.* Add to this that the dower brought by the wife became almost an essential part of marriage, and avarice added its weight to the various other motives for divorce, if the chance of a better dower were offered. The dissolution of morals began with the upper classes at Rome, but the contagion could not help reaching the lower parts of society, the needy, shiftless freeman, the supple freedman, and the profligate foreigners, who made up a large part of the free population of Rome.

Towards the end of the Republic, then, things had reached this pass in regard to divorce:—that public opinion had ceased to frown upon it, that it could be initiated by husband or wife with almost equal freedom, that there was a ready consent of both parties to the separation in the prospect of marrying again, and that this facility of divorce was open to all classes who could contract lawful marriage. It might be supposed that the crime of adultery would be diminished by the power thus furnished of entering into a new marriage with an object of guilty attachment. But adultery too went along with divorce. They were both indications of a horrible corruption, and neither of them was a venthole large enough to let off alone the inward foul stench of family life. And if proof were wanted of this we need only refer to the legislation of Augustus, and to the continual allusions made to adultery by the poets of the imperial times, such as Juvenal and Martial.

A few particulars, however, illustrating the sunken condition of the Roman lady towards the end of the Republic, and the

* In the *confarreatio* or religious marriage of the patricians, a form called *disfarreatio*—that is, separation with the ceremony of offering the cake of spelt, as *confarreatio* denoted union with the same ceremony—dissolved the marriage tie. In both *coemptio* and *usus*, it is probable, a form called *remancipatio*, another fictitious sale, set the wife free from her husband. In marriage without the *manus* no form was necessary, and this kind of marriage at the fall of the republic had superseded the others almost entirely.

small degree of sanctity which the marriage tie had now come to have, will perhaps make more impression than the most emphatic general statements. Already, before the last age of the republic, there was a foreshadowing of a decline of family morals in the expensiveness and in the crimes of married women. It was not enough that the Censor could interfere by his almost unrestrained power as a conservator of public morals; sumptuary laws also, broken and disregarded to be reënacted with new provisions, show what was felt to be an evil of family life. At an early time also poisoning of a husband by a wife is noticed by the Roman historians. The case mentioned by Livy, as occurring in the year 422 of the city (B. C. 332) wears the look of an incredible prodigy. A number of the principal men having died without known cause, a maid gave information to one of the ædiles that some of the leading matrons had prepared and administered poisonous drinks. The case was looked into by order of the Senate, twenty were put to death at first, being compelled to take their own potions, and as many as one hundred and seventy were condemned afterwards (Livy viii, 18). Again about the year 572 (B. C. 182) the wife of a consul was convicted by many witnesses of having poisoned her husband; and a little later, just before the third Punic war, two of the first ladies of Rome, being convicted of the same crime by a court of relatives, were put to death.* Nor ought we to overlook that frightful development of mingled superstition and lust, the affair of the Bacchanals, which so much alarmed the Senate, on account of its political as well as its moral aspects, in the year of the city 568 (B. C. 186), and which in the very circumstances of its detection gives us a dark picture of family life, and discloses to us, as it were before the time, the corruption of Roman morals. It is to the year prior to that which brought these things to light that Livy assigns the introduction of foreign luxuries through the soldiery who had served in Asia;—the costly garments and furniture, the singing women and sumptuous feasts, the cook, “vilest of slaves in the view of the forefathers” but now regarded as an artist. Yet, adds he, what was then wit-

* Livy xl. 37, and Ept. xlviii.

nessed was but the seeds of a luxury that was to come. The corruption that grew from the time of Sulla to that of Catiline, which Clodius helped to increase, at the acme of which that "strong-minded" woman, Fulvia, and then Julia, an Emperor's daughter, flourished, is acknowledged and painted in glaring colors by the Roman historians. They are more apt however to dwell on avarice, lust of power, and luxury as the ground-work of the evil, not making enough of the decay of religion and the family, and less aware of the poisonous influence of slavery. The satirist Juvenal speaks thus of the sources of the corruption :

Nullum crimen abest facinusque libidinis, ex quo
Paupertas Romana perit.

And again,

Prima peregrinos obscena pecunia mores
Intulit, et turpi frugerunt secula luxu
Divitiæ mollea.

But Horace goes more to the roots of things, when he says

Fecunda culpæ secula nuptias
Primum inquinavere et genus et domos.
Hoc fonte derivata clades
In patriam populumque fluxit.

We know Rome best during the last age of the republic, or at least biography and anecdote preserve more details of the private life of that period. Let us look at a few of these details which touch on divorce and domestic morals.

First we notice cases in which a slight impropriety on the part of the woman furnished ground for divorce. Here the ancient severity and a weakening of the family tie mingled their influences in one. A Sulpicius Gallus put away his wife because she had gone abroad with her head uncovered. An Antistius Vetus did the same, because his wife was seen by him talking in public with a freed-woman of the common sort ; and a Sempronius Sophus, because his wife went to the spectacle without his knowledge. These may have been early cases : then, as morals fell and divorce grew common, mere dislike, or a fancy for some one else, caused men and women to desert their partners with a very summary notice, such as *tuas*

res tibi habeto. An early instance of this occurs in the case of *Emilius Paullus*, who put away *Papiria*, the mother of *Scipio Africanus* the younger, without giving any reasons for the step. Another striking instance is mentioned by a correspondent of *Cicero*, that of *Paulla Valeria*, the sister of *Triarius*, who divorced herself from her husband on the day that he was to return from his province, for the purpose of marrying *Decimus Brutus*. Innumerable must have been the cases of this kind. As numberless were divorces on the ground of adultery, provoked very frequently, where the wife committed the crime, by the intolerable dissoluteness and disregard of the husband. Only the fear of having to pay back the *dower* seems now to have restrained divorce, and this was often counteracted, as has been remarked, by a greater advantage in prospect.

The lives of many of the most eminent Romans show how loose was the marriage tie, or how great the crimes of one of the parties.

L. Lucullus, the conqueror of *Mithridates*, repudiated two wives on account of their infidelity—*Claudia*, daughter of a Consul, and then *Servilia*, half-sister of *Cato* the younger. Her sister, another *Servilia*, the mother of *Brutus*, *Cæsar's* murderer, was a favorite mistress of *Julius Cæsar*. *Cæsar* was married four times:—his first wife, *Cossutia*, he divorced in his youth, to marry the daughter of the infamous *Cinna*; his third wife, *Pompeia*, he divorced on suspicion of an intrigue between her and *Clodius*, who came by stealth into her husband's house, in female attire, at the celebration of the mysteries of the *Bona Dea*. *Cæsar* himself was notorious for his impurity and libertinage, so that his soldiers scoffed about it in a triumphal procession. *Pompey*, a less immoral but much meaner man, repudiated his first wife, *Antistia*, to please the dictator *Sulla*, and his third, *Mucia*, on account of her profligacy. What shall we say of *Cicero*, one of the best of the Romans, who dismissed *Terentia* without crime, after a long marriage, to unite himself with a rich young lady, *Publilia*, in the hope of paying his debts out of her property. This connexion, also, proved unfortunate, and was dissolved in about a year. Nor was his daughter *Tullia* less happy in her matrimonial affairs. Her first husband dying, she married a second,

from whom ere long she divorced herself, and then became the wife of a most profligate man, Dolabella, who divorced his wife Fabia, it is said, to marry her. Cato the younger was married twice, and the second wife was worthy of him, but the first, Atilia, he divorced for adultery, after she had borne him two children. To these specimens, drawn from the families of the leading men at Rome, a rich collection might be added. If we now go down a little to Augustus, who forced the husband of Livia to repudiate her for his benefit, and took her to wife three months before the birth of a child by her first husband, or to his minister Mæcenas, who was as scandalous in his life as he was elegant in his taste, or to the profligate life of Julia, the emperor's daughter, and of so many other ladies of the house of the Cæsars, we shall find that family life grew worse instead of better, as the republic fell. There were indeed efforts made to effect a reform. Augustus, profligate himself, endeavored to alter morals by legislation—first in the year 727 (B. C. 27), then in 736 (B. C. 18), by several laws, among which the *lex Julia de adulteriis et de pudicitia* may be mentioned, and finally in 762 (A. D. 9), by the *lex Papia Poppæa*. Of these laws, so far as they related to divorce, our space prohibits us from saying much, although they form an epoch in the Roman legislation concerning the family relations. Divorce was now subjected to certain formalities, being invalid if not declared before seven grown up Roman men and a freedman of the divorcing party. The man whose wife was caught in adultery or found guilty of it was obliged to put her away, on penalty of being held privy to the crime, and it was made incumbent on him to prosecute in such a case within sixty days, after which any other person might act as her accuser. A woman convicted of this crime was punished with relegation and a loss of a certain portion of her dower and of her goods. A freedwoman marrying her patron could not take out a divorce without his consent. This legislation also settled more fully and minutely a principle already acted upon that in suits concerning dower after divorce the fault of the wife subjected her to a detention of a portion of the dower. This in the practice of Roman law seems to have been a most important matter, but its details do not belong here.

Augustus, and even that frightful wretch Tiberius, acted as legislators in the department of family morals. But morals grew worse and worse. He who is shocked by the developments of family life in the oration for Cluentius, or by such a character as Aurelia Orestilla, who, being reluctant to marry Cataline on account of a grown up son, consummated the union when the son was made way with,—he who is shocked by these earlier acts of wickedness will be more shocked by what Suetonius and that tragic historian Tacitus have to tell of life under the emperors. It was then that Seneca, a man better skilled in writing than in acting morally, could say that no woman was now ashamed of divorce, since certain illustrious and noble ladies counted their years not by the number of consuls but of husbands. The moral disease had reached the vitals, and was incurable. As Rome rose to her greatness by severity of family life, so she fell into ruins by laxity just at that point.

Rome is a most interesting study for us Americans, because her vices, greed for gold, prodigality, a coarse material civilization, corruption in the family, as manifested by connubial unfaithfulness and by divorce, are increasing among us. We have got rid of one of her curses, slavery, and that is a great ground of hope for the future. But whether we are to be a thoroughly Christian nation, or to decay and lose our present political forms, depends upon our ability to keep family life pure and simple.*

* For divorce among the Romans, Wächter's work on that subject (Stuttgart, 1832), Rein's *Privatrecht* (Leipzig, 1836), Bekker-Marquardt's *Roman Antiquities*, part V. (Leipzig, 1861), and Roebach's *Roman Marriage*, deserve, among many others, especial mention.

ARTICLE VI.—A ROMAN PHILOSOPHER.

THE "Catholic World," published at New York, is a monthly magazine of original and selected articles in the interest of the Roman Catholic Church. A friend has directed our attention to the latest number, and particularly to an essay entitled "Philosophy of Conversion." The essay referred to is worth reading for several reasons; and we cannot but think that by giving some account of it, we may render a service to our readers and to the truth.

Conversion, as the word is used by this philosopher, is not what we, who take the Bible as the rule of our faith, are wont to call by that name. It is not the turning of a sinner from his sins to God, but the turning of a Protestant from his supposed right of private judgment to believe implicitly whatever the Roman Catholic Church believes. Beginning with a reference to the notoriously numerous instances of transition from Anglicanism to Romanism, the writer affirms on the authority of "reliable statistics," that "within the last fifty years no less than forty-one clergymen of the American Episcopal Church alone have laid down the emoluments which they there enjoyed, and have espoused poverty and insignificance with the Catholic faith." Then admitting that he has no data by which to determine "how far the ranks of other Protestant sects have been invaded by God's converting grace," he illustrates the proficiency which he has made in the grace of credulity, by professing his own belief that the number of clerical converts from each of those other sects "will fall little short" of the number from the Episcopal "denomination." Whereupon he indulges in triumphal rhetoric about the multitudes of laymen, from all sects and denominations, and from none, who are constantly becoming good Roman Catholics. An editorial foot-note says: "Judging from the statistics of the past few years in the dioceses of New York, the number of converts in the United States must exceed 30,000."

These exultations deserve to be considered. Whatever may

be said about some sweeping assertions in which the writer before us indulges his imagination, and exhibits the easiness with which he can believe without evidence, some facts in relation to the growth of Romanism in this country may be, reasonably enough, regarded with satisfaction and gratulation by intelligent Romanists. 1. The migration of foreigners into the United States has been for a long time, and will probably continue to be, more largely Roman Catholic than Protestant. A certain fatality, of misgovernment or something else, seems to afflict those countries of the old world in which the Roman hierarchy has a predominating influence with the people. Doubtless the philosopher whose essay is before us might explain the fact to his own edification if not to our satisfaction. We propose no explanation of the fact; we only refer to it as showing what is, and what must be expected. There is no great movement of population from one Roman Catholic country to another—none, for example, from Spain into Spanish America—none from Austria into Brazil. But Protestant Geneva is actually in danger of being romanized by immigration. The Roman Catholic Irish forsaking their own country, so blessed with the gifts of nature—so impoverished by human arrangements and influences—swarm into over-populous England and Scotland, but not into Celtic and Catholic France, where the growth of population is hardly perceptible, and where the imperial government is ready to welcome any accession to the number of its conscribable subjects. They pour in a steady volume into this country, but not into Mexico; and so they will continue to come till Ireland shall be (we will not say Protestant, but) free and prosperous, or till the United States shall begin to be like Mexico. 2. Under the influence of American ideas and institutions, the Roman Catholic population in the United States is becoming intelligent and prosperous in proportion as it becomes a native population—that is, in proportion as the number of Roman Catholics born and educated here exceeds the number of those who, born and educated elsewhere, are Americans only by naturalization. 3. In proportion as the average of the Roman Catholic population, by intellectual and moral improvement, and by the prosperity consequent on industry and thrift, rises to a higher level in so-

ciety, accessions to that sect from the various Protestant bodies, and from the large class of the simply irreligious or "Nothingarians," are of course increasingly numerous. 4. The Tractarian movement, here and in England, tends Rome-ward with a constant force. No Episcopalian who falls into that movement with a hearty acceptance of its principles, and who has any instinct of logical inconsistency, can find the catholicity of which he dreams till he finds it in the Roman Catholic communion. All these things considered, we can hardly wonder at the exultation in which our philosopher indulges himself by way of prelude to the philosophy of conversion. The body with which he has connected himself is really making a good many proselytes in this country. He calls those proselytes "converts." Our Episcopalian friends, and some other Protestants, prefer to call them "perverts." The "perversion," when an Anglo-Catholic, having embraced all the Tractarian superstitions, and having practiced all the follies of extreme ritualism, has at last gone over to the Roman obedience, is not much of a "conversion." Whether we give it one name or the other, is of little consequence.

Yet it is worth remembering that the process of conversion or perversion works both ways. While Protestants, or those who might be counted as such in a census of the population, are continually received into the Roman communion, Roman Catholics, on the other hand, or persons of Roman Catholic parentage, are continually becoming Protestants. It may be doubtful on which side the balance falls in the account current of conversions and perversions; or there may be, as some think, no doubt at all. The obvious growth of the Roman power in this country might be accounted for, even if it were much greater than it is, by the natural increase of the Roman Catholic population, together with the great and constant additions to it by immigration. Our opinion is—and this is not a Protestant opinion only—that if all the children and descendants of Roman Catholics in our country, since the beginning of the century, had remained till now in communion with the Pope, and if in all that time no converts or perverts had been added to them, that portion of the American people would be far more numerous than it is to-day. We will even hazard

the conjecture that if in any certain series of years sixty thousand persons have gone into the Roman Catholic Church from without, not fewer than one hundred thousand persons, in the same series of years, have gone out of that connection into Protestantism, or into simple infidelity and irreligion.

As for our philosopher's professed belief that the number of clerical converts to Rome from each of the leading Protestant "sects" in this country, "will fall little short" of the number from the Episcopal "denomination," we have already intimated our incredulity. We ought to say more. Our acquaintance, direct and indirect, with the ministry of the Congregational Churches in the United States, and with the Presbyterian clergy, Old School and New School, is not very limited. We have long been on terms of friendly intercourse with Baptist and Methodist ministers, and have watched with some care the various directions in which the progress of thought and inquiry among them seems to be tending. From a date as early as the publication of the Oxford Tracts, we have been observing the natural history (if we have not explored the philosophy) of clerical conversion or perversion to Romanism. But in all our memory we find no instance of that phenomenon occurring in any one of those four great Protestant bodies. We have known instances of young ministers, or candidates for the ministry, or theological students, going over into the Protestant Episcopal Church, and then, after a sufficient course of Tractarianism, passing on to Rome. But all such instances are among the "forty-one clergymen of the American Episcopal Church" whom our philosopher counts up as converts, himself being evidently one of them; and certainly he cannot expect to strengthen his argument, or to illustrate his philosophy of conversion, by counting them twice. Dr. O. A. Brownson cannot be named as an exception. That remarkable man never had any clerical standing or title among Protestants, except as a Universalist preacher. He, after working his way through Universalism into a more avowed and consistent scheme of unbelief, and finding in his philosophy no satisfaction for his restless soul, bowed at last to the pretended infallibility of the Church of Rome, hoping, it would seem, to gain in that way the rest of an assured belief.

What then is the philosophy of conversion to Romanism, as expounded by the writer before us? He professes to write not only from observation and study, but also from his own experience of such a change; and we do not question his honesty when he speaks of it as a "work of grace which in the convert's memory has overshadowed and embraces all other gifts of God." Following a natural order of thought, he defines the change "to which," he says, "we [Roman Catholics] give the technical name '*conversion*,'" by the double method of showing first what it is not, and then what it is. He gives three negative definitions of conversion. It is not "the adoption of the articles of the Roman Catholic faith into the individual's creed." It is not "the adoption of our [Roman Catholic] extreme ritualism in worship." It is not "union with the visible body of the [Roman] Catholic Church." Having illustrated these several positions, he proceeds to the affirmative part of his definition:

"The change we call '*conversion*,' thus residing neither in the transfer of ecclesiastical relations to the church, nor in the growth of ritualism into the external conduct, nor yet even in the adoption of Catholic doctrine as the individual's creed, must have its sphere of action in regions deeper and more fundamental than we have yet explored. The church of God looks with the eyes of God upon the souls of men. '*Give me thine heart*,' is her, is His demand, confident that if this be given all else is also gained. The change she seeks in those whom God would make her children is a change, not of opinion, not of tastes, not of behavior, but of *heart and will*; a change which reaches to the citadel of life, and thoroughly and permanently converts the man. With nothing less than this can she be satisfied. On nothing less than this can she securely build."—*Catholic World*, Jan. 1867, page 464.

Passing over at present the description of Protestantism and of the opposite Catholicity, by which the writer attempts to illustrate his definition of conversion, we find more of the same sort. Having shown that heresy means "choice," he says:

"To the church heresy is evermore a name of execration and of horror. The heart and will of her disciples have but one exercise, and that is submission. Unconditionally, unquestioningly, unprotestingly, they bow before her voice, and echo its decrees. * * * The soul has but one inquiry for every dogma, for every precept: '*Teacher of God, what hast thou spoken?*' The teacher answers, and the soul obeys." Page 469.

"Whether from the external Saharas of Christian scepticism, or whether from beneath the shadow of the truth itself, the path he follows leads to one goal, the goal of unconditional submission. Conversion may come to him through the suc-

cessive adoption of Catholic dogmas, through fondness for external rites and forms, through personal friendship and familiarity, through any of these myriad ways by which God bends the steps of his elect towards Heaven; but when it comes, it is the same change for each, for every one—the abnegation of all choice and self-affirmation, and the complete subjection of the heart and will to the obedience of faith. Then, and then only, is the work ended and the conversion made complete. What the church teaches is from that hour the faith of that Christian heart. What the church commands is the law of that Christian will. Doubt and hesitation and self-following are of the days gone by, and his devotion to the church, as God's teacher, is only rivaled by his love for her as the home of God's elect. The waters of the deluge roar and dash around his mighty ark of safety, and men and women, as they clamber up the rugged mountains of their own devices, laugh at him for his ignorance and folly; but he abides in peace when the dark waves have overtopped and engulfed them, and will live to offer sacrifice on Ararat when the days of divine searching have passed by."—*Ibid.*

Such then, in the theory of our philosopher, is the only true conversion. There may be an outward and seeming conversion, accepting all the propositions of the Roman creed in its latest and most enlarged edition, eagerly adopting all the Roman ritual in worship, and formally passing over into the outward and visible communion of the faithful; but a true conversion is something deeper than all this, "a change of heart and will"—and therefore invisible save to him who "searcheth the hearts." Absolute submission to ecclesiastical authority, that is to the authority of the Roman Catholic hierarchy—absolute faith in what that hierarchy teaches—absolute obedience to what that hierarchy commands—the abnegation of reason, of the faculty which discerns right and wrong, and even of choice and personal responsibility to God, in the awful presence of that hierarchy—is the only true conversion.* We

* For the sake of greater clearness, we substitute "*Hierarchy*" for "*church*" in this statement of the author's doctrine of conversion, because, so far as "submission" is concerned, the Roman Catholic organization is nothing less than a hierarchy. Or if there be an attempt to distinguish in theory between the church and its mediating and ruling priesthood, that distinction is of no account in relation to the required abnegation of personal freedom and the getting rid of a direct responsibility to God. The authority of the church—whether it be represented by a General Council, or by Christ's Vicar, or by a bishop, or by a confessor and spiritual director—is the authority of the hierarchy, and nothing else. To the individual Romanist asking what God has revealed to him, or what God will have him do, there is no possible answer but from the hierarchy, and no possibility of inquiring whether that answer is right without incurring the guilt of that which "to the church is evermore a name of execration and horror."

have no doubt that the author brings forth this doctrine of conversion out of his own experience. There may have been a time in his religious history when his conscience was burdened with the feeling of his direct and individual responsibility to God, and when, under the necessity of obeying the truth in order to know the truth, and of knowing in order to obey, he labored and was heavy-laden. Doubtless he has found a relief—a sort of relief very precious in his esteem—by surrendering himself to the authority of the Roman Catholic Church. Doubtless he has found, in that way, a measure of tranquillity—rest from the dread responsibility involved in the freedom wherewith the author of his being had invested him—rest from the duty of proving all things, and holding fast that which is good. What effects that conversion of his has wrought upon his intellectual and moral being, may perhaps appear as we proceed in our study of his philosophy.

To illustrate and confirm his idea of conversion from Protestantism to Romanism, he undertakes to tell what Protestantism is in its principles, and in their logical and actual results. He says :

“Protestantism, so far as it is a religious system, is based upon two principles, from which have been developed all its influence and power, and to which may be traced the numerous and immeasurable evils whereof for many ages it has been a fruitful source. The first of these is: That the church, founded by our Lord, is an *invisible* church, to which every man who believes he is saved by Christ is by *that sole belief* united, whatever else his creed and religious observance may be. The second is: That every man by his own reason working on the text of Scripture, is able to and must determine for himself what his religious faith and moral code shall be.”—Page 464.

It may be presumed that this writer, before his experience of the conversion which he describes, had only, at the best, a very imperfect and muddled notion of the “religious system” in which he had been more or less intelligently trained. But we are sure that nothing less than such a conversion—such an abnegation of his intellectual and moral powers—such a surrender of himself to the absolute control of the ecclesiastical authority which radiates from Rome—could have made him capable of writing the statement which we have just transcribed. If the statement is made up of blunders merely, with no infusion of willingness to misrepresent, we do not see how

he could have made such blunders, had he not long ago, in that "change of heart and will" which he describes, stifled his faculty of thinking for himself, and of discerning between truth and falsehood. If, on the other hand, it seems impossible that an educated man who was once a Protestant can have made so false a statement through mere ignorance of notorious facts, the misrepresentation illustrates the effect which his conversion, as described by himself, has had, not merely on the intellectual faculty which discerns the truth, but on the moral habit of truthfulness.

We are using strong language concerning this writer's statement of what he expects his readers to believe are the two fundamental principles of Protestantism. Strong language is what the case requires, and inasmuch as these pages are likely to fall under his eye, we will justify the strength of our language by showing to him and his associates how widely his statement differs from notorious truth.

I. The first of the two fundamental principles which he imputes to Protestantism as a religious system, consists of two points: 1, "That the church founded by our Lord is an *invisible* church;" and 2, That to that invisible church "every man who believes he is saved by Christ is *by that sole belief* united, whatever else his creed and religious observances may be." Is it true that Protestantism adopts these two propositions, or either of them, as a fundamental principle?

1. Does Protestantism deny, or ignore, the visibility of the church founded by our Lord? Protestants in common with Romanists accept that ancient formula of a Christian profession, the Apostles' Creed. They are accustomed to say, as truly and conscientiously as the Pope himself, "I believe in the holy, universal church, the communion of saints." True, they do not attach to the word church in this article of the Creed precisely the same meaning which Romanists attach to it. They do not include in it the notion of that particular hierarchy and that particular body of traditions which in the Roman theory must needs be included in a right conception of "the church founded by our Lord." But do they therefore deny that the church of Christ has a visible existence on the earth? Did our philosopher, who expresses himself so fluently and knowingly about Protestantism, ever hear of Cal-

vin? Did he ever look into Calvin's Institutes? Can he tell what the subject is of the Fourth Book? The first thirteen chapters of that book treat of the Church, of its government, of its power, and of its discipline. At the very beginning, two chapters are taken up with discussing the necessity of being in communion with the church, and the criteria by which the true church of Christ may be identified and distinguished.

A few passages from the first chapter will sufficiently enable intelligent readers to recollect how Calvin was wont to express himself concerning the church of Christ as a visible institution :

"I shall begin with the Church in whose bosom it is God's will that all his children should be collected, not only to be nourished by her assistance and ministry during their infancy and childhood, but also to be governed by her maternal care till they obtain a mature age, and at length reach the end of their faith." *Sec. 1.* * * * "That article of the Creed, in which we profess to believe ~~the~~ Church, refers not only to the visible church of which we are now speaking, but likewise to all the elect of God, including the dead as well as the living. The word *believe* is used because it is often impossible to discover any difference between the children of God and the ungodly." *Sec. 2.* * * * "This article of the Creed, however, relates in some measure to the external church, that every one of us may maintain a brotherly agreement with all the children of God, may pay due deference to the authority of the church, and, in a word, may conduct himself as one of the flock. Therefore we add *the communion of saints*." *Sec. 3.* * * * "But as our present design is to treat of the *visible* church, we may learn even from the title of *mother* how useful and even necessary it is for us to know her; since there is no other way of entrance into life unless we are conceived by her, born of her, nourished at her breast, and continually preserved under her care and government till we are divested of this mortal flesh, and become like the angels. For our infirmity will not admit of our dismission from her school; we must continue under her instruction and discipline to the end of our lives. It is also to be remarked that out of her bosom there can be no hope of remission of sins or any salvation." * * * "In these words, [Ps. cvi. 4, 5], the paternal favor of God, and the peculiar testimony of the spiritual life are restricted to the flock, to teach us that it is always fatally dangerous to be separated from the church." *Sec. 4.* "The universal church is the whole multitude collected from all nations, who, though dispersed in countries widely distant from each other, nevertheless consent to the same truth of divine doctrine, and are united by the bond of the same religion. In this universal church are comprehended particular churches, distributed according to human necessity in various towns and villages; and each of these respectively is justly distinguished by the name and authority of a church." *Sec. 9.*

The doctrine of Calvin on this subject is the doctrine of the Church of England as propounded in the Thirty-nine Articles. Calvin says, B. IV., Ch. i., Sec. 9: "Wherever we find the

word of God purely preached and heard, and the sacraments administered according to the institution of Christ, there, it is not to be doubted, is a church of God." The Nineteenth Article says, in words quoted almost literally from Calvin: "The visible church of Christ is a congregation of faithful men in which the pure word of God is preached, and the sacraments be duly administered according to Christ's ordinance in all those things that of necessity are requisite to the same." Does not Anglican Protestantism maintain that the church which Christ has founded in this world is a visible church?

Is it possible that our philosopher, who makes a show of understanding all about Protestantism, never knew the Westminster Confession? That well-known standard of Presbyterian orthodoxy, in Scotland and in America, has a chapter "of the Church," (Ch. XXV.), summing up the doctrine of Calvin clearly and forcibly:

"The catholic or universal church, which is invisible, consists of the whole number of the elect, that have been, are, or shall be gathered into one under Christ the head thereof; and is the spouse, the body, the fulness of him that filleth all in all.

"The visible church, which is also catholic or universal under the gospel, (not confined to one nation as before under the law), consists of all those throughout the world, that profess the true religion, together with their children, and is the kingdom of the Lord Jesus Christ, the house and family of God, out of which there is no ordinary possibility of salvation.

"Unto this catholic visible church Christ hath given the ministry, oracles, and ordinances of God, for the gathering and perfecting of the saints, in this life, to the end of the world, and doth by His own presence and spirit, according to his promise, make them effectual thereunto."

Presbyterianism is commonly reputed to be (whether for good or for evil) more Protestant than Anglicanism. Does not Presbyterian Protestantism hold and teach that the church founded by our Lord is a visible church?

Congregationalism is a still more advanced form of the Protestant reformation. Our readers need not be told that Congregationalists recognize the visibility of the church which Christ has founded among men. But let Congregationalism speak for itself in its own authentic documents. What says the Cambridge Platform?

"The catholic church is the whole company of those that are elected, redeemed, and in time effectually called from the state of sin and death, unto a state of grace and salvation in Jesus Christ.

"This church is either triumphant, or militant: Triumphant, the number of them who are glorified in heaven; militant, the number of them who are conflicting with their enemies upon earth.

"This militant church is to be considered as invisible and visible: Invisible in respect of their relation wherein they stand to Christ, as a body unto the head, being united unto him by the Spirit of God and faith in their hearts: Visible in respect of the profession of their faith, in their persons, and in particular churches. And so there may be acknowledged a universal visible church."

—*Camb. Platform Ch. ii, Sec. 1-3.*

We might have gone farther back, beginning with Luther and the Augsburg confession. We might trace the series of testimonies onward to the Congregational Council at Boston in 1865. But the citations we have made are enough, and more than enough to show our philosopher and his associates how grossly and inexcusably his statement misrepresents Protestantism in its fundamental principles. "That the church founded by our Lord is an *invisible* church," is not more a doctrine of Luther and Calvin, of Episcopalians or Presbyterians, of Wesleyans or Congregationalists, than it is a doctrine of the very writer whose "philosophy of conversion" we are now examining.

Let it not be said that the statement in question is justified by the distinction which Calvin and other Protestants make between the church as visible and the church as invisible. Should such a subterfuge be resorted to, it will be answer enough to call for an authentic instance in which Protestantism has affirmed that "the church *founded* by our Lord is an invisible church." The church, considered as actually redeemed and saved by Christ, according to the eternal counsel of the Father, is invisible, for, inasmuch as it includes all the regenerated children of God, and excludes all who though they profess to believe "draw back unto perdition," it is an object of faith, and is counted among the things eternal which are "not seen." The church considered as including all those and only those whom God did "foreknow" from before the foundation of the world, whom "he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son," whom in the progress of ages "he also calls" effectually by his grace, whom "he also justifies," and whom "he also glorifies" forever,—is invisible to eyes that look only on the outward appearance. But "the

church *founded* by our Lord,"—that is, the church considered as an *institution* in this world of time,—is visible: just as a man born into the world, and living in it, is visible, though the man himself, the mind, the will, the living soul, "the hidden man of the heart," the responsible agent who must give account to God for all the deeds done in the body, is literally invisible. The distinction is that which the apostle Paul makes when he says, "They are not all Israel which are of Israel." It is the same distinction which our philosopher himself makes when he undertakes to demonstrate that "union with the *visible* body of the Catholic Church is not conversion."

2. Does Protestantism teach or hold that to the invisible church "every man who believes he is saved by Christ is *by that sole belief united*, whatever else his creed and religious observance may be?" Protestantism does indeed hold that, as sinners, we are justified by faith alone, for the sake and by the efficacy of what Christ has done in our behalf, and not by any works of external or formal righteousness without faith. It does hold that the invisible church consists only of believing and justified souls. But to say that in the Protestant system every man who believes himself justified is therefore justified—or "every man who *believes he is saved by Christ* is by that sole belief united" to the invisible church of the redeemed, "*whatever else his creed and religious observance may be*"—falls below the level of respectable caricature. It is the very fatuity of misrepresentation—a fatuity which may be regarded as illustrating "the philosophy of conversion" to Rome.

"Faith" (we quote the authentic language of Protestantism) "receiving and resting upon Christ and his righteousness, is the alone instrument of justification; yet *it is not alone in the person justified, but is ever accompanied with all other saving graces*, and is no dead faith, but worketh by love." Faith, "receiving and resting upon Christ," as prophet, priest, and king, is a very different thing from the belief of the man who merely "believes he is saved by Christ;" and the proposition that, while faith is the alone instrument of justification, "it is not alone in the person justified, but it is ever accompanied with all other saving graces"—the proposition that the faith which justifies, "is no dead faith, but worketh by love"—is a

very different thing from the proposition that the belief of the man "who believes he is saved by Christ," is sufficient for his membership in the church invisible, "whatever else his creed and religious observance may be." Did our philosopher, in that great change of heart and will which passed upon him when he surrendered his intellectual and moral being to the Church of Rome, become incapable of discerning a difference so palpable?

II. The second of the two fundamental principles which he imputes to Protestantism is more plausibly stated; but the imputation is equally untrue. Protestantism holds that the only *authoritative* rule of faith and Christian life is the word of God, contained in the Holy Scriptures. It holds that the inspired sense of Scripture, or what God teaches by means of that recorded revelation, is to be ascertained by legitimate methods of interpretation and exposition. It holds that the Scripture "given by inspiration of God, is profitable"—not to the Pope only, nor to bishops, nor to clergymen of any rank, but to all believing souls—"for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness." It holds that the precept, "Search the Scriptures," is for all who have access to those holy books, and that every man who has the privilege is responsible for the use he makes of it. It holds that while these Scriptures are marvelously adapted to readers of all ages, of all conditions, and of all degrees of intelligence, they yield their richest fruit of wisdom only to the humble and earnest reader seeking to become acquainted with God, and to do God's will. It holds that the Bible is to be studied with all the light which learning and science can throw upon its pages, and that every reader is to use whatever helps of commentary and exposition are within his reach, but most of all that help which is within the reach of every believing soul, the Holy Spirit freely given of the Father to those who ask. It holds that while there is room for the amplest learning and the profoundest wisdom to be employed in the illustration of the Scriptures, every man who reads these holy books, humbly and devoutly, for the purpose of learning what he must do to be saved, will find that they are "able to make him wise unto salvation through faith which is in Christ Jesus." It holds

that in all cases of controversy about Christian doctrine, the ultimate appeal is not to oral tradition, nor to the opinions of doctors, nor to the sayings of the fathers, but to the Scriptures; and that therefore the proper function of pastors and teachers, or of the clergy by whatever names they may be called, is not to keep Christian people from thinking, or from searching the Scriptures, but to help and guide their search, and to help and stimulate their thinking, so that they may see for themselves what the Scriptures teach. In regard to the authority and use of the Bible, Protestantism and Romanism are irreconcilably opposite to each other. But Protestants do not accept the principle which the writer before us represents as one of the two principles on which their religious system is based.

His statement of that well known principle on which the Reformation rests, namely, the principle that the Bible is for all Christian people, and that every Christian man has a right to read it for himself and in reading must use his own intelligent faculties, is in these words:—"That every man, by his own reason working on the text of Scripture, is able to, and must determine for himself what his religious faith and code shall be." What he means by this becomes evident on the next page, where he says of Luther and "his successors in all countries and all ages," "They have denied that God has furnished to mankind other interpreters of his revelation than the *unaided intellect* of man," and where he proceeds to say, "It cannot be disputed that every man to whom the name of Protestant belongs, depends entirely for his knowledge of the truth which God commands him to believe, and of the laws which God commands him to obey, upon what he can learn, *unled by note or comment*, from that collective translation," &c. In contradiction of all this we do not hesitate to say that nothing is more characteristic of Protestant writers and teachers, than their earnestness in maintaining that if a man would *safely* "determine for himself what his religious faith and moral code shall be," he needs something more than his own reason" or his "unaided intellect" "working on the text of Scripture," and learning, "unled by note or comment, from that collective translation" which happens to be within his reach. For example we turn to Baxter's "Directions for profitable reading

the Holy Scripture" in his Christian Directory, Part II., Ch. XX. [Baxter's Practical Works, IV., 263-266]. His directions are like those which any faithful pastor and preacher gives when attempting to show how the Bible should be used. Two or three specimens taken from this chapter of "directions" will sufficiently explain the value of our philosopher's statement on the point in question.

"DIRECT. VI. Bring not [to the reading of the Bible] a carnal mind which savoreth only fleshly things, and is enslaved to those sins which the Scripture doth condemn. 'For the carnal mind is enmity against God, and neither is nor can be subject to his law;' . . . and enmity is an ill expositor. It will be quarreling with all and making faults in the word which findeth so many faults in you," &c.

"DIRECT. VIII. Presume not on the strength of your own understanding, but humbly pray to God for light, and before and after you read the Scripture, pray earnestly that the Spirit which did indite it, may expound it to you and keep you from unbelief and error, and lead you into the truth."

"DIRECT. IX. Read some of the best annotations or expositors; who being better acquainted with the phrase of the Scripture than yourselves, may help to clear your understanding." . . . "Make use of your guides, if you would not err."

"DIRECT. X. When you are stalled by any difficulty which overtaketh you, note it down, and propound it to your pastor, and crave his help, or (if the minister of the place be ignorant or unable) go to some one that God hath furnished for such work. And if after all, some things remain still dark and difficult, remember your imperfection, and wait on God for further light, and thankfully make use of all the rest of Scripture which is plain. And do not think as the papists, that men must forbear reading it for fear of erring, any more than that men must forbear eating for fear of poison, or than subjects must be kept ignorant of the laws of the king for fear of misunderstanding or abusing them."

Such is the ignorance (or shall we say, audacity?) with which our philosopher imputes to Protestantism as the two principles "on which it is based," and "from which have been developed all its influence and power," a statement impossible to be accepted by any man who acknowledges the Bible as authority and the sole authority in religion. The deductions which he makes from those two principles, and which he represents as the practical inferences drawn by Protestants themselves from their own theory, are equally wide of notorious truth.

"The inevitable consequence of the first principle is,—that the doctrine and moral law of one man, so long as they embrace the Saviourship of Christ in any sense whatever, are matters in which his brother Christian can have no concern.

The inevitable consequence of the second is,—that the self-eliminated creed and rule of observance of each Christian are as correct and reliable as those of any or even of all others, and will be the only standard of his judgment at the bar of God."

Where are the Protestants, and who are they, who accept these "inevitable consequences," or whose ecclesiastical system is modified even in the least, by any such inevitableness? Not to inquire about the Lutheran and Reformed Churches on the European continent, we ask, does the Church of England with all its latitudinarianism, hold "that the doctrine and moral law of one man, so long as they embrace the Saviourship of Christ in any sense whatever, are matters in which his brother Christian can have no concern? Does American Episcopalianism hold it? Does Presbyterianism, either in Scotland or here, with its almost ceaseless wrangling about orthodoxy, hold any such consequence? Do the Methodists hold it? Do the Congregationalists? Do any of these Protestant bodies hold "that the self-eliminated creed and rule of observance of each Christian are as correct and reliable as those of any other, or even of all others?" We do not ask whether anybody can tell what sort of a thing a "self-eliminated creed" is, but we have a right to ask what man there is who holds that the Bible is the rule of a Christian's faith and the only authoritative rule, and at the same time holds that "the self-eliminated creed and rule of observance of each Christian" "will be the only standard of his judgment at the bar of God?" Surely some marvelous incapableness of truth—some lamentable deficiency, either moral or intellectual,—cannot but underlie such statements as these. The philosophy of conversion to Romanism might be illustrated by the experience of this convert, if we could know whether the incapableness is to be regarded as the cause of his conversion or as its consequence.

He proceeds to inform such readers as are credulous enough to believe him, that "this first principle and its logical deductions have resulted in simple individualism;" and, among other things, he says:

"It has destroyed, in the collective sect, all sense of responsibility for the faith and conduct of its members; and in the members, all sense of responsibility for their personal belief and morals to the sect at large. It has overturned every tribunal established for the preservation of Christian discipline, and has abroga-

ted '*church authority*' as wholly incompatible with purity of conscience and religious freedom. It has reduced the conditions of admission to ecclesiastical fellowship to the '*minimum of Christianity*,' and has abolished '*terms of communion*' and '*professions of faith*' as utterly subversive of denominational integrity. In this way it has made each man not only *de jure*, but *de facto* a spiritual autocrat, and has created him into an isolated independent religious body, depriving the sect of all real organic life, and degrading it from a church, with head and members, to a mere aggregation of discordant particles."

Here is a description of Protestantism in the present stage of its development. Is the description true? Is it even an exaggeration of the truth? Does it rise even to the dignity of caricature? We frankly recognize the fact that Protestants instead of being, as Roman Catholics are, one great and powerful sect under a centralized ecclesiastical despotism, are divided into many sects, variously distinguished from each other; and that in every free country the number of organized sects is, on the whole, increasing. But this fact, however undeniable, can hardly be considered as bearing any resemblance to what the writer before us says is the present condition of Protestantism. According to this writer, there are no Protestant sects, but only "isolated, independent religious bodies," each consisting of a single individual who has become "a spiritual autocrat." If his statement is true, there is no such thing left as a "collective sect" with any "sense of responsibility for the faith and conduct of its members," and no member of a sect with any "sense of responsibility for his personal belief and morals to the sect at large." If his representation is trustworthy, "terms of communion" and "professions of faith" in the various Protestant churches are "abolished." Of course, then, the Westminster standards have become quite obsolete in all the Presbyterian sects, Old-school and New-school, Associate-Reformed and United; the everlasting debates about the orthodox interpretation of the standards are ended, and the great machinery of judicatories for the trial of all errors in doctrine and all scandals in practice has nothing to do. Of course, too, the Articles and the Prayer-Book are no longer the platform of the Episcopal Church; any clergyman may renounce and denounce the Articles, or may introduce extemporaneous prayers of his own in the place of the prescribed forms of prayer, without being called to account. Of course,

too, in the Congregational and other self-governed churches, a member or a minister may be a Unitarian or a Universalist, may worship the sacramental wafer, may believe in the divine inspiration of Brigham Young and the Mormon Bible, may commit bigamy or forgery, may be a profane swearer or a drunkard, may frequent horse-races and gambling-houses, and not be in danger of any ecclesiastical censure. If our author does not mean just this, what does he mean?

We observe that by way of giving some show of significance or authority to the statement above quoted, this philosophic gentleman appends to the sentence which declares that "terms of communion and professions of faith" are "abolished" among Protestants, a foot-note referring to the "New Englander for July, 1866, pages 477 to 487, *et seq.*" No reader of ours needs to be told that neither on the pages referred to, nor on any other page of our twenty-five volumes, is there a syllable which an honest man can understand as implying that professions of faith and terms of communion are, or, in our opinion, ought to be abolished in Protestant churches. Evidently the reference was made for effect upon readers who are in no danger of being tempted thereby to look into the New Englander.

Having shown, in his way, that the first of the two principles fundamental to Protestantism results, logically, and historically, in the disintegration of all sects, in the subversion of every tribunal established for the preservation of Christian discipline, in the abolition of terms of communion, and in erecting every individual man "into an isolated, independent, religious body," our author proceeds to argue that "the individual, being thus debarred of all external aid, is thrown upon his own resources for religious guidance." "Hence," he says, "arises the necessity for that second principle, on which, as well as on the first, the foundations of Protestant Christianity were laid," the principle "that every man, by his own reason working on the text of Scripture, is able to, and must determine for himself what his religious faith and moral code must be." This second principle, he affirms, "recognizes the intrinsic individualism that the first produces, and perfects it by removing from man every hope but one. That one hope is the Bible." We suggest that there is a fairer way of putting the

case. Romanism removes from man every hope but one of knowing anything about the way to be saved from sin and spiritual death, or about the revelation which God has made by sending his Son into the world, that the world, through him, might be saved. That one hope is not the Bible, but the hierarchy culminating in the Pope. Protestantism puts the Bible in the place of that hierarchy as an authoritative guide to the knowledge of Christ and of the revelation which Christ has brought to men. It brings all Roman dogmas and traditions, all hierarchical assumptions, all papal pretensions to the test, by comparing them with the record in the Bible. It "searches the Scriptures daily whether those things are so;" and it finds that if the New Testament gives a true account of what the Apostles taught, and of what Christ himself taught, then Romanism, with its invocation of uncounted intercessors, instead of the one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus—with its worship of a woman as the mother of God, instead of worship offered to God alone—with its justification by penances and priestly performances instead of justification by faith—with its sacrifice of the mass instead of the Lord's Supper—with its bondage to priestly despotism instead of the glorious liberty of the children of God—is not the original and true Christianity. But see what this philosopher says about the Bible and the way in which it is used by Protestant Christians:

"That one hope is the Bible; a dead and speechless book; a body whose spirit hides itself in the interminable labyrinth of languages long since unspoken; a star which gathers its reflected rays through paraphrases and translations as chromatic as the intellects that framed them or the pens that wrote them down."

* * * "The first work of Luther, after his apostasy, was the publication of such parts of the New Testament as he considered best suited to his purposes; and the great aim of his successors, in all countries and in all ages, has been to flood the world with copies of the Scriptures, in such guise and such proportions as should soonest and most surely undermine the principles of church authority, and establish their version of the Bible as the sole acknowledged teacher of the truth of God." * * * "It will not, therefore, nay, it *cannot* be disputed that every man to whom the name of Protestant belongs, depends entirely for his knowledge of the truth which God commands him to believe, and of the laws which God commands him to obey, upon what he can learn, unaid by note or comment, from that collective translation of ancient books to which he gives the name 'Ο Βίβλος' or '*The Bible*.'"

* * * "While no evidence, by them [Protestants] admissible, can determine

beyond cavil the completeness of the canon; while divine inspiration remains a fact beyond the power of human testimony to establish; while that confusion of tongues which the centuries of barbarian incursion wrought has rendered more or less questionable all translations from ancient Greek or Hebrew to a modern dialect; while human pride and prejudice have lost none of their hold upon the heart of man; it is not in our nature to believe that God has left us to such a guidance as this principle asserts, and still holds us responsible for the truth of our opinions and the purity of our conduct at the peril of our eternal damnation." pp. 465, 466.

We have quoted these passages because they reveal the author's mind. We cannot but recognize them as illustrating the intellectual and moral philosophy of his conversion to Romanism. Two things in these passages are especial significant.

First, the author intimates his own opinion of the Bible—an opinion which may be regarded as at once a cause and a consequence of his conversion. He calls the Bible "a dead and speechless book; a body *whose spirit hides itself* in the interminable labyrinth of languages long since unspoken; a star which "instead of shining with any intrinsic light" gathers its *reflected* rays through paraphrases and translations as chromatic as the intellects that framed them, or the pens that wrote them down." Considered as a book, it is dead and speechless. Considered as a body, its spirit is not in it, but is concealed far away in the interminable labyrinth of the long unspoken Greek and Hebrew. Considered as a star, it bears very little resemblance to that "prophetic word" of the Old Testament which Simon Peter, writing to the Christian laity of his day, commended for its illuminating power. That same Peter, according to the traditions of Romanism, was the first and holiest of the Popes. If infallibility is to be found anywhere in the long series, surely Romanists themselves must acknowledge the authority of Peter as infallible. For the present then, let the second epistle of Peter be considered not as "Scripture" or portion of the Bible, but only as a papal bull, the oldest in existence save one. In that bull, pronounced authentic by the Council of Trent, the first Pope, and the greatest, said of the Old Testament Scriptures, to men who read them not in the original Hebrew, but in a translation, "We have the prophetic word (*τὴν προφητικὴν λόγον*, called in the next verse *προφητεία*

γραφῆς), whereunto ye do well that ye take heed as unto a light that shineth in a dark place, until the day dawn, and the day-star arise in your hearts." If such was the light which the ancient Scriptures gave, how much better must the light be which shines from the completed Bible, including two authentic bulls from the earliest of the Popes! If Christian laymen in the days of Pope Peter I., were commended for giving heed to the prophetic word of the Old Testament, surely there is no good reason why Christian laymen, in these last days of Pope Pius IX., should be blamed for searching the same Scriptures enlarged by comments and expositions from the pens of Peter and his fellow apostles, and from the lips of the Lord Jesus Christ himself. But this philosophic convert to Romanism holds a very different opinion. In his theory our giving heed to the Bible as to a light shining in a dark place, till a responsive and kindred illumination be kindled in our hearts, is hardly safe. His estimate of the Bible is that it only gleams with borrowed light, reflected through paraphrases and translations framed by chromatic intellects, and written down with chromatic pens. We submit that there is something of the chromatic in his pen and in his intellect.

Yet, after all, he concedes in another place that the Bible is not altogether worthless. He says,

"As a historical work, the Bible is a sufficient witness of the visible and audible facts which it records; and the miracles of Christ therein related establish his personal divine commission and the entire reliability of the declarations which he made. As historical works also, the writings of his immediate disciples, are a sufficient witness of their understanding of his teachings, and of the actions which in pursuance of that understanding they performed." p. 470.

Good Richard Baxter said, two hundred years ago: "The Papists cannot cry up their tradition, but they must speak so reproachfully, impiously, foolishly of the Scriptures as if they were stark infidels." (Works, xvi., 351.) The writer before us might seem to have run into that extreme, but for the concessions last quoted. One might have thought that in his opinion the Bible is just about worthless for all the purposes of Christian faith and living, so that a soul inquiring and feeling after God, and seeking to become acquainted with Christ, is quite as likely to be misled by it as to get any good from it.

But here we find him actually referring to the Bible itself, and not to any authoritative exposition of it, for a decision of the controversy (as he states it) between Protestantism and Romanism. The "dead and speechless book" is to be made the arbiter in the most fundamental of all the questions between Rome and the adherents of the Reformation. This "body, whose spirit hides itself," and has been hidden, for more than a thousand years, "in the interminable labyrinth" of dead languages, is competent to make us acquainted with Christ, as manifested in the wonders of his divine power, and to give us assurance that the words which he spake, and which it records, are true. This "star," which was just now represented as shining only with borrowed and refracted light, is after all the very star of Bethlehem, leading us to him whose advent was "glory to God in the highest," and making us acquainted with his teachings as heard and understood by his immediate disciples. Surely this cannot but be a good book,—a book to be read with all diligence, with prayer for divine illumination, and in a reverent and obedient spirit.

But in close connection with his disparaging representation of the Bible, we have also his representation of the manner in which Protestants receive and use the Scriptures. Passing over what he says about Luther, as if that great man did not give to his countrymen, in their own language, the entire Old Testament from the Hebrew, and the entire New Testament from the Greek, we come to where he tells us that "the great aim" of Protestants since Luther's time, "in all countries and in all ages, has been to flood the world with copies of the Scriptures, in *such guise and such proportions* as should soonest undermine the principles of church authority, and establish *their version* of the Bible as the sole acknowledged teacher of the truth of God." He tells us that every Protestant "depends *entirely*" for his knowledge of revealed truth upon what he can learn "from that *collective translation* of ancient books to which he gives the name 'Ο Βιβλος,' or the Bible." Probably he does not know that the Greek name by which Protestant scholars commonly designate the collected books of holy Scripture is not ἡ Βιβλος, "the Book," but τὰ Βιβλία, "the Books"—whence is derived our English word "Bible." But

let that pass as unimportant. It is a much graver matter for him to pretend that the Protestants publish and distribute not the Bible as a whole, but only the Bible "in such guise and such proportions" as may best answer their purposes. The Protestant principle is (and he knows it) that the whole Bible is for the people; and the only controversy between them and Rome, about what constitutes the Bible, is the controversy about certain books which the Council of Trent recognized as belonging to the Old Testament, but which were never included in the Jewish canon, and never existed in the Hebrew language. If they publish or circulate the New Testament apart from the Old, or any detached portions of the sacred volume, it is never for the purpose of suppressing or concealing other portions, but always for the purpose of inducing men to become acquainted with the whole Bible. The insinuation that this is not so, is an insinuation which the writer of the article before us could not have made without knowing that it is (not to speak harshly) very disingenuous. He knows that, among Protestants in all countries, the entire Bible, including the Scriptures of the old covenant, according to the Hebrew canon and those of the new covenant according to the universally accepted Christian canon, is everywhere a household book. Does he not also know that at this moment there are extant more copies of the common English Bible with the Apocrypha inserted between the Old Testament and the New, than there are Roman Catholic Bibles in all the languages of Europe? This insinuation of the stale calumny about garbled and mutilated copies of the Bible is dexterously combined with another of the same sort. When the writer before us represents Protestants as endeavoring "to establish their version of the Bible as the sole acknowledged teacher of the truth of God;" and when he affirms that every Protestant depends entirely on a certain "collective translation" of the Scriptures; he contradicts his own knowledge of the facts. No effort of charity can imagine him ignorant enough not to know that among Protestants no translation of the inspired books is accepted as infallible. He knows that from every translation an appeal may be made to the original text in Greek or Hebrew. He knows the Protestant doctrine that "the Old Testament in Hebrew,

and the New Testament in Greek, being immediately inspired by God, and by His singular care and Providence kept pure in all ages, are therefore authentical, so as in all controversies of religion the church is finally to appeal to them." *Westm. Conf., ch. i. sec. 8.* He knows that while Romanism has decreed, in its pretended infallibility, that the translation made by Jerome, fifteen centuries ago, into a language now long ago as dead as the original Greek and Hebrew, "shall be held as authentic, in all public lectures, disputations, sermons, and expositions; and that no one shall dare to presume to reject it under any pretense whatever;" Protestantism insists on the right and the duty of comparing all versions with the original text as the authentic and only standard. We say he knows this—let us rather say, he did know it before his experience of that conversion which he undertakes to expound philosophically. Whether his conversion to Romanism has effaced his remembrance of facts so simple and so notorious, or has relieved his conscience from the vulgar duty of making his representations agree with the facts, we need not decide. In either case, the conversion which he describes—the "change of heart and will"—the abnegation of the responsibility which his Creator laid upon him—the surrender of his intelligence and conscience to priestly authority—does not seem to have been a good thing for him. The result gives no favorable testimony to the system which numbers him among its proselytes. "By their fruits ye shall know them," is a principle which he may have forgotten, but which is worthy of all acceptance.

In another passage he illustrates, incidentally, the sense in which he speaks of the Bible as "a dead and speechless book." He undertakes to show how individual Protestants use the Bible. A child is brought up by Protestant parents and teachers in what they regard as the nurture and admonition of the Lord. His mind having become in some degree mature, he applies his developed and educated faculties to the reading of the Bible; and here is our philosopher's representation of the process and result.

"That sacred book he opens. It has no voice to him of its own. Its pages offer to him the same words as to all men before him; but those words contain no meaning independent of the meaning that he gives them. It places before him

the formal statement of all doctrine ; but teaches him, as absolutely and infallibly true, no one specific dogma, which, whether consistent with his present views or not, he must receive. That which interprets, not that which is interpreted, is ever the real teacher ; and, in his case, his private judgment, trained and biased by the prejudices and conclusions of a life-time, utters the only voice and defines the only doctrine which it is possible for him to hear or to receive. The Scripture does not teach him new and otherwise undiscoverable truth. It rather confirms and expresses the truth which is already accepted and declared. The oracle whose utterance is the indisputable law, speaks from the depths of his interior being. The Bible is a mere '*phrase-book*' in which it finds the words and symbols fitted to convey its thought. The divine authority dwells in the man, not in the *volumes*. He holds the sacred book before the mirror of his reason. The image it presents, however imperfect or deformed, becomes to him the truth of the Eternal Word. He casts the pure wheat of God between the millstones of his human judgments and his human loves. The grist they grind is all the bread he has whereon to feed his soul. It is not difficult to see that by this process of investigation, every man must become the worshiper of a God who is as truly his own handiwork as is the brazen idol of the Hindoo or the living Buddha of Sha-Saa." p. 466.

Is this the philosophy which proselytes to Rome learn in the process of their conversion ? " Words"—for if what this writer affirms of the words written down in the Bible is true, it is equally true of all other written words—" *contain no meaning independent of the meaning that he [the reader] gives them.*" And does this philosopher expect that his written words will convey any meaning of his into the minds of his readers ? Written words, according to his philosophy of language and of mind, have no voice of their own, and no meaning ; and they get their meaning, in any particular combination of them, not from him who selects them for his own use and puts them together into sentences, but from each separate individual who reads them. Even this essay on the philosophy of conversion is only a little "*phrase-book*" offered by the benevolent writer to ingenuous readers, that in it they may find not *his* thoughts conveyed to them, but the words and symbols fitted to convey *their* thoughts to nobody. Surely, if he has attempted to do, by means of this written composition, what he, at the same time, affirms that God cannot do by means of the divinely inspired Scriptures, his conversion has brought him to a lower depth of folly, and has put him upon a higher flight of impiety, than ordinary mortals can reach—except by a similar conversion. Therefore, it cannot be supposed that he intended any

such thing. He never presumed that this philosophical essay was to be a vehicle on which thoughts of his would be carried into other minds. Let no reader, as he pursues his charmed way from column to column, suffer himself to imagine that a philosopher is teaching him; for he is himself the only philosopher in the case. Let him remember that the interpreter, not the document interpreted, "is ever the real teacher," and that the meaning which he seems to find, as he reads and applies his common sense to ascertain the meaning, does not come from the document into his mind, but is first elaborated in his mind by his own "unaided intellect," and is then projected into the document before him. "The oracle" of all the philosophy in the essay on the philosophy of conversion, "speaks," not from the essay, for that is "dead and speechless,"—but "from the depths of his interior being." All that gives thought or force or beauty to the essay "dwells in the *man*, not in the *volume*," and the man, in every case, is the reader, not the writer. We frankly admit that if this is the true philosophy of language and of mind, "every man" who attempts to become acquainted with God by means of the inspired Scriptures, "must become the worshiper of a God who is as truly his own [the worshiper's] handiwork as is the brazen idol of the Hindoo." Not being learned enough to know who Sha-Sa is, or how "the living Buddha" is his handiwork, we make no concession on that point.

Look a little further into this philosophy. If written words "contain no meaning independent of the meaning that the reader gives them," how can spoken words have any meaning independent of that which the hearer gives them? If the reader of what is written understands nothing save as he puts his own interpretation on what he reads, then surely the hearer of what is spoken is under the same necessity of putting his own interpretation upon what he hears; and if what he hears is an interpretation of the Bible from his priest, then he is under a necessity of interpreting that interpretation. If "that which interprets, not that which is interpreted, is ever the real teacher," then the devoutest Romanist, reverently listening to his spiritual director, and trying to receive the meaning of what he hears (that is, interpreting it for himself as well as he can)

is, after all, as really his own teacher as if he were reading the Bible. He may rejoice that he is guided by an infallible authority, but in that respect the Bible-reading Protestant is not more mistaken than he. If in the case of the Protestant "the divine authority dwells in the *man*, not in the volume," then in the case of the Romanist the divine authority dwells in him, not in the articulated vibrations of air that strike the tympanum of his ear. In his case, as really and as inevitably as in that of the so-called heretic, "the oracle whose utterance is the indisputable law, speaks from the depths of his interior being;" for the words he hears "contain no meaning independent of the meaning that he gives them." This philosophy is of the sort that sweeps away all faith, and leaves the soul alone with no universe but of its own creating. If words have no meaning but that which the mind of the reader or hearer gives them, how can what seems to be the world have any meaning or reality external to the mind which seems to behold it.

We cannot wonder that, having thus betrayed his relation to Pyrrhonism, our philosopher immediately proceeds to quote Mr. Ralph Waldo Emerson as one "of the better class of Protestant minds." He gives that author's definition of belief as a perfect description of the only belief possible to a man who does not depend for his belief on church authority. "Belief," says Mr. Emerson, "consists in the acceptance of the affirmations of the soul; unbelief, in their denial." We will not ask what the sage of Concord means by this fantastic aphorism; for we cannot think that if we had the opportunity of asking him confidentially, in a friendly interview, he would be able to give us any answer more intelligible than the aphorism as it is. To our intelligence the dark saying is—like much that comes from the same source,—hardly better than stark nonsense. Belief is the soul's affirmation, not its acceptance of its own affirmation; unbelief is the soul's denial, not of what itself affirms, but of what it does not affirm. Let Mr. Emerson, however, mean what he may, his definition is no more descriptive of what it is for a Protestant to believe, than of what it is for a Romanist to believe. The difference between the two does not lie in the nature of belief considered as a mental act or state, but in the things believed, and in the sort of evidence on which belief is founded. Does not the one as well as the

other, and the other as well as the one, believe just what his soul affirms? Is not the proposition, in relation to either of them, that he believes just what his soul affirms, a simple truism? If either of them denies anything which his soul affirms to be true, is he anything else than a hypocrite and a liar? We might put the question to our philosopher himself. He professes to believe "transubstantiation, the immaculate conception, the seven sacraments." p. 470. Does not his soul, relying on "the authority of the church," affirm these things? If not, is his professing to believe them anything else than a false profession? In relation to the Protestant doctrine of justification by faith, his position is unbelief and denial. Is his unbelief in that case the denial of his soul's affirmation? Is it anything else than the fact that his soul, in view of what the Council of Trent determined, or in view of the creed of Pius IV., or in view of all the evidence before him, does not affirm the doctrine? One man bows to the authority of God's word in the inspired Scripture, and believes. Another man bows to the authority of the Roman Catholic Church, and believes. What kind of philosophy is it that would mystify so simple a distinction?

This writer, like many others of the same sort, seems to have no conception of what constitutes the value of the Bible as a book for anybody that will reverently read it, or of how it makes men acquainted with Christ and with God. He seems to think that every Protestant must needs regard the Bible simply as a repository of opinions ready made, and of dogmatic propositions, which the reader is to believe, not because he sees them in the light of adequate testimony, but because he is commanded to believe them "at the peril of [his] eternal damnation." We trust there is no need of saying to our readers that such a view of the Bible and of what it is good for, is grossly erroneous. If a man wants to hold and profess a system of abstract propositions scientifically made up for him and imposed upon him by a terrible anathema instead of being commended to his conviction by evidence, Romanism is the system for him; the Bible does not meet his want. The Bible deals in facts rather than in dogmatic statements. It reveals beings, persons, realities of the unseen world, historic verities, rather than abstract propositions. "The whole world

lieth in wickedness," is a fact. "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish but have everlasting life," is a fact. "God commendeth his love toward us, in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us:" "Jesus our Lord was delivered for our offenses, and was raised again for our justification:" "He ever liveth to make intercession for us:" "Behold what manner of love the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called the sons of God:"—these are matters of fact, not abstractions. "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God." "The Word became flesh and dwelt among us—full of grace and truth:"—these are not dogmas, but statements concerning a historic person. The entire "mystery of godliness"—that apostolic summary of the Christian faith, "God was manifest in the flesh, justified in the Spirit, seen of angels, preached unto the Gentiles, believed on in the world, received up into glory,"—is made up of facts, for the Gospel itself is a story. By the revelation of concrete realities—of a historic creation and providence, a historic apostasy from God, and a historic Redeemer—by the revelation of Christ, and of God in Christ reconciling the world to himself, the Bible appeals to the highest intuitions and sensibilities of a nature created in the image of God. By such revelations it appeals to conscience, to the instinctive *sensus numinis*, to the consciousness of responsibility and of dependence, to gratitude, to reverence, to admiration and awe, to infinite fears and infinite hopes; and thus it wakens and stimulates the soul in all its highest faculties. In this respect, no other book is equal to the Bible. No other book approaches it in the power of rousing into consciousness the soul's capability of religion. No other book so impresses the attentive and docile reader with the feeling that he has to do with a living and personal God, ever present, and ever conversant with human affairs. Of all this the writer before us seems to be ignorant. Instead of recognizing the Protestant idea that faith is only the instrument of justification—the grasp with which the soul takes hold of the hope set before it and clings to the revelation of a redeeming God, he seems to be possessed with the idea that a right belief is one of the good works which merit salvation. Divine truth, in our conception of it, is that which God reveals to us,

that we, believing it, may be enlightened by it, may be awakened by it to new habits of thought and affection, may be transformed by its efficacy, may be elevated to "fellowship with the Father and with his Son Jesus Christ," and may thus "become partakers of a divine nature." But in the conception of this writer, divine truth is that which God "*commands* us to believe," and the belief of it is part of that righteousness which God requires us to perform, and which will be finally rewarded with the joy of Paradise. In his way of thinking, faith is orthodoxy, and orthodoxy is the acceptance of all decisions and definitions given by the church. Thus he mistakes the character of the Bible as well as the use which Protestants are expected to make of it. Of the Bible in the hands of his imaginary Protestant he says, "it places before him *the formal statement of all doctrine*;" whereas the formal statement of doctrine hardly enters at all into the plan on which it is written. All doctrine, in the ecclesiastical sense of the word, must be tested by the Bible, must be deduced from that one authentic source of doctrine; for all true doctrine is informally contained in the Bible. Informally the doctrine enters into the mind and spiritual life of the believing reader—though perhaps he may not be able to frame that formal statement of it which belongs to orthodox theology.

An additional illustration of our author's philosophy may be found in his position, deliberately taken, that if a man, by searching the Scriptures, should find in them all that Romanism holds, and should believe it all on their authority, such faith is not conversion. From this position he attempts to show the self-styled Catholics of Anglicanism that far as they may have advanced in their pseudo-catholicity—even though they be as near to Rome as the young man in the gospel was to the kingdom of Heaven—they are still unconverted, and after all are nothing but Protestants in the eyes of one who accepts the same dogmas on the right ground, that is, not because he thinks they are in the Bible, but because he has "submitted heart and will and reason to the dictation of" a spiritual director.

"There is no inherent impossibility that a pure Protestant, exercising to the fullest extent the right of private judgment, should arrive at doctrines identical with those which the church teaches, and should, as a result of this identity, accept even her formularies as expressive of his faith. The mystery of the Trinity, than which no mystery is greater, is that received by the majority of Protest-

ants, and there is nothing in the doctrines of transubstantiation, purgatory, and the like, which is unreachable by the same process of scriptural investigation, unaided by the conscious teachings of the church. There can be no doubt that men have, by this method, approximated closely to Catholic doctrine, who yet were wholly actuated by Protestant principles, and never dreamed of submitting heart and will and reason to the dictation of any authority whatever.

"These men apparently hang over the church, ready to drop, like ripe fruit, into her open bosom. Nevertheless, whatever of her symbolism they may cherish, they cherish, not because it is *hers*, but because it is *their own*. It is not truth which *she* has taught them; *they* have discovered it themselves. It brings them no nearer to her in heart. It does not subject their *will* to hers. On the contrary, it often begets in them an arrogance of her divine security, as if their similarity to her constituted them her equals in the authority of God. Such men are not with the church, whatever proximity they seem to have. Their boast of Catholicity deceives many, and most frequently themselves, but can delude none who realize to what humility her true children must descend, and how unquestioningly, when God speaks, man must hear. The prayers of the faithful are more needed for such souls than for any others, that God would send them the disposition, as well as the light of faith." pp. 469, 470.

Those pseudo-Catholics who accept neither the Roman view nor the Protestant of what constitutes the universal church of Christ, might learn something if they were capable of it, from this writer's compassionate yet somewhat contemptuous account of them. Evidently he knows them, for he has been one of them, and has learned what they have not learned, and what he seems to think them hardly capable of learning, namely, that the imitation of Romanism, in dogma or in ritual, is as far from being Roman catholicity as it is from being Protestant catholicity. As long as they have not surrendered heart and will, judgment and conscience, to the dictation of the Papal hierarchy,—as long as they keep up their feeble attempt to recognize some church not unprotestingly submissive to the spiritual despotism centralized at Rome—they are only like moths attracted by a candle and fluttering toward it: let them approach as near as they may, they are not the candle nor of it. See what our author says about them.

"We have in our memory, just now, a clergyman who has for years openly professed his firm belief in transubstantiation, purgatory, and other equally extreme Catholic articles of faith. He goes into our churches and adores the holy eucharist upon our altars. He venerates the mother of our Lord, and supplicates God's mercy on the faithful dead. In all these he is perfectly sincere, and of the truth of what he believes, and of the plety of what he does, he is as well convinced as any Protestant can be. Still he is not a Catholic, and we are almost satisfied he never will become one. Years have found him as we find him now, and other years will probably work no change upon him in the nature of conversion.

Nearly the same may be said of Dr. Pusey * * * No, not if a man can tell over on his fingers, one by one, the definitions of the councils and the traditions of the fathers, and pronounce a *credo* over every one of them, is he necessarily a Catholic, nor must he have passed through that vital transformation without which there never has been and never can be a true conversion." p. 462.

"Candles and flowers upon the altar, crosses and paintings on the walls, the bowed head at the name of Jesus, the cassock-skirted coat, and other innumerable minutia, are to these people [i. e. to large numbers of the Episcopal "denomination,"] indubitable evidence of Popery. * * * Many of these very ritualists themselves imagine that, in mimicking Catholic forms and ceremonies, they have secured in Anglicanism all that the Catholic Church herself can give." p. 463.

So thoroughly does the writer before us understand those Anglican imitators of Romanism. He sees how shallow their views are when they talk about the reunion of Christendom, or the restoration of communion among the three great branches of what they call the Catholic church. The phrase in which he speaks of them as "mimicking" Roman Catholic forms and ceremonies is felicitously chosen. We may distinguish in thought between Tractarianism as a doctrinal scheme, and simple ritualism as an affair of clothes and ceremonies (though they are rarely if ever distinct in fact): but they both are essentially mimicry. The one is an attempt to agree as nearly as possible with the doctrines which Rome has substituted for the gospel of the New Testament. The other is an attempt to copy more or less of the complicated and often idolatrous performances with which Rome has overlaid the simplicity and purity of spiritual worship. But neither the doctrinal scheme nor the ritual, nor both together, can have the dignity of a completed and coherent system, if detached from that stupendous despotism over the souls of men which is centralized in the person of the Pope. The spiritual despotism of the Roman hierarchy is not a mere accident that has somehow come to pass in connection with what those shallow imitators regard as the catholic tradition of doctrine and observance. On the contrary, the despotism is vitally related to both doctrine and ritual. It might even be said to have created them both for its own use, and that they are the instruments of its power. Purgatory, transubstantiation, priestly absolution, prayers for the dead, the seven sacraments, the Mariolatry, the immaculate conception, and all things else included in the scheme—are doctrines without which the despotism could not stand; nor could

such a body of doctrines have been developed out of enthusiasms and traditions, and imposed upon even half-christianized nations, by any other force than that of an organized priesthood instinctively and persistently seeking to enslave the minds of men, and taking advantage of all the superstitious tendencies in human nature. It is natural and most consistent for such doctrines to be associated with the Popish claim of infallible authority, and with the demand that heart and will, intelligence and the sense of responsibility to God, shall be unresistingly and unquestioningly swayed by hierarchical dictation. Roman Catholic doctrine in the hands of the compact and centralized hierarchy that made it, and that wields it, is a terrible enginery for subduing men, and making them helpless under the despotism that oppresses their souls. But Roman Catholic doctrine with Rome left out—the so-called catholic doctrine not received on the authority of Rome, but got at by some supposed investigation of the Scriptures and the fathers, and wielded by a priesthood with no infallible head—is at best a flimsy imitation. It is like an arch from which the key-stone has fallen out. When we read or hear some solemn disquisition on “catholic doctrine” from the Tractarian stand-point, we seem to see a harmless man trying to put on airs, as if he was a great deal bigger and more terrible than in his heart he knows he is—a man half conscious of not believing, but trying to find some show of reason for believing what Rome with her *sic volo, sic jubeo* requires to be believed without reason—an Englishman, or still worse, an American, conscious that this is the nineteenth century, but trying his little utmost to be medieval, as if the last four hundred years had never been—a professed inquirer after old paths, yet not daring to take so old a book as the New Testament for his guide, lest he should miss the old way of catholicity—a self-styled Catholic, refusing to acknowledge the Pope as having dominion over his faith, yet denouncing Luther and the reformers for a similar refusal, and at the same time endeavoring to accept all Roman doctrine without becoming a Romanist, and so to illustrate in his intellectual career the mathematical paradox of the curve that forever approaches but never quite touches the line with which it is almost but not quite parallel, and at the same time almost but not quite coincident. The ritualist, as distinguished from the dogmatic Tractarian, is

still more shallow—childish even to silliness. Religion, that is catholicity, is with him one of the fine arts—the finest of them all; and he makes it so fine that in his exhibitions it is tawdry. Shocked at the impiety of people who dare to pray speaking their own thought and desire in their own words into the ear of God, he thinks it much better to get up a histrionic imitation of the worship which somebody else offered long ago in the dark “ages of faith”—or perhaps (according to the latest definition that we have heard of) a scenic representation of the worship performed in Heaven. So with altar instead of table, with symbolic candles and flowers, with crosses and pictures, with many-colored altar cloths full of recondite meanings, with wonderful diversity of costumes and man-millinery, with smoke of incense if he dares, with plentiful bowings at the name of Jesus and genuflections before the altar, he gets up his imposing show to the delight of little souls as empty as his own of all great thought and feeling. Such mimics are too shallow to understand what our philosopher puts in a clear light.

“Ritualism,” he says, “is not Catholicism.” “Even the public worship of the church [Roman Catholic], when stripped of its essentials, is almost devoid of any outward sign or sound that can properly be characterized as ceremonial.” “Ritualism is a *means used by the church to accomplish certain ends*, and so used, because the example of the divinely instituted Jewish church, and her own ages of experience have convinced her that by it *those ends can be most surely attained*. But it is no more an essential element of her being than royal robes are of the being of a king; and the weak caricature of her stately ceremonial, in which some Protestant experimentalists indulge, converts them into Catholics as little as the tinsel crown and sceptre of the stage give royal birth and power to the actor in the play.” p. 468.

Would that the weak ritualists of Anglicanism could understand how widely the ritualism of Rome differs from the child’s play which they think so much of! Let them “submit heart, will, and reason” (if their practice in folly has left them any reason) to Rome, and they will find that the ritual, which they have been trying to mimic, is valued not for its own sake, but only as a means to the end for which it was invented—only for its efficacy as one of the methods by which the subjects of that huge despotism are trained into habits of unquestioning because unthinking submission. Meanwhile our philosopher, if they would hear him, can teach them that their mimetic performances are no less ridiculous to intelligent Romanists than to the common sense of Protestants.

ARTICLE VII.—SOUTHERN REGENERATION.

Message of Governor Worth to the Legislature of North Carolina.

Message of Governor Patton to the Legislature of Alabama.

Address of Henry A. Wise at the dedication of a Cemetery in Virginia.

Letter of Count A. De Gasparin on Universal Amnesty and Universal Suffrage.

THE Rebellion was the effort of a degenerate civilization, and of social ideas that had fallen behind the age, to throw off their allegiance to a government solemnly established by a better and wiser generation. In the seventy years which had elapsed since the Constitution was adopted, the South had gone backward a century—the North constantly forward; and when at last the heavy drags of Aristocracy and Slavery strove to tear themselves from the advancing car of progress and freedom, the contest that followed was a war of the seventeenth century against the nineteenth. To all intents and purposes the Southern mind, the Southern civilization, and the Southern social and political ideas in 1860, were those of two hundred years ago; and the revolt of the South, both in its crime and its folly, was a proof how little it knew of the progress which the world outside of itself had been making.

The struggle was terrible, for it was between opposite civilizations and social systems, and it was for these, on both sides, a matter of life or death. It ended only with Southern exhaustion. The South was conquered, but the war had been too short to accomplish amendment, except by destruction. No war of five years ever completely converted a people to truth from the errors of centuries. The rebels were subjugated—not convinced: the house upon the sandy foundation had been overthrown, but no new building had been erected in its place.

No one, whatever opinion he may entertain of some of the Rebel leaders and their motives, can doubt that the mass of the people had been deluded into the belief that their cause was just, and that they made all their tremendous sacrifices, as they honestly imagined, for their freedom and their rights. To this idea all their education, for at least two generations, had tended. In the faith of this they devoted their property, their lives, and their dearest and tenderest affections, and submitted to a tyranny of which we can form little conception. The utter defeat of their hopes could not be expected of itself to destroy their convictions, or remove their fears. It could not be expected that immediately upon the surrender of their armies the Southern people should suddenly abandon the cherished views of successive generations, should curse the teachings of their fathers, and execrate the memory of those dear relatives and friends who, side by side with themselves or in their behalf, had perished fighting in the common cause. This would be unnatural, and had such conduct been exhibited it would have afforded reasonable proof of a weak instability of character, or a deep seated hypocrisy, even more despicable and dangerous.

But if we had no right to expect this from the Southern people as a fruit of victory, there is something which we clearly had a right to expect. It is that they should, in good faith, "accept the situation" of defeat, with all its legitimate consequences, both to themselves and to their peculiar social systems and ideas. This is all, but it secures eventually everything. For first—it implies their admission that to themselves, whether viewed as individual rebels, or as defeated communities in recognized warfare, the victors have the right to dictate such terms of peace as they may deem essential to their own future security. It implies that they will comply with these conditions without any haggling or quibbling about their "constitutional rights" as still and always legally States of the Union; and especially without any factions opposition to such proposed constitutional amendments, as shall merely put themselves upon an *equal* footing in the government with the loyal States. So long as the proffered conditions of peace, and especially conditions so just and liberal as these are not accepted, so long

there is merely a truce. The victorious party is entitled and compelled, even though active hostilities may have ceased, to consider that a state of war, with all its laws and rights and duties, is still continuing.

The "acceptance of the situation" implies, secondly, the sincere adoption by the South of the new order of things. It implies its practical recognition of the fact that the doctrine of Secession is a thing of the past, and that the indissolubility of the Union is the fundamental law of the land; that the old Southern system of aristocracy, with its attendant social features of idleness, ignorance, and slavery, has been utterly and forever overthrown, and is to be supplanted by the Northern system of democratic freedom, with its hitherto hated foundations of labor, equality, and popular education. It implies the pledge that these, as they have triumphed in the shock of arms, shall freely enter and take possession of the land, and shall be everywhere accorded the supremacy they have won by the sword. We do not insist that the people of the South should divest themselves at once of all their ancient prejudices;—that they should declare with alacrity that the negro race is not naturally inferior in human rights to the white;—that they should sing *Te Deum* over the overthrow of their confederacy, and the destruction of their armies; that they should perceive on the instant that the free institutions of the North, synonymous as they are in their inexperienced minds, with extravagance, vice, and infidelity, are theoretically superior to those of the bowie knife and the "regulating committee." And if we cannot and do not expect that these results, the certain future fruits of time and experience, shall now be found in full development, we cannot and will not insist that every Southern tongue be tied from expressing the absence of abstract conviction. We shall not therefore be surprised or discouraged if we learn from Southern papers or correspondents that the people still speak mournfully in private and in public of their "fallen flag"—that they honor, in public addresses at the erection of monuments or the dedication of cemeteries, the memory of the confederate dead, that they speak in terms of exaggerated eulogy of their leaders in the recent struggle, or that with the narrow prejudice of ignorance and vanity they are accustomed to indulge in

spiteful malediction of "the detested Yankees." We can tolerate these trifles, if only to teach by example respect for free speech,—but we have a right to require, and ought to require that such toleration be imitated on their part. Let them say what they will, and think what they will, so long as there is no interference with conflicting opinions—no attempts at covert restoration of the old order of things—no more slavery under any disguise, no more suppression of newspapers, no more burning of school-houses, no more persecution of teachers, white or black.

So far however, as these expressions of feeling are accompanied by *acts*, especially by public and official acts—that are violative of the existing truce, hostile or obstructive to the victor's authority or rightful demands, so far it is evident that all professions of "accepting the situation in good faith" and whining appeals to be restored to confidence and power, are to be sternly disregarded.* Unfortunately in the period that has elapsed since the Rebel armies surrendered, there have been afforded abundant proofs that we cannot be too cautious in believing that all experience is reversed in the case of the Southern people, and that, convinced as they were most sorely against their will, they are yet not only completely converted but may be safely trusted to govern themselves and us also. It

* The late Message of Governor Patton to the Legislature of Alabama recommending the rejection of the Constitutional Amendment, is a striking example of this kind of insolence and presumption. He opposes the amendment "as dangerous to the liberties of the whole country." The disfranchisement of certain leading rebels, he says, "would operate as an *ex post facto* law, a thing unknown in the history of enlightened liberty. Such a mode of dealing with citizens charged with offenses against government, belongs only to despotic tyrants,"—&c., &c. The change of representation whereby the Rebel States will be placed upon the same footing as the rest in Congress, instead of having an advantage as formerly, he opposes upon the ground that "it is a change in a feature of our Government which has never been complained of before, and which has never been a source of trouble or inconvenience." And he adds with impressive solemnity, "we are sincerely desirous for a complete restoration to the Union. We want conciliation, harmony and national tranquillity. We feel that we have given every evidence which human action can furnish of an honest purpose to conform in good faith to the condition of things surrounding us. Alabama is as true to-day to the Constitution and laws of the General Government as any State in the Union."

has been said that the leniency displayed by President Johnson and the general course of his "policy" have changed the disposition of the Southern people, who were previously ready to accept and carry out in good faith any terms of restoration whatever,—and have raised them from the depths of humility to a haughty insolence that would never otherwise have appeared. We greatly doubt this view. The extreme depression of the South at the close of the war was entirely natural in view of its terrible disappointment, exhaustion, and distress, but must in any case have been merely temporary. The old character was unchanged. The old spirit and the old ideas were there as strong as ever, and with the lapse of time and the return of hope, and strength, the reaction was inevitable. Mr. Johnson by his shortsighted "policy" brought on this reaction sooner than it would otherwise have occurred; but it may prove in the end, that his folly and presumption, like the blunders of the preceding administration in the conduct of the war, were providentially ordered for the good and safety of the nation. Had a firm and cautious course been pursued with the conquered rebels, it is quite possible that the revolution would have been kept back until their restoration had been completed, and when once more established in place and power, voting in solid column with Northern demagogues in Congress and at Presidential elections, they might have been able to defeat the most necessary measures of national security.

Nothing is plainer to one who has watched the history of parties in our country for the past twenty-five years, than the necessity in all political provisions of taking into account this certainty of *reaction* in the tides of popular feeling. How often, especially in State politics, have we seen a party again and again overwhelmed until we thought it had gone down forever, yet again and again rising triumphantly to the surface, from the tendency of men, when a temporary excitement is past, to return to their old ideas and party associations! In the case of the South, every influence would be at work to revive in an ignorant and narrow minded population its ingrained prejudices; and it would be the height of folly to assume that the first depression of defeat in that excitable people was indicative of a permanent conversion. Yet Count A. De Gaspa-

rin, advocating in his recent letter, the policy of universal amnesty and universal suffrage, seriously insists that "the equality of races, that inseparable complement of emancipation, would have been accepted with little difficulty by the rebellious states on the morrow of their defeat;" and that "real emancipation with real reconciliation as its corollary would have been realized." Upon such a theory, we are having this policy of universal amnesty (meaning the immediate restoration of all rebels to State and federal power), upon condition of universal suffrage (meaning thereby *the passage of laws* establishing it, in every Southern State), urged upon us by the united voices of extreme Northern radicals, and extreme Southern rebels and sympathizers. It is a sufficient objection were there no other, to such a course, that with the state of feeling and the condition of society which prevail at the South, there is no guaranty and no probability that the laws permitting black suffrage would be fairly applied or faithfully enforced. If the military power of the Freedman's Bureau is even now lamentably unable to protect the lives and property of the colored race in the South from the hatred and injustice of the whites, what prospect would that helpless people have of being permitted fairly to exercise the right of self-protection at the ballot box, when the entire executive and legislative State authority should be in the hands of their oppressors? The value of such a privilege to them would be like that which sheep possess to fight and eat the wolves,—a perfect legal right, but practically difficult of enforcement. Nor would they be likely to derive much help from the Federal power, were this constitutionally able to extend it. The solid Southern representation in Congress, numerically based upon the entire population, would speedily hold the balance of power in that body. The elections in Kansas under border ruffian auspices, defended as they were by the whole South and half the North both in and out of Congress, afford fair illustrations of the mode in which the elective franchise is respected where the spirit of slavery prevails, and of the difficulty in a popular government of applying an adequate remedy for the most palpable and atrocious crimes, when committed in the interest of a powerful political party.

The great, the primary need of the South then is not "restoration" nor "reconstruction" but regeneration. To restore to the duties of vigorous life before health is secured to the system,—to reconstruct the fallen edifice out of the old materials which have already signally failed,—would be futile and temporary. But how is the requisite change to be effected? Must the Southern States be kept in a territorial condition for generations? The answer to this will depend much on the *spirit* of improvement which shall be seen in themselves. And in this connection a great responsibility devolves upon the leading Southern men, those whose position and ability give them an influence with the general mass of the people. Unfortunately these are almost without exception the very men who led their States into rebellion; and from the conduct and counsel of most of them since the close of the war, we are almost led to regret that the permanent banishment of the entire class had not been effected as the first step towards reconstruction. It is now too late for such a measure; but it is not too late for them to assume the position which every consideration of honor and good sense alike requires them to occupy. Recognizing the utter and final defeat of the South and its social system, they are bound to "accept the situation" in the true sense of the phrase; to address themselves sincerely and at once to advancing the new ideas and principles which fate has determined shall take possession of the South, by easy and beneficent growth if encouraged,—by stern and agonizing conflict if opposed. By doing this (and some of them to their honor be it spoken, are nobly awake to their duty), they will be of immense service in speedily restoring their States to power and prosperity, and will do much towards retrieving the evil they have caused. Let them do it, if upon no higher principle, as chivalrous knights in former days honorably acknowledged defeat, and faithfully fulfilled its obligations. Let them do it in good faith, and it would be unreasonable to require that they should avow any other reason or motive for their course,—if they are led by no other—than the necessity and wisdom of the hour;—to insist that they shall make professions of choice or conviction which they do not honestly feel. We shall not quarrel in such case with natural laudations of their

heroic dead, nor criticise too closely or too coldly their sad allusions to "a lost cause," *forever* lost. Such language of sympathy and rhetoric may even be of beneficial effect in softening the Southern heart to receive and adopt their teachings. To forbid or to punish it or manifestations akin to it, except in some aggravated form calculated and designed to inspire hatred and hostility, would be unwise, and would have a worse effect than the manifestations themselves. Such expressions of feeling, indeed, belong almost entirely to the sentimental side of our nature, and have no considerable influence upon the judgment or actions. We lament the dead even when we would not bring them back; we recall with something of old affection the early loves which we feel it would have been folly to continue. Some such feeling will survive in the South long after all desire for secession or slavery has disappeared. Traditions of the ancient order, and of the terrible conflict in which it fell, colored with the hues of romance, will be cherished in all future ages, and be celebrated in oratory, poetry, and song. The sensible, practical Scotchman glows with enthusiasm as he recalls the glorious days of feudal anarchy and blood, and many a liberty loving Briton upon the 30th of January next will quaff lugubrious bumpers to the memory of "King Charles the Martyr."

But, in truth, the regeneration of the South will go on apace, even from natural causes and influences, and in spite of every obstructive effort by demagogues and fanatics. The doctrine of Secession—the asserted right of minorities to rebel at will against a popular government—has received a mortal blow. Legalized slavery—the degradation of labor, and of man as man—is forever overthrown. The landed Aristocracy—synonym of social lawlessness—with its caste, and its tyranny—is fatally shattered. The seventeenth century has passed away—there is nothing but the nineteenth to succeed it. Free speech can no longer be suppressed: a free press can no longer be excluded; and though Mrs. Partington's broom may fight the in-rolling Atlantic, its efforts will be powerless. Already the South has heard, and felt in every fiber, the fiat of Omnipotence, "Ye must be born again!" She could not, if she would, avert her fate. The civilization of the North will pour along

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her railroads and rivers ; it will fill the streets of her cities ; it will be heard in her schools and her churches ; and it will go like the morning light into every household in her land. Especially will its progress be promoted by the special efforts and agencies that must inevitably be put forth to disseminate truth, and to inculcate, by every educational means, correct ideas and principles. It is true that the whole result will not be accomplished in a day. Great changes in national character, even under the most favorable auspices, are not suddenly effected. It would be strange indeed to find at once a general enthusiasm for liberty and humanity and the supremacy of law, in a generation which has sacrificed everything for secession and slavery ;—which perpetrated the horrors of Salisbury and Andersonville, and which joins in British admiration over the heroic exploits of Semmes, and Blackburn, and Davis. From the men of to-day the most we look for will be simple acquiescence. But use will bring habit, and habit choice. Another generation is not far distant, with new conceptions of right and justice and freedom ; and though these will doubtless be somewhat incongruously blended with romantic illusions concerning the “olden time,” when aristocrats sold children, and whipped women, and starved and robbed and murdered prisoners in the name of chivalry, yet even these inconsistencies will gradually disappear. Then, and long before then, the South, in the full tide of that high career of greatness, freedom, and prosperity which it is surely destined to achieve in atonement for the errors of the past, will proudly and gratefully realize that not merely in its physical generations, but in its moral and material advancement, it has been born again !

ARTICLE VIII.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

SCHENKEL'S PORTRAITURE OF THE CHARACTER OF JESUS.*—Dr. Furness appends the following note at the end of his edition of this work: "In concluding a labor which he has found full of interest, the translator is free to confess that, with great respect for the learning and industry of German critics and commentators, he is struck with the fact that these eminent and laborious scholars appear never to perceive *that the records owe their existence to the facts recorded*. They search with wonderful acuteness for every shadow of a "dogmatic necessity," for every possible extrinsic consideration, in order to account for the telling of the story. They look everywhere but directly at the facts related, to solve the secret of their having passed into history. The facts of the Life of Jesus—it is one of the translator's strongest convictions—when once they are truly and distinctly apprehended, will be felt to be so full of life and power, that it would have been strange indeed if "many" (Luke i. 1) had not taken it in hand to record them, and if also, of the numerous early records that must have sprung into existence, such narratives as we now have in the Four Gospels had not lived on from age to age, and proved themselves imperishable." We cannot agree with Dr. Furness in this sweeping condemnation of German scholarship. There are "German critics and commentators" who are better able to build up and defend than the destructive school is to pull down. To them we owe an immense debt. At the same time, we are highly gratified with this expression of confidence in the Gospel histories on the part of Dr. Furness; and we regard his reflections upon German criticism as eminently just when applied to the book which he "has taken in hand" to translate and edit. His numerous notes are generally in opposition to the opinions of the author, and in

* *The Character of Jesus Portrayed. A Biblical Essay, with an Appendix.* By Dr. DANIEL SCHENKEL, Professor of Theology, Heidelberg. Translated from the third German edition, with Introduction and Notes. By W. H. FURNESS, D. D. 2 vols. 12 mo. pp. xxxvi. 279, 359. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1866. New Haven: Judd & White.

favor of a more believing view of the Gospel narratives. It is with some surprise, therefore, that we find him willing to submit to the labor of rendering into English a work which he controverts on points of vital importance, and which he impliedly condemns, as unsound and untrustworthy, in the passage quoted above.

Schenkel's work produced some excitement in Germany, partly because it appeared in the wake of Renan's *Life of Jesus*, but chiefly because the author had been generally supposed to be an orthodox theologian. Its intrinsic merits are small. It throws no new light on any branch of the subject of which it treats. It simply echoes the theories of Baur and Strauss, with enough of modification to give the reader an impression that the author has a "stand-point" of his own, and that he has not utterly thrown away Christianity as a system supernatural in its origin. There is no important position which Schenkel takes in opposition to the genuineness and credibility of the Gospels, which has not been thoroughly refuted by scholars much more profound and accurate in their learning than he can claim to be. It is plain that he questions the truth of the Gospels, simply because he deems the miracles which they record—except certain cases of healing which he does not consider miraculous—incredible. He maintains, with Holtzmann and Meyer, that Mark was written first, before the other three. In this he may be right, but the dogmatic confidence with which he propounds this opinion is without warrant. He pretends that Mark has been recomposed since its first issue—a proposition that is supported by no conclusive evidence, to say the least. He assumes a collection of Discourses to have existed prior to our Gospel of Matthew, and to have served as the foundation of it. This judgment, though approved by some excellent scholars, appears to us to rest upon no sufficient proof. It is based entirely on an interpretation—a *misinterpretation*, as we think—of the term *λογια* in Papias. Luke's Gospel Schenkel assigns to about the year 80. The genuineness of the Fourth Gospel he denies. It was written, he thinks, between A. D. 110 and A. D. 120, and is made up, to a considerable extent, of fictitious narratives, invented to embody certain ideas and sentiments. He talks about an "Ephesian group of legends" as furnishing the matter for this Gospel. That within twenty or thirty years of John's death, a document that John never composed, that contradicted the traditional conception of Christ's life, that was filled with incidents which John had known nothing of,—that such a document should

so soon be imposed on the Ephesian Church, where John had lived and died, and have speedily found acceptance everywhere, among Catholics and heretics, constitutes no difficulty to the mind of Herr Schenkel. The external evidences of the genuineness of this Gospel are handled, we are compelled to say, with inexcusable flippancy. Not content with refusing to admit that Justin Martyr was acquainted with the Fourth Gospel, he tries to show that the testimony of Irenæus has little, if any, weight! A man who had personally known Polycarp, a pupil of the Apostle John; a man who was acquainted with the churches of the East and West; a bishop of so much consideration that he could rebuke the Bishop of Rome for failing in Christian charity; a writer whom Tertullian styles "a diligent explorer of all sorts of opinions"—"omnium doctrinarum curiosissimus explorator;" a writer, too, who had prepared himself by diligent inquiries to combat, in a copious treatise, the various schools of Gnosticism, and whose uprightness is unquestioned,—such is the man whose testimony to the genuineness and universal acceptance of John's Gospel goes for nothing! He occasionally utters a fanciful argument, and, therefore, he is incompetent to testify on a question of fact!

We cannot undertake to review this pretended "Portraiture" of Christ. If we have spoken of it in severe terms, we have not gone so far in our condemnation as Strauss, who, at least, has the method of proposing theories not wholly destitute of plausibility. Dr. Furness shows himself to be a modest, candid, and reverential scholar, and we cannot but wonder at the deference which he seems to pay to the dogmatism of his author, whose groundless propositions he so frequently calls in question.

The mechanical execution of these volumes is exceedingly neat and tasteful.

THE LIFE AND LIGHT OF MEN.*—Any work from the author of the "Christ of History" will of course attract attention and be read with interest in this country. This volume will be read with the greater interest and attention when it is known that the author contends for substantially the same view of the work of Christ which is taught by Dr. Bushnell in his "Vicarious Sacrifice." The arguments of the two writers are not always the same—either

* *The Life and Light of Men.* By JOHN YOUNG, LL. D. (Edin.) Alexander Strahan, publisher, London and New York. 1866.

for the rejection of the received doctrine, or for the acceptance of the theory which both would substitute in its place. Their interpretations of proof texts do not always agree. But the positive import which they find in the death of Christ as sacrificial is precisely the same. As we have so recently and so fully subjected this theory to critical discussion, we may very properly excuse ourselves from repeating our own arguments. We notice two or three particulars which seem worthy of comment.

First of all, the theories by which the doctrine of the atonement is defended in Scotland must be very antiquated. Dr. Young seems to take it for granted that if such theories of this doctrine as those of Anselm and Dr. Shedd can be shown to be inconsistent with common sense and the conscience, then the doctrine itself must be abandoned. The readers for whom Dr. Young writes are evidently those who have been taught to believe that the doctrine of the atonement rests on the theory of a literal transfer for the advantage of the believer of the righteousness of Christ's heart and life. These assumptions involve by logical necessity the inference that Christ died only for a part of the human race, and that there must, of course, be some qualification in the gospel offer, and some hesitation or misgiving in the faith with which it is accepted, until the recipient is in some supernatural or mystical way assured that he is one of the elect. We cannot very much wonder when the alternative is presented, of accepting this as the only conceivable doctrine of the atonement or of rejecting any doctrine of atonement at all, that such a thinker as Dr. Young should choose the latter view. We regret he should be driven to this necessity, and especially that he should fail to see the more excellent way of escape from the pressure upon his conscience and reason; but if it is true that the whole theological world of Scotland has willfully and dogmatically rested in such traditions, notwithstanding the better light upon these points, their only help and deliverance seems to be in a vigorous reaction to an opposite extreme in the form of an earnest protest against the traditional dogmas which involve such serious error.

Second: Dr. Young's attempts to reconcile his theory with the declarations of the Scriptures are on the whole less successful than those of Dr. Bushnell. His exegesis of the words *to justify* and *justification*, and his readings of the passages in which these words occur are apparently more elaborate and minute than his, but they are, if possible, more forced and untrue. His theory of sacrifice

is on the whole less successfully sustained, in respect both to the origin and divine sanction of the rite and the transfer to the work of Christ of the ideas and symbolism which sacrifice has furnished.

Third: His theories of the Divine government and of the nature of penalty are more objectionable than Dr. Bushnell's; being less clear, farther from the truth, and weaker in moral energy and tone than those of the American theologian. We notice here the results of the more thorough discussion of these subjects to which American theologians have been accustomed, and their greater familiarity with elementary principles of prime importance.

Fourth: The earnest Christian spirit of this treatise cannot be too highly commended, and the positive tone of its faith in the incarnation, as a manifestation of the personal love and condescending mercy of God, redeem this work from many objections which otherwise would lie against it. The moral and religious power of the positive parts of the Essay is by no means inconsiderable. The pathos with which the author contends for the views of the gospel which he considers most honorable to God, is always moving and elevating, and the energy and warmth with which he contends for the Christian truths which he accepts, go far to reconcile us to the omission of those which he rejects. There are many fine thoughts in the work, and they are uniformly presented in eloquent and flowing diction. In these particulars the author sustains the reputation which he had deservedly acquired by his previous writings.

PROFESSOR PHELPS ON REGENERATION.*—In common with other readers of the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, we have been charmed with the four dissertations from Professor Phelps which enriched the successive numbers of that work in 1866. We were even meditating a request to the author for the republication of them in a more popular form, when we received a copy of the four dissertations or discourses with another appended, and found that our thought was more than realized. This little volume, entitled "*The New Birth, or the Work of the Holy Spirit*," is in every respect excellent. We can commend it without any fear that our words of commendation will be too strong. As a theological treatise it is characterized by accuracy of definition and statement, by thorough soundness of evangelical doctrine, and by freshness of conception

* *The New Birth: or, The Work of the Holy Spirit.* By AUSTIN PHELPS, Professor in Andover Theological Seminary; Author of "*The Still Hour*." Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1867. 18mo. pp. 358. Price \$1.25.

and illustration. The most watchful and jealous organs of old school Calvinism will hardly find much "fatal error" in it; and yet, on the points which it touches, it holds forth with great force the New England Theology—the new-school doctrine of regeneration—nay, even the "New Haven views," which, less than forty years ago (when Dr. Taylor at New Haven, and Dr. Lyman Beecher at Boston, were the two "sons of thunder"), terrified some of Dr. Phelps's predecessors in the Andover professorships. But the book is not aridly, nor distinctively a theological treatise. It reminds one of the time when theological discussion and spiritual edification were not so far apart as they are now commonly reputed to be. While it exhibits with scientific accuracy all that theology knows concerning the new birth and the divine influence on the renewed soul, it is thoroughly practical, appealing continually to the religious sensibilities of every reader. As a contribution to our popular religious literature it is characterized not only by discriminating thought, but by earnestness in the application of truth to the conscience, by devotional feeling, and by great purity of force and style.

LIGHTFOOT'S COMMENTARY ON THE EPISTLE TO THE GALATIANS.*

—Among the modern English commentaries on the New Testament Scriptures, this appears to us to be the best. Ellicott is an accurate grammarian, but we miss in him the grasp of doctrinal and historical questions which belongs to the ablest expositors. Alford is learned, and his work is a valuable repository of opinions, though his own power as an interpreter is, in our view, not remarkable. But the present work bears marks of thorough and comprehensive scholarship; and the critical dissertations which form a leading feature of it are in the highest degree valuable. There are five introductory papers of this character:—I. The Galatian people; II. The churches of Galatia; III. The date of the Epistle; IV. The genuineness of the Epistle; V. Character and contents of the Epistle. Annexed to the several sections into which the Epistle is cast, are shorter essays, and at the end are three additional dissertations:—I. Were the Galatians Celts or Teutons? II. The Brethren of the Lord. III. St. Paul and the Three. This last is a discussion of the position of Paul with reference to the

* *St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians.* A revised text, with Introduction, Notes, and Dissertations. By J. B. LIGHTFOOT, D. D., Hulsean Professor of Divinity, and Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. Second edition. Revised. London and Cambridge: Macmillan & Co. 1866.

other Apostles, Peter, James, and John. It involves a thorough, full, and candid examination of the critical tenets of the Tübingen school. We know of nothing on this subject, from the pen of any English writer, which is so satisfactory. This commentary will not fail to command the universal respect of Biblical students.

GODET ON THE GOSPEL OF JOHN.*—The Neuchâtel pastor and theological instructor has furnished what we are quite unaccustomed to look for—a learned, orthodox, evangelical Biblical commentary in the French language. The importation into France of the scepticism of Germany and Holland, by the publications in which Renan, Réville, Schwalb, and others, are supplying the public with the views of Baur, Schenkel, Strauss, Hase, and Scholten, and dressing up the whole Tübingen criticism in French attractions, has waked up conscientious defenders of the New Testament among those who are proud to remember that Calvin belonged to their own race. Among these defenders Godet stands conspicuous; and his commentary on the Gospel of John shows him to be fully acquainted with the latest German criticism, and well prepared to deal with rationalism, and skillful enough often to turn its weapons back upon itself.

Godet describes the Gospel of John as *le point de mire de l'attaque, comme le foyer de la défense*; and it is with the chivalry of faith and devoted zeal for the cause of his Lord, that he stands for the defense of this fortress. He has written for theologians and scholars, and has given to his work "a strictly scientific character;" but at the same time it is not a mere exegetical repertory. Without wasting time and space in fine writing, he has given to his production not a little of that peculiar charm with which the French know how to invest almost any theme.

The introduction and the concluding chapters, in which are presented fully and admirably the external and internal evidences of the genuineness of this Gospel, the character of John, and the aim of his work, the minute historical fidelity and credibility of the same, and other kindred topics, and the extended treatment of the Prologue, may be regarded by many as the most valuable part of M. Godet's contribution. Our own attention has been given especially to these; but we are satisfied that the exegesis is well studied, meeting difficulties with a frank endeavor to solve them, treating with fairness the opinions of others, and evincing quick

* *Commentaire sur l'Evangile de Saint Jean.* Par F. GODET, Paris: 1866.

apprehension of the import of the words of our Lord. In commenting on those passages which speak of the deep mysteries of the incarnation and redemption, the author finds himself most in his element, and will most engage the attention of his readers. Here his views of the *subordination* of the Son, and his rejection of the hypothesis of two natures—a human and a divine—and his preference for the theory which supposes an *abasement* of the divine, for the accomplishment of the redeeming work, will not find universal acceptance. But no one will doubt that the author is essentially orthodox in regard to the person of Christ. In drawing the comparison between the teachings of the Synoptics and those of John, and in exhibiting the successive phases of Christ's own revelations concerning himself, Godet is original and profound.

The *Logos* idea and term were derived, according to our author, not from Philo (whose conception is represented as entirely different from that of John), but from the Old Testament, and the paraphrases of the Jewish interpreters.

We may add that the translation of the Greek into the French, as the verses are successively brought forward in the commentary, has been pronounced by French critics strikingly precise and accurate, being apparently uncontrolled by any favorite views of interpretation.

STUDIES IN THE BOOK OF PSALMS.*—The title would naturally prepare us for discussions of detached passages, or of topics necessarily excluded from the plan of a regular commentary. Placed upon the back of a volume, as large as a family Bible, which claims to be “a Critical and Expository Commentary, with Doctrinal and Practical Remarks upon the Entire Psalter,” it savors strongly of affectation. In one respect certainly the claim of the work is made good. Not a verse however plain but is compelled to bear its load of comment, and hardly one that does not by some mysterious law of association suggest a doctrinal or practical remark. How far the commentary deserves to be called “critical” will appear more clearly hereafter. Sober criticism of

* *Studies in the Book of Psalms ; being a Critical and Expository Commentary, with Doctrinal and Practical Remarks on the Entire Psalter.* By WILLIAM S. PLUMER, D. D., LL. D. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott. 1866. Royal 8vo. pp. 1211. New Haven: H. C. Peck. Price, \$6.

such a work being out of the question, we shall best exhibit its character by a few extracts—and first from the Introduction. Passing by such headings as “The Wonderful Character of the Psalms,” “The Psalms Excellent,” we make a short extract from Sec. 4, “The Peculiarities of the Psalter”: “The Book of Psalms is very peculiar. It differs from all other parts of God’s word. It contains *one hundred and fifty* distinct compositions. Of these some consist of a very few short sentences; others are quite extended. One has a *hundred and seventy-six* verses. In the Hebrew, the Psalter contains *two thousand five hundred and seven-teen* verses. The middle verse is Ps. lxxviii. 36.”

The difficulty of the imprecatory Psalms he thinks may be best removed by turning them into predictions. That the Psalms are not as their internal structure clearly shows, and as the judgment of scholars has pronounced them, five books, but one book, he thus proves: “In Luke xx. 42, and in Acts i. 20, we read of the ‘Book of Psalms,’ but nowhere do we read of ‘The Books of Psalms,’ nor of the *first, second, third, fourth, or fifth* Book of Psalms.”

Farther on (Sec. 18, Object of the Work), we are informed that “the great object of this work is to glorify God in the edification of his Church.” But this, it seems, was not the reason why it was undertaken. At least he has seen fit to devote a separate section (20) to the statement of these reasons. “If any ask why this work was undertaken, the answer is: 1. The word of God is not bound; it is open to all. 2. The author has a mind to it. He has never felt more disposed to any work. He has always found it best to pursue that kind of literary labor for which he has a strong inclination. 3. He saw no way in which he could more fitly spend a portion of the afternoon of his life, than in a special study of this incomparable collection of sacred psalms. 4. Others, who had devoted considerable time to the Psalms, uniformly testified that they were thereby great gainers. The author felt his own poverty, and wished to be enriched. * * * 6. Several learned and judicious persons, who heard of my contemplated design, and have examined parts of it after it was commenced, greatly encouraged the author to go on with his undertaking.”

The above extracts are sufficient to show that both in the choice and in the treatment of topics the present introduction differs from most. If now we pass to the commentary, the *thirty-second* of the “Doctrinal and Practical Remarks” on the fourth psalm gives us by implication the author’s idea of the work of the commen-

tator. "In writing on this psalm, the author has with high satisfaction read not a few expositions and treatises on this portion of Scripture. On the other hand, he may say, that he has never been more impressed with the danger of driveling or trying to make little of Scripture than in reading some others. When a preacher or writer undertakes to make as little as possible of any part of God's Word, he has reason to fear that he has quite missed its import."

His usual method is, after each clause of the translation, to give a list of authorities and various renderings, accompanied with occasional remarks of his own. Of both the material and the manner in which he has used it, the following may serve as an illustration. It is taken from Ps. xiv. 1: "(English version), *They have done abominable works.* Edwards: They commit abominable actions; Mudge: They are abominable in their frolics; Jebb: They are abominable in their doings; Horsley: They are abominable in their profligacy; Fry: They have done abominable deeds; Hengstenberg: They are abominable in their actions; Calvin: They have done abominable works; Church of England: They are become abominable in their doings; Alexander: They have done abominably (in) deed (or act); Doway: They have become abominable in their ways; Syriac: They are become corrupt in their artful devices. Each of these gives a good sense, though some are rather too free translations."

A parallel to the above may be found on almost any page of the Commentary. He estimates his authorities apparently not by weight, but by bulk or number. Between Calvin and Scott he recognizes no difference in specific gravity. Generally speaking, the commentators of highest authority among scholars are not quoted at all. It has occurred to us in view of the method which he has taken to arrive at the meaning of the original text, that possibly the Hebrew was omitted by mistake from the list of languages, of which, in the Introduction (Sec. 19) he confesses himself ignorant.

Of the "Doctrinal and Practical Remarks," which occupy in general about half as much space as the Commentary, we have only room to remark that they are made up to a considerable extent of extracts from other writers—a fact for which the reader has reason to be profoundly thankful. The "Studies in the Book of Psalms," taking the size and pretensions of the work into account, will rank high among the literary curiosities of modern times.

DR. SHIELDS'S EDITION OF THE REVISED PRAYER BOOK.*—After the Presbyterians, to their great cost, had aided in restoring Charles II., and when the King, though determined to disappoint their hopes, wished to make a show of redeeming his promises, he called a Conference at the Savoy, in May, 1661, between twenty-one Anglican and as many Presbyterian divines, for the ostensible purpose of accommodating their differences as to ceremonies and worship. On that occasion the Presbyterian divines brought forward their objections to certain parts of the Book of Common Prayer, and their suggestions of amendment. They thus presented a Prayer Book which would meet their views, and which they would be willing to use. It is the Puritan Prayer Book. Dr. Shields has republished it, accompanied by an historical and critical review, in which we are presented with highly interesting and valuable information respecting the history of worship and forms of worship among the Presbyterians, and respecting the origin of the matter comprising the English Prayer Book. The discussion of the latter topic is specially interesting. It shows how many of the devotional forms in which Episcopalians delight are from the pen of Calvinistic divines outside the pale of the Anglican Church. It is diverting to hear, as we do now and then, hearty abuse of Calvin from men who in the same breath laud prayers which (however ignorant they may be of the fact) Calvin wrote. Dr. Shields has executed his task *con amore*, and with the best judgment and taste. The whole subject of public worship is now engaging the attention of not a few thoughtful minds in the Presbyterian and Congregational denominations. It must be considered anew, and it should be considered with candor. We hope to offer to our readers, before long, an essay or series of essays on this subject.

MILMAN'S HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE FIRST THREE CENTURIES.†—Since this work first appeared, a vast amount of inves-

* *The Book of Common Prayer, as amended by the Westminster Divines, A. D. 1661.* Edited by CHARLES W. SHIELDS, D. D. With a Historical and Liturgical Treatise. Philadelphia: James S. Claxton. 1866. New Haven: Judd & White. Price \$2.50.

† *The History of Christianity, from the birth of Christ to the abolition of Paganism in the Roman Empire.* By HENRY HART MILMAN, D. D., Dean of St. Paul's. In three volumes. A new and revised edition. New York: W. J. Widdleton. 1866. New Haven: Judd & White. Price \$6.75.

tigation and discussion has been devoted to the early history of the Church. We have only to mention the Tübingen school to remind our readers of the recent controversies relating to this theme. Milman professes to have given attention to these modern discussions, but his references to them are cursory and superficial. In order to take account of them, his work would almost need to be rewritten. His reply to Strauss is not without merit, although his representation of the mythical theory is neither sufficiently full nor quite correct.

Milman, as a historian, must have the credit of having made wide and careful researches. His reading is extensive and generally accurate. He writes always in a liberal, kindly spirit. He abstains from denunciation. His style is animated, being in advantageous contrast, in this respect, with the style of most of the Church historians. But here the catalogue of his merits must stop. His style, though lively, is artificial, latinized, and betrays the vicious influence of Gibbon. His liberality savors too much of indifferentism. He assumes, if we may so say, the tone of an outsider in his treatment of the persons and events that pass under his eye. Sometimes this easy manner comes near to superficiality. Religious phenomena that pass beyond the limit of good English decency and mediocrity he evidently regards with little respect. Hence in his estimates of character he is too often superficial. The foibles, extravagances, eccentricities, of men of genius fill too large a space in his eye. When Milman undertakes to describe a character like that of St. Louis of France, he produces a caricature. The same may be said of the representation he gives of men like Marcion and Tertullian. He lamentably fails in sympathy and depth of appreciation. Notwithstanding these very serious deductions to be made from the value of his writings, an author who is so learned, and who always intends to be fair-minded and catholic, cannot fail to be instructive. To most people he is at least much more readable than the eminent German historians of the Church.

Milman, speaking of the origin of the Episcopate, observes on page 19 (vol. II.) of the work before us, that "at a very early period, one religious functionary superior to the rest appears to have been almost universally recognized; at least it is difficult to understand how, in so short a time, among communities, though not entirely disconnected, yet scattered over the Roman world, a scheme of government, popular or aristocratical, should become,

even in form, monarchical. Neither the times nor the circumstances of the infant church, nor the primitive spirit of the religion, appear to favor a general, a systematic, and an unauthorized usurpation of power on the part of the supreme religious functionary. Yet the change had already taken place within the apostolic times. The Church of Ephesus, which, in the Acts, is represented by its Elders, in the Revelations (*sic*) is represented by its angel or bishop." In a note he speaks of this change as "a total revolution," and acknowledges that his opinion on the subject is at variance with that of Mosheim, Gibbon, Neander, and "most of the learned foreign writers." It is unfortunate for the Dean's argument that the Apocalypse was, in all probability, written *before* the Acts. Milman himself dates the former book in the reign of Nero. It is unfortunate, again, for his argument, that the term "angel" in the Apocalypse does not denote *bishop*. Everything that is said to the several "angels" is said to the *churches* respectively; and "angel" is a personification of the spirit of the church. The gradual concession, to a particular presbyter, of a presidency or a precedence over his fellow-presbyters is not properly called "a usurpation." This change which Milman finds so wonderful was very natural and easy to take place. The growth of the hierarchical system, until it culminated in the papacy, was imperceptible, though rapid. The first movement in this direction, which Milman thinks to be so surprising in case the Apostles did not decree it, is not a tenth part so astonishing as the subsequent changes in the same direction, which all know to have occurred without Apostolic commandment.

NIEDNER'S CHURCH HISTORY.*—The first edition of Niedner's Manual of Church History appeared in 1846. Notwithstanding the author's excessive division of the matter into sections and sub-sections, by which some readers were bewildered and repelled, and certain equally obnoxious qualities of style, this work was acknowledged by all discerning students to have extraordinary merits. Professor H. B. Smith, in his very thorough and able "History of the Church in Chronological Tables," speaks of it as "an invaluable aid." Niedner emulated Gieseler and Neander in

* Christian Wilhelm Niedner's (weil. Doctor and Professor der Theologie zu Berlin) *Lehrbuch der Christlichen Kirchengeschichte, von der ältesten zeit bis auf die Gegenwart*. Neuerste, von dem Verfasser kurz vor seinem Tode ausgearbeitete Auflage. Berlin. 1866.

laborious research and in familiarity with the original sources. It is to be regretted that he did not live to prepare a much more copious work, of which the manual would have served for the foundation. Since his decease, this new edition has been issued. He had rewritten the book, canceling some passages, introducing new matter, and casting the old into new expressions. In its latest form, it will remain a monument of genuine scholarship and learning.

PHILOSOPHICAL.

RECENT BRITISH PHILOSOPHY.*—This is a very readable volume, and will to very many readers convey all the information upon recent British Philosophy which they need care to possess. It consists in substance of three lectures delivered at the Royal Institution of Great Britain in the year 1865. These were designed doubtless for a cultivated, but as certainly for a popular audience, and therefore the subjects and the authors are all treated in a way that makes no pretension to special subtilty or profoundness. In expanding the volume from the lectures, the author adheres to his original design, and, as the result, has produced a work which may be recommended as one of the best, if not the very best, upon this subject for the uses of the reader who is not a philosopher in the special sense of the term. His notices of the authors who, with greater or less propriety, may be called philosophical is very nearly complete, and is brought down to the latest date. Scarcely a single work of importance seems to have escaped, unless it be the quasi philosophical tales of Mr. William Smith,—*Thorndale* and *Gravenhurst*. His account of the opinions of each may be accepted as fair and intelligible—the only criticism which we have to offer being that his system of classification compels him to adopt a high sounding and somewhat inconvenient terminology, which requires him to find a definite place for each author under some one of the categories which he has provided, or else to have no place for him at all. In other words Professor Masson falls into the practice adopted by too many critics and historians of philosophy of using high sounding, if not “glittering generalities” for purposes of exposition and criticism. The estimates of the author seem to us just. His stand point is correct, being the spiritual as

* *Recent British Philosophy*. A Review, with criticisms, including some comments on Mr. Mill's answer to Sir William Hamilton. By DAVID MASSON. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1866. New Haven: H. C. Peck. Price \$1.50.

opposed to the materialistic, psychological as contrasted with the physiological, intuitional as distinguished from the empirical, and theistic as opposed to the atheistic. We cordially recommend the book as worthy the attention of our readers.

SUPERSTITION AND FORCE.*—This solid volume is packed full of solid facts gathered from a very extensive and exact reading, and arranged so as to illustrate each of the topics indicated by the titles of the several essays. These facts, with the brief comments by which they are explained, illustrate in a very striking and impressive manner the darkness of other times, and the slow emancipation of the race from the dominion of Superstition and Force. They also illustrate the tenacious and ineradicable faith of the human race in God, in the moral order of the universe and the certain triumph of the right. The simple curiosity which delights in the bizarre and amusing will find in these strange recitals an inexhaustible fund for its entertainment. The enquiry is often made by the curious what were the facts respecting the prevalence of these wagers and trials. How extensively did they prevail?—under what forms and conditions were they applied? This volume can answer all these questions to full satisfaction. It will take its place in all good libraries, we doubt not, as a collection of valuable monographs on these several topics. The preparation of them is most honorable to the research and scholarship of the country, none the less certainly that the writer is conspicuous in other forms of activity.

HISTORICAL.

FROUDE'S HISTORY OF ENGLAND, VOLS. VII. AND VIII.†—With the seventh volume, Mr. Froude enters on the reign of Elizabeth—an independent section of his history. In vividness and graphic power of style, and in that skillful disposition of the matter by which a dramatic interest and progress are given to the narrative, the volumes before us even excel their predecessors. If history were always written in this style, it would have more read-

* *Superstition and Force. Essay on The Wager of Law—The Wager of Battle—The Ordeal—Torture.* By HENRY C. LEA. Philadelphia: Henry C. Lea. 1866. 12mo. pp. 407. New Haven: Judd & White.

† *History of England from the fall of Wolsey to the death of Elizabeth.* By JAMES ANTHONY FROUDE, M. A., late Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford. Reign of Elizabeth. Vol. I. New York: Charles Scribner & Company. 1867. New Haven: Judd & White. Price \$3 per volume.

ers from the class now devoted to novel-reading. In describing the early years of Elizabeth's reign, the historian is obliged to record contemporaneous events outside of England, especially the story of Mary, Queen of Scots, down to the murder of Darnley. The chapters which relate to the Scottish Queen are written with great power. The same is true of the account of the struggles in Ireland, and the briefer notice of the civil wars in France. Indeed, the attention of a thoughtful reader is nowhere relaxed, but the interest of the stirring tale is sustained throughout. Notwithstanding Froude's excessive partiality for the Tudors, Elizabeth is made to appear, in this part of her reign, in a very unfavorable light. If we make all due allowance for the difficulties of her position, she cannot be said, so far as she is personally concerned, to have manifested remarkable ability as a ruler. Some of her personal traits are exceedingly repulsive. She was vain and petulant. She found fault almost uniformly with her most faithful officers. She was half-hearted in her enterprises, and too niggardly to give the requisite means for prosecuting them at the critical moment. She did not hesitate to break her word, and to confirm her lies with an oath. She would promise her aid, now to the insurgent Scots and now to the Huguenots, and treacherously fail them. More than once she was seized with a needless panic, and held back from measures which would have brought her prosperity and glory. She was in love with that worthless scoundrel, Dudley, whom she made Earl of Leicester, and was prevented from marrying him only by the dread of a rebellion. This passion for Dudley was the one thing that deranged her policy, and cost England the loss of signal advantages which were within reach. It is plain that during these years Elizabeth owed her salvation from ruin to the profound ability and long-suffering patience of her advisers, especially Cecil, and to the vigor and valor of her generals. In religion, she was too proud and loved power too well—she loved English liberty too well, let us grant—to permit the Pope to exercise authority within her realm. But she had no objection to most of the Catholic dogmas and ceremonies. She wanted crucifixes, surplices, and the like; and she would have been glad to have a celibate clergy. The character of that "all-accomplished woman," the Queen of Scots, is delineated finely in this history. Her great and fatal defect was the feebleness of her conscience. In other womanly qualities, she far outshines her rival. The sympathy which has been lavished upon her has been awakened by her personal attractions. Her character is entitled to no respect. Pascal said that if Cleopatra's

nose had been a little longer or shorter, the whole history of the world would have been different. One is reminded of this remark, in view of the romantic interest and regard bestowed upon the unprincipled Scottish Queen. She was an accomplice in the murder of her husband under circumstances of aggravated cruelty, and then married the chief perpetrator of the crime, who had been before, if not a paramour, an avowed lover. It gives one no very favorable idea of what John Knox called the "regiment of women," to see the fortunes of two kingdoms turning upon the whimsies of two young ladies who had inherited power.

The principal fault of Froude's history has been pointed out in our previous notices of the work. He does not appreciate the distinctively religious side of the English reformation. He is a champion of the Tudor policy. He habitually sneers at "doctrines" and doctrinal belief. He does signal injustice to many of the scholars and preachers who espoused and defended the Protestant cause. As far as the present volumes are concerned, Knox is almost the only prominent reformer whom he admires. For Parker, whom Elizabeth made Archbishop of Canterbury, he expresses more respect than for any of the rest of the English Protestant leaders. In this particular, his work is not only unfair, but superficial. His usual mode of characterizing the Protestant clergy may be gathered from a few sentences: "The Protestants nominated to the sees being left to whine in expectation" (Vol. VII. p. 158); "the London preachers, who had set their hearts on her taking Arran, burst into a scream of indignation" (*Ibid.* p. 297); for "once the pulpit showed itself wise," etc. He sneers at Jewel for having fled during the Marian persecution, not remembering that Knox did the same, and that his favorite, Parker, hid himself. Why should he not fly? The whole tone of the author respecting Protestantism, as a doctrinal reform and a peculiarly religious movement, is in a high degree objectionable. He systematically undervalues, and even decries, the principal among the forces that gave vitality to the great revolution which he professes to record.

MISCELLANEOUS.

G. WASHINGTON MOON'S STRICTURES ON DEAN ALFORD'S ESSAYS ON THE QUEEN'S ENGLISH.*—It ought to be an easy task

* *The Dean's English*; a Criticism on the Dean of Canterbury's *Essays on the Queen's English*. By G. WASHINGTON MOON. Fourth Edition. New York: Alexander Strahan & Co. (No date.) Pp. xlvI, 180. New Haven: Judd & White. Price \$1 75.

for any one into whose hands this book may fall to draw up a critical estimate of it. For its author and publisher have taken pains to incorporate with it a set of models, by the use of which, as by a "complete letter-writer," each one may construct new notices in any style and degree of eulogium that he may select. Of eulogium only, it must be well understood: the abundant "Extracts from Reviews" (reviews of all kinds, from the *Edinburgh* down to the *Sunday Times* and *Morning Advertiser*), with which the volume is made to begin, are more monotonous and less entertaining than those prefixed to the "*Biglow Papers*," in that they are all upon one side, lauding Mr. Moon and decrying his adversary without stint. To aid us still further in judging of the matter in controversy between these two gentlemen, we are favored in the latter part of the work with another set of "*Opinions of the Press*," covering forty pages, and ending with a rather tedious essay on the general subject of "*Criticism*," from the *Saturday Review*,—an essay which has nothing whatever to do with either the Queen's or the Dean's English, and for whose introduction it is hard to conjecture a reason—unless, indeed, Mr. Moon himself wrote it. Then comes the publisher's "*Book List*," twenty-four pages more. Thus, whereas we fondly imagine that we have supplied ourselves with Moon's criticisms to the extent of two hundred and fifty pages, making a sturdy little volume, we find them actually filling less than half its bulk,—only one hundred and twenty-three pages! How are we to understand this? Does the author regard his part of the work as requiring all this backing up and cushioning? or does his publisher credit it with such extraordinary buoyancy as to be able to float such a pile of extraneous stuff, enabling him to extract from the public the price of a volume for the matter of a pamphlet?

The whole of this Alford and Moon controversy has to us, we must confess, its absurd as well as its amusing aspect. It has attracted a vastly larger share of the public attention than it has merited. A man seldom addresses himself to the task of instructing his fellows how to use their mother tongue with fewer qualifications than Dean Alford possessed. His book is crowded with blunders, false principles, worthless judgments, and platitudes of every kind. It deserves the worst things that have been said of it by Mr. Moon and all his coadjutors—those cited and those not cited in the volume before us. But so much the less need was there that any noise should have been made about the matter. Some how or other, the attacks upon it have themselves

helped to raise it into notice and importance. We can see no good reason why the Dean's lucubrations should ever have emerged out of their primitive condition of papers furnished to the periodical "Good Words," and taken the shape of an independent volume. Nor can we see any better reason why Mr. Moon's strictures upon them should not have continued to be fugitive essays, controversial pamphlets, as they were at first. Notwithstanding the commendatory epithets lavished upon them in the "Extracts from Reviews," we quite fail to recognize, either in their matter or their manner, anything giving them a permanent value. They concern themselves, in the first place, with but a single department of the Dean's shortcomings, his inaccuracies and infelicities of style, not noticing any of the rest. Now the Dean, having set himself up as a teacher of style, has fairly laid himself open to such an attack; he cannot complain if his sentences are subjected to a microscopic examination, and if every flaw in them is spied out and exposed; yet this sort of criticism is of the lowest and easiest kind, and would find abundant field for exercise in the works of almost every great author who has written English. We shudder to think how Shakespeare, and Milton, and Addison, would writhe under Mr. Moon's little scalpel, should he choose to dissect them after the same fashion. Such a thing, of course, neither he nor any other sensible man would ever think of doing; and, if one were to attempt it, the community would hold him in derision. The genius and power of those great men lift them quite out of the reach of a petty, carping criticism. And if the Dean's lectures were filled with the evidences of deep learning, wide reading, and acute philological discernment—especially, if his teachings did not in part concern the very points where his example is faulty—he could afford to laugh at all that his adversary has said, claiming that it did not touch the substantial value of his work. The insignificance of the thing criticised, then, is needed to make the pertinence of the criticism; but it cannot raise the latter into independent significance.

In the second place, the style of these strictures is not a sufficient foundation for wide and prolonged popularity. "Smart" enough, they are, to be sure, vigorous in attack, triumphant in tone and argument: but their task of conquest is an easy one. There is nothing delicately incisive about them; their tone is loud and haw-haw-ing; they storm and beat down; their weapon is the mace, not the rapier. They are not content with the merit they arrogate to themselves, of "calling a spade a spade;" they stop

but little short, often, of pronouncing it a "a dirty old spade." Mr. Moon had some right, doubtless, to be irritated by the manner in which his first letter of criticism was received; but his irritation has notably hurt the tone of the remaining letters.

Neither the Queen's English nor the Dean's English, then, nor the reception given them, are to be looked upon as altogether creditable to the philological taste and culture of the English-speaking public; and there are indications that Mr. Moon is in danger of being misled by the success of this effort of his into thinking that its style of criticism is the right foundation upon which to build up a literary reputation.

SIMSON'S HISTORY OF THE GYPSIES.*—We have here a very rambling and gossipy, but generally entertaining book, upon the Gypsies of Scotland. To these it ought fairly to be limited by its title; for neither the learning nor the judgment of the author or editor is equal to the task of preparing anything claiming to be called a general treatise on the Gypsies. Of the editor's historical insight we may form an idea from the theory which he frames to account for the ultimate origin of this race: he supposes that they are the "mixed multitude" which quitted Egypt with the Israelites, and that, having no better place to betake themselves to, they slipped into India, and lay quiet there for a matter of thirty centuries, before they recommenced their wanderings! Both editor and author are enthusiasts upon their subject, and inclined to overestimate its importance, as also to exalt into a kind of wierd and supernatural potency the Gypsy race-character. According to them, the Gypsy taint is about as hard to eradicate as original sin. Neither mixture of blood, nor change of occupation and mode of life, can make one who counts a Gypsy ancestor otherwise than a Gypsy to the bone. The chapter on the language of the race is of interest chiefly as showing what a deal of trouble Mr. Simson had in winning from the jealous reticence of his "Tinkler" friends a very small modicum of knowledge upon the subject: for, compared with what has been gathered elsewhere, his collections are quite insignificant. Yet they have their value, as adding another to the many proofs that these homeless wanderers, scorned and

* *A History of the Gypsies: with Specimens of the Gipsy Language.* By WALTER SIMSON. Edited, with Preface, Introduction, and Notes, and a Disquisition on the Past, Present, and Future of Gipsydom, by JAMES SIMSON. New York: M. Doolady. 1866. 12mo. pp. 575. New Haven: Judd & White. Price \$3.

hunted of all European nations as they have been for five centuries past, still cling everywhere to fragments of the dialect which they brought with them out of India.

The nucleus of the volume seems to have been written in Scotland, a quarter of a century ago; and it has met with strange adventures in its day. Its manuscript "was twice lost, and once stolen." "Then the original copy, in its present form, was stolen and never recovered." Then a copy was sent to Scotland and never acknowledged; and so on (p. 537, note). Evidently, the written pages had caught something of the ineradicable persistency of the race they concerned. No work upon other than a Gypsy subject could ever have survived such a succession of misadventures, and come at last safely before the public.

THE ORIGIN OF THE STARS.*—World making is a fascinating study, and when facts seen in the world around us are made the firm basis of our speculations it becomes a noble science. The present volume is an effort to tell how the world was made. The author gives us a modification and extension of the nebular hypothesis. He assumes that all matter was originally homogeneous and diffused through space—that the several chemical elements are modifications of this primitive matter—that in the development of these forms of matter by chemical action the light and heat of the sun and stars are produced. "Chemical action" is with him the key that unlocks the mysteries of creation.

He has collected and arranged a large number of facts in astronomy and geology in support of his views. As a collection and classification of such facts the book has a decided value, and yet we must caution the reader not to trust too implicitly to some of the statements. We wish the author had more frequently given references to original authorities. Copious indexes add much to the value of the volume.

No doubt the heat of the sun is in part developed through chemical action, but we are not ready to find in it, as does Mr. Ennis, the only or main source of solar light and heat.

* *The Origin of the Stars, and the Causes of their Motions and their Light.* By JACOB ENNIS, Principal of the Scientific and Classical Institute, Philadelphia. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1867. New Haven: H. C. Peck. Price \$2.

FIRST LESSONS IN READING.*—Numerous attempts have been made, at various times, to smooth the way for beginners in reading, by the introduction of a phonetic alphabet of some kind. The number of sounds to be expressed by the few letters of the alphabet is so great, and the modes of representing these individual sounds are so various, as to cause incalculable difficulty and perplexity to a learner. Phonetic characters do indeed render the accurate pronunciation of words written in them a comparatively easy accomplishment. But the pupil who has learned to read words thus written is still obliged to learn the common alphabet; and though by the phonetic system his apprehension of the elements of words may be sharpened, he has made but little actual progress toward being able to read.

Messrs. Soule and Wheeler have endeavored to unite the advantages of phonetic spelling with those of the common method, without involving any of the disadvantages of the former. In this little book only the letters of the ordinary alphabet are used, their sounds being indicated, where possible, by such combinations as admit of no ambiguity, while in other cases diacritical marks are employed. These marks, however, are not only of the simplest description, and few in number, but are such as, from their very general use, are nearly as familiar as the letters themselves. The simpler sounds are taught first, these being the vowels in their most common or name sounds. Then come the consonants, in small groups which are associated in reference to the manner of their formation, as first *p, b, f, v*; then *s, z, t, d*; next *k, c, g, j*; then *m, n, l, r*; and so on. No time or effort of the child is wasted, at this early period, in learning the order or names of the letters as belonging to the alphabet. He is simply taught the forms of the letters, and that these forms stand for certain sounds. As soon as he has become familiar with the vowels and principal consonants, he is shown that when a consonant is placed before a vowel the two are pronounced together, and may form a word or part of a word, and short sentences are given of words containing but two letters thus combined. He thus comes to know what syllables are. He is next informed that when a vowel stands *before* a

* *First Lessons in Reading*; a new method of teaching the reading of English, by which the ear is trained to discriminate the elementary sounds of words, and the eye to recognize the signs used for these sounds in the established orthography. By RICHARD SOULE and WILLIAM A. WHEELER. Boston: Lee & Shepard. 1866 12mo. pp. 98.

consonant, it has a different sound, called the short sound, and this is likewise illustrated with numerous examples and simple reading lessons. In a similar way the effect of final *e* in lengthening the vowel before a consonant, of a doubled consonant, of position in accented or unaccented syllables, in short, all the various circumstances which influence the pronunciation of letters and syllables are introduced and made familiar by lessons and appropriate exercises. The learner, first becoming acquainted with the normal sounds and relations of the letters, is thus gradually taught the irregular and exceptional sounds, and where these are capable of classification or analogies, such relations are carefully pointed out. Much ingenuity is displayed in the selection and arrangement of the materials for the lessons and exercises. The authors deserve great praise for the manner in which they have succeeded in giving to simple and rudimentary matter, suited to the comprehension of a child, a form and method truly scientific. They have attained the best results of the various phonetic systems without obliging the child to learn anything that he will ever need to forget or disuse; and no child who studies this book under the direction of a faithful teacher can fail of acquiring a distinct articulation and a correct pronunciation. We cannot forbear expressing the hope that the authors will complete a series of Readers on the same admirable plan.

A YANKEE IN CANADA.*—The friends of the late Mr. Thoreau seem resolved that none of his papers shall remain unpublished, for which his admirers throughout the country will doubtless be very thankful. We do not rank ourselves among his admirers, but we are most free to say that there is a charm in all that he writes which holds our attention, notwithstanding his manifold perversities both of thought and feeling. He is the Diogenes of that American school of philosophers of which Concord is the Academy, and Emerson the Plato. We like Mr. Thoreau above all as a traveler. The *Yankee in Canada*, like his "Cape Cod," paints to the eye photographic pictures so clear, sharp, and bold that we see every object with a startling sense of reality. The queer and quaint humors of the author alone give the pictures a dash of the grotesque and the comic. Notwithstanding his contempt for all

* *A Yankee in Canada*; with Anti-Slavery and Reform Papers. By HENRY D. THOREAU, author of "Walden," &c., &c. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1866. New Haven: T. H. Pease. Price \$1.50.

the perverse ways of his fellow men, he cannot quite keep down the whimsical perversities of Mr. Thoreau. These are continually oozing or rather bursting out, through every seam and junction of his discourses. The time will come when this little journal will be greatly valued for its graphic pictures, though the grim jokes of the showman will be uncared for.

The so-called Anti-Slavery and Reform papers that make up the remainder of this volume are all eminently characteristic and interesting. They are suggestive of many thoughts concerning the men who have done much to mould the thinking of large portions of our country in the present generation, and the influence of whose thinking will long survive in our institutions and literature.

CHARACTER AND CHARACTERISTIC MEN.*—Whatever Mr. Whipple writes is carefully written—some would say a little too elaborately. His readers or hearers always expect to receive from him thoughts carefully considered, facts carefully gathered, words carefully chosen, and sentences carefully constructed. He may, without injustice, be pronounced one of our most finished lecturers and essayists. Though he does not despise humor, and sometimes aspires rather painfully to reach it, he scorns trifling, and most conscientiously abjures sensational exaggeration. He has steadily pursued his own course for many patient years till now he has become a veteran critic and *litterateur* worthy of all honor and esteem. It is greatly to his credit that he has never preferred the striking to the true, nor the brilliant to the ennobling—that his writings all tend to strengthen the faith in the beautiful and the good, as well as to elevate the aspirations towards that which is nobly ideal. The titles of the essays in this volume indicate the direction of thought which is taken by the writer: Character—Eccentric Character—Intellectual Character—Heroic Character—The American Mind—The English Mind—Thackeray—Nathaniel Hawthorne—Edward Everett—Thomas Starr King—Agassiz—Washington, and the Principles of the Revolution.

THE PICTURE OF ST. JOHN.†—In this poem of four books and a

* *Character and Characteristic Men.* By EDWIN P. WHIPPLE. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1866. New Haven: T. H. Pease. Price \$1.75

† *The Picture of St. John.* By BAYARD TAYLOR. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1866. New Haven: T. H. Pease. Price, \$2.

poem we have a very elaborate sketch of the supposed career of an artist, in its outward incidents, its inner experiences, together with such pictures of nature and of life as make a suitable framework for the tale. It is ingeniously conceived, and very carefully and laboriously written. Single passages and facts excite no little interest in the mind of the attentive reader, but the whole wants inspiration, and therefore unity in the best sense of the word. The verse shows a practised ear and hand, and therefore is not unpleasant to be heard or read, but we cannot call the production poetry in the best sense of the appellation.

THE BIGLOW PAPERS, SECOND SERIES.*—It is not strange that the complete success of the first series of the famous Biglow Papers should prove an obstacle to any further success of the author in the same line. It is hard for a man to write well who is conscious that the world is looking over his shoulder. After the old series, the humor and originality of which have gained the applause of the whole English-speaking world, the present papers seem heavy. The valuable, as well as diverting, introduction, in which Mr. Lowell talks about language and style, is the best part of the volume. We except, however, the admirable and inimitable verses about "The Courtin," which are reproduced from the former series, and which are worth all the rest of the verses in the book. Satire, such as the Biglow Papers furnish, and such as Rev. Petroleum V. Nasby is giving to the newspapers, may be made—as these examples prove—a very effective and useful weapon in American politics. Nowhere is there a more inviting field for the humorist, or one where his interference is more needed. There are countless follies and sins in the political sphere which are best swept away, not by argument or denunciation, but by laughter-provoking wit.

POEMS BY ROBERT WEEKS.†—This little volume of poems, which has come unheralded into the literary world, is deserving of the cordial greeting with which it has been received. If it had no other claims to attention, it would at least be a gratifying indication that literature, in the strict sense of the word, is not neglected wholly by the younger graduates of Yale. The author has not

* *The Biglow Papers. Second Series* Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1867. New Haven: T. H. Pease. Price \$1.50.

† *Poems.* By ROBERT K. WEEKS. New York: Leypoldt & Holt. 1867. 16mo. pp. 142. New Haven: Judd & White. Price \$1.25.

been long out of college (having graduated in 1862), but he already shows a mature literary culture. His verses evince so much true poetic taste, and such delicacy and purity of sentiment, that they give promise of still better things to come. Instead of being exhausted by one effort, he seems to us possessed of reserved power which ought to be developed. Some of his pieces remind us of Robert Browning, not in any unpleasant way, and certainly not by the obscurity or the profundity of the thought;—but by a freedom from conventionality in the structure of the verse and by the direct and pointed way in which the theme is presented. Ease and grace, rather than force or brilliancy, are the characteristics of most of the poems. Some of the pieces are strikingly pretty. But if there had been greater boldness in the selection of the subjects and in the mode of treatment, we think the volume would have taken higher rank. The Yale triennial includes the names of Pierpont, Percival, Brainerd, Hillhouse, and Willis, already honorably known among the poets of America, whose works will live, and it includes the names of many more whose early promise of poetic fame has not been realized in after life. We trust that Mr. Weeks will be encouraged by the very cordial reception which has been given to his volume to persevere in literary labors and that he may win for himself a name among the most honored of the land.

FLOWER-DE-LUCE.*—This little volume, which contains some dozen of Mr. Longfellow's later lyrics, makes one of the most pleasing gift-books of the season. Most of the pieces will be recognized as having been already published in the *Atlantic Monthly*. The book derives its name from the first poem of the collection, which is addressed, in the poet's best vein, to the "*Flower-de-Luce*,"

"Beautiful lily, dwelling by still rivers."

The other pieces all bear the distinctive marks of Mr. Longfellow's genius. They have impressed us anew with the gracefulness and beauty of his verse, and the scholarly taste manifested everywhere in the selection of his words. Yet highly as we are gratified, we are reluctantly constrained to apply to these poems the criticism he himself makes on Giotto's Tower. They

"—— are in their completeness incomplete."

* *Flower-de-Luce*. By HENRY WADSWORTH LONGFELLOW. With illustrations. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1867. 16mo. pp. 72. New Haven: T. H. Pease. Price \$2.

There is, notwithstanding all that is so pleasing, a lack of fervor and power. As we read, we are stopped in mid-career, and feel the need of something more.

Five beautiful wood-cuts illustrate the volume. They are designed and engraved by the first American artists, and add materially to its attractiveness.

THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.*—There is, we know, a certain class of people who during all their lives read such books as these with credulous and admiring faith. There are others who, for a brief period of intellectual transition, find in the writings of Swedenborg a temporary interest and imagined satisfaction. We confess to entire inability to understand the tastes of such. We can only share in the admiration which we presume they have in common with common mortals for the exquisite typography, binding, and paper of this delicately elegant volume. We only wish that its contents (to our taste) were worthier of the embodiment.

THE DRAYTONS AND THE DAVENANTS.†—This is a new book by the authoress of "*The Schönberg-Cotta Family*;" and is scarcely, if at all, inferior in interest and real power to those affecting "*Chronicles*" of the times of Martin Luther, which at once obtained everywhere so hearty a welcome. The scene of this new story is laid in England, in the days of Charles I. and the Civil War. All the prominent events that took place during that fierce struggle are interwoven easily and naturally with the thread of the narrative,—from the time just before the fall of Strafford and Laud, when the irregular levying of ship money, and the introduction of new ceremonies into the church, furnished matter for passionate discussion around every English fireside, to that memorable day in January, 1648, when the King was brought as a criminal before the High Court of Justice in Westminster Hall. Of course, the details of history are only brought out incidentally; for, as might be supposed, the main object of the authoress is to illustrate character and the changing feelings, hopes, fears, and

* *The Divine Attributes; including also the Divine Trinity.* A treatise on the Divine Love, and Wisdom, and Correspondence. From the "*Apocalypse Explained*" of EMMANUEL SWEDENBORG. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1866.

† *The Draytons and the Davenants.* A Story of the Civil Wars. By the author of "*Chronicles of the Schönberg-Cotta Family*," etc., etc. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1866. 12mo. pp. 509. New Haven: F. T. Jarman. Price \$1.75.

prejudices of both the contending parties—the Puritans and the Cavaliers. The method she has taken is the one which is so evidently a favorite with her, and which she certainly uses with much effectiveness—the carrying on of her story by means of contemporary diaries. In this case, there are two; one kept by Lettice Davenant, who introduces the reader to the country home, in Lincolnshire, of her father, a cavalier, who is a courtier and a personal friend of the King; and the other kept by her friend and near neighbor, Olive Drayton, who is the daughter of a gentleman who had fought, years gone by, in Germany, in the religious wars, under Gustavus Adolphus, and is now a friend of Cromwell, Hampden, Milton, and all the leaders of the popular party. As already intimated, we think the book eminently successful; and are confident that there will be very many readers who will find a new and fresh interest thrown around the great English Civil War which was waged for the rights of the people, and will be impressed with the many points of resemblance to the war with which we are so familiar, and through which we have just so gloriously passed.

ENGLAND TWO HUNDRED YEARS AGO.*—This is quite an attractive little volume, which has been prepared by the Rev. Dr. Gillett for Sunday school scholars and other young people, with the design of interesting them in the story of the Non-Conformists in the reign of Charles II. The central figure in the book is the Rev. Joseph Alleine, of Taunton. The author has availed himself of some facts in the life of this eminent divine—whose name is yet a familiar one in New as well as in Old England—and interweaving with them a slightly fictitious story, he has succeeded in presenting a picture of the state of things which followed the Restoration, two hundred years ago, which cannot fail to give the reader a vivid impression of the trials and sufferings of those noble men who were so unhappily betrayed, and whose memory and whose cause are here so well vindicated.

THE FAIRE GOSPELLER.*—This is a new work by the author of

* *England Two Hundred Years Ago.* By Rev. E. H. GILLETT, author of "The Life of Hues." Philadelphia: Presb. Pub. Committee. 16mo. pp. 363. New Haven: F. T. Jarman.

† *Passages in the Life of the Faire Gospeller, Mistress Anne Askew.* Re-counted by ye unworthie Pen of Nicholas Moldwarp, B. A., and now first set forth by the Author of "Mary Powell." New York: M. W. Dodd. 1866. 12mo. pp. 237. New Haven: F. T. Jarman. Price \$1.75.

"The Maiden and Married Life of Mary Powell, afterwards Mistress Milton," founded on the sad fate of Anne Ascue, who in July, 1546, after having been put to the rack for her religious faith, was burned at the stake before St. Bartholomew's Church in London. The accepted story of this fair young gentlewoman, it will be remembered, is one of the most affecting of all those who suffered in the progress of the reformation in England, during the reign of Henry VIII. Froude gives it at length, and says that the tragedy of her martyrdom overshadows the fate of those who suffered with her. We are sure that those who have been charmed with the quaintness, simplicity, and beauty of the other works of the author of "Mary Powell" will find a rich treat in this new story of "The Faire Gospeller."

POEMS BY THE AUTHORESS OF THE SCHÖNBERG-COTTA FAMILY.*

—On a former occasion, we have spoken in high terms of the poetry of this authoress, who is now so widely known. The present edition of her poems, with some additions, has been arranged with express reference for publication in this country.

The author of "The Schönberg-Cotta Family" wishes it to be generally known among the readers of her books in America that the American editions, issued by Mr. M. W. Dodd, of New York, alone have her sanction.

POEMS FOR THE HEART AND HOME.†—This new volume of poems by the Rev. Dr. Phelps includes a selection from pieces which have appeared in two previous volumes. There is quite a large variety among the subjects which have tempted his muse. "The Poet's Song," the first in the collection, is of considerable length, and has been recited on several public occasions. The most satisfactory of his efforts, however, are the Sonnets and the religious hymns, of which there are quite a number.

REPRINTS OF BRITISH REVIEWS.—We will remind our readers of the five British Reviews which are republished by the "Leonard Scott Publishing Company," of New York, as they were never

* *The Women of the Gospel; The Three Wakings; and other Poems.* By the author of "The Schönberg-Cotta Family." New York: M. W. Dodd. 1867. 12mo. pp. 275. New Haven: F. T. Jarman. Price \$1.75.

† *The Poet's Song for the Heart and the Home.* By S. DRYDEN PHELPS. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1867. 12mo. pp. 416.

more full of interest than just at this time, when so many important questions in politics, theology, and philosophy are agitating the minds of all thinking persons in England and on the Continent. (See advertisement in *New England Advertiser*.)

THE RIVERSIDE MAGAZINE.—This new magazine for young folks, of which the first number has appeared, bids fair to provide abundant entertainment as well as instruction to the class for whom it is designed. The editor, Mr. Scudder, is a gentleman in every way qualified for his task. He can write well for boys, as well as for men, and no one need fear that anything offensive to taste or morals will gain admission to his pages. The admirable *cat story*, entitled "The Neighbors," in the present number, is from his pen.

OUR YOUNG FOLKS.—We have spoken before of this Magazine, which is published by Messrs. Ticknor and Fields, of Boston. It is now entering upon its third year; and its conductors seem never wearied in furnishing new attractions for the great army of boys and girls who watch each month for its coming. The price of subscription for a year is \$2.

THAT GOOD OLD TIME.*—This is a fine book for boys. It is written in a healthy tone, and, abounding in lively accounts of out-of-door adventures and sports at the sea-side, deserves a welcome from the class to whom it is addressed.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

The Heavenly Father. Lectures on Modern Atheism. By Ernest Naville, Corresponding Member of the Institute of France, &c. Translated from the French, by Henry Dawnton, M. D., English Chaplain at Geneva. Boston: Wm. V. Spencer. 1867.

In the World, not of the World; Thoughts on Christian Casuistry. By Wm. Adams, D. D., Madison Square Church, New York city. American Tract Society, 150 Nassau street, New York. 24mo. pp. 64.

* *That Good Old Time; or, our Fresh and Salt Tutors.* By VIKTOR MOUTACHE. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 1867.

Bible Emblems. By the late Rev. Edward E. Seelye, D. D., Schenectady, New York. 12mo. pp. 222. American Tract Society, 150 Nassau street, New York city.

The Law of Ritualism, examined in its relation to the Word of God, to the Primitive Church, to the Church of England, and to the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States. By the Right Rev. J. H. Hopkins, Bishop of Vermont. 12mo. pp. xi., 98. New York: Hurd and Houghton.

A Memorial of the Pilgrim Fathers. By S. G. Buckingham, Pastor of the South Church, Springfield, Mass. 1867. 8vo. pp. 52.

Four Commemorative Discourses; delivered on his sixty-third birthday, Feb. 19, 1865; on the fortieth anniversary of his installation, March 12th, 1865; and on his retirement from pastoral duties, Sept. 9, 1866. By Rev. Leonard Bacon, D. D., Pastor of the First Church and Society in New Haven; together with extracts from the records of the First Ecclesiastical Society and First Church, respecting Rev. Dr. Bacon's retirement from the pastoral office. Published by request. New Haven. 1866. 8vo. pp. 66.

A Discourse delivered at the Opening of the Synod of New Jersey in the First Presbyterian Church of Elizabeth, New Jersey, Oct. 16, 1866, by the Moderator, Rev. John T. Duffield, D. D. With Notes and an Appendix. Philadelphia: James S. Claxton. 1866. 12mo. pp. 64.

The Christian Student. A Sermon preached in the College Chapel, Yale College, Sept. 16, 1866, by President Woolsey. Published by request of the students. New Haven. 8vo. pp. 16.

HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL.

Life and Letters of John Winthrop. Second Volume. From his Embarkation for New England in 1630 to his Death in 1649. By Robert C. Winthrop. 8vo. pp. xv., 483. Boston: Ticknor & Fields.

A History of the Huguenots. By W. Carlos Martyn, author of "The Life and Times of John Milton," and "The Life and Times of Martin Luther." American Tract Society, 150 Nassau street, New York. 12mo. pp. 528.

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Beethoven's Letters (1790-1826). From the Collection of Dr. Ludwig Nohl. Also his Letters to the Archduke Rudolph, from the Collection of Dr. Von Köchel. Translated by Lady Wallace. With a Portrait and Fac-simile. In two volumes. 12mo. pp. xviii., 284; ix., 257. New York: Hurd & Houghton.

Surrey Congregational History. By John Waddington D. D. London: Jackson, Walford & Hodder, 27 Paternoster Row. 1866. 12mo. pp. 368.

BELLES LETTRES.

The Merchant of Berlin; an Historical Novel. By L. Mühlbach, author of "Joseph II. and His Court." Translated from the German, by Amory Coffin, M. D. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1867. 12mo. pp. 394.

King René's Daughter; a Danish Lyrical Drama. By Henrik Hertz. Translated by Theodore Martin. New York: Leypoldt & Holt. 1867. 12mo. pp. 100.

Essays on Art. By Francis Turner Palgrave. 16mo. pp. 330. New York: Hurd & Houghton.

The Authorship of Shakespeare. By Nathaniel Holmes. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 1866. 12mo. pp. 601.

The Brewer's Family. By Mrs. Ellis, Author of "Women of England." New York: M. W. Dodd, 506 Broadway. 1867. pp. 325.

The Brownings; a Tale of the Rebellion. New York: M. W. Dodd, 506 Broadway. 1867. 16mo. pp. 310.

Stories of Many Lands. By Grace Greenwood. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1867. 16mo. pp. 206.

The Children of the Frontier. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1867. 16mo. pp. 290.

Red-Letter Days in Applethorpe. By Gail Hamilton. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1867. 16mo. pp. 141.

MISCELLANEOUS.

The Science of Wealth; a Manual of Political Economy, embracing the Laws of Trade, Currency, and Finance. By Amasa Walker, Lecturer on Political Economy in Amherst College. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1866. 12mo. pp. xxx., 478.

Elements of International Law and Laws of War. By H. W. Halleck, LL. D., Major-General, etc. Prepared for the use of colleges and private students. 8vo. pp. xxviii. 380. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co.

Homes without Hands; being a Description of the Habitations of Animals, classed according to their principle of construction. By the Rev. J. G. Wood. Illustrated. 8vo. pp. 651. New York: Harper & Brothers. New Haven: Judd & White.

On Democracy. By J. Arthur Partridge. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1866. 8vo. pp. xxiii., 418.

The Making of the American Nation; or the Rise and Decline of Oligarchy in the West. By J. Arthur Partridge. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1866. 8vo. pp. xxxvii., 523.

The Great Rebellion. Its Secret History, Rise, Progress, and Disastrous Failure. By John Minor Botts, of Virginia. The political life of the author vindicated. 12mo. pp. 402. New York: Harper & Brothers.

With General Sheridan in Lee's Last Campaign. By a Staff Officer. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1866. 12mo. pp. 235.

A Hebrew and Chaldee Lexicon to the Old Testament; with an introduction, giving a short history of Hebrew Lexicography. By Dr. Julius Fuerst, Professor at the University of Leipzig. Third edition, improved and enlarged. Containing a grammatical and analytical appendix. Translated from the German by Samuel Davidson, D. D., of the University of Halle, and LL. D. London. New York: Leypoldt & Holt. 1867. Royal 8vo. pp. xxxvi.; 1611. New Haven: Judd & White. Price \$11.

An Elementary Hebrew Grammar, with Tables, Reading Exercises, and a Vocabulary. By W. H. Green, Professor in the Theological Seminary at Princeton. 12mo. New York: J. Wiley & Son.

English Composition and Rhetoric. A Manual. By Alexander Bain, M. A.,

Professor of Logic in the University of Aberdeen. American Edition Revised. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1867. 12mo. pp. 248.

A Grammatical Analysis; or, the Derivation and Definition of Words, with their Grammatical Classification, for the use schools and academies. By W. J. Tenney. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 12mo. pp. 227.

The French Manual: a new, simple, concise, and easy method of acquiring a conversational knowledge of the French language; including a dictionary of over ten thousand words. By M. Alfred Havet. Entirely revised and corrected from the last English edition, with a new system of pronunciation. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1867. 12mo. pp. xxxii; 188, 112.

An Introductory Latin Book, intended as an elementary drill book on the inflections and principles of the language, and as an introduction to the author's Grammar, Reader, and Latin Composition. By Albert Harkness, Professor in Brown University. 1866. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 12mo. pp. 162.

A Practical Arithmetic. Appleton's Mathematical Series. By G. P. Quackenbos, A. M. Upon the basis of the Works of George R. Perkins, LL. D. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1866. 12mo. pp. 328.

Oration, Poem, and Speeches, delivered at the third annual meeting of the Associated Alumni of the Pacific Coast, held at Oakland, California. June 6th, 1866. Published by the Association. 1866. 8vo. pp. 93.

Publications of the American Tract Society, New York, 150 Nassau Street.—Jesus Christ's Alluring Love. pp. 158. 18mo.—Charlie Scott, or There's Time Enough. pp. 147. Square 16mo.—Nuts for Boys to Crack. By Rev. John Todd, D. D. pp. 267. 18mo.—Sybil Grey: or a Year in the City. By the author of "The Huguenots of France," etc. 16mo. pp. 264.—Phil Kennedy. By H. N. N. 16mo. pp. 128.—The Climbers. 16mo. pp. 268.—The Illustrated Family Christian Almanac for 1867. 12mo. pp. 60.—Catalogue of Volumes and Libraries adapted to the use of Pastors, Families, Bible Classes, and Sabbath Schools. 24mo. pp. 82.—Grace's Visit. A Tale for the Young. From the Religious Tract Society, London. 16mo. pp. 231. New Haven: F. T. Jarman.

Publications of the American Tract Society, Boston, Mass., 28 Cornhill.—Uncle Downes' Home; the Boys and Girls at Donaldton. By Glance Gaylord. 24mo. pp. 156.—Madge Graves. By the author of "Bessie Lovell." 16mo. pp. 268.—Lucy and Bell, and how they overcame. 24mo. pp. 72.—Christmas at the Beeches. 28mo. pp. 170. New Haven: F. T. Jarman.

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NEW ENGLANDER.

No. XCIX.

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Orthodoxy, its Truths and Errors. By JAMES FREEMAN CLARKE.
Boston: Published by the American Unitarian Association.

Christian Examiner. November, 1866.

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A PROMINENT Unitarian minister has recently written a book (whose title will be found above), in which he has, with a good degree of candor and frankness, stated his impressions as to what constitutes the basis of the so-called evangelical faith—what there is of good and what of evil in it, and what are its prevailing tendencies. It is not for the sake of reviewing this book that we write the present Article; but to examine Unitarianism—its history, its present aspects, and probable destiny, in a somewhat similar way. And we will endeavor to treat the subject with an equal measure of candor. We desire to record our own honest impressions upon this subject, as outside

but not indifferent spectators of what is going forward. All will agree that Unitarianism, in its historical development, and especially in the attitude in which it now stands before the Christian people of this country, is an interesting and somewhat curious subject for contemplation and study.

First of all, it will be well to take notice of some of the more prominent aspects of Unitarianism as it now presents itself to general inspection. And in doing this, it will be perhaps the shortest and easiest way, to interweave certain comments as we pass along, as also to note the changes that have taken place since the days of the Unitarian fathers. In recording our honest impressions, as those standing outside the circle—mere lookers on—we shall be likely to differ not a little from those within the circle. One may be too far off from an object for an accurate survey, but it is possible, also, to be too near. A man involved in the noise and smoke of battle—sharing in its confusion and wild excitements—knows much less about the contest as a whole, than he who stands retired on some neighboring height and overlooks the scene. Of certain aspects of the strife, he gains a far more vivid conception than the outside observer; but he fails in respect to the general plan and movement of the battle. Let it be fairly understood, then, at the outset, that the aim of this Article is not to flatter and compliment, neither is it to abuse. It is to show how Unitarianism looks, at the present time, from our post of observation.

It would be useless to pretend to give the present doctrinal basis of Unitarians. Many of their own writers attempt this, but we find ourselves utterly incompetent to apprehend the result. "Such knowledge is too wonderful for us." It may, indeed, be understood, in some good measure, what is the doctrinal belief of individual men among them, but to find out what the ground-work and underlying basis of Unitarianism is, that is another matter altogether. The editor of the *Christian Examiner*, Dr. Bellows, in the number for November last, says: "There are within the Unitarian ranks all shades of opinion about Jesus Christ, from a modal or Sabellian Semi-Trinitarianism, through high and low Arianism, Socinianism, Priestleyism, down to pure Humanitarianism and Naturalism."

* * "There is no place of safety in the Unitarian body, for

any Christian who is afraid of fellowship with such men as Theodore Parker. We have a hundred men, I presume, in our pulpits, who look up to him as one of the best Christians, and one of the greatest spiritual forces that Divine Providence has vouchsafed to our denomination or our generation. * * * Let me add, too, that to put Dr. Channing and Theodore Parker, differ as they did in theology, into opposite categories, is a mistake in every way."

The above, according to our general observation, is a correct and truthful statement, and being so, it would manifestly be preposterous for us to try and set forth the doctrinal basis of Unitarians. But it has occurred to us, that if they would eliminate every thing in which they disagree, and weave the residuum into a Confession of Faith, it would not be so long that the most strenuous opposer of creeds need be greatly frightened at it.

In speaking of the general aspects of Unitarianism, at the present time, perhaps the most natural fact to be first noticed is the division now prevailing in the body, separating the members into old school and new—the right and left wing—conservatives and radicals—or by whatever other names the parties may be called. Dr. Bellows says: "The Unitarian body is divided, perhaps, nearly evenly, between what may be called the old and new school of thinkers—persons on the one hand more in sympathy with Dr. Channing; and persons on the other hand more in sympathy with Theodore Parker." At the late National Convention at Syracuse, a question arose which seemed to try the strength of the two parties, and the conservative or old school wing prevailed by a vote of about two to one. But we have always supposed in that trial of strength that the radicals stood at a great disadvantage. The issue itself was a peculiarly audacious one—no less than an effort to rid the preamble and first article of the Constitution of an offending clause, in which the members were designated as "disciples of the *Lord Jesus Christ*." Would a Christian man, living at a distance, guess exactly what the difficulty was? It was the same in substance that troubled some of the Athenians of old when they heard Aristides called "The Just." They would not bear this ascription of Lordship to

Jesus Christ. This, in its very nature, was an extremely audacious question for the radicals to introduce, and on which they could not so well hope to gain a victory as on some others. Then again it was an effort to take a clause out of the Constitution, which is quite a different thing from deciding not to put a given clause in. One may seriously hesitate about uprooting a tree standing in some inconvenient place near his door-way. The associations of the past come in to save it. But if the question were merely about setting out a tree, then it would be easily decided. For these reasons we have supposed that the public could not gain the exact measure of the strength of the two parties by that debate and vote, and the passage from Dr. Bellows, quoted above, confirms this opinion.

But we need also to make a further analysis of this conservative wing. The men who compose it may indeed be "more in sympathy with Dr. Channing" than with Theodore Parker, but most of them, if we mistake not, have silently traveled a great way off from Dr. Channing and the early Unitarian fathers, in several important respects. There are, it is true, a few ministers that have been generally numbered with the Unitarians, who start back with alarm at the way things are moving, and some of them, when the roll is called, seem willing to be left out. These men are more conservative—they are nearer the Evangelical stand-point of doctrine even than Dr. Channing was, but these are not so numerous that they cannot easily be counted. The practical divergences of the others from the earlier standards of thought and action will come out more fully as we go on.

But what shall be said of the religious status of those who have so far departed from the New Testament language and style of thought, that they are jealous of the titles and honors which are there continually ascribed to Christ? An apostle, even in simple narrative, out of reverence and love he bore to the Redeemer, could find time to stop, and throw in, by way of parenthesis, the ejaculation, "He is Lord of all!" But here were men, who from their antecedents might claim to be called Christians, striving to take away that name of majesty and power from One of whom another apostle says: "Wherefore

God also hath highly exalted Him, and given Him a name which is above every name—that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things *in heaven, and things in earth*, and things under the earth; and that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord to the glory of God the Father.”

It does not appear that either the conservative or the radical party had any just conception how strange a question they were discussing, or how singular the spectacle which they presented to the Christian world. They have been alike brought along step by step, from their starting point half a century ago, until it seemed to them apparently a very natural and proper thing that they should be there, in solemn convention assembled, debating the question whether Christ could rightfully have Lordship ascribed to Him—whether that Being, who often called himself Lord, and who is continually named by this name from the beginning to the end of the New Testament, was not enjoying honors to which he was not entitled. And pray where do these men go for information as to who Christ was—what his rank and station? Would they ever have known Him at all except for the New Testament record? And do they attempt to set the revealed Christ utterly aside, and to evolve another from the depths of their own consciousness?

They seem to admit that there was such a person, but how do they learn that fact even except by the Book that constantly calls him Lord? The world will be likely to conclude that it has quite as august and symmetrical a Saviour in the revelations of the Evangelists and Apostles, as in the Christs that the Parkerites educe, each for himself, from the interior folds of their own remarkable being.

And this brings us to consider another aspect of Unitarianism at the present day. It has almost entirely ceased from the use of the Bible, as a book of sacred authority and binding force. It is no longer made the ground of ultimate appeal on points of religious doctrine. Even what is called the conservative party, with a few exceptions, has reached this state and condition. Men that are called sound and grave divines, in their references to Scripture, have so many “if and ands”—so many suggestions about want of authenticity for this and that, that

the Word of God has almost entirely ceased to be of divine and commanding authority among them. Indeed, it is most noticeable in the sermons of Unitarians at the present day, that, though the text is usually taken from the Bible, proof-texts are rarely brought forward. We have an abundance of what Mr. Smith and Mr. Brown think about the invisible things of God's kingdom—matters which they know nothing of, except as the Bible has directly or indirectly shed its light upon them. But there is seldom any attempt to rest back upon a "Thus saith the Lord," as that which must end the matter, and settle all strife. In a sermon preached by Dr. Bellows of New York, Dec. 6th, and published in the "Liberal Christian," of Dec. 29th, though the title of it is, "Unitarianism: what it is and what it requires;" and though it occupies six columns in the paper, yet, beyond the text, we have not discovered in it the slightest reference to any particular passage of Scripture whatever. Probably it never occurred to him to make any such reference. But one is interested to know whether in religious things there is any authority or not farther back than Dr. Bellows, or the man who for the moment happens to be speaking. Indeed, matters have unconsciously come to that pass, that it would probably be regarded as rather droll than otherwise, if one of their young preachers should go to work, after the old-fashioned way, to prove his points, by an honest marshaling of proof-texts. We do not deny that there are a few men among them who still follow the old style of preaching, treating the Bible as the Book of God, and appealing to it as authority final and decisive. But most of the younger ministers, and not a few of the older ones, are entirely guiltless of owning any such dependence. Complimentary references to the Bible, and even high-wrought eulogies you may often hear, but little of careful examination to see whether this or that doctrine is found there.

On this point we give our impressions after a somewhat extended observation, and if we have stated the case stronger than the truth will warrant, we shall be happy to know it. In many sermons, the Bible is used for ornamental and *belles lettres* purposes, without any thought of making it a court of ultimate appeal.

Now this is a fact of great significance, and seems to show quite clearly, that for a long time back, Unitarians have had a certain half-way conviction that their religious system could not very safely be rested upon the Bible. No denomination is likely to throw away the support of a book encircled with such time-hallowed associations—a book that has left a track of living light along the ages wherever it has traveled, if they feel entirely sure that they can securely ground themselves upon it. The very fact that they turn away from it—that they harshly criticise and find fault with it—that they are constantly trying to undermine the credit of this writer and that, and destroy the obvious import of one and another passage—this fact will be taken by a common sense world as proof, that they do not find the Book in its present shape suitable for their purposes. They are opening it here and there, and they stumble upon passages continually that do look as though Christ made an atonement for sin, and that he was a Divine Person, and they find it easier on the whole to give forth their own wisdom, and let the Bible mostly alone. We know of no other way of explaining the general attitude of Unitarians towards the Bible, than by supposing that they have long carried within themselves the secret conviction that the Book, just as we have it, is not a good and safe basis for them to stand upon. Open the Unitarian papers, and if a scientific discovery has been made anywhere in the world, which seems to damage the authority of the Bible, you will be likely to find it reported with some favorable remarks. If some German Professor, whom “much learning has made mad,” and who sits his sixteen hours a day, amid smoke and manuscripts, trying like an Eastern devotee to evolve wisdom from his “inward parts,” thinks he has found an argument which will upset the authority of the “Fourth Gospel,” or any other gospel, you may be tolerably sure that the fact will be duly noticed in these papers as one of the signs of the progress of the age. What means this readiness on the part of the Unitarians to catch and appropriate everything which seems to militate against the authority of the Word of God, except that they do not find the Book on their side, and are glad to curtail its range and influence.

But a denomination of Christians who have no absolute au-

thority for their faith, except what A, B, and C, may chance to think and say about "unseen and eternal" things, is in rather a feeble condition. When such men preach, their hearers, if they have common discernment, will be likely to conclude, that if it comes to mere human theories on the relations of the soul to God and the invisible world, they can make their own theories as well as anybody else, and they will be apt to indulge the privilege.

Another noticeable aspect of Unitarianism at the present time is, that it has come to consort freely and lovingly with Universalism. A few years ago this was not so. Indeed one need not go back very far, to reach the time when Universalists were rather snubbed and repelled, if they attempted to make themselves too familiar. The Unitarians would have it understood that they were not Universalists—no, not by any means! They came, by regular descent from Plymouth and the May Flower. They occupied the old Puritan churches with their high-backed seats, and looked up to a preacher in an old-fashioned pulpit, with a threatening sounding-board hanging over him. They inherited the ancient traditions and stately ordinances of the past, and nobody had any right to call them Universalists. It is true, even in those days, outsiders found it very hard to tell the mighty difference between them, and were sometimes tempted to use the old adage, "Two of a trade cannot agree." But all that has passed by. A sense gradually seemed to come over both parties, that they were separately making no effectual headway, or even resistance to the "sects," and that it would be the part of wisdom to unite their forces. Accordingly if one reads the Unitarian and Universalist papers now-a-days, he will find high courtesies and civilities from week to week passing between them. In some instances the Universalist and Unitarian parishes in a given town have become one. Conventions are called, to which men of both orders are expressly invited, and in manifold ways, it is made manifest, that the two denominations are drawing more and more closely together.

Another feature of Unitarianism not exactly peculiar to the present time, though by long use it is becoming more chronic and fixed, is a habit of perpetual boasting—a constant procla-

mation of the immense range and sweep of its influence. Hardly a newspaper, monthly, or quarterly, belonging to the denomination can be opened, in which you will not hear of the astonishing progress that Unitarians are making,—that Orthodoxy is a failure, &c., &c. Even Dr. Bellows, in the sermon before referred to, gives us some fine specimens of this habit of boasting. He says: “There are, I doubt not, fifty thousand Unitarian Christians in the city of New York this day—and most of them in Trinitarian churches.” What hinders them from coming out and declaring themselves? Is human nature such a poor and mean thing, that it skulks away after this manner and dare not follow its convictions of truth? Is the Protestant part of the city of New York under such an overshadowing despotism that these fifty thousand people dare not manifest their religious preferences? We never should have thought it, from the occasional glimpses we have had of the great city. In the opening of the sermon, Dr. Bellows has a very comely little figure suggested by his text, which proceeds after the following fashion. “This little city (see Eccl. ix. 14, 15, 16), with few men within it, is that fortified position which a minority in possession of truth in advance of the times always seem to be holding, and which that great King, Majority, as steadily comes up against, and besieges, and builds great bulwarks against it, and seems just ready to overwhelm it. But that poor wise man—who is nothing less than *Truth* itself—as regularly by his wisdom delivers the city, no matter how imperiled it may seem. Yet no man remembers that same poor man! Truth in the hands of a minority gets little honor, even though it renders vast services and merits all praise—and so the sacred proverb holds good in all ages.” Well indeed! Isn’t it a bad and wicked world when things are always going forward after this manner? Are the Orthodox too hard upon such a world after all? Here are a few men who have been industriously waving the torch of Truth for fifty years, and cannot rally more than a feeble handful out of the uncounted masses to their side. How dense must be the moral blindness—how perverse the inward temper and spirit of such a world! One really needs to walk all around his figure of speech, view it carefully on every side,

before he decides to knock out the underpinning and launch it upon the great deep.

No, this is not quite so bad a world after all as that. We Orthodox take a livelier and more cheerful view of it. Things do not always remain small and feeble, simply because they are good. Evil habits and opinions and institutions sometimes get into trouble and have quite a discouraging time of it.

Still "boasting of things without his measure, that is of other men's labors," Dr. Bellows says again:—"If the liberal Christians in America could be known to each other—could rise like one man at a given signal and discover in what formidable numbers they exist, what a mass of intelligence, character, influence, and worth they carry—they might achieve a monstrous triumph in a twelve-month." And why, pray tell us, do they not do it? What is to hinder? For ourselves, if we were in Dr. Bellows' place, we would not own such a miserable company of Nicodemuses, who dare not follow their religious convictions, in a land of religious liberty like ours. Let the mighty multitude rise up at once, and stand till they are counted! We might easily introduce similar examples of boasting from various quarters. But these will suffice to illustrate our meaning.

Now the simple and dry matter of fact is, that we have had a half century of Unitarianism in this land, and the system has not progressed at all in proportion to the various Evangelical denominations. By the published statistics of the Unitarians for January, 1866, they had in the whole land two hundred and seventy-eight churches or societies. Many of these are very small. Some new churches are springing up at the West, but for every rising organization in these newer fields, there is one in the East, feeble and ready to die—hardly a breath of life remaining in it. Of these churches, one hundred and sixty-nine are in Massachusetts, and one hundred and nine out of it. Since Unitarianism started among us, the Orthodox Congregationalists alone have *added* to their churches, at least six times the whole number of Unitarian churches now existing in this country, and Baptists, Methodists, Episcopalians, and Presbyterians have made similar advances. With what patience then, can these denominations hear this perpetual story of wonderful

Unitarian progress and growth, when there is nothing to show for it?

Another characteristic feature of Unitarianism at the present time is a newly kindled zeal for organization and propagandism. Accordingly there is not only an annual National Conference, and an annual arrangement for raising \$100,000 for denominational purposes, but the general idea is still farther carried out in the recent formation of Local Conferences. This trick of organization was perhaps learned from the surrounding "Sects." Something seemed to be wanting, and it was thought best to make a larger trial of what organization and money might do. Whether it will be found to answer the purpose remains to be seen. When Aaron waved his potent rod, "the magicians of Egypt did so with their enchantments," but it did not have the same effect. It would not be strange, amid the present divergences of the members, if a National Conference should soon become an unwieldy body to manage—more provocative of war and division, than an agency for peace and united effort. And certainly these large gatherings serve to publish abroad more widely and effectually, what were "quite as well hushed up among one's friends." Then again, the world is not very greatly impressed with the results in the financial line. Year before last, if we mistake not, the \$100,000 was raised and a little more, but last year it fell short. It used to be a common remark that Unitarianism had the culture, the intelligence, and the *wealth* of Boston, and even of Massachusetts. But last year three hundred and eighty-three Orthodox Congregational churches in Massachusetts, after paying their own expenses, raised for purposes of general Christian benevolence the sum of \$392,244. And they did not have to hold a general Convention to do it. It came along in a very natural and matter of course way, and the same thing essentially will be done this year and for years to come, without any great noise or machinery, and with no sense of weariness or exhaustion. In the State of Connecticut, the Orthodox Congregational churches number two hundred and eighty-six. After meeting all home expenses, these churches raised last year, for benevolent operations, \$257,164.60.

Eleven Orthodox churches in the city of Boston contributed last year, to various benevolent objects, \$107,755.11. Boston, where the Unitarian wealth and intelligence are so largely concentrated, has nineteen Unitarian churches. Our Methodist brethren have been displaying remarkable energy the past year, in raising their Centennial fund. Single churches have contributed for this special object, almost the entire annual Unitarian fund. Bromfield Street Church gave between \$70,000 and \$80,000. Christ Church, Pittsburg, gave \$80,000.

No, we repeat, the world at large is not so much impressed with the feat of raising \$100,000 a year, for religious work, as the Unitarians seem to be themselves.

We might dwell upon still other aspects, but before going farther we desire to take up one topic which has been already touched, but which needs a separate and fuller expansion. Few people are really aware as yet, what this radical wing of the Unitarians is now saying and doing. We desire, if possible, by a few illustrations, to enable the readers of the *New Englander* to know, what some men in our land now regard as the highest and best religious development of our times. There is published in the city of Boston a monthly Magazine, called "*The Radical*." It is now passing through its second volume. In this work you have the thoughts of men, who are not afraid to speak out, and have determined that they will speak out,—who are not ashamed openly to avow their sympathies with men of every class and condition, who hate evangelical religion—men who are ready to say that they expect better things for society and the world, from what has generally been called infidelity, than from all existing church organizations of the so-called evangelical type. And if they did not directly say so, no one, after reading their writings, could doubt that they felt so. Their words are winged with a peculiar virulence and hate. One of these writers says:—

"The cry of 'Infidel' that comes up from the churches has no echo in the invincible tendencies and intrinsic needs of the American people. The tide wave of its inward life obeys an attraction which those eyes do not see, nor that tongue confess. We do not convey the whole truth when we claim that the 'Infidelity' of to-day will be the common sense of to-morrow; that to Science belongs the Theology of the Future." *Radical*, Vol. II., No. 5, p. 259.

On the cover of the *Radical* for December last we find an

advertisement, which is not to be taken authoritatively as an utterance of the Magazine. Only, "straws show which way the wind blows," and we quote from this *morceau*, with the understanding, that after the explanation given, our readers will take it for what it is worth. "I wish to become acquainted with the character and methods of organization of the various *free* religious Societies of the West, including all organizations of Spiritualists, Friends of Progress, Rationalists, Free Thinkers, Infidels, &c. I wish to open correspondence with officers or members of these societies in order to obtain from them copies of whatever declarations of ideas, aims, or principles, or constitutions they have adopted, with a statement, in the case of each, of the time of organization, present number of members, &c., with such information as will help me to form a just estimate of the character and importance of this division of the religious work of our time."

We might quote many passages, going to show that these writers openly, unblushingly avow a deeper sympathy with what is known as *infidelity*, than with what is known as *Christianity*, and we use the word Christianity here in the broadest sense, to include what even a conservative Unitarian or Universalist means by it.

But we wish to bring forward a few passages to show what these men think about Christ. When we read these pages, we can understand as we could not before, the spirit that animated the Parkerite wing, in the debate at Syracuse. One of the coolest and most careful of these writers says:* "A preamble, after warm three-fold discussion from year to year, is re-adopted to express the fundamental Unitarian faith by the single article of the Lordship of Jesus Christ. But the moral sense disowns this soleness of supremacy. To make him a finality is to make him a fetish; and we have a fetish now regularly installed in the Unitarian church, occupying room which only the adorable spirit should fill."

From another pen we have a theory of Christ's life and death, showing the ambitious hopes which stirred his mind, and the plans which he revolved for gaining a name and place among

* Radical, Vol. II., No. 5, p. 287.

men. He was possessed, it seems, of "great spiritual force, and with this the peculiar physical habit which gives the power to heal disease." And then the writer goes on to say:

"This pious calculation affected deeply the thought of Jesus. He would descend to the lowest service that he might reach the highest throne. He would even submit to death, if he could not otherwise reach the messianic throne. He thought this might be, sometimes was sure it would be, but did not really prepare his mind for it. It was a trial that shook his faith when the cross rose in his path. The same fate as other aspirants before him! He could not drink that cup. He raised himself to hope that even this might conduct to that goal. But the cross was too much. He died with the old wall of the Jew mind upon his lips—'My God! my God! why hast thou forsaken me!'"*

The same writer, in the same article, p. 217, speaking of Edward Irving, says:

"The tale is too sad to tell, how a life glorious as pure spirit can make life in mortal flesh, was put wholly wrong by confidence in an unwarranted word of Jesus. Irving went down into the dark valley, leaning his giant spirit upon the mere word of the peasant rabbi of Galilee, believing with the faith of a great soul, that in the very hour of death miracle would raise him up; and he died unvisited,—the word on which he leaned had been broken on Calvary."

On the same page we find also the following:

"It was impossible to favor, even in its best form, the pretension of the Jew mind. The world might accept it for twenty centuries, until a better thought should be discerned; the confident natural mind might live by it until spiritual reason should be broadly enough revealed to throw it off; but it could not be accepted in the will of God. The man had chosen wrong when he said I and my Father, whether he said it in terms, or said it only in expectation that the supernatural would break through in his favor."

But enough of this. We might quote, from other contributors, divers passages to the same general end. We might copy the preamble and articles of a constitution, creed, or confession of faith, or by whatever other name it may be called, which has been prepared and published for a model, and in which the name of Christ does not appear, and all reference to Christianity is studiously avoided. We might speak of one church organization at least, which disowns the name of *Christian*, and of discussions in other localities looking to the same result. We might show how bitterly these men speak of the Christian Sabbath, and how they look with lofty hopes and

expectations to the German element at the West, partly because it makes Sunday a holiday.

But we have traveled in this tangled wilderness long enough, and are glad to emerge again into the clear light, and to find that the Word of God, the great moral sun of this world, still keeps its steady place in the heavens. If these men only knew their state and condition, they would take up the expressive language of Isaiah and utter it with unwonted fervor:—"Therefore is judgment far from us, neither doth justice overtake us: we wait for light, but behold obscurity; for brightness, but we walk in darkness. We grope for the wall like the blind, and we grope as if we had no eyes. We stumble at noonday as in the night: we are in desolate places as dead men."

This then is the general condition of Unitarianism in our land to-day. A few men (we speak now of preachers and recognized teachers) stand where they stood of old. They have been held fast by the sacred associations and traditions of a former age. They use the Word of God reverently, and appeal to its pages for authority. They faithfully preach the doctrine of repentance for sin, and unfold clearly many important Scripture truths. A larger number, though still called conservative, have wandered far off from the old standard, and are ready to apologize for that in others which they have not themselves as yet fully embraced. But about one-half the preachers of the denomination are down upon the low, hard level of infidelity. They have outgrown the need of Christ, and regard him as an incumbrance. Some express themselves more gently and mildly, others speak in bolder and more impious terms against him. We heard a sermon from a prominent preacher of the Parkerite wing, some years ago, on the text: "Henceforth know we no man after the flesh; yea, though we have known Christ after the flesh, yet now henceforth know we him no more,"—the doctrine of which was that Christianity has outgrown Christ, just as a tree outgrows the seed from which it sprang. The men of this Radical wing would generally go to that extent at least.

We wish now, in the concluding part of this Article, to suggest that the present condition of Unitarianism is, in part at least, a logical conclusion from the premises. After all our

wanderings through these labyrinths of error and darkness, we return, and find that we have a New Testament, which unfolds to us clearly a system of salvation, and the central idea of that system is, *an atonement for sin*. After all the early and later arguments and protests of our Unitarian friends, we really have no more doubt that this doctrine is there than that we have a New Testament. It stands out so plainly that it is hard to understand how any honest man, unless he have some peculiar obliquity of vision, should fail to see it. This atonement is not a commercial arrangement—to buy off from punishment so many souls for so much suffering. It is not, in any proper sense, to appease the wrath of God, and reconcile Him to the sinner, for “God so loved the world” antecedently, “that he gave His only begotten Son” to work out this redemption. It is that God “might be just and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus.” It is that the universal moral empire of God might receive no detriment while this process of free pardon for guilty sinners should be going on. It is that there should be no secret sliding away from that spotless purity which encircles the divinity throne. It is not necessary that one should understand fully all the influences which go out from this arrangement to preserve order and holiness in the great world of intelligent being. God never asked Mr. Theodore Parker or any other man to tell exactly how this atonement by Christ would produce its effects in men here on the earth, or in uncounted spheres, and on the wider scale of eternity. Indeed it would be a very cheap and small device in comparison with what it is, if we who “are of yesterday and know nothing” could trace out the full sweep of its influence. What if the sun should not be allowed to shine, until our radical friends had first found out all the secrets of its light and heat, and compassed the outmost bounds of its beneficent agency! And what a petty object this glorious orb must have been, if it had been created small enough, and brought near enough, so that they could stand here on the earth and at one quick glance snatch all its mysteries!

But it is needless to dwell upon considerations of this kind. We open the New Testament, and we find ourselves at once within the circle of a scheme for acting upon the human mind,

unlike any other with which we are acquainted. We know what the earth is, and what are its native-born ideas and institutions,—its kingdoms and empires, with their slow-moving but continuous machinery of law and punishment. We know what are the human methods of culture and discipline, by which the mind is trained and swayed, little by little, to our earthly standards of intelligence and virtue. We know the commercial and economical arrangements of human society, by which one thing is given in exchange for another so that the merchant has his reward, and the laborer his hire. We know what earthly honor and glory are—for what kind of acts and services men ascend to the pinnacles of fame and stand out conspicuous before the admiring multitudes. In short, the laws and usages of this world, in all matters pertaining to man and his welfare, we comprehend easily, at least in a general way.

But we step within the sacred enclosure of the New Testament, and we are in the midst of another and quite different system. We have the evidence of this fact, not alone in a few striking proof-texts, but everywhere. It lurks in all the little nooks and corners. It peeps out from unnumbered words and phrases. It shapes and pervades the parables. It fills with its peculiar philosophy all the epistles. It comes forth in the joyful exultations and peans of victory sounding through the Apocalypse. It is a “kingdom of heaven,” pervaded by laws and customs, unknown in earthly usage. This “kingdom of heaven” is likened unto an householder, who hires laborers into his vineyard, and can with perfect propriety say to the man who has wrought his twelve hours, and complains that he should have no more wages than he that has wrought one hour: “Friend I do thee no wrong: didst thou not agree with me for a penny? Take that thine is and go thy way: I will give unto this last, even as unto thee. * * So the last shall be first and the first last.” It sends the poor Publican, with his past life confessedly corrupt and deformed, after one prayer of sincere penitence, “down to his house justified.” It has no favor whatever for the self-righteous Pharisee, whose standing in community has been high, and whose outward life has been fair and reputable. When the young man comes, in all the

glow of health, and in the beauty and pride of an earthly virtue, it abruptly cuts him short, with "One thing thou lackest." It says to the penitent thief on the cross, after a life of sin and crime, "This day shalt thou be with me in Paradise." This is the "kingdom of heaven"—these are features of the system of grace and redemption, which Christ came to work out and unfold, and it needs but the glance of a moment to perceive, that it is something different from any known human system or method for acting on the mind. And yet it violates no principle of absolute justice, though on a superficial view it might seem to do so. There is a mysterious and unknown factor (unknown as to its full place and power) entering in to this combination of influences by which everything is shaped to the laws of truth and eternal justice. Only it is a rapid and summary method of reaching results. It never could have been contrived and fashioned on the earth. It must come down from higher spheres of thought and being.

Now the central idea of this "kingdom of God"—of this gospel system of grace and pardon,—is the atonement for sin by Jesus Christ. This is the keystone of the sacred arch. Knock it out, and as sure as effect follows cause, the whole arch is destined to crumble, and fall to pieces. It may be a long time in doing so. There are other fastenings besides this keystone that may prevail for a time. Some parts of the structure may be stayed up more effectually than others, by local causes and influences—by outward surroundings and adhesions. It may be a long time before "there shall not be left here one stone upon another that shall not be thrown down." But amid the strains and heavings of nature, the law of gravity at last triumphs and your arch is a ruin.

The key-stone of the Christianity of the New Testament,—of its scheme of grace and redemption,—is the atonement by Jesus Christ. Take that one doctrine away, and you have really nothing left but a system of barren naturalism. It may seem to be a more august and illuminated system, than one that should be born wholly of the earth. But it differs, at most, only in degree, not in kind. Christ may utter wiser and better precepts than did the sages of antiquity, but they uttered many wise and good ones. He may unfold more dis-

tinctly the duty of repentance for sin. But the human reason and conscience, in all generations, have instructed men, that when they have done wrong, they ought to be sorry for it. He may indeed work miracles, but in this case it is only to attest that he is simply a better moral teacher than any that have preceded him. He may rise from the dead, and bring "life and immortality to light," but it is not a new and unknown truth that he brings to light, for the wise men of earlier times, and of different nations, believed in immortality. It is only that he adds more light to the light of nature. In short, look at the matter as we may, all the supernaturalism there is in Christianity, after the doctrine of the atonement is taken out, is in the service of naturalism.

It would be easy, had we space, to trace the successive steps by which Unitarianism has been steadily descending, year by year, down this logical plane, toward this low level of natural religion. The logic of some men drives them on to reach this conclusion much sooner than others. Theodore Parker hastened by rapid strides from the premises to the results. Regarded simply as the working of mere intellect, we might say, that such a man deserves far more credit than one who will not go where his premises point. But there is a logic of the conscience and the heart in these matters that we really respect and love more than we do the cast-iron tread of the intellect. We confess to a greater sympathy with the men who will not wander so far away from the temples and shrines where their fathers worshiped—who still love to linger amid the Christian thoughts, usages, and associations of the past. One often finds his heart touched with a strange and sympathetic tenderness, when he happens, in some occasional religious service, to meet with Unitarians who love the old ways of Zion and her comely ordinances—who feelingly read the old Christian hymns without caring much whether there are lingering in them traces of the atonement or not—whose hearts are stirred by the old tunes in which these hymns were sung by our common Christian fathers. In such moments we are ready to grasp these men by the hand, and say, "why cannot we be one again, sitting together in the same heavenly places, and walking to the house of God in company?"

But *logically*, using this word now in the strict sense, Theodore Parker and the Radicals are right. They are where they ought to be from the premises on which they started. They are down in the wilderness of this world, amid brambles and bogs, where a few scattered rays from a divine revelation, it is true, reach them, in spite of themselves, but where they are trying to make their way mainly by the light of nature. They are manufacturing gospels and moral systems, at the rate of a score or two a year. This universe, in its full reach and extent, with all its subtle laws, mental, moral, and physical, is rather a large problem for a finite mind, here on earth, to grasp. But they have mastered it. They know it all. Their reason is adequate to meet and answer all moral questions. Some of their writings, for pride and hate, make us think of the speech which Milton puts into the mouth of the fallen archangel. They have reached that point where they seem to take a strange delight in "trampling under foot the Son of God, and counting the blood of the covenant wherewith they were sanctified an unholy thing."

We look on and see all this with pity and sorrow of heart, but without the slightest fear or apprehension, as to the ultimate result, so far as the Gospel of Jesus Christ is concerned. It is no new thing for this system of grace and redemption to encounter enemies. From the first centuries of the Christian era, all the way along until now, its foes have perpetually thronged about its path, and threatened to bar all further progress. For eighteen hundred years they have been just about to rid the world of this old superstition. They have been as boasting and self-confident—as wise in their own conceit—as sure that the last days had come, as our Radical friends are now. A Gospel that has lived so long in such a world as this is, and has not only lived, but gone on conquering and subduing nations to itself from generation to generation, in spite of the rage and malice of its enemies, has a vitality, the secret of which is not revealed unto those who hate it. The Greeks of our day may call it "foolishness," as they did of old, but it does not vanish from the earth because the Greeks call it foolishness. Somewhere in the unknown years of the future a scene is to be enacted, which will probably appear in its appropriate

place and time, and will not be left out of the drama, lest it should prove offensive to our Unitarian friends of the Radical wing. The scene is thus described by an ancient writer: "And I beheld, and I heard the voice of many angels round about the throne, and the beasts, and the elders, and the number of them was ten thousand times ten thousand, and thousands of thousands: saying with a loud voice, 'worthy is the LAMB *that was slain* to receive power, and riches, and wisdom, and strength, and honor, and glory, and blessing.' And every creature which is in heaven, and on the earth, and under the earth, and such as are in the sea, and all that are in them, heard I saying, 'Blessing, and honor, and glory, and power, be unto him that sitteth upon the throne and unto the LAMB *for ever and ever.*'"

ARTICLE II.—DIVORCE.

PART II.—DOCTRINE OF DIVORCE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.

NOTHING places in a more striking light the sway of Christ over the mind of the Christian world than the fact that a few hints of his have been enough to turn the opinions and the practice of men into a new channel. This is illustrated by what he says of divorce; in giving commands concerning which he passes outside of his ordinary line of teaching, and enters into the region of positive external morality, instead of confining his precepts to the regulation of the thoughts and the affections. What he says on this subject is small in compass, it is a moral rule, and not a law for a state, it leaves more than one problem to be solved, and yet it has to a great extent controlled Christian law in an important branch of private relations, it has directed the discipline of the Church, it has helped to purify the family, and thus has aided the spread of the Gospel. It was, moreover, eminently needed at the time when it was made known. We hope to have shown, in our former Article, that the great looseness and corruption, in the marriage relations, of the three nations to whom the world owes most of its progress, called for a reform, that there was need that a higher idea of marriage, a deeper sense of its sanctity should be placed among men, and a community be formed where the practice should be consonant with the idea. This has been done by Christ through his church; and they who receive him as the Lord from heaven, when they reflect that he is abstinent and reserved on most points of external morality, will admire the wisdom which led him to be outspoken on this. We propose in our present Article to examine his words relating to divorce which are on record, and then to proceed to a consideration of the Apostle Paul's precepts on the same subject.

The passages in the Gospels which bear on the subject of divorce are contained in Matthew v., 31, 32, xix., 3—9, Mark x., 2—12, and Luke xvi., 18. The second and third of these

passages were evidently uttered on the same occasion in reply to tempting questions put by Pharisees, and with some differences of importance they have the same strain of thought. The passage in Luke is found in company with verses between which the connexion of thought is hard to be traced, and in an address or reply to the sneers of covetous Pharisees. When we compare this passage with that in the sermon on the mount, the disjointed thoughts in Luke have a light thrown upon them, and appear to be fragments of the same discourse. Without the place in Matthew we could find no law of association in Luke, or at most could only guess at one. But with the help of the first gospel, v. 17, of Luke, "and it is easier for heaven and earth to pass than one tittle of the law to fail," occurring as it does in Matthew chap. v., and being an essential part of that wonderful sermon, is seen to have a vital union with v. 18, which treats of divorce. We conclude that they must be brought into harmony, or that Christ repeated his instructions in similar forms on different occasions, in the one case delivering them to the people, in the other to the Pharisees. Which of these harmonizing theories is to be chosen it is not our business here to decide. We assume that our Lord expressed himself at least twice on the subject of divorce, and not once only, for we assume that there was a connected discourse on the mount, and that the words in Matthew v., 31, 32, fit too well into that discourse not to have belonged to it from the first.

The principal differences between these places of the gospels are the following:—1. Matthew in both his passages adds a condition under which divorce is permissible,—“except on the ground of fornication,” “but for fornication,”—while Mark and Luke express a prohibition of divorce which is altogether absolute. It is easy to say with Meyer that the condition, being understood of course, did not require to be expressed. But we ought to notice that St. Paul also, when he refers to our Lord’s teaching, inserts no condition whatever. We have then three witnesses to the absence of the condition against one for it, and the conjecture is not altogether improbable that it was added for the sake of greater clearness in Matthew, rather than omitted out of brevity by the others as being understood of

itself. Upon the meaning of *αποστία*, and the condition itself, we shall speak hereafter.

2. Mark has the important addition, "if a woman shall put away her husband and be married to another she committeth adultery." Now as by Jewish law a woman had no power whatever to put away her husband, this certainly looks like an addition to the original words of Christ, intended for the relations of believers in the heathen countries, where wives could procure divorce as well as husbands. But here again Paul supports Mark in 1 Cor. vii., 10: "unto the married I command, yet not I but the Lord, let not the wife be separated from her husband." What if by the law of Moses the wife could not be active in a case of divorce, we know that this occurred in the family of Herod, and it is likely that Greek or Roman custom may already have begun to creep into Palestine; at least the license of divorce allowed by the rulers of the world could not have escaped the knowledge of our Lord. Why is it incredible then that he should have contemplated the case of a woman putting away her husband?

3. In Matthew xix. our Lord says everything in the presence of the Pharisees. In Mark x. he gives out the principle of the indissolubility of marriage, and then in the house expounds the matter further to his disciples. Some critics see a mistake or inaccuracy here. If there were any, it must be laid at Matthew's door, for the words of Mark, "and in the house the disciples asked him again of this matter," give proof of fresh clear recollection. But is there anything forced here in the supposition that our Lord went over again to his disciples with what he had said just before, so that there was no need on the part of either evangelist to give an account of the whole conversation. In Matthew the disciples felt perplexed by what he had said, and put him further questions. They would not readily do this before the carping Pharisees, and so Mark's statement that the subject was continued in the house is justified, and his account of what was said in the house rendered at least probable.

Having thus discussed the form in which our Lord's words appear, let us now look at their purpose and their import. Here the *first* thing to be noticed is that our Lord acts the part

not of a civil legislator, but of a supreme moral teacher. He does not establish a law concerning divorce, but declares that the existing code permits certain things which must be condemned as wrong, as violating high ethical rules acknowledged by the law itself. Every moral teacher, not to say every moral man, must take the same position in regard to the laws of his country. These may, in fact they must, fail to forbid, even when they do not allow, many things which sound morality condemns. The law is an external, general, coarse, imperfect rule, commanding often what the ethical code requires, and as frequently permitting what that code prohibits. If there were any permissions of the Jewish law which ran counter to true righteousness, if it afforded any facilities for transgression which ought to be cut off, it was the business of Christ to notice them and to animadvert against them. Herein he differs in no respect from any other moral teacher. Nor are these verses touching divorce peculiar in this respect. When he cites the *lex talionis* of the Old Testament, "an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth," he tells his hearers that justice as expressed in the law might permit this to be done, but there was something higher than justice; "resist not evil" was a better law of life, a law necessary for anyone who would be his disciple.

Now it might happen, as it has happened, that some of these rules propounded by our Lord would reform and transform legislation. Such, owing to the fact that marriage has most important civil, moral, and religious relations, would inevitably be the result of the utterances concerning divorce. Still they are not properly legislation, but they are principles which in lands under a Christian faith must leaven all legislation.

Secondly, the tone our Lord uses, and the ground on which he puts his restrictions of divorce, show at once a remarkable depth of thought and the consciousness of an authority such as pertains to a divine messenger. The man who beyond all others was nourished by the scriptures and revered the scriptures, criticises a provision of the Mosaic law, and taxes it with imperfection. In so doing he boldly lays down a principle of the utmost importance and of far reaching consequences,—that the Mosaic economy, although given by God,

was rudimentary, transitory, and accommodated to the state of a nation not yet capable of the highest kind of civil polity. There is in his words even the germ of an abolition of the old economy, the beginning of a judgment pronounced against the old rites, in short against the old religion in its external forms; for if divorce was permitted on account of the hardness of the people's hearts, why might not the forms of the ceremonial law be accommodated to an early stage of their progress and be unsuitable for a more advanced stage. Thus our Lord without seeming to do so, drove that entering wedge into the law which Paul and his school drove further, until all men saw that it was done away in Christ.

Nor is the reason which our Lord gives for his new morality, in the matter of divorce, less remarkable. The freedom allowed by the law, he says, was inconsistent with the true primeval conception of marriage. Law, a patch-work of expedients, needs not to conform to the true conception of human relations,—that is to say, there are times, there is a state of feeling, a “hardness of hearts,” which stand in the way of perfect legislation, although the nearer the law approaches to that standard, the greater the proof and the greater the security of the genuine culture of the people. But morality must conform to the true idea, and it is the highest merit of a moral teacher, if he has the idea bright in his own mind and is able to set it forth to his fellow-men. Christ had this idea. The man who never drew from experience any judgments concerning the human relations of which he here speaks, whose vocation was too high for the entanglements of family life,—he corrects the judgments of men by a reference to the essential nature of marriage; it is the state of life in which two have become one flesh, it is a state founded by God at the first creation of man, it is therefore a union made by divine authority which human authority may not sever.

Before proceeding to the special rules which our Lord lays down, we remark that he does not side with either of the two schools which then divided opinion among the Jews on the subject of divorce. The doctrines of Hillel* of course he utterly discards, but he does not give his adhesion to those of

* See New Englander for January 1867, Article V., page 88.

Shammai any more than in the conversation with the Samaritan woman he pronounces altogether for the Jews against her nation. In fact it is altogether probable that his rule is far stricter than that of the school of Shammai, and he shows no interest in the explanation of Deut. xxiv., 1—5, about which the rabbis wrangled. His interest is moral, his views are general and human, not Jewish and Mosaical, while his line of thought must have surprised the tithers of mint, anise, and cummin.

What then does he lay down? His rules may be all comprised in the following propositions:

First, that the man who in conformity with the permission or sufferance of the law puts away his wife by a bill of divorcement,—“saving for the cause of fornication”—and marries another, commits adultery, or, as Mark has it, commits adultery “against her,” or to her injury.

Second, that the man who thus puts away his wife causes her to commit adultery, that is, by placing it within her power to marry whom she pleases leads her to form an adulterous connexion, inasmuch as she is still his wife in the eye of God. Matthew alone preserves this declaration.

Third, that the man who marries her who has thus been put away commits adultery. This rule is contained in both places of Matthew, and in Luke, but not in Mark.

Fourth, that the woman who puts away her husband and is married to another commits adultery. As we have already had occasion to say, Mark alone has recorded this declaration, but is sustained by the Apostle Paul.

The general principle, serving as the ground-work of all these declarations, is, that legal divorce does not in the view of God and according to the correct rule of morals authorize either husband or wife thus separated to marry again, with the single exception that when the divorce occurs on account of a sexual crime the innocent party may without guilt contract a second marriage.

In the application of these precepts for the guidance of the church of Christ, it will not be doubted that whatever is said only of the husband may be said *ceteris paribus* of the wife also. Had the case of a woman divorcing herself from her

husband never been put on record by Mark, the reason of the rule would have applied equally to her, and the fact that Jewish law never gave the woman the power to commence proceedings in a divorce would have sufficiently accounted for all silence respecting cases of that description. This case is plain enough, but there are questions of some importance and of some difficulty growing out of our Saviour's words which need to be considered.

We notice in the first place the fact that nothing is said of the remarriage of a party—a woman for instance—divorced on account of her crime. It has been gravely argued in our country and our time, that inasmuch as the married pair are no longer one flesh after crime, the guilty one is free to marry again, yes, even to marry the tempter or seducer, and that this is no violation of the law of Christ. We admit that Christ observes silence on this point. He could not say that such a guilty author of a divorce committed adultery by marrying again, for she is now free from her husband. But it would have been idle to refer to such a case, for in the first place it had nothing to do with the immediate point on which Christ expresses an opinion, and in the second place such a person would have been punishable by Jewish law with death. To claim for an adulterer and an adulteress the protection of law in a Christian state, so that, when free through their crime from former obligations, they may legally perpetuate a union begun in sin, is truly to put a premium on adultery. A Herod on that plan, after sinning with his brother's wife, would need only to wait for legal separation to convert incest into legitimate wedlock.

Another question of importance relates to the meaning of *πορνεία* in the two passages of Matthew. Is it synonymous with *μορξία* or does it embrace unchaste acts not going to that length? Can it include acts committed before marriage, or must it be confined to sins which violate the marriage covenant? Interpreters might be named who have given latitude to the word in one or the other of these respects. In regard to the question of time, it is enough to say that our Saviour's whole strain of remark assumes that the parties have become one flesh, and that one of them by the violence of crime has

been torn away from the other. He does not go back of the commencement of marriage to enquire what previous crimes, frauds, deficiencies or closeness of relationship made the union illegitimate *ab initio*. That he leaves to the civil law. He is not giving a lecture on marriage or making canons for church discipline; he is merely answering a question in regard to the termination of a marriage already existing. How then can we conceive him to have referred in his precepts to an antenuptial condition of things. To this which is entirely conclusive, we might add a consideration which is only corroborative and has no independent force of its own, that in corrupt states of society a most alarming license would be given to divorce by making such a precept embrace a whole lifetime, especially if the rule were applied alike to both sexes.

The word then relates to what has transpired *since* marriage. We add that it must refer to some *outward* act. It cannot in its proper sense denote a mere quality, and, if ever used with a breadth of meaning to embrace sensual lust, it must be in the company of words which made its sense clear, like "in his heart," Matthew v., 28. It must intend a positive outward act which all would understand to be a violation of the obligations of marriage, a departure in essentials from its idea, otherwise we cannot account for the omission of the condition in Mark, Luke, and St. Paul's writings, and its appearance in Matthew alone. It must point to crime wrought by one of the married pair with a third person, not to wanton conduct in which the married pair unite, which might be called impurity, or lewdness, but never *πορνεία* in any proper sense. We have then, in assigning it a meaning, to choose between the narrowest sense in which it is strictly synonymous with adultery, or a broader sense, including as well crimes more grave and bestial than adultery, as acts of attempted but interrupted crime. It seems hardly worth our while to decide whether the narrower or wider sense ought to prevail. Many of the best interpreters regard the word as equivalent to the more specific *μορξία*, and we are willing to accede to their opinion.*

* Origen seems to understand it thus, Tom. 14 of his comment on Matthew (iii., 322, 323, ed. Lommatach). So Greg. Naz. says (Or. 87), that Christ allows separation only from the *πόρνῃ*, because she *πορεύεται τὰ γένη*. Basil in his 21st canon

But why should an exception like that in the two passages of Matthew be made, if *πορνεία* is the same as adultery, when the latter crime was punishable with death and thus divorce would seem to be superfluous. A conjectural answer might be drawn from the altered circumstances of the Jews in their later times, when intercourse with the more polished heathen, in whose eyes sexual crimes were not very heinous, tended to relax the strictness with which the law was enforced, and when the right of capital punishment was taken away from their courts by the Romans. But a better solution of the difficulty lies in this, that the husband was not bound, so far as appears, to denounce his guilty wife, but that it was the business of the local police to bring crimes before the local courts—the elders or presbytery of the commune—for their adjudication. Thus the husband, even in such cases, might give the ordinary bill of divorcement, leaving it to common fame to bring the matter before the police magistrates.* This view of Jewish usage gives a better explanation of Jer. iii., 8, than we gave in the last number of the New Englander. God is there spoken of as putting adulterous Israel away, and as giving her a bill of divorce, and if our present explanation is the right one there was no deviation in this from the usage in actual cases of adultery. The husband put away his wife, and on the magistrates devolved the duty of bringing her to justice. With this agrees what is said of Joseph in Matthew i., 19. He was a just man, and therefore unwilling that the supposed crime of his betrothed should go unrebuked, and yet being reluctant to expose her, he made up his mind to put her away so as not to attract public notice. Justice was satisfied in his view, so far

cited by Suicer, voce *ἀρπάζειν*, used that word in the same way, and Balaam remarks that he calls the adulterer a *ἀρπάζων*. Euthymius in his commentary on Matthew v., 32, explains the one word by the other. All the most recent commentators of highest credit do the same. For opinions allowing a wider sense to the word, Tholuck (Bergpred. ed. 3, p. 229) who himself adheres to the sense which is here defended, and Alford in his note on Matthew v., 32, may be consulted. We may add that in Hosea ii., 3, where it is said of the wife whom he bought in symbol, "thou shalt not play the harlot," there is the same substitution of the more general for the more specific term.

* Comp. Saalschütz, chapters 4 and 5 on the judges and the Shoterim.

as he was concerned, when he abrogated the contract by a private separation.*

But there are frightful crimes against nature, odious even to the heathen : supposing these not to be included in the term *πορνεία*, will they furnish no ground for divorce? All that needs to be said here seems to be that death is the penalty for such crimes by Jewish and most other laws, so that the separation would be inevitable ; that our Lord had no occasion to speak of gross crimes of very rare occurrence about which there could be no difference of opinion ; and that if both he and the Pharisees admitted these crimes to be more than adultery, his exception by right reason would include them.

There ought to be, however, some reason why *πορνεία*, the generic word, is here used instead of the more specific *μορξεία*. That reason can hardly be the rhetorical one of avoiding the repetition of the same word. Nor can it well be what Tholuck suggests, in his commentary on the sermon on the mount, that the generic word gives more indication of the moral category of the offense. Still less is DeWette's solution satisfactory—"that *μορξεία* is avoided because the verb *μορξᾶσθαι* is afterwards used in a wider sense." Perhaps the explanation may be found in the consideration that as the same offense could be called by the one name in relation to the husband, and by the other in relation to the paramour, the word was naturally suggested.

The one exception made by our Saviour excludes all others, unless it can be shown that they are embraced under the same reason to an equal or greater extent. Meyer and Tholuck therefore justly rebuke DeWette for his loose assertion that in allowing one actual ground of divorce our Lord allowed more than one. The exception, when the indissoluble nature of marriage is the starting point, is of strict interpretation, or else such as all, at the time when it was made, would admit without its being mentioned. And this remark brings us to the passages in the two other evangelists, and in Paul where no exceptional case is stated. The reason for these unqualified

* The notion at one time pretty common that *δίκαιος* here means *mild, clement*, is now nearly exploded.—The betrothed was treated as a wife by the law. Deut. xxii, 23.

statements of the sacred writers is not—as Meyer well observes—that Christ conceded somewhat at first to Jewish marriages contracted before his church was established,* but that the two Evangelists and the Apostle regard the exception as a matter of course, and pass it over in silence. This they might well do, if the exception related to so great a crime as adultery, which of itself actually caused the married pair to be no longer one flesh, which violated the idea of marriage.

There is nothing in these passages, nor in our Saviour's principle in regard to marriage, nor in other passages of the New Testament, that can fairly be regarded as forbidding the innocent party, against whom the crime of adultery has been committed, to contract a second marriage. This severe opinion arose in the early church. Augustin advocated it in his treatise *de conjugis adulterinis*, although in his retractations† this nobly honest man doubts whether he has cleared up the matter in that work. The opinion became current and passed into canonical law. The Council of Trent, in the seventh canon on matrimony, pronounces a curse on him who taxes the church with error for teaching “that he commits adultery who puts away an adulterous wife and marries another woman, and that the woman commits the same crime who puts away an adulterous husband and marries another man.” But this canon, which rests on a view of marriage not entirely scriptural, receives no sanction from the New Testament. It is most clear that the words “except it be for fornication” (Matt. xix., 9) allow divorce in that particular case, and that in the divorce spoken of liberty of remarriage is implied. The question is what must the parties to the conversation have understood by putting away, as our Lord here uses the word. How could they have guessed that he meant separation *quoad thorum* only, which was not known to the law? Is it not evident that they were compelled to give that sense to his words which divorce had in the law of Moses

* A worthy Catholic scholar, Hug, throws this out, and it would help the absolute indissolubility of marriage according to the view of that church, but it would require us to believe that “except it be for fornication,” in Matt. xix., is an interpolation. Of this however, although the reading varies, there is no good evidence.

† Lib. ii., chap. 57.

about which they were talking. The permission then to put away a wife in this one case involves a permission of remarriage to the innocent party.

After the same analogy the parallel crime of the husband separates the married pair to the same extent, and involves permission of remarriage to the innocent wife. This is generally conceded by those who do not hold with the Catholics that marriage cannot in the absolute sense be dissolved by crime. But a difficulty here arises. What sense shall we attach to the word adultery—the narrower Jewish sense, or the broader one, which the word now generally carries with it? Among the Jews the wife and the husband were not on an equality; the husband might commit whoredom with an unmarried woman without being an adulterer; the wife was an adulteress when she fell into similar transgression. What then would our Saviour have meant, had he uttered the words used by Mark (x., 12), “and if a woman put away her husband,” with the qualification found in Matthew, “saving for the cause of fornication?” If *porneia* could mean any lewd conduct inconsistent with being one flesh the case might be clear, but this is, to say the least, doubtful, and we have not been able to admit it. As far then as the use of words is concerned we could not infer that our Lord gave the same liberty of remarriage to the wife thus injured as to the husband similarly wronged. But when we consider that he must have viewed the husband’s crime with an unmarried woman as a great one, as an equal violation of the marriage covenant with the wife’s, as an equal breach of the original law or declaration that “they twain shall be one flesh,” which excludes all sexual impurity of both alike with anyone else, we believe that he would have placed both partners on the same ground, and given liberty of remarriage in that one case to the wronged woman. And yet, in the absence of any words from our Lord, we do not hold this opinion with the same confidence as we hold that the liberty of remarriage for the man, when the woman is the offender, is clearly to be gathered from our Lord’s precepts.

But may it not be said with Augustin * that the precept of

* *De adul. conj.*, near the beginning.

Paul, "if she depart, let her remain unmarried," can only be reconciled with the words of our Lord on the supposition that this departure had taken place on the ground of the adultery of her husband. She could then put him away or depart from him, but according to Christian law had no liberty of remarriage; and she might be reconciled to him so as to live with him again. The same would be true *mutatis mutandis* of the husband, and thus forgiveness for the highest matrimonial crime would be in accordance with the spirit of the gospel, but remarriage be opposite both to its genius and its positive rules. Or, to express the argument in a word, Christ allows putting away only on account of adultery. But Paul conceives of a separation of one member of the church from another who is a husband or wife. Therefore this separation must be on the ground of adultery. But the party leaving the other must remain unmarried. Therefore the man or woman separated from a guilty partner must remain unmarried.

The only way of meeting this argument is to deny that separation is understood by Christ and Paul in the same sense, and to take the ground that the case of adultery was not before the Apostle's mind. Christ was arguing with the Pharisees on such divorces as were attended with a licence of marrying again, and denies that any such could take place except in one specific instance. Did Paul draw the rule tighter, and deny that remarriage was lawful even in that specific instance? Or did he contemplate such separations of an informal sort, begun without even the idea of remarriage, as might have occurred within the Christian Church? To us it appears that he meant such separations by his word *χωρισθῆναι*, and he says in effect, if separated let her not commit adultery by marrying again, which she would do if she had left her husband for a cause falling short of adultery.

We now pass on to that important passage in the first of Corinthians, where the Apostle Paul handles the subject of divorce. Two cases are here noticed, one for which the Lord had given commandment, where both the parties were Christian believers, and another which had not been provided for by the Saviour's authority, where one of the parties was an unbeliever. In regard to the first case, the Apostle must refer to the com-

mandment contained in the extant words of Christ, or to some other of similar import. We have already observed that he coincides with Mark in speaking of a wife divorcing herself from her husband, and with both Mark and Luke in omitting the exception which Matthew twice inserts in his Gospel. How the exception came to be admitted we have tried to explain, and the explanation will derive additional weight from a similar omission in Rom. vii., 2, where, when it broadly said that the wife is bound by the law to her husband as long as he liveth, the Apostle puts out of sight the husband's freedom of divorcing the wife which the law itself concedes to him.

The commandment of Christ is limited, as we conceive, by the Apostle to the case where both partners in the marriage are believers, because only in such a case could it be regarded as the practical law of the household, whatever might be the law of the land, and in such a case its infraction would always fall under the jurisdiction of the church. In the other case one of the parties would profess submission to a commandment to which the other attached no binding force. It may be that the Apostle regarded marriage to be as indissoluble in itself for partners of diverse faith, or even for two heathen, as for two Christian believers. The principle uttered by Christ of the "one flesh," he may have fully received as applicable to marriage in general, and yet there was need of discussing a second case, not because the principle here was different, but because it contained difficulties which needed to be considered by themselves. We must not impute to the Apostle the opinion that Christ's precept was not as broad as the reasons on which it was based, but the gospel in its spread met persons whose subjective state could not be controlled by the precept: there was need therefore of advice for those whom such persons affected by their conduct.

The Apostle's repetition of the Gospel precept, besides the prohibition there found, contains the decision of a case that may have existed at the very time in the Corinthian Church. Let not the wife separate herself from her husband. But should she even have separated herself,—which seems to imply that instances of this kind had occurred and were known to the Apostle,—let her remain unmarried or be reconciled to her

husband. Here the latter words imply that the separation was due not to any crime on the husband's part, but to dissensions between the married pair. And the Apostle allows the wife who has gone so far—such is the sense of *καὶ*—as even to withdraw from her husband and to live apart, the choice between remaining unmarried and returning, after an amicable settlement of the difficulties, to the former condition. Here the verb denoting separation is somewhat indefinite in its sense. It can denote simple withdrawal from the husband's house and society without any formal act by which remarriage would be legalized, or it can include the declaration of a purpose of divorce besides. We question whether it means so much as this, although it is used as the equivalent of *ἀφίημι*. For the Apostle says, "let her be reconciled," which seems to imply that mere peace between the parties and return to the husband was all that she needed to do, as not having already taken the step of a legal separation. Yet, on the other hand, the expression, "let her remain unmarried," implies the power of sooner or later contracting a *legal* marriage with another man. But whatever may be thought of this, it is obvious that the Apostle conceives of a state of things in which a woman separated from her husband, and that, it may be, permanently, shall have no right, according to the Lord's commandment, of marriage with another man. In other words, we have here an actual separation *a mensa et thoro* without a separation *a vinculo matrimonii*. This third state between absolute divorce and the full marriage union has then the sanction of the Apostle,—not of course as something desirable, but probably as a kind of barricade against divorce and a defense of the Saviour's commandment. It may be introduced therefore into the law of Christian lands.

From cases where both parties were Christian believers the Apostle passes on to a new kind of cases, doubtless frequent enough, for which Christ had not provided,—those in which one of the parties had received the Gospel, while the other still continued a heathen. In regard to all such cases the Apostle's words involve, without expressing fully, the principle that the believing party is not to initiate any steps which will terminate the marriage union, but must remain passive, while all

active proceedings are expected to emanate from the other side. Thus should the unbelieving husband or wife be content to dwell with the Christian partner, the latter may not put the other away. This is the first case that is noticed and it was doubtless of frequent occurrence. Here Paul meets a feeling to which the new faith itself might give rise. So great was the transition from the foul worship of impure divinities to the faith in Christ and in a God of holiness, that close connexion with a heathen, however ignorantly or innocently begun, might seem unclean and unhallowed. To this he replies, without mentioning the feeling itself, that the heathen partner is hallowed by the believing one, that marriage and the marriage bed preserve their sanctity because one of the parties is a consecrated person. Otherwise the children would be unclean, whereas all admit that they are consecrated. Without stopping to discuss the Apostle's meaning here, it is enough if we say that he draws a broad line between a family where both parents are heathen and another where one is a Christian.

But the heathen, whose husband or wife had become a Christian convert, might be soured or alienated for that very reason, and might insist on terminating the union. The decision in this second case is expressed in these words: "But if the unbelieving depart let him depart." That is, if he separates himself from his Christian partner (or is in the act of separating himself, as some explain the tense), let him take his course unhindered. A believer has not (by his profession) been brought into slavery, is not under bondage in such cases, is not subjected to the obligation of keeping up the marriage relation and of preventing the disruption by active measures of his own. Such bondage would subject the believer to a state of warfare, but God's call to him, when he invites him into the Gospel, is in the form of peace. And moreover let not the believing party think that he ought to take on him this painful obligation in order to convert the heathen partner. For it is wholly uncertain whether by living with such a partner, when he is bent on separation, any such result will be attained.*

* The clause "but God has called us to peace" is difficult. We have given the antithesis, represented by *et*, as pointing to a state of strife which Paul only

This is an important passage, as furnishing the authority, if there be any in the scripture, for divorce with remarriage on the ground of desertion. In rendering its meaning, as we have done, we have unavoidably shown a certain amount of bias on that question, because otherwise the connexion of thought could not easily be presented. We will now return on our steps, glancing as briefly as possible at the leading interpretations of ver. 15-16, then looking again at the connexion, and finally, endeavoring to discover how the decisions of the Apostle can be brought into harmony with those of the Lord.

The greater part of the commentators, although by no means all, understand *ὁ δὲ δούλωται*, "is not under bondage," to deny the necessity of remaining unmarried, and infer from it the lawfulness of taking another husband or wife under the conditions specified by the Apostle. The Catholic Church, so strict in the matter of divorce, allows, and that in good part on the authority of this passage, both divorce and second marriage to a Christian separated from a heathen by the agency of the latter.* The prevailing view among the Protestants also has drawn a justification of divorce in cases of malicious desertion,

hints at, for it seems to us to be implied in the word *ἡσυχίαται*. The expression "in peace," as the original is literally rendered, many make equivalent with *into peace*. Winer teaches us that Paul never uses *εἰς* as equivalent to *ἐκ*, and explains it "so as to be in peace," which is really admitting what he condemns. DeWette follows him. Harless and Meyer give the solution adopted in our paraphrase.—"God has called us in peace," i. e. God's call has come to us in the ethical form of peace. The words "for what knowest thou—whether" were taken by nearly all the older commentators as implying the possibility that by living together with the heathen the Christian might save him or her. It would then be a dissuasive against separation. But logic will not bend to this rendering. We ought to have for it a different context. It would require *τί δὲ* instead of *τί γάρ*, and the words scarcely admit of the version "what do you know but that," or "how do you know that you will not." For an attempt of Tholuck to defend this way of understanding the interrogation, see his *Bergpred.* fourth edition, p. 252. Billroth, Rückert, Olshausen take it in the same way. It would strengthen our side to follow them, but this seems to us an inadmissible construction. Nor can v. 17 weigh in opposition. The condition in which the believer actually is, is one of desertion, not one of cohabitation with a husband or wife. Let him or her then remain in this state of desertion. The case is like that mentioned in v. 27.

* We may have to revert to this again; at present it is enough to say that in passages of the Canon Law relating to this subject (Decret. Grat. ii, Caus. xxviii., Qu. 2, C. 2, and Decretals, iv., 19, de divortiiis, Cap. 7), this text is cited as the authority. It should be added, however, that the opinion entertained in

whether the guilty party be a heathen or not, from this commandment of the Apostle. To some the bondage which the Apostle speaks of is that of remaining unmarried, or the alternative obligation of either remaining unmarried or being reconciled, so that the duty, where one of the parties is a heathen, is just the opposite of that prescribed in v. 11. Others draw this right of remarriage as an inference from the scope of the passage, rather than rest it upon any particular expression. And the question may be asked with some force, why, if remarriage is not allowed, does the Apostle consider his commandment to be a new one. Is all the difference between the case in v. 11, and that in v. 15, that in the former the separated party must, and in the latter need not be reconciled to the other?

We will first look at the meaning of *ὡς δεδούλωται*. The verb has been compared by some with *δέδεσται*, which in several places is made use of by the Apostle to denote the marriage bond (vv. 27, 39, Rom. vii., 2). But in truth there is no connexion between the two words. The one denotes an obligation merely, and the other a severe or painful obligation, an unfree subjection resembling that of slavery. It might without question be used on the proper occasion by an author who wished to express a harsh necessity of remaining unmarried. But the sense would lie not in the word, but in the context.

What then is the bondage which the context here points out? Meyer correctly answers that *ὡς δεδούλωται* does not deny the obligation to remain unmarried, as Grotius and others assert, but the necessity of continuing the married state; and so he remarks that the place gives no express answer to the question whether Paul concedes remarriage to the Christian party. Stanley on the passage remarks in the same strain, "that this is not so much a permission of separation as an assertion that, if on other grounds a separation has taken place, there is no obligation on the Christian partner to insist on a union." So too DeWette says that "the positive side of this notion [*i. e.* of the notion of separation, viz.: remarriage] is certainly not

the ancient church concerning heathen marriage facilitated this allowance of remarriage, where the parties had been heathen.

brought forward by the Apostle, although it may be supplied by correct inference." Nor can we forbear to introduce a passage from Neander's commentary on Corinth. vii., for which our readers, we are sure, will thank us. "Protestant exegesis," he says, "has understood the Apostle to the effect that in such a case the Christian party would be authorized to enter into a new marriage. But this is not at all contained in the words. The Apostle simply means that in things pertaining to religious conviction no one ought to be the slave of another, that the Christian partner cannot be forced to stay with the heathen, if the latter will not allow to the other the exercise of his religious convictions. In such circumstances a separation can be allowed, but of an allowance to contract another marriage there is not a word here said." And we close our citation of authorities with an extract from Tholuck's exposition of the Sermon on the Mount. (p. 233, 3d ed.) "The words 'is not in bondage in such cases,'" says he, "have a direct reference only to living together,—and in verses 10, 11, *χωριζέσθαι* is so used that with it reconciliation is thought of as still possible." And in the greatly altered 4th edition (p. 253), he expresses his opinion that "we cannot find in the case of malicious desertion so called, which the Apostle adduces, a justification of remarriage."

With this view the Apostle's reasons agree, and show most clearly that whether he regarded remarriage in such cases as lawful or not, he can here have had no thought of it in his mind. The first of these reasons is that a compulsory cohabitation with an unbeliever who disturbs his partner's peace is not in accordance with the call of the Gospel. Here then reluctant living with a quarrelsome heathen, not any ultimate step such as remarriage, was in the Apostle's mind. The other reason is that the probability of converting such a heathen partner, so bent on separation, is not so great as to make remaining with him against his will a Christian duty. Here again nothing but dwelling in marriage relations with the heathen husband or wife is thought of. The Apostle's mind goes no further than that point, if we have fairly represented his train of thought, and this we have done in harmony with the opinions of the best modern interpreters. The Apostle

then says simply this: 'if the heathen is fixed on separation, let him take his course. You are permitted to suffer this in order to preserve your peace. You are not bound to stay with him to secure his conversion, for this is an uncertain thing.

But, it may be asked, why did the Apostle think it worth his while to give a decision in such cases, if the decision amounts only to a license of non-cohabitation, without granting the power of remarriage? And does not the contrast of the cases in verses 11 and 15, show that the obligation required in the former verse—either to remain unmarried or to be reconciled—had no existence in the case of which the latter verse treats; that here, in fact, the believer is neither bound to remain unmarried nor to be reconciled to the infidel partner.

To the first of these fair objections we answer that a new case of duty, unknown among the members of a believing community gathered out of the Jews, came up where a church was gathered in gentile lands. Some there were who in their abhorrence of false gods and of idolatrous worship regarded a yet unconverted husband or wife as unclean; the contamination spread over the family relations, and a wife, for instance, looked with inward horror on a husband who sacrificed to Zeus or to Aphrodite, although he had been kind to her, and had no thought of separation. Others there were, whose heathen husbands, after interfering with their dearest rights and hopes, determined to separate from them, but who were morbidly conscientious lest by consenting to such separation they should hinder the conversion of the unbeliever. Was it not well worth the Apostle's while to tell persons so situated how they ought to act?

To the other objection we answer that it is fair to infer that neither of the injunctions of the eleventh verse can be applied to the fifteenth, unless it can be shown, as we seem to ourselves to have shown, that the context proves the Apostle to have had no thought of remarriage in his mind.

To this we may add that there is a certain improbability, inherent in the case itself, that the Apostle would have given such a permission. The word *χωρίζεται* denotes any separation, whether attended with a formal statement of a purpose of

divorce or not, in other words, it includes divorce and desertion. And the exemption from "bondage" began to exist as soon as the separation commenced. Now would the Apostle have given a license greater than any law of the loosest Christian State gives, when he must have been cognizant of instances in which husbands or wives, who had thus deserted their partners, had become converts within a few months, and were thus ready to be reconciled and to live in Christian wedlock? Would he not have added some qualification or advised some delay?

The view here presented brings the precepts of our Lord and that of the Apostle into harmony, or at least shows that there is no necessary contradiction between them. The Christian wife or husband must accept as a fact what the unbelieving partner has done, but the marriage, so far as the Apostle lets his opinion be known, may still have been indissoluble, and the injured believer must remain in a state of desertion. All other ways of reconciliation, which proceed on the assumption that Paul permitted remarriage, are failures. Will any one say with DeWette in his Commentary, that both Christ and Paul permit remarriage, when the parties are separated in fact? But Christ, at the most, only allows it in cases of adultery, and if Paul allows it in other cases he enlarges the rule. To say that Christ, when he said "except on account of fornication," only gave a sample of several exceptions which he regarded as valid, is to trifle with his words, and to leave the door open for any degree of laxness. Will it be said, as Meyer says, that Christ did not have mixed marriages in his mind, but only marriages within his church? We reply that he laid down a universal rule, and gave a reason of general application for his rule. If those Pharisees whom he addressed in Matthew, chap. xix., admitted the force of what he said, they would be bound to take it as the rule of their life, even if they could not admit his claims to be the Messiah. Why should the Christian partner in a marriage be released from obeying a command of his Lord, because the heathen would not submit to it? Or will it be said that Paul, and perhaps Christ, did not regard heathen marriage as marriage in the proper sense,

but only as a kind of *contubernium*, to which the laws that govern Christian marriage were inapplicable. But the Apostle nowhere indicates that he holds any such opinion. Marriage with a heathen was, indeed, in his view a violation of Christian duty for one who was already a believer (2 Cor. vi., 14); but marriage contracted in a state of heathenism was a condition in which the heathen was called the husband or wife of the converted partner, in which the Christian was to remain if the heathen did not dissolve the union, in which the unbeliever himself partook of a kind of sanctity and the children were holy. To apply the rules of Ezra's time to the times of the kingdom of God, to require that the idolater must be separated from the believer in the nearer relations of life was not in accordance with Paul's strain of thinking. Marriage among the heathen, it is true, was far from conforming to the ideal presented to us in the earlier scriptures, where the man is conceived of as cleaving to his wife so closely as to bring her nearer to him than father or mother, and as becoming one flesh with her. But there was some purity left, there were examples of illustrious conjugal fidelity, and there were vices against marriage that "were not so much as named among the heathen." If on the whole it fell far short of the ideal, so too in a heathen family the parental relation failed to come up to the ideal, and yet the Apostle, without doubt, regarded that as the source of important and permanent obligations; and if he bade bond servants to treat unbelieving masters with all honor (1 Tim. vi., 1), much more would he have recognized the duties of the natural relation of parent and child.

The result then to which this exposition has brought us is that Paul advances beyond our Lord's position in a single particular,—in conceiving of, and, to a certain degree, authorizing separation without license of remarriage. That he goes so far is clearly shown by v. 11; that this leads him into any departure from our Lord's principles cannot, we think, be made to appear.

We had hoped to bring into connexion with this exhibition of the scripture doctrine of divorce several other important topics, without consideration of which our essay must remain

incomplete, such as divorce on the ground that the marriage was null *ab initio*, the office of the church in divorce, and cases, sometimes of a perplexing nature, which can arise where state law is laxer than the morality of the Bible. But we must defer all this for some future Article, and we hope also to be able to give a brief sketch of the state of opinion and of law in the principal Christian countries touching this important subject.

ARTICLE III.—CHURCH COMMUNION BY COUNCIL.

CONGREGATIONALISM is rather an ellipse than a circle. Its two *foci* are, the principle of the independence of the local Church of all authority but that of Christ; and the principle of the sisterly equality, friendliness, and helpfulness of these independent local churches—manifested in constant communion with each other.

This communion is ordinary or extraordinary, as occasion prompts. Ordinarily it expresses itself in the recognition of each other's officers and members; in exchanging members, at mutual convenience; and, generally, in all reciprocal charity and coöperation for the promotion of each other's welfare, and for the furtherance of the common cause and kingdom of God. Extraordinarily it has two functions; first, that of tendering advice to a church lacking light or peace, or both; and, second, that of admonition, and of procuring the self-justifying withdrawal of communion, where scandal exists, and is shielded by impenitent persistence, in the face of all suitable and scriptural loving labor.

The method of this extraordinary communion is by Ecclesiastical Council. Inasmuch as neighboring churches cannot conveniently assemble *en masse* to take into consideration the need which any sister church may have of light and peace,* they meet by delegation; and this assembly of the delegates of their appointment is held to be the churches themselves in council.

Councils for light are usually held when a band of believers propose to form themselves into a new church, or when a church proposes to ordain or dismiss its Pastor; and it is desired to know whether such action, in the reasons of it, will satisfy the judgment and receive the fellowship of neighbor churches. Such Councils may be held also for purposes of general consultation in regard to the welfare of the churches,

* Cambridge Platform, xv. 2, (2).

and the prosperity of the cause of Christ, like those at Cambridge in 1637, and 1646-8, those at Boston in 1662, and 1679-80, that at Saybrook in 1708, that at Albany in 1852, and that at Boston in 1865.

Councils for peace are held when any difficulty within a church proves too much for its own adjustment. Should matters proceed to such a length of obduracy as to make all the conciliatory labors of the Council of no avail, and to involve disgrace and danger to the common cause, the Council would issue in solemn admonition; and, if worst comes to worst, it may recommend to its constituent churches—each, for itself, by solemn vote—to withdraw all communion and fellowship from the offending body, until it shall repent.

Congregationalists hold that this method of ordering affairs between Churches, by Council, and not by Presbytery, or any Court or Prelate, is scriptural, while all other methods are unscriptural; and that it is adequate to every possible emergency, as they do not conceive other methods to be—as they assert, indeed, that long and wide experience has proved them not to be.

They find many Scriptures which seem to them to involve for local churches the duty of just such mutual affection, counsel, and admonition, as are enjoined upon individual Christians; and they conceive that the natural way of carrying out the spirit of those precepts is by precisely such a theory of church communion as distinguishes themselves from Independents, properly so called. While, in the fifteenth of Acts, they find in the sending of Paul and Barnabas, with “certain others of them,” from the Church at Antioch to the Church at Jerusalem, to submit the question whether the Mosaic rites were still in force over the conscience of a Christian Jew; in the discussion of that question by “the Apostles and Elders with the whole Church,” and the advice resulting, which was dispatched in the name of “the Apostles, and Elders, and brethren,”* by Judas and Silas; both the proff

* Tischendorf sustains the common reading of this text, as do Scholz, Meyer, DeWette, and Lange. Wordsworth mildly protests, but leaves it standing; while even Dr. Pusey does not presume to say more than that the omission of the *et ei* is “a reading extant in the second century, for which there is con-

that, while Apostles retaining the authority of inspiration were still within reach, it was God's will that his churches should seek light, and peace, by mutual counsel, and the precedent that gives scriptural warrant to Councils called by churches in the Congregational manner, to the end of time.

Ecclesiastical history bears no trace of this way of church communion, after this, for the next hundred years or more; nor was it to be expected that it should do so, for such Councils, if held, were, doubtless, in those troublous times, secluded from the general eye, and there was no contemporary historian interested in them to register, or refer to, them. The first reference to such communion, in that modified form which grew to what the Church of Rome knows by the name of Council, is believed to be found in a passage of Tertullian,† in which, after reference to the powers of a bishop at that time, he adds that Councils of the churches were accustomed to be held among the nations of Greek descent, for consultation upon matters of special import, and that their decisions were treated with the greatest respect. Colman† argues from this passage: (1), that Councils were then regarded as resting upon merely human authority; (2), that at the close of the second century they were known only in nations bearing the name of Greeks; (3), that they had their origin in Greece, and were suggested by the Amphictyonic Council; (4), that already certain places were assigned for their lawful sessions; (5), that they were devoted not to minor and local, but to public business; and (6), that the bishops, in them, decreed not in their own name but in that of their churches.

It was but a very short time before these popular, represen-

siderable authority." [*Councils of the Church*, 82.] In connection with the undisputed *ἐν ἑκῇ καὶ ἐκκλησίᾳ*, of v. 22, there can be no reasonable doubt in the minds of persons not having strong reason to wish it otherwise, that the common reading is the genuine. [See, for concessions on this, *Joyce's England's Sacred Synods*, 8; Brett's *Church Gov't*, 243-5.]

* Aguntur præterea per Græcias illa certis in locis concilia ex universis ecclesiis, per quæ et altiora quæque in commune tractantur, et ipsa representatio totius nominis Christiani magna veneratione celebratur, &c. [*De Jejuniis*, xlii. Opera, ed. 1839, ii. 195.]

† *Ancient Christianity Exemplified*, 476.

tative, deliberative assemblies were seized by the spirit of Episcopal ambition; the laity first silenced and then excluded;* and the whole working of the organization so transformed as to make a Council but a method by which the decrees of a few hundred bishops, enforced by the severest threats of the civil power, became the rule of faith and of conduct to all Christendom.†

When the Reformation dawned upon that tedious night of superstition and barbarism in which Rome had shrouded the world, it was not to be expected that the primitive doctrine of Councils should be rediscovered, until that theory of the independence of the local Church under Christ, out of which it grows, and of which it is the correlate, should first reassert itself, and gather adherents. The old Synods, or Convocations, still kept at their work in England, after they had formally discharged the Papal supremacy; only shaping matters to the views of Henry the VIII., instead of Clement the VII.‡

It has often been affirmed, and perhaps usually believed, that the first reassertors of the original doctrine of the Christian Church as being a local company of confederate believers, reacted so violently from the corruptions of the Ecclesiasticism which surrounded them and threatened their lives, as to lose sight entirely of the justness and value of any confederation or visible communion between the churches.§ It has been sometimes held to be a tenet of original Brownism, that each local church is so absolutely independent, as neither to seek nor acknowledge communion with any other. But Browne himself favored "a joining or partaking of the authority of Elders, or forwardest and wisest, in a peaceable meeting, for redressing and deciding of matters in particular churches, and for counsel therein."¶ The anonymous Brownist tract entitled "A True Description, out of the word of God, of the VISIBLE

* The first pretext was that the laity were present to assent to what their betters had decreed. The very form of subscription to the result of Council which thus grew up is extant. The clergy signed thus,—"*Ego definiens subscripsi.*" the laity,—"*Ego consentiens subscripsi.*" [Field—*Of the Church*, Ed. 1635, p. 646.]

† Spittler, *Gesch. Kanon. Rechts.* Sec. xiv.

‡ Joyce, 351-455.

§ See for example, McClure's *Life of John Cotton*, p. 143.

¶ *Points and Parts of all Divinity*, A. D. 1582. (4to. pp. 112). Def. II.

CAUTION" (of date 1589), the authorship of which is assigned by Joseph Hall* to Robinson's pastor—though whether Clyfton or Smyth was intended, is uncertain—in several passages implies a theory of the fellowship of individual churches essentially like that now known to Congregationalism, especially in the provision to warn "all other Faithful"† in the case of the excommunication of the unworthy. Barrow‡ makes it a point against the "Pontificals" that they object to what he holds as the true way—that "the doubts of the Churches should be decided by an assembly of other Churches, which they call a Synod and a Council." So, in another treatise,§ he urges that the Elders of a particular church should, in some cases, be ordained "by the help of the Elders of some other faithful Congregation; one Church being to help and assist another in these offices." The "Confession of Faith of certaine English people, living in the Low Countries, exiled," of date 1596, has the following for its xxxviiiith Article,| viz:—"And although the particular Congregations be thus distinct and severall bodies, every one as a compact and knit citie in it self, yet are they all to walke by one and the same rule, and by all meanes convenient to have the counsel and help one of another in all needful affaires of the Church, as members of one body in the common faith, under Christ their onely head." John Smyth, of Gainsborough, and afterwards of Amsterdam, explains the charge of rigid separation from all other churches made against the Brownists, thus:¶—"We Separate from al Churches vppon several reasons:—1. From some (such as are the English Churches) we Separate for the Falsehood of them—and that is a just cause in any indifferent man's judgment; 2. from other (such as are the Reformed Chnrches) wee Separate not for

* *A Common Apology of the Church of England against the Brownists*, p. 14.

† *Hanbury*, i. 33.

‡ *A Brief Discovery of the false Church*. [A. D. 1590.] p. 188.

§ *A plain refutation of Giffard's Short Treatise, &c.*, A. D. 1591. [Ed. 1605] p. 129.

| *An Apologie, or Defence, of such true Christians as are commonly (but unjustly) called Brownists, &c.* [A. D. 1604.] p. 26.

¶ *Parallels, Censures, Observations, aperteyning to three several writings, &c.* [A. D. 1609.] p. 123.

that they are false, but for that being true they are corrupt—and herein our Separation is not total but for a tyme, til we have performed our dntyes vnto them: when we have therfor, admonished them of their corruptions and they repent, then *we joyne in communion with them*: if they repent not wee leave them to the Lord: and wee must needes keep ourselves vnsported, and take heed that we partake not with other men's sinnes." About the same date when Smyth was writing this, Henry Jacob, on behalf of the Separatists, was addressing to King James "An humble supplication for Toleration, and Liberty to enjoy and observe the ordinances of Jesus Christ in the administration of his Churches in lieu of human Constitutions." In this he says, "we do humbly entreat that we may not be so interpreted as if we disclaimed all sorts of Synods. It is the Ruling, and not the Deliberative and Persuasive Synod, which we except against. That a Synod should enjoin us to receive and entertain a constitution enacted by themselves, we hold it unlawful: to be moved thereto by way of persuasion, grounded upon a clear demonstration of utility and advantage growing thereby to the Members, we do in no sort dislike."* And, four years after, he said again, "we willingly take that Apostolike practise in Acts 15, both as being a Synod, and also a good patterne of Synods for ever. Neither do wee indeed mislike any Christian Synods, but greatly approve of them: though some out of malice do object to vs the contrary. Alwayes the Apostle's practice we take for our rule."†

Ainsworth's doctrine on this subject has been already hinted in the xxxviiith Article of the Confession of the English exiles, of which he was the author.‡ But he goes at large into the subject, in one of his controversial treatises, in which he not only shows his own opinion, but illustrates the practice of the Brownist Churches then in Amsterdam, and of Robinson's Church at Leyden; introducing exceedingly valuable corroborative documents from the pen of Robinson and Brewster—

* A. D. 1609, 4to pp. 48. No imprint of place or printer. p. 18.

† *An Attestation of many learned, Godly, and famous Divines, &c., &c.* [A. D. 1613.] p. 117.

‡ See *Hanbury* i. 49 (note).

which do not seem to have been elsewhere preserved. It is enough here to set down that Ainsworth asserts the "Apostolical practice" of communion by Council, between churches lacking light or peace, to be not merely permissive, but "instead of Commandments unto us;" that, in a particular case of difficulty, he "signified" that the help of the Church in Leyden "should be desired in the end, if we could not agree, but we would first use all means among our selves;" and that *he* would have been willing even to have called in the counsel of "the Dutch and French churches" by their side, only that "they could not discuss the controversie in our English tongue, to the understanding of our Congregation now troubled: no nor of all our Elders," while still, on that account, he would not have "absolutely refused," if that plan of conciliation had been insisted on.*

John Robinson's own position, in which Elder Brewster appears to have fully concurred, it seems clear from the documents above referred to, was exactly what would be inferred from his "Letter to the Church of Christ in London," where he says, that "he conceives it not orderly that the bodies of churches should be sent to for counsel, but some choice persons. Power and authority are in the body for elections and censures, but counsel for direction in all affairs, in some few; in which regard every particular Church has appointed its eldership for ordinary counsellors, to direct it and the members thereof in all difficulties; with whom others are also to advise upon occasions, specially ordinary."† It comes out in a letter of Robinson and Brewster to Ainsworth,‡ that, after the church in Amsterdam, of which Johnson was pastor and Ainsworth teacher, had been long divided and convulsed upon the question whether church power resided in the elders (according to Johnson's innovation upon the previous faith of that church), or in the entire membership (as Ainsworth held, and as the twenty-third and twenty-fourth Articles of their "Con-

* *An Animadversion to Mr. Richard Clyfton's Advertisement, &c., &c.* [A. D. 1613,] pp. 108-110.

† *Works*, (Ashton's ed.), iii., 382.

‡ pp. 133-136 of Ainsworth's *Animadversions, &c.*, before cited.

fession" * fully taught), some thirty of the brethren at Amsterdam wrote to the Church at Leyden stating their unhappy position, and that, failing to see any hope of relief among themselves, they had often desired the church to request the help of the Leyden brethren, but the elders would no way approve thereof, but would only *permit* their coming, of their own motion, or at the request of the aggrieved, "as men use to permit of that which is evill, and which indeed they cannot hinder;" and beseeching them to come to their relief. The Church at Leyden, though thus earnestly requested, did not immediately comply, but their elders wrote to Johnson's church, communicating the fact of this request, "desiring by them to be informed how things stood with them: and signifying withall, our unwillingness to interpose, but upon a dew, and necessary calling; and that also as much as might be, under the conditions of best hope of good yssue." The Amsterdam Church replied, declining to approve the project of counsel of their Leyden brethren, "and would onely permit it, and that under the terms of jealousy and advantage."† The Leyden elders wrote back; "our purpose is, according to the request of the brethren which have moved us, and our duty; to send, or come unto you; not to oppose any person, or to mainteyn any charge of error, but by all brotherly meanes to help forward your holy peace (if so the Lord's will be:) which how precious it is unto us we hope to manifest to the consciences of all men: then [than] which we know nothing in this world we haue more cause to endeavour, both with God, and your selves. Of which our comming we pray you to accept, and to appoint us some such time, asseemes to you most convenient." The majority of the church, under the lead of Johnson, maintained its attitude of stubbornness, whereupon Robinson and Brewster went to Amsterdam, as individuals, to exert their private influence; failing in which, at the request of Ainsworth and the thirty with him, they went again as formal delegates, "being sent by the Church;" where, they say, "we did reprove what we judged evill in them, and that we confesse with some vehe-

* *An Apologie, &c.*, p. 21.

† We confess our inability to get the exact sense of this clause; but we quote the exact words of Robinson and Brewster.

mency." Three propositions for peace were considered, and rejected:—the first, that the two parties should continue together, Ainsworth and his friends being satisfied with protesting against the doctrine and practice of the pastor and the majority; the second, that the minority should be dismissed to the Church at Leyden—who were one with them in the subject under controversy—but should continue to live and hear at Amsterdam; the third,—proposed by Robinson as a compromise—that all the church business should be first considered and resolved on by the elders, and then be submitted to the membership for confirmation only. The discussion issued in a motion made by Johnson himself for the "free dismissal" of Ainsworth and his friends to the Church at Leyden;—the Johnson party being clearly urgent that their opposers should leave Amsterdam. To this the Church in Leyden "condescended, and so sent back the Officers for the further ratification of it, and for some other purposes tending to the establishing of peace amongst them." That course was finally and fully agreed upon, but Johnson's party subsequently "reversed the agreement of themselves," without acquainting the Leyden Church "with the change of their mind, or reasons thereof." The thing ultimately in a secession of Ainsworth and his adherents in Dec., 1610, and the formation of a separate church in Amsterdam.

In his answer to Bernard, Robinson has one passage which shows his general position on this subject: "But it will be said, may not the officers of one or many Churches meet together to discusse and consider of matters for the good of the Church, or Churches, and so be called a Church, *Synode*, or the like? I deny it not, *so they infringe no order of Christ, or liberty of the brethren*, they may do so, and so be called, *in a sense*." *

Ames states his view very distinctly: "Yet particular churches, as their communion doth require, the light of nature and equity of rules, and examples of Scripture do teach, may and oftentimes also ought to enter into a mutual confederacy and fellowship among themselves in Classes and Synods, that they

* *A Justification of Separation from the Church of England, &c.*, [A. D. 1610,] p. 199.

may use their common consent and mutual help as much as fitly may be, in those things especially which are of greater moment; but that combination doth neither constitute a new form of a church, neither ought it to take away, or diminish any way, that liberty and power which Christ hath left to his churches, for the directing and furthering whereof only it serves." *

The views of Ames are still further illustrated by the following extract from Bradshaw's *English Puritanism*, which he translated into Latin, and published with a preface of his own: "Christ has not subjected any Church to any other superior ecclesiastical jurisdiction than to that which is in itself, so that if any Church or congregation should err in matters of faith or worship, no other Churches or spiritual officers have power to coerce or punish them by divine right, but are only to counsel and advise them, &c." †

The exact position of the Leyden-Plymouth Church upon this subject, at the date of the settlement of this country, and for a generation after, is admirably set down by the clear-headed William Bradford in that "Dialogue between some young men born in New England, and sundry ancient men that came out of Holland and Old England," which he wrote in 1648, and which by the affectionate pen of his nephew, Nathaniel Morton, was transcribed in the first volume of the Plymouth Church Records. The "ancient men" are explaining to their juniors the Brownist peculiarities; and to the inquiry whether those Separatists did not differ from other

* *Ecclesiæ tamen particulares, ut earum communio postulat, naturæ lumen, et equitas regularum, et exemplorum Scripturæ docent, possunt, ac sæpius etiam debent confederationem, aut consociationem mutuam inter se infra, in classibus, et synodis, ad communi consensu et subsidio mutuo utantur, quantum commodè fieri potest, in iis præsertim, quæ sunt majoris momenti: sed ista combinatio neque constituit novam Ecclesiæ formam, neque tollere aut minuire ullo modo debet libertatem ac potestatem illam, quam Christus suis ecclesiis reliquit, cui tantum dirigendæ ac promovendæ inservit.* [*Medulla Theologica*, Lib. I., cap. xxxix., sec. 27.]

† We follow Neal's abstract of Bradshaw, rather than Ames's translation. This *Puritanism Anglicanus* is usually wrongly regarded as by Ames himself; and is included as such in the Amsterdam edition of his works. [Neal's *Hist. of the Puritans*, i., 482; *Puritan. Angl.*, p. 6. See also Increase Mather's *Disq. Concerning Eccl. Councils*. Preface, p. v.]

Christians "about Synods," Bradford,* for the "ancient men," replies: "It is true we do not know that ever they [the Brownists] had any solemn Synodical Assembly. And the reason may be, that those in England lived dispersed, and could not meet in their ordinary meetings without danger, much less in Synoda. Neither in Holland, where they might have more liberty, were they of any considerable number, being but those two churches, that of Amsterdam, and that of Leyden. Yet some of us know that the church [of Leyden] sent messengers to those of Amsterdam, at the request of some of the chief of them, both elders and brethren, when in their discussions they had deposed Mr. Ainsworth and some other both of their elders and brethren, Mr. Robinson being the chief of the messengers sent; which had that good effect, as that they revoked the said deposition, and confessed their rashness and error, and lived together in peace some good time after.† But when the churches want neither peace nor light to exercise the power which the Lord hath given them, Christ doth not direct them to gather into synods or classical meetings, for removing of known offenses either in doctrine or manners; but only sendeth to the pastors or presbyters of each church to reform within themselves what is amongst them. 'A plain pattern,' saith Mr. Cotton, in his answer to Mr. Baylie, page 95, 'in case of public offences tolerated in neighbour churches, not forthwith to gather into a synod or classical meeting, for redress thereof, but by letters and messengers to admonish one another of what is behoovefull; unless

* Bradford's own opinion on the subject is hinted in the fact that on the blank leaves of his own copy of Robinson's *Justification, &c.*, (now belonging to the 1st Church at Plymouth), in his own handwriting, appear several quotations on Councils: e.g., from Peter Martyr, "When they decree against the testimony of the Holy Scriptures, they are not to be suffered. . . . Such counsells must be harkened unto which cleave unto the word of God. . . . In counsells y^e voyces be not waiged but numbered, whereby it cometh to pass that often times y^e greater parte prevaieth against y^e less, and y^e worse above y^e better."

† The slight discrepancies which appear here as compared with the account of the Amsterdam *imbroglio* which we have already given from the contemporary documents, find easy explanation, when we remember that Bradford was but a youth of scarcely twenty-one, when the quarrel took place, and that thirty-eight years had elapsed afterwards before he wrote this dialogue.

upon such admonition they refuse to hearken to the wholesome counsel of their brethren.' And of this matter Mr. Robinson thus writeth in his book, *Just.*, page 200, 'The officers of one or many Churches may meet together to discuss and consider of matters for the good of the Church and Churches, and so be called a Church Synod,* or the like, so they infringe no order of Christ or liberty of the brethren;' not differing herein from Mr. Davenport and the principal of our ministers." †

Three things are here made clear :

First, that the Mayflower Congregationalism held that every local church ought to manage its own affairs, and settle its own difficulties, without calling upon its neighbors, if possible; but, when in need of light or peace, is both authorized and bound to resort to communion by Council for relief.

Second, That in this it supposed itself to accord with the old Brownist way, and especially with the theory of the venerated Robinson.

Third, that twenty-eight years after the settlement of Plymouth, twenty after that of Salem, eighteen after that of Boston, twelve after that of Hartford, and ten after that of New Haven, this was understood to be the general sentiment of the elders and churches of these colonies.

A rapid survey of the various utterances of prominent New England Divines upon this subject, down to the time of the Cambridge Platform, may perhaps wisely preface a glance at the practice of the New England Churches from the beginning until now.

John Cotton claims first attention. It is clear that when he came over he was troubled lest he should not avoid the name of "Brownism," and sensitive as to the idea of Separatism in general.‡ He preferred to style his departure from the Eng-

* By comparing this with the quotation which we have made of the same passage, on a previous page, directly from Robinson, it will be seen that Gov. Bradford has modified the sense by omitting the comma which Robinson put between "Church" and "Synod."

† Young's *Chronicles of the Pilgrim Fathers of the Colony of Plymouth*, pp. 418—419.

‡ See *A copy of a Letter of Mr. Cotton, &c.*, [A. D. 1641,] p. 8: and various passages in his *Way Cleared*. •

lish establishment as not "a separation from them as no churches, but rather a *secession* from the corruptions found amongst them."* Remembering this position of his mind, we are prepared to understand his utterances. It has been usual to speak of his *Keyes of the Kingdom of Heaven* as his first publication bearing upon the church and its government. Some *Questions and Answers upon Church Government*, bearing his name, with the date of 1634, are however extant, which set forth fully his views as preached during the year after his arrival, to the extent to which they were then matured; but stopping short of any discussion of the communion of the churches.† Circumstances soon pressed that topic upon his attention, and, in 1643, the tract was reprinted in London, in a revised form, and enlarged by the addition of sixteen new questions, in the answers to some of which his more matured opinions were set forth.‡ The fortieth question ends thus: "*Tell me now whether any Church hath power of government over another?*" "*Ans.* No Church hath power of Government over another, but each of them hath chief power within itself, and all of them equall power one with another. Every Church hath received alike the power of binding and loosing, opening and shutting the Kingdome of Heaven. But one to another, all of them are Sisters, all of them *Saraks*, all of them Queens, none an *Hagar*, none of them Concubines, but by their own corruption or usurpation of others. Finally, all of them are Candlesticks of the same precious mettall, and in the midst of them all Christ equally walketh." The next question is: "*But if one Church have no power of government over another: what course then is there best to reform such corruptions as may arise in any Church, whether in Doctrine or practice?*" His answer, after a preliminary paragraph, is: "Though one Church hath not power of Government over another, as subordinate to them, yet every Church hath equall power one with another, as coördinate with them; and, therefore, look what

* *Way of Congregational Churches Cleared*, p. 14.

† It is our impression that this tract is exceedingly rare. The only copy that we have ever seen is in the Library of Yale College, where it is bound up with others in a pamphlet of 32 pp.

‡ *The Doctrine of the Church, &c. &c.*, [A. D. 1643.] 4to. pp. 18.

power one Brother hath over another in the same Church, the same power hath one Church over another in Brotherly communion. As if one church shall heare of any offence in another, they may enquire the certainty of it, and therupon send letters and messengers to convince and admonish them of it. If the Church offending doe heare the Church admonishing, they have gained their Brethren and their desire; if the Church hear them not, then that other Church may take one or two Churches more to assist them in the conviction of that sinne. If yet the Church heare them not, then, upon due notice therof given, all the Churches thereabout may so meet together; and after judicious inquirie into the cause, may by the Word of God confute and condemne such errors, in doctrine or practise, as are found offensive, to prevent the spreading either of the gangren of Heresie or of the leprosie of sin. And if the Church offending shall not yet hearken to their Brethren, though the rest of the Churches have not power to deliver them to Satan, yet they have power to withdraw from them the right hand of fellowship, and no longer to hold them in communion of Saints till they approve their *repentance*.”* We have taken space for this extract, because it shows that the essential ideas of “the third way of communion” of the Platform, were thus clearly in Cotton’s mind, at least five or six years before the Synod of Cambridge met, and some time also before the *Keyes* was written.

In the *Keyes* he says: “Though the Church of a particular Congregation, consisting of Elders and Brethren, and walking with a right foot in the truth and peace of the Gospel, bee the first subject of all Church-power needfull to be exercised within itselfe; and consequently bee independent from any other Church or Synod in the use of it; yet it is a safe, and wholesome, and holy ordinance of Christ, for such particular Churches to joyn together in holy Covenant or communion, and consolation amongst themselves, to administer all their Church affairs (which are of weighty, and difficult and common concernment) not without common consultation and consent of other Churches about them. Now Church-affairs of weighty and

* pp. 11, 12.

difficult and common concernment, we account to bee the *election and ordination of Elders, excommunication of an Elder*, or any *person of publick note* and employment; the *translation of an Elder* from one Church to another, or the like. In which case we conceive it safe and wholesome, and an holy Ordinance, to proceed with common consultation and consent.”* At the close of the discussion he adds a caution—that “this consociation of Churches be not perverted either to the oppression or diminution of the just liberty and authority of each particular Church within it self,” remarking, “all the liberties of Churches were purchased to them by the precious blood of the Lord Jesus; and therefore neither may the Churches give them away, nor many Churches take them out of the hands of one.”†

When vindicating the independence and self-sufficiency, under Christ, of the local church, Cotton spoke clearly and conclusively; sometimes—for he really did feel that it was not *quite* safe to trust everything to moral suasion and the healing power of time and the grace of God, and so desired, somehow, a little more *authority* over a church than he could logically develop from his own system—when unfolding the conservative power of Congregationalism, he used language stronger than his premises would warrant,‡ and so involved himself in an inconsistency which his opposers were quick to see and seize. Thus the reviewer of the *Keyes* snaps him up: “Grant but your Synod of Churches the key of *authority*, to *bind* an offending party or Church, and to release them upon repentance, and the matter is at an end. But if you grant no more but a *doctrinall* declarative power, you grant but what every Pastor single hath. And whether this be the Key of Authority, given by our Saviour to the Church, let every indifferent reader judge;”§ and again, “You destroy the *liberty* of the Brethren, afore granted, and give the *Synod* a binding power, which you seeme to deny; or else *prevaricate*, in this cause.”||

* pp. 54, 55.

† p. 57.

‡ Thus in the *Keyes* he says, that “a Church is *subject to the determination and judicall sentence of a Synod* for direction into a way of truth and peace.” p. 52.

§ *Vindicia Clavium, or, a Vindication of the Keyes of the Kingdom of Heaven into the hands of the right owners, &c.*, [A. D. 1645.] p. 88.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 55.

In his *Way of Congregational Churches Cleared* [A. D. 1648], Cotton restates his position in this matter in reply to his reviewer. He says—still, as we conceive, suffering unclearness of inward vision, through his vague impression that there must be *authority* somewhere—“Neither was it my intendment to exclude lawful Synods (gathered, and proceeding according to the pattern, Acts, 15) from all participation in some part of the power of the Keyes. For they have a power to decide controversies from the Word, and to appoint a course for the preventing and healing of offences, and for agreement in the Truth according to the Word. But these Synods are not the ordinary standing Judicatories of the Church; neither do they convene, nor exercise their directive Power, but when the particular Churches lie under variance or offence, or are not yet settled in a way of Truth and Peace.”*

In his *Exposition of the 13th Chapter of the Revelations*—preached 1639–40, but not published until 1655—he quaintly says, upon verse 2: “Beware of all secular power and Lordly power of such vast inspection of one church over another. Take heed of any such usurpation, it will amount to some monstrous Beast. Leave every church Independant, not Independant from brotherly counsel; God forbid that we should refuse that; but when it comes to power, that one Church shall have power over the rest, then look for a Beast, which the Lord would have all his people to abhor.”†

The *Answer of the Elders* is one of the earliest of our New England church classics. Printed in 1643, it was written in 1639, by Richard Mather,‡ was introduced to the Christian world by Hugh Peter, and consented to by the then elders of the Bay. Peter says in his address to the reader: “We are much charged with what we own not, viz: Independency, when as we know not any Churches Reformed, more looking at

* *Way of Congregational Churches Cleared.* Part II., p. 20.

† *An Exposition, &c., &c.*, p. 30.

‡ “There is a book which bears the title of ‘Answer of the Elders,’ &c., printed in the year 1643, of which book my father Mather was the sole author, and he wrote it in the primitive times of these churches (viz: in the year 1639), as himself assured me.” [Increase Mather’s *Order of the Gospel*, p. 73.]

sister Churches for help than ours doe, only we cannot have rule yet discovered from any friend or enemy, that we should be under Canon or power of any other Church; under their Councell we are." (p. ii). The xviiith of the xxxii questions which the Elders answer, respects the views of the then New England churches in regard to the function and power of "Councells;" to which it is replied: "The consociation of Churches into Classes and Synods we hold to be lawfull and in some cases necessary; as namely in things that are not peculiar to one Church, but common to them all. * * * And for Synods, if they have such power that their determination shall binde the Churches to obedience (as you speake) it is more than we yet understand."* It has been usual to quote from this connection† that golden utterance: "The sentence of a Synod is onely a certaine enquiring and giving of sentence by way of Ministry, and with limitation; so that THE DECREE OF THE COUNCELL HATH SO MUCH FORCE AS THERE IS FORCE IN THE REASON OF IT," as a dictum of Mather; but the remark is really due to the discreet Amesius,‡ only receiving here most cordial endorsement.

In 1643, Master Herle issued a pamphlet out of Lancashire, in which he argued the unscripturalness of all church government which does not include the idea of jurisdiction, determination, and censure over the local church; and insisted that "if the benefit of Appeales and consociation of Churches to their mutuall helpe in government should not be as free to us as to the Jews, how much more defective and improvident were the Gospel then the Law!"§ To this, in 1644, Richard Mather and William Tompson, of Braintree, replied; and on this point they say: "Consociation of Churches for mutuall help, we willingly acknowledge, so that this consociation may neither constitute a new form of a Church, nor take away or impair the liberty and power which Christ hath given to

* *Answer of the Elders*, pp. 64, 65.

† *Ibid.*, p. 66.

‡ "Vero tantum sit inquisitio quædam, et dictio sententiæ ministratoria et limitata, ita ut tantum valeat decretum Concilii, quantum valet ejus ratio." [*Belarminus Enervatus*, tom. ii., lib. i., cap. 8. *Amesii Opera*, iii. 2, 19.]

§ *The Independency on Scriptures of the Independency of Churches*, p. 7.

Churches; but serve onely according to the true use thereof, for the directing and guiding of the same.”*

In 1644, William Rathband published *A Briefe narration of some Church-courses in New England, &c., &c.*, in which he gave what he gathered from various authors as the New England doctrine on this subject, viz: (1), “They grant that Churches may and ought to consult and advise one with another, in any doubtfull matter incident, and ought to hearken to the good advice of one another; and, therefore, they sometimes allow combinations of divers Churches for consultation; but not imperative or coercive;” (2), “Each particular congregational Church is the supreme judicature whose power is absolute and imperiall, and therefore may and ought to transact all things within themselves, without seeking or submitting unto any authoratative concurrence of any other Churches;” (3), therefore they hold it unlawful for synods, &c., to “take upon them authoritatively to determine or decree anything in matter of doctrine or practise,” &c.; (4), “if any Church among them doe erre or sinne in any notorious sort, the rest agree together to call them to an account, to instruct, advise, reprove, admonish them, &c. If they prove obstinate, and obey not their advises and admonitions, &c., then they likewise agree together to desert them, and withdraw themselves from their communion,” &c.† To this he adds, by way of comment—among other things—the following: “They love no imperative Synods or Presbyteries, but they have store of imperative Churches who may command, yea, compell both members and Ministers to act, it may be what they like not,” &c.; and “whiles they oppose excommunication Synodically, they seeme to establish it;” closing by the judgment, that “Popular Government and want of authoritative Synods [are] the cause of their many schismes, confusions, and contentions, which though by some dissembled, yet have been by others formerly espied, and now by some of themselves lately confessed.”‡

* *A modest and brotherly answer to Mr. Chas. Herle, his book, &c.*, p. 17.

† *A Briefe Narration, &c.*, p. 47. [4to. pp. 55.]

‡ Rathband fortifies this assertion by reference to letters which good (Presbyterianish) Thomas Parker of Newbury had lately written to some friends in England.

Thomas Welde, of Roxbury, who was then in England with Hugh Peter, as an agent of the colony, immediately replied to this volume of Rathband, with fullness and force. To the points above he objects—among other things—“that ‘we have store of imperative churches,’ is another slander,—without ground, or proof, or truth. To persuade men to act without light, much more to ‘command’ or ‘compel,’ * * * though the thing required were lawful, are odious in the Churches of Christ.” “All we use to speak of our Church power is that it is ‘ministerial;’ which is far from ‘absolute and imperial:’ words fitter for emperors of this world than the Churches of the saints.”* As to the insinuation that the way of non-communication was really Synodical excommunication, Welde argues:—“Though W. R. thinks they are both one, I cannot: for that [the latter] is positive, this, [the former] only negative: that, after a sentence passed; this, not so: that, a cutting off from Christendom, at least for the present, and a giving up to Satan, &c.; this, only a cessation of conferring Church privileges, &c. By the one, the Churches withdraw, and call in that only which they gave, the right hand of fellowship: by the other, the Synod or Classis take away that which they never gave or had power to bestow, the excommunicate’s membership in their own Church. So that, when we stand for the one—as having no rule to carry us further—we do not establish the other. * * By non-communication, a man is only let go into the world where Satan’s walks are: by Synod’s excommunication, he is given up, and cast to Satan to terrify and vex him.”† There is a lasting force in his reply to Rathband’s sneer about ‘popular government,’ &c., which craves space for it here: “Blessed be God, that under that government of ours which you call—or rather miscall—‘popular,’ the very neck of ‘schisms’ and vile opinions, brought to us from hence, was broken; when here amongst you, where there is not such a government, they walk bolt upright amongst you, and crow aloud! You shall do better to lay aside this objection, till a

* *An answer to W. R. his Narration, &c., &c.*, [A. D. 1644. 4to pp. 68.] pp. 63, 64.

† *Ibid.*, p. 67.

Presbyterian government have healed these sore breaches in these Churches here!" *

The Rev. Samuel Eaton, who was for a short time associated with John Davenport in the care of the church in New Haven, in 1645, five years after his return to England, in conjunction with Timothy Taylor, his then colleague at Duckenfield, published a defense of the Congregational way. In this there is denied "the authority of *Synods* by way of *jurisdiction* in any case;" and again it is said, "A Synod of neighbour Churches, or their messengers, may judicially condemn those errors and schisms [which may be in any particular church], and impose ways of peace and truth; but yet not assume authority of censuring the delinquents, but leave that to particular Churches to be performed." †

Gov. Winthrop tells us, in his invaluable Journal, under date of 1 July, 1645, that "many books coming out of England, some in defense of Anabaptism, &c., and others in maintenance of the Presbyterian government against the Congregational way," the elders of the churches of all the united Colonies met that day at Cambridge, "where they conferred their councils, and examined the writings which some of them had prepared in answer to the said books, which, being agreed and perfected, were sent over into England to be printed, &c." ‡ The *Survey of the Summe of Church-discipline* was the principal of these "writings," so that it stands before us not only with the value attaching to the revered name of Thomas Hooker, but also as bearing the apparently unanimous and careful endorsement of the entire eldership of New England, at that date. The forty-two pages of the fourth part, which is "Concerning Synods," are supplemented by a note from those who, after Mr. Hooker's death, sent over the second copy to the press (the first having been lost at sea), stating that the Treatise on Synods was left imperfect, and so some notes found in his study are appended, and continuing: "Onely this

* *Ibid.*

† *A Defence of Sundry Positions, and Scriptures alledged to justify the Congregational way, &c.* [A. D. 1645, 4to pp. 184.] pp. 51, 90. This treatise seems to have been overlooked by the faithful and accurate Hanbury.

‡ Savage's *Winthrop*. [Ed. 1853.] ii: 304.

we should adde, that whereas there is a seeming denyall of a Synod to have at all any footing in the Scriptures, and yet an allowance of it from *Acts 15*: this is known to be the Author's mind, *which the whole discourse doth manifest*, that he denies a Synod that hath juridicall power, which he takes for a Synod properly, as used in the present controversie [with Rutherford, whose book he has been answering]; and he grants a Synod that hath power of counsell, which is a synod more largely taken, and for such a Synod the fifteenth of the *Acts* is alledged as a patterne by way of proportion."* That this correctly renders his opinion is made clear by these sentences in the appended notes above referred to:—"If Synods and such meetings be attended onely in way of consultation, as having no other power, nor meeting for any other end: then as they are lawfull, so the root of them lyes in a common principle which God in providence hath appointed for humane proceeding, and that is, he that hearkens to counsell shall be safe, &c."†

At the same Cambridge meeting above referred to, John Davenport presented ‡ his *Power of Congregational Churches vindicated, &c.*; so that although it was not printed until 1672, —the first MSS. having perished at sea, like Mr. Hooker's—its testimony may pertinently be put in here. The introducer of it to the English public—Nathaniel Mather—well said of it: "Two graud and pillar-principles of the Congregational way" "run through this whole discourse, and are legible even in every line of it, viz.; (1) That the power of churches is confined to their *res propria*; (2) that there is not any Spiritual Church power, to which they are by any Institution of Christ subjected."§ The author | well sums up his ideas on this head, thus: "In-

* *Survey, &c.* Part IV., 48.

† *Ibid.*, p. 51.

‡ See Felt's *Eccles. Hist. N. Eng.*, i., 540.

§ *The Power of Cong. Churches asserted, &c.* [A. D. 1672. 16mo. pp. 179.] Preface, p. iv.

| It is noticeable that John Davenport, in the profession of faith which he made when admitted to the church at New Haven, copied for his 18th article—expressive of his views on the communion of churches—almost *verbatim* the 38th article of the Old Hoiland original Brownist confession, already referred to on page 235. [See *The Profession of the Faith of that reverend and worthy divine, Mr. J. D., &c., &c.* (A. D. 1642. 4to. pp. 8.) p. 8.]

tireness of Church-Government, in a particular Church compleated with its Officers, *in re propria*, will well consist with that communion of Churches which the Scripture establisheth. The reason is, because both are the Ordinances of Christ, and Christ's Ordinances do not interfere. As the Communion of Neighbour-families doth not cross the compleate Government of several Families within themselves, respectively, in things properly Domestical. And as communion among Kingdoms and Commonwealths hindreth not the intireness of Jurisdiction in each Kingdom and Commonwealth within it self, in its proper concernments; So it is in the communion of Churches. Therefore Church-communion must be only, in a way of Brotherly association, for mutual helpfulness, in matters of this nature, but not in way of subordination, or subjection of one Church to the Ecclesiastical Government, whether of another Church, or of the Elders of several Churches assembled in Classes or Synods. The Communion of Churches, in the former way, is exercised according to Rule in sundry cases, [as, (1) care; (2) exchange of members; (3) occasional communion; (4) relief; (5) fellowship at ordinations, &c.; (6) consultation; (7) admonition and withdrawing fellowship, &c.] Communion of Churches in the latter way, of subordination or subjection to other Churches or Synods, *in re propria*, the Scripture nowhere approveth. Not of one Church to another, for there is a parity among Churches, and *par in parem non habet imperium*. Nor of one Church to a Synod made up of the Elders of sundry Neighbour-Churches. * * * There are two cases, wherein the *res propria* of a particular Church may fall under the cognizance and determination of other Churches or Synods: (1.) When they want sufficient light, or competent consent among themselves; * * * (2.) When that which is *res propria*, in the thing done, simply considered, becomes *res communis* in the Cause or ground of proceeding. * * * If, therefore, a Church * * * become Heretical or Schismatical or scandalously corrupt, &c., the Neighbour Church, or Churches, or Elders and Brethren assembled in a Synod, * * * have power, and it is their duty (1) to consider, * * * (2) to argue, debate, and determine according to the Word; (3) to publish the same, * * * and to give directions for reformation;

* * (4) the Church are to receive them [being found consonant to the word] with due reverence and submission as to the Ordinance of God ; (5) in case of obstinate persistence * * * the Churches offended are to withdraw from them the right hand of fellowship and Church-Communion, till they repent and reform." *

John Norton has left his opinion, in his answer to Apollonius, written in 1645, and printed in London in 1648 ; † as he shewed it when he preached to the church in Boston at the Wednesday Lecture, Sept. 2, 1646, and succeeded in persuading that refractory body to send their elders with three messengers to the waiting synod at Cambridge "to consult, conferre, and to consider of sundry questions, and cases of conscience, touching Christian religion, and y^e practice thereof in these churches ;" ‡ by convincing them that the intent of the synod was not "to make ecclesiastical laws to bind the churches, and to have the sanction of the civil authority put upon them," § but that synods are "only consultative, decisive, and declarative, not coactive, &c." ¶

In the very beginnings of the Massachusetts colony, there seem to have been some tendencies toward a "strong government" for the churches, which were corrected by the tonic of the decided leaning of Mr. Phillips of Watertown, ¶ and some

* *Power of Cong. Churches, &c., &c.*, pp. 141-146.

† He says: *Synodus non potest authoritative, hoc est, juridice dijudicare causas ecclesiarum, ita ut particulares ecclesias sub ea notione earum decretis sese subicere debent: neque possunt causas ecclesiis particularibus proprias cum jurisdictione ecclesiastica pertractare. Sententia synodica licet obligat directive non tamen juridice: quia non potest exercere jurisdictionem ecclesiasticam.* [*Responsio ad Totam Questionum Syll. a Clar. Vir. Dom. Gul. Apollon. proposit.* p. 114.]

‡ Felt's *Ecol. Hist. N. Eng.* i., 576.

§ Winthrop's *Journal* ii., 329.

¶ *Ibid.*, 331.

¶ "It is said that Mr. Phillips, of Watertown, was, at the first, more acquainted with the way of church discipline, since owned by Congregational churches; but being then without any to stand by him (for wo to him that is alone) he met with much opposition from some of the magistrates, till the time that Mr. Cotton came into the country, who, by his preaching and practice, did by degrees mould all their church administrations into the very same form which Mr. Phillips labored to have introduced into the churches before." [Hubbard's *Gen. Hist. New Eng.*, p. 186. See also the *Magnalia*, B. iii., 82.]

who agreed with him, toward strict Independency; and by the influence of the Plymouth men.* Subsequently to Mr. Cotton's coming, there appears to have been very little disposition toward Presbyterianism, except in the case of the Newbury ministers, Thomas Parker and James Noyes. The former had written home to England, "My cousin Noyse and myself have seen such confusion of necessity depending on the government which hath been practised by us here, that wee have been forced much to search into it within these two or three years, &c."† While the latter had published in London, in 1647, a treatise in which he took decidedly Presbyterian ground. He says, "Synods and Councels have power of Iurisdiction, to declare and apply both implicite and explicite laws of Christ, &c." * * The power of many Churches over one is natural and naturally necessary, as the power of many Members over one Member, if it be true (which hath been proposed) that all Churches are but one Church and corporation under the Lord Christ."‡

Cotton Mather intimates § that there was a general acquiescence in the doctrine of Cotton's *Keyes*, in New England, when the famous Synod met, in 1646, which, after two adjournments of one year each, issued the *Cambridge Platform*. The fifteenth and sixteenth chapters of that platform respect the matter before us. The former lays down first the duty, and second the manner of church communion. The latter fully discusses the doctrine of synods. It is as follows:—

OF SYNODS. |

1. Synods orderly assembled, and rightly proceeding according to the pattern, *Acts 15*, we acknowledge as the Ordinance of Christ: and though not absolutely necessary to the Being, yet many times, through the iniquity of men, and perverseness of times, necessary to the well-being of Churches, for the establishment of Truth and Peace therein. *Acts, xv. 2-15.*

* See 1 *Mass. Hist. Coll.* iii., 76; Clark's *Cong. Churches Mass.*, p. 8.

† Felt's *Eccles. Hist. New Eng.* i., 494.

‡ *The Temple Measured, &c.*, [4to., pp. 95,] p. 54.

§ *Magnalia*, Book v., 20.

| The word "Synod" is here used—and seems to have been generally employed in the ecclesiastical parlance of New England—simply as a name for a council larger than the needs of one particular church, or occasion, suggest; the difference being one of degree, and not at all of kind.

2. Synods being Spiritual and Ecclesiastical assemblies, are therefore made up of Spiritual and Ecclesiastical causes. The next efficient cause of them under Christ, is the power of the Churches, sending forth their Elders and other Messengers, who being met together in the name of Christ, are the matter of a Synod; and they in arguing, debating, and determining matters of religion according to the word, and publishing the same to the Churches it concerneth, do put forth the proper and formal acts of a Synod, to the conviction of errors and heresies, and the establishment of truth and peace in the Churches, which is the end of a Synod. Acts, xv. 2, 3, 6, 7-28, 31, and xvi. 4, 15

3. Magistrates have power to call a Synod, by calling to the Churches to send forth their Elders and other messengers, to counsel and assist them in matters of religion; but yet the constituting of a Synod, is a church-act, and may be transacted by the Churches, even when civil magistrates may be enemies to Churches, and to Church assemblies. 2 Chron. xxix. 4, 5-11. Acts, xv.

4. It belongeth unto Synods and Councils, to debate and determine controversies of faith, and cases of conscience; to clear from the word holy directions for the holy worship of God, and good government of the Church; to bear witness against mal-administration and corruption in doctrine or manners in any particular Church; and to give directions for the reformation thereof: not to exercise Church censures in any way of discipline, nor any other act of Church authority or jurisdiction, which that presidential Synod did forbear. Acts, xv. 1, 2, 6, 7. 1 Chron. xv. 13. 2 Chron. xxix. 6, 7. Acts, xv. 24, 28, 29.

5. The Synod's directions and determinations, so far as consonant to the word of God, are to be received with reverence and submission; not only for their agreement therewith (which is the principal ground thereof, and without which they bind not at all), but also secondarily for the power whereby they are made, as being an ordinance of God appointed thereunto in his word. Acts, xv.

6. Because it is difficult, if not impossible, for many Churches to come together in one place, in all their members universally; therefore they may assemble by their delegates or messengers, as the Church of Antioch went not all to Jerusalem, but some select men for that purpose. Because none are, or should be, more fit to know the state of the Churches, nor to advise of ways for the good thereof, than Elders; therefore it is fit that in the choice of the messengers for such assemblies, they have special respect unto such: yet inasmuch as not only Paul and Barnabas, but certain others also were sent to Jerusalem from Antioch, and when they were come to Jerusalem, not only the Apostles and Elders, but other brethren also do assemble and meet about the matter; therefore Synods are to consist both of Elders, and other Church members, endued with gifts, and sent by the Churches, not excluding the presence of any brethren in the Churches. Acts, xv. 2, 22, 23.

It will be seen, at once, that this chapter—which, with the whole document, was essentially the handiwork of Richard Mather*—is but the classifying and arranging of those views which, as has been shown, prevailed almost unanimously in

* *The Life and Death of that Reverend Man of God, Mr. Richard Mather*, p. 32. See also the *Magnalia*, Bk. iii., p. 128.

New England up to this date; the only clause where any progress is discernible* being the last of the fifth section, where—perhaps in deference to the “Newbury ministers,” and their friends; perhaps for its effect in Old England; more likely because of some premonitions of a general drift in the public mind at home, for reasons which will hereafter appear—there is an insinuation of some indefinite respect due to the decision of a Synod, over and above the “quantum valet ejus ratio” of Ames and Mather, “for the power whereby they are made, as being an ordinance of God appointed thereunto in his word.”

This Platform in the following year was commended by the Court to “the judicious and pious consideration of the seuerall churches within this jurisdiction, desiring a retourne from them at the next Gennerall Courte how far it is suitable to their judgments and approbation.”† On the 19th June, 1650, the Court order “Forasmuch as (it is said) that some of the churches were ignorant of the said order, and therefore little hath ben done in that particuler, this Courte therefore takeing into consideration how nessesary the perfectting of that worke wil be, and how much it will tend to God’s glory and peace of those churches, doe hereby order, that the sayd booke be duly considered off of all the sayd churches within this pattent, and that they, without fayle, will returne theire thoughts and judgments touchinge the particulars thereof to the next session of this Courte, to the ende that the said worke may be perfected to God’s prayse, and that a copie of this be forthwith sent to every one of the sayd churches.”‡ On the 22d of May, 1651, the Court took further order upon the subject. It appears that “seuerall objections against the said confession of discipline, or seuerall partyculers therein,” had been sent in, whereupon the Court instructed the Secretary to draw

* Some progress is, however, discernible in the last clause of the last chapter of the instrument, (O.xvii., 9), where it is provided that the *civil power* shall be called in “as the matter shall require,” in case of the “schismatical” or “obstinate” and “incorrigible” walking of any church “in any corrupt way of their own, contrary to the rule of the word.”

† *Mass. Col. Rec.*, iii., 178.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 204.

up said objections, and present them to Mr. Cotton within one month, to be communicated to the elders, who were desired to meet and "cleare the sayd doubts, or any other that may be imparted to them by any other person concerning the s'd draught of discipline."* On the 14th October following, the Court took final action, in view of the answer given in by the elders to the difficulties and objections which had been referred to them, saying: "The Court havinge perused, doe thankfully acknowledge theire learned paynes therein, and account themselves called of God (especially at this time when the truth of Christ is so much opposed in the world), to giue their testimony to the said Booke of Discipline, that for the snbstance thereof it is that we haue practiced and doe beleue."†

The names of fourteen dissenters to this vote are endorsed on the margin of the record. Perhaps this intimates fairly the state of the public mind with regard to the Platform. It was, "for the snbstance thereof," generally approved; though some churches delayed assent to it, or endorsed it with a proviso.‡ It became, and to this day remains, in general, "the exponent of the Congregational polity."§

Turning from these enunciations of principle to the practice of New England, it is needful to remember, in the outset, that all which was settled in the beginning was the fundamental principle that churches needing light or peace should seek for it, under God, through communion by council; subordinate principles and details—as to how councils should be called, of whom composed, how managed, &c., &c., being left to the gradual suggestion of experience. The first Ecclesiastical Council ever held on these shores was upon the occasion of the formation of the first church at Salem. Morton describes it:

* *Mass. Col. Rec.*, p. 236.

† *Ibid.*, p. 240.

‡ As late as August 23, 1794, the church at *Hassanimisco* (Grafton), Mass., voted to adopt the Cambridge Platform as its rule of discipline, "excepting the platform's making it necessary to the being of a church that there should be ruling elders, and making lawful or expedient for lay brethren to lay on hands in the ordination of elders." [*Ms. Church Rec.*, Vol. I., p. 89.]

§ *Debates of the National Council*, Boston, 1865, p. xi.

" Mr. Higginson and Mr. Skelton, in pursuance of the ends of their coming over into this Wilderness, acquainted the Governor, Mr. Endicott, and the rest of the godly People whom they found Inhabitants of the place, and the chief of the Passengers that came over with them, with their professed intentions, and consulted with them about settling a Reformed Congregation; from whom they found a general and hearty Concurrence, so that after some Conference together about this matter, they pitched upon the 6th of *August* [1629], for their entering into a solemn Covenant with God, and one another, and also for the Ordaining of their ministers; of which they gave notice to the Church of *Plimouth* (that being the onely Church that was in the Country before them)* the people made choice of Mr. *Skelton* for their Pastor, and Mr. *Higginson* for their Teacher. * * * When the sixth of *August* came, it was kept as a day of Fasting and Prayer, in which after the Sermons and Prayers of the two Ministers, in the end of the day, the foresaid *Confession of Faith and Covenant* being solemnly read, the forenamed persons did solemnly profess their Consent thereunto: and then proceeded to the Ordaining of Mr. *Skelton* Pastor, and Mr. *Higginson* Teacher of the Church there. *Mr. Bradford, the Governour of Plimouth, and some others with him, coming by Sea, were hindred by cross winds that they could not be there at the beginning of the day, but they came into the Assembly afterward, and gave them the right hand of fellowship, wishing all prosperity, and a blessed success unto such good beginnings.*"†

The next church—Mr. Warham's, which, in 1636, removed to Connecticut, and settled Windsor—came to this country, and sat down at Mattapan in an embodied state. The third—the first of Boston (though formed at Charlestown)—was formed at a time and under circumstances which did not favor

* See letter from Mr. Charles Gott to Governor Bradford (of date 30 July, 1629), which may have been the "Letter Missive;" which describes what they have done, and intend to do, and adds: "Now, good Sir, I hope that you and the rest of God's people (who are acquainted with the ways of God) with you, will say that here was a right foundation laid," &c., &c. Gov. Bradford's *Letter-Book*. [1 *Mass. Hist. Coll.*, iii., 68.]

† *New England's Memoriall*, [1st Ed., 1669, 4to. pp. 208,] p. 74.

delay or ceremony, besides that they were (then) scarcely, perhaps, prepared to welcome any assistance in their organization from Plymouth. That which was organized on the same day (30th July, 1630), at Watertown, probably sympathized too strongly with their pastor's theories of independence, to invite any fellowship which required waiting and painstaking. The second instance of the communion of churches by council in New England seems, then, to have occurred at Watertown, 21st July, 1631, when Governor Winthrop, Deputy Governor Dudley, and ruling elder Nowell, went thither to confer with Mr. Phillips and elder Brown, in regard to some opinions promulgated by the latter, which were thought to be dangerously favorable to the Church of Rome. "The matter was debated before many of both congregations, and by the approbation of all the assembly, except three, was concluded an error."* This, however, neither convinced nor silenced Brown, "a man of a very violent spirit;" and, the difficulty continuing, the Court wrote a letter to the church advising them to consider whether Brown ought to be continued in the Eldership. After some weeks the church replied, that, if those objecting would prove their objections, redress should be endeavored. Whereupon, on the 8th December, Winthrop, Dudley, and Nowell repaired again to Watertown, and offered to appear, (1), as the magistrates (their assistance being desired); or, (2), as messengers of the Boston Church; † or, (3), as prosecutors, to prove the objections formerly made. Mr. Phillips desired them to sit as messengers of the Boston Church. "Then the one side, which had first complained, were moved to open their grievances; which they did, to this effect: That they could not communicate with their elder, being guilty of er-

* Winthrop's *Journal*, i., 70.

† It may be urged that these visits of Winthrop, Dudley, and Newell were rather official as magistrates, than as representing the Boston Church, of whose action in the premises, it may be said, there is no proof. But it is clear that if the Boston church had taken no action, they took interest enough in the matter largely to attend, as the "many of both congregations" implies. While Winthrop's offer that they should sit as messengers of the Boston church, and Phillips' acceptance of it, makes the matter look sufficiently like a council, to say the least, for those informal days.

rors, both in judgment and conversation. After much debate of these things, at length they were reconciled, and agreed to seek God in a day of humiliation, and so to have a solemn uniting; each party promising to reform what hath been amiss, &c.; and the pastor gave thanks to God, and the assembly brake up.”*

The first *general* exercise of communion by council seems to have taken place,—in an epistolary form,—3d July, 1632, when the church in Boston wrote letters to the other churches, viz: Plymouth, Salem, Dorchester, and Watertown,†—for their advice in three questions, viz: (1), Whether one person might be a civil magistrate and a ruling elder at the same time? (2), If not, then which should be laid down? (3), Whether there might be divers pastors in the same church? All agreed in answering the first question negatively, and the others doubtfully. On the result of this advice, Mr. Newell, who had been both assistant and ruling elder, resigned the latter position in the church receiving it.‡

A few days later, the matter of the settlement of Thomas Welde, who had arrived by the William and Francis from London on the 5th of the previous month, was referred to the advice of the churches in Boston and Plymouth, and, as the result, he was ordained at Roxbury; a church being organized of settlers who had so far worshipped at Dorchester.§

A similar Council, on a larger scale, including “the ministers and elders of all the churches,” was held 17th September, 1633, to consult and advise as to the best place for Mr. Cotton to labor—who, with Hooker and Stone, had arrived in the Griffin thirteen days before.¶

* Winthrop's *Journal* i., 81. The excitement, however, continued, if it did not increase, till it could be quieted only by displacing Brown from his station in the church; and, consequently, towards the end of the year 1632, he was removed from his office of ruling elder. [Francis' *Hist. Watertown*, p. 19; Bond's *Hist. Watertown*, p. 123.]

† It is possible that the church at Roxbury had been formed so as to be included in this list, but not probable; while Mr. Bachiler's, at Lynn, which had been formed 8th June previous, it is not likely was noticed at this time, as there seems to have been, at Boston, a prejudice against him.

‡ Winthrop's *Journal*, i., 97; Felt's *Ecccl. Hist. N. E.*, i., 159.

§ Winthrop's *Journal*, i., 98.

¶ *Ibid.*, i., 132.

In the November following, a circumstance occurred which sheds light upon the jealousy then existing among the churches here, lest some external jurisdiction should grow up over them, to abridge their liberties. It seems that the ministers in the Bay and vicinity had formed the habit of meeting once a fortnight, in course, at each other's houses, for mutual intercourse and the consideration of topics of common concernment. Samuel Skelton, pastor at Salem, had questioned the wisdom of this course, and being now reënforced by Roger Williams, who had just returned to Salem from his two years' ministry at Plymouth,* though not yet in office at Salem, exception was taken against the practice, "as fearing it might grow in time to a presbytery or superintendency, to the prejudice of the churches' liberties." But Winthrop remarks that "this fear was without cause; for *they were all clear in that point, that no church or person can have power over another church*; neither did they in their meetings exercise any such jurisdiction."†

The elders were often consulted, simply as *amici curiæ*, by the magistrates, and sometimes by the churches. This was not in the nature of a council, but it simply recognized the ministers as individuals of culture and character, whose good judgment was specially desired. Thus all the elders of the Bay colony, except Mr. Ward of Ipswich, convened in Boston, 19th January, 1634-5, at the request of the Governor and Assistants, to give the Court their advice, (1), as to what ought to be done if, according to the new Laudian scheme, a general Governor should be sent over from England; and, (2), whether the scruples of Endicott and others at Salem, about the red cross in the flag, were well founded.‡

We think the first Council called to advise in a case of church difficulty, which met and acted much after the manner now common, was held at Sagus (Lynn), 15th March, 1635, where Mr. Stephen Bachiler had been pastor since, on the 8th June, 1632, he had formed a church, beginning with six

* *Publications of the Narragansett Club*, i., 18.

† *Winthrop's Journal*, i., 139.

‡ *Ibid.*, i., 183.

members, without consultation with the other churches, or with the Court. Some of the members, not liking him, were subsequently led to make a question whether they were a church or not, and withdrew from communion. He with the other brethren desired the advice and help of the rest of the churches, to be given by letter. They, seeing the infelicity, if not impossibility, of judging the case fairly as proposed, desired to hear the other side, and offered to go to Sagus, and there hold an impartial investigation. Mr. Bachiller, apparently averse to this, required the aggrieved to present a written statement of their grievances; which they declined to do. Whereupon Mr. Bachiller wrote to the churches that, on this refusal, he and his church proposed to excommunicate the separated members, and they might "stay their journey." But, as Winthrop says: "The letter being read at a lecture at Boston (where some of the elders of every church were present), they all agreed (with consent of their churches) to go presently to Sagus, to stay this hasty proceeding."* The thing issued well. "Being met, and both parties (after much debate) being heard, it was agreed, that they were a true church, though not constituted, at first, in due order, yet after consent and practice of a church estate had supplied that defect; and so all were reconciled."†

Whether this Sagus matter was the moving cause, or not, does not appear. but almost contemporaneous with it, we find the following order of the General Court: "This Court doeth intreate of the elders and brethren of every church within this jurisdic'n, that they will consult and advise of one vniforme order of dissipline in the churches, agreeable to the Scriptures, and then to consider howe farr the magistrates are bound to interpose for the preservacion of that vniformity and peace of the churches."‡

This latter clause suggests one of the greatest practical perplexities which, from the very outset of their settlement, beset

* Winthrop's *Journal*, i., 187.

† It happened then as it has happened since, that the parties didn't stay reconciled. The difficulties, which were only scotched, revived, and raged until Mr. B. asked, and received, a dismission. [Newhall's *Lynn*, p. 148.]

‡ *Mass. Col. Rec.* i., 142.

our fathers. Beginning here preëminently as Christians, seeking asylum from a persecution intolerable at home, and in that capacity crystallizing into churches at local convenience, on arriving; the problem which they had to solve was how to evolve a State from the Church, and how to manage the connection during gestation, and until Providence should cut the umbilical cord, so as to be just to both. Winthrop said to Vane: "Whereas the way of God hath alwayes beene to gather his churches out of the world; now the world, or civill state, must be raised out of the churches."* The first step in this direction was taken on the 11-21 November, 1620, in the cabin of the *Mayflower*, riding at anchor in Provincetown harbor, when the forty-one adult males of her company agreed together to become "a civill body politike," and "by vertue hereof to enact, constitute, and frame such iust and equall Lawes, Ordinances, acts, constitutions, and offices, from time to time, as shall be thought most meet and convenient for the generall good of the Colony," unto which they promised "all due submission and obedience."† These forty-one were not all members of the Scrooby-Leyden-Plymouth Church; but the majority of them were. And herein that superior tolerance and breadth of view which always marked the Plymouth Colony, as compared with its richer and more powerful neighbors here, appears. When the records of "The Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England" begin, on this side the sea, to take shape as "the Records of the Colony," the first entry at the first meeting, "att Charlton, Aug. 23, Ano. D'm., 1630," was: "It was propounded how the ministers should be mayntayned."‡ And as soon as time and opportunity were afforded to consider well how the foundations of the State should be laid, we find the enactment: "To the end the body of the commons may be preserued of honest and good men, it was likewise ordered and agreed that for time to come noe man shalbe admitted to the freedome of this body polliticke, but such as are members of some of the churches within the

* See *North American Review*, lxxxiv., p. 458.

† *Mourt's Relation*, p. 8.

‡ *Mass. Col. Rec.*, i., 78.

lymitts of the same.”* It was their object to establish here a Christian nation, and it seemed to them that the only safe way of procedure toward that end was to require the men who should be directly concerned in the work to be, themselves, Christians. Their local church democracies gradually suggested, and grew into, those town democracies which are the peculiarity, as they are the glory, of New England.† The elders—and there remains precedent for it to this day in the Fatherland, in the seats which the bishops, as such, hold in the House of Lords—who were chiefly influential in the church by virtue of office as well as culture, it was inevitable should be consulted perpetually by the State, in virtue of their culture, in spite of their office. And when anything went wrong in any church, it was the most natural of all expedients to move toward calling in the notice, admonition and even constraint of that civil power, which, in their theory, existed mainly for the sake of the churches. Some of the questions which thrust themselves earliest upon their thought were—whether the general good would permit the principle that any company of people who might desire to do so could sit down upon any vacant place of their choice in the colonies, and covenant themselves into a church by independent act? Whether the other churches had not a right, indirectly through the Court, to require such persons to take previous counsel as to the wisdom of such a procedure? Whether the magistrates had not the power and duty of intervention when obvious and damaging irregularities were taking place in any church? Whether the magistrates had not the power and duty of calling the churches to meet in Synod, when any subjects affecting the general welfare were clamoring for decision, &c., &c. No calm reflection cognizant of the circumstances, can fail to see that these problems, as population grew and interests became complex, must meet them at every turn; and must endanger the consistency both of church and State, so long as both were in the mere gristle of experiment, and were so intimately joined.‡

* *Mass. Col. Rec.*, i., 87.

† Baylies's *Memoir of Plymouth Colony*, i., 241.

‡ “Here, in these first developments of republicanism, we find the solution of

The case of Roger Williams illustrates their practical perplexity on these points, at almost every step. Some of his opinions were thought to be so radically erroneous as to endanger the very foundations of the civil government, as well as to imperil the general piety; yet the majority of the Salem Church upheld him, so that it seemed to be impossible congregationally to reach him. The Governor and Assistants sent for him and labored with him for having taught publicly that the magistrate had no right to put an unregenerate man under oath, because it was causing him "to take the name of God in vain." They called in the elders, who "clearly confuted" his position, and convinced Endicott, who had shared Williams's notion. But, three months afterwards, they felt obliged to summon Williams again. He had been teaching, (1) that the magistrates had no right to punish "for breach of the first table," except the civil peace were disturbed; (2) that they had no right to put an unregenerate man under oath; (3) that a regenerate man had no right to pray with his unregenerate family; (4) that a Christian ought not to give thanks after meat. For these errors, the other churches were just commencing labor with the Salem Church, when that church invited him, so teaching, to become their teacher. The Court were at a loss what to do. They sent out for the elders. Much debate ensued. All—magistrates and ministers—adjudged these opinions "erroneous and very dangerous, and the calling him to office at such a time, a great contempt of authority." The elders advised the Court that "he who should obstinately maintain such opinions (whereby a church might run into heresy, apostacy, or tyranny, and yet the civil magistrate could not intermeddle) were to be removed," and that the

a vexed point in our early legislation—the strange confusion, as it strikes many, of things sacred and things secular, which has given rise to so many bitter sarcasms against our fathers, for attempting to unite Church and State. * * * It was not the Church allying itself to the State, but a *State growing out of the Church*, which occasioned the seeming jumble of ecclesiastical and civil affairs—a condition of things almost inevitable while the great interests of religion, as centered in the church, were about the only subjects requiring legislation; and while the State, as such, was in its non-age." [Clark's *Congregational Churches of Massachusetts*, p. 18.]

other churches ought to request the magistrate to do it.* Action was however delayed, in hope of his changing his course. Soon after, in the name of the Salem Church, he wrote letters to the other churches, laboring with them to admonish the magistrates because the Court had refused them the favor of some land at Marblehead, in consequence of their contumacy about Mr. Williams. Williams next wrote a letter to his own church, saying that he could no longer commune with the churches of the Bay, nor with his own church, unless they too would withdraw from all. On their declining to do this, he withdrew from them. In October, the Court again sent for him, and, all the elders of the Bay being gathered for counsel, he was labored with for his course, in connection with these two letters, but justified himself and wanted to debate the matter. Hooker was appointed to argue with him, but "could not reduce him from any of his errors." It being obvious that he *would* not stay among them without constantly intermeddling with their civil, as well as religious affairs, in what seemed to them a disorganizing way, he was finally sentenced—all the elders but one approving—to depart from the jurisdiction within six weeks.† At his request he was allowed to stay until Spring, on condition that he would not meanwhile spread his notions. In January, however, the Court were notified that, notwithstanding the understanding on which he had been permitted to remain, he was gathering assemblies at his house, preaching to them even on the forbidden topics, and making arrangements to plant a colony on that faith in Narragansett Bay. They accordingly determined to send him to England in a ship then ready to sail. But on summoning him, he returned word that he "could not come without hazard of his life." They dispatched a pinnace to apprehend and take him to the ship lying at Nantasket, when it was found that he had been three days gone—whither, they could not learn; as the event proved, gone to found the colony of Rhode Island.‡

The first instance, of which we have record, of the refusal of a Council to recommend the action proposed by the parties calling it, and the staying of such action in consequence, took

* Winthrop's *Journal*, i., 188, 194.

† *Ibid.*, p. 204.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 209.

place at Dorchester, 1st April, 1636. Warham and the greater portion of the original church having removed thence to Windsor, Conn., Richard Mather and others proposed to form a new church there; desiring the approbation of the other churches and of the magistrates.* The Council met, but, on examination of the candidates, with the exception of Mr. Mather and one other, it was feared that, although they were orthodox in their confession of faith, they were unsound in their religious experience. Some rested their faith that they were Christians "upon dreams, and ravishes of spirit by fits;" others, "upon the reformation of their lives;" others, "upon duties and performances;" whereby the Council apprehended them to be wrong in these three particulars:—(1) that they did not hate sin because it was filthy, but left it because it was hurtful; (2) that they had made use of Christ only to help the imperfection of their sanctification and duties, and not to make him their sanctification, &c.; (3) that they expected to believe by some power of their own, and not only and wholly from Christ. The Council accordingly judged

* The Court had just (8d March, 1635-6) passed the following order:—"Forasmuch as it hath bene found by sad experience, that much trouble and disturbance hath happened both to the church and civill state by the officers and members of some churches, which have bene gathered within the limitts of this jurisdiction in an vndue manner, and not with such publique approbacion as were meete, it is therefore ordered that all persons are to take notice that this Court doeth not, nor will hereafter, approve of any such companyes of men as shall henceforth joyne in any pretended way of church fellowship, without they shall first acquainte the magistrates, and the elders of the greater parte of the churches in this jurisdiction, with their intencions, and have their approbacion herein. And further, it is ordered, that noe person, being a member of any church which shall hereafter be gathered without the approbacion of the magistrates, and the greater parte of the said churches, shalbe admitted to the freedome of this commonwealthe." [*Mass. Col. Rec.*, i., 168.] But this was, in 1638, explained thus to the Dedham Church, who objected to it: "Y^t y^e Court, or law, did no way intend to abridge such a liberty of gathering into church fellowship privately, as if it were unlawful, or as if such a church were not a true church rightly gathered; but y^e scope was this—y^t if any people of unsound judgment, or erroneous way, &c., should privately sett up a church amongst them, y^e commonwealth could not so approve them as to communicate that freedome and other priviledges unto them which they did unto others, or protect them in their government, if they saw their way dangerous to y^e publicke peace, &c. [*Felt's Eccl. Hist. N. E.* i., 369.]

them "not meet, at present, to be the foundation of a Church—and thereupon they were content to forbear to join till further consideration."* On the 23d of August following, the Council met again, and the Church was organized, and Mr. Mather ordained their Teacher.†

The first Council which, after discussion, put on record any *dictum* in the way of the establishment of a general principle for the subsequent guidance of the churches, appears to have been that called 6th April, 1637, at Newtown (Cambridge) by the church at Concord‡ for ordination of Peter Bulkley as their teacher, and John Jones as their pastor. A delegate from the church in Salem raised questions which were decided as follows: (1) that such as had been ministers in England were lawful ministers by the call of the people there, notwithstanding their acceptance of the call of the Bishops (but being come hither, they accounted themselves no ministers until called to another church); (2) that, upon election, they were ministers before they were solemnly ordained.§

The first General Synod held in New England met at Cambridge, to consider the doctrinal troubles growing out of Mrs. Hutchinson's "Antinomianism," 30th August, 1637, and sat three weeks. It was not called by the Court; although the Court which met on the 5th September was adjourned to the 19th, "because of the synode kept at New-towne for the settling of things in difference amongst vs";¶ and the charges of entertainment, and of the travel of the Connecticut members, were borne by the Massachusetts Colony. Cotton's account is: "with consent of the Magistrates, a time, and place, was appointed for a Synodical meeting, and sundry Elders were sent for, from other jurisdic-

* Winthrop's *Journal*, i., 219.

† On the 8th November subsequent, nearly the same difficulty happened at Sagus (Lynn) where, after two days' discussion, "six, with Mr. Whiting, the pastor," were accepted, "but with much ado," by the Council. [Winthrop's *Journal*, i., 243.]

‡ The church had been gathered—the magistrates declining to attend, because they thought they had not been invited with sufficient courtesy—5th July of the previous year. [*Ibid.*, p. 225.]

§ *Ibid.*, p. 259.

¶ *Mass. Col. Rec.*, i., 202.

tions, and messengers from all the Churches in the Country to assist in this worke."* Johnson says: "where was present about twenty-five Reverend and godly Ministers of Christ, besides many other gracious, y eminent servants of his."† Weld says Mr. Hooker and Mr. Bulkley were moderators; that the magistrates were present all the time, as hearers and as speakers when they saw fit, but not as members; and that the "Opinionists" were welcomed to come in and "take liberty of speech." The first week was spent in drawing up the specifications of eighty-two errors which "were found to have been brought into New England, and spread under-hand there," with a few lines of confutation of each. The other two weeks were "spent in a plaine Syllogisticall dispute (*ad vulgus* as much as might be) gathering up nine of the chiefest points (on which the rest depended) and disputing of them all in order, *pro* and *con*."‡ "In the forenoones," says Weld, "we framed our arguments, and in the afternoones produced them in publick, and next day the Adversary gave in their answers, and produced also their arguments on the same questions; then we answered them, and replied also upon them the next day."§ The issue appears to have hardened the errorists, but to have checked the wavering, and enlightened the general mind. Still, the event proved that even the Synod did not avail to stay the evil. The offenders persisted "not onely to disturb the Churches, but miserably to interrupt the civill Peace" and raise sedition, until the magistrates took hold of the matter,—“for these grounds named, and not for their opinions,”||—and disfranchised some, fined some, and banished the incurable.

* *Way of Cong. Churches Cleared*, p. 40.

† *Wonder-working Providence*, [2 *Mass. Hist. Coll.*, vii., 1].

‡ Some of the messengers of the Boston Church retired from the Synod during its progress, because they felt constrained to object to some of its positions; while Cotton protested that for them to do so would be to "father upon Boston" the errors with which they sympathized, so far, at least, as not to be ready to condemn them. He told them they knew those points must come before the Synod, and they should have notified the church, when they were elected, of their position in regard to them. [*Way Cleared*, &c., pp. 47, 48.]

§ *A Short Story of the Rise, Reign, and Ruine of the Antinomians, &c., &c.* (A. D. 1644.) Preface, p. 10.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 11.

At the close of this Synod's session Gov. Winthrop proposed, that, as they had enjoyed so much together and apparently done so much good, they should "have the like meeting once a year, or at least the next year, to settle what yet remained to be agreed, or if but to nourish love, &c." But there was too much pure Congregationalism present to welcome such a suggestion, even from so honored a source. "It was not thought fit to conclude it."*

A Council to heal divisions caused by misunderstandings between the two ministers which were usual in the same church, in those days, was held at Dorchester, 2 Feb., 1640-1; where Richard Mather and Jonathan Burr were at issue. Burr had been suspected of "familism," and the church, desiring satisfaction, requested Mather and him to confer, and together explain the matter to them. Mather reports to the church a list of Burr's errors. Burr disclaims them. Mather retorts by maintaining them from his colleague's writings. The church get divided, heated, and alienated, and finally call in the help of the Governor (Dudley) and Winthrop, with ten neighboring elders. They spend four days in the hearing, when they decide that Burr had used erroneous and inconsiderate language, and Mather had been too fast and earnest in condemning him for the same; "upon this Mr. Mather and Mr. Burr took the blame of their failings upon themselves, and freely submitted to the judgment and advice given, to which the rest of the church yielded a silent assent, and God was much glorified in the close thereof."†

In 1641, the "Body of Liberties," drawn up by Nathaniel Ward of Ipswich, was adopted—having been previously copied and sent round for the approval of the freemen; being the first code of laws established in New England. The 95th clause is "a Declaration of the Liberties the Lord Jesus hath given to the Churches." This contains eleven sections. The seventh section authorizes monthly or quarterly ministers' meetings for conference and consultation. The eleventh, is as follows:—"For the preventing and removeing of errour and offence that may grow and spread in any of the Churches of this Jurisdiction,

* Winthrop's *Journal*, i., 287.† *Ibid.*, ii., 28.

and for the preserving of trueith and peace in the severall churches within themselves, and for the maintenance and exercise of brotherly communion, amongst all the churches in the Countrie, It is allowed and ratified, by the Authoritie of this Generall Court, as a lawfull libertie of the Churches of Christ: That once in every month of the year (when the season will beare it,) It shall be lawfull for the minesters and Elders of the Churches neere adjoyneing together, with any other of the bretheren, with the consent of the churches, to assemble by course in each severall Church one after an other. To the intent, after the preaching of the word by such a minister as shall be requested thereto by the Elders of the church where the assembly is held, the rest of the day may be spent in publique Christian Conference about the discussing and resolving of any such doubts and cases of conscience concerning matter of doctrine, or worship, or government of the church as shall be propounded by any of the Bretheren of that church, with leave also to any other Brother to propound his objections or answeres for further satisfaction according to the word of god. Provided that the whole action be guided and moderated by the Elders of the Church where the Assemblie is helde, or by such others as they shall appoint. *And that no thing be concluded and imposed by way of Authoritie from one or more churches upon an other, but onely by way of Brotherly conference and consultation.* That the trueth may be searched out to the satisfying of every mans conscience in the sight of god according to his worde. And because such an Assembly and the worke thereof can not be duely attended to if other lectures be held in the same weeke; It is therefore agreed, *with the consent of the churches,* That in that weeke when such an Assembly is held, All the lectures in all the neighbouring Churches for that weeke shall be forborne. That so the publique service of Christ in this more solemn Assembly may be transacted with greater deligence and attention.”*

In this suggestion of the lawfulness and expediency of frequent and regular church conference in this manner there is a

* See the “Liberties,” [3 *Mass. Hist. Coll.*, viii., 191—237.] See also *Mass. Col. Rec.*, i., 340, 344, 346.

trace of the semi-Presbyterian tendency which existed in some leading minds; while the sentences which are italicised bring out into sharp contrast the prevalent feeling of the independency of all local churches of all *control*, save that of Christ.

Nearly contemporaneous with this, though perhaps a little later in its date of authorship, is another document interesting for its testimony on this subject. It is the *Modell of Church and Civill Power*, which Roger Williams comments upon in his *Bloody Tenent*. He ascribed it to Mr. Cotton. Mr. Cotton denied the authorship: "that Modell was drawn up by some other fellow-Brethren, but not by me." * He elsewhere indicates that several of the ministers of the Colony had a hand in its composition.† The thirteenth head of this *Modell* refers to such public assemblies of the churches, as the *Body of Liberties* contemplates. It takes the ground that the churches have *power* to assemble and continue such assemblies without, or even against, the consent of the magistrate; that in corrupt times the magistrate should assemble a Synod for reformation; that in reformed times he should give liberty to the churches to assemble at their own judgment; and it suggests that monthly meetings of some of the elders and messengers and annual meetings of all the elders and messengers may be well, but that "*the end of this assembly be to do nothing by way of authority, but by way of counsel, as the need of churches shall require, * * * leaving the determination of all things to particular churches within themselves, who are to judge and so to receive all doctrines and directions agreeing only with the word of God.*"‡ Williams argues against such meetings, and acutely suggests that the reason why "these worthy men" refer all matters back to the local church, after all, for final decision, doubtless is, "there is a strong conviction in their souls of a professed promised presence of the Lord Jesus in the midst of *his church*, gathered after his mind and will, more than unto such kind of assemblies, though consisting of far more able persons, even the flower and cream of all the churches." §

* *Bloody Tenent Washed, &c.*, p. 150.

† *Ibid.*, p. 192.

‡ *Bloody Tenent*, [Hansard Knollys' Society Edit.,] p. 333.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 347.

Thomas Lechford went home to England in 1641, and published his *Plain Dealing* in 1642. Being a lawyer, and an Episcopalian, he is, perhaps, a witness whose testimony has special value, making due allowance for his not unnatural prejudices. It will be seen that he takes advantage of some events which had then recently occurred, to advance conclusions which would not receive general assent. He says: "Every Church hath power of government in and by it selfe; and no Church, or Officers, have power over one another but by way of advice or counsaile, voluntarily given or besought, saving that the generall Court, now and then, over-rule some Church matters: and of late, divers of the Ministerie have had set meetings to order Church matters; whereby it is conceived they bend towards Presbyterian rule." * And again: "Some of the learnedest, and godliest in the Bay, begin to understand Governments; that it is necessary, when Ministers or People fall out, to send other Ministers, or they voluntarily to goe among them, to seek by all good wayes and meanes to appease them. [He then refers to Hugh Peter's going to *Pascattaqua*,† and Wilson's going to Green's harbor,‡ and Wilson, Mather, and others going to Taunton,§ to endeavor to settle church quarrels.] It may be, it will be said, they did these things by way of love, and friendly advise: Grant that; But were not the counselled bound to receive good counsell? If they would not receive it, was not the Magistrate ready to *assist*, and in a manner ready, according to duty, to *enforce* peace and obedience?" |

A Council, the forerunner of many melancholy ones since called, was held at Concord, 28th July, 1642, to consider what action ought to be taken by that church in view of their inability to support the gospel. They had a pastor and a teacher, and not having been pecuniarily as successful as had been expected in the outset of the settlement, they found the maintenance of the two "too heavy a burden for them." The Council

* *Plain Dealing: or, Newses from New England*, p. 14.

† See Winthrop's *Journal*, ii, 84.

‡ See Trumbull's ed., of *Lechford*, (1867), p. 125.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 126.

| *Plain Dealing*, pp. 53, 54.

advised them to "continue and wait upon God, and be helpful to their elders in labor, and what they could;" and "that the elders should be content with what means the church was able at present to afford them, and if either of them should be called to some other place, then to advise with other churches about removal." *

The second general Synod was held at Cambridge, 4th Sept., 1643; at which all the elders of the colonies (about fifty in all) were present, with such ruling elders as desired to sit with them. Cotton and Hooker were moderators. "They sat in the college, and had their diet there after the manner of scholars' commons, but somewhat better, yet so ordered as it came not to above sixpence the meal for a person." † The main object of the assembling seems to have been to consider and discuss the aims and theories of Parker, Noyes, and the few who sympathized with them in the attempt "to set up presbyterian government under the authority of the assembly at Westminster." ‡ Winthrop wrote of the result to Hugh Peter: "the way of our Churches was approved, and the Presbytery disallowed;" § and one of the members wrote to a minister in Old England, that it was a part of its judgment: "that consociation of Churches, in way of more general meetings, yearly; and more private, monethly or quarterly; as *Consultative* Synods, are very comfortable, and necessary for the peace and good of the Churches." ¶ Winthrop adds, in his *Journal*: "The assembly concluded against some parts of the presbyterial way, and the Newbury ministers took time to consider the arguments, &c." ¶ Parker's view of the subject comes out in a letter which he wrote, 17th Dec. following, to a member of the Westminster assembly. He says: "My cousin Noyse and myself judge that the ordinary exercise of government must be so in the presbyters as not to depend upon the expresse votes and suffrages of the people. There hath been a convent

* Winthrop's *Journal*, ii, 83.

† *Ibid.*, ii., 165.

‡ Hutchinson's *Hist. Mass.*, i., 112.

§ *Reply of Two Brethren to A. S., &c.*, (A. D. 1644, 4to, pp. 112), p. 7.

¶ *Ibid.*

¶ Vol. ii., 165.

or meeting of the ministers in these parts, about this question, at Cambridge, in the Bay, and there wee have proposed our arguments and answered theirs, and they proposed theirs and answered ours; and so the point is left to consideration." *

The third General Synod—if it did not fail to earn that name through the absence of messengers from the churches other than their pastors and teachers—was held at Cambridge, 1st July, 1645; and was attended by all the elders of the United Colonies. The need of it arose from the fact that many books had been sent over from England urging Presbyterian government, or, in some form, maligning the Congregational way; and it was felt that some well considered reply to them ought to be made. Hooker's *Survey*, and Davenport's *Power of Congregational Churches, &c.*, were read, perfected, and agreed upon to be sent over to England, to be printed there.†

This brings us down to the days of the Synod which matured the *Cambridge Platform*. The first motion toward this seems to have been made by the Commissioners of the United Colonies, at their meeting at Hartford, 5th Sept., 1644, on the suggestion of a letter from Governor Endicott. They proposed to the elders there present, "whether the Elders may not be intreated seriously to consider of some confession of doctrine and discipline, w^h solid grounds to be approved by the Churches, and published by consent (till further light) for the confirmeing y^e weake among our selues, and stoping the mouths of adversaries abroad."‡ The Commissioners readily entertained the motion, thankfully acknowledged the intent toward the public good, and promised to use their best diligence to further the suggestion, "as God shall gine a fitt season." Not, however, until 15th May, 1646, did the Court of Massachusetts take action. Then it requested the churches in the United Colonies to send their elders and messengers to meet at Cambridge on 1st Sept. following, "there to discusse, dispute, and cleare up, by the word of God, such questions of church government and discipline as they shall thinke needfull and meete, &c.;" § the

* Felt's *Ecc. Hist. New Eng.*, i., 494.

† Winthrop's *Journal*, ii., 304.

‡ *Acts of the Commissioners of the Unit. Col.*, i., 28.

§ *Mass. Col. Rec.*, ii., 155.

churches who should send elders to bear the expense of the same. A jealousy soon manifested itself upon two points, viz.: lest the civil authority had gone too far toward requiring the churches to send to this Synod; and lest the churches should be compelled to practice what the Synod might recommend. Mr. Felt justly says of this manifested jealousy, "here we have another marked expression of the popular wish to have the church treated and considered as independent of civil power, and also for ecclesiastical councils to be accounted as advisory, and not commandatory."* This jealousy was so decided that some churches at first refused to send; and the church in Boston did not, until Norton persuaded them distinctly that the power of Synods was only consultative and not coactive. The Synod met 1st September, continued together a fortnight, and adjourned to the eighth of the next June. They seem not to have got much beyond preliminaries at this session; most of which appears to have been spent upon the questions raised by the popular feeling:—(1) as to the power of the magistrate in matters of "the first table;" (2) as to the nature and power of Synods. A Result of this discussion, "drawn up by some of the members of assembly deputed thereto," was read and agreed upon "thus farre only, that they should be commended unto more serious consideration against the next meeting."† This "Result" is explicit in stating its doctrine: "the judgement of a Synod is in some respect superior, in some respect inferior to the judgment of a particular Church; it is superior in respect of direction; inferior in respect of *jurisdiction, which it hath none.*"‡ The next meeting was broken up prematurely by a sudden sickness, so that their real work was mainly done at their third convention, beginning 15th Aug. 1648, when "they went on comfortably," drawing up their discipline "according to the general practice" of the churches, and "so ended in less than fourteen days."§ Governor Bradford was a member of this body, as a messenger from the church in Plymouth. |

* *Eccles. Hist. New Eng.*, i., 574.

† *The Result of a Synod at Cambridge, in New England, A. D. 1648, &c., &c.*, London [1675, 16mo., pp. 75], p. 1.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

§ Winthrop's *Journal*, ii., 408.

| Felt's *Eccles. Hist. New Eng.*, i., 605.

Three important Synods were held, since that which originated the Cambridge Platform, in the earlier days of New England; and two have had a place in the present generation.

That of 1662 was confined to Massachusetts. It grew out of the Hartford troubles, the result of a Council suggested in consequence, a general restiveness under the existent close restrictions of church privileges at a time when those privileges involved civil prerogatives, and a judgment on the part of some influential men that various threatening aspects demanded a closer consolidation of the churches.* It met at Boston 10th March, 1662; was composed of about thirty elders, and about forty messengers; was presided over by "several successive moderators,"† one of whom, it is said, was Samuel Whiting;‡ adjourned, after a fortnight's session, to June, and again to September, when it reached its result;—recommending the ever-to-be-lamented half way covenant—by which persons baptized in infancy should be allowed, if not scandalous in life, to "own the covenant" without coming into full communion, and so gain a *quasi* church membership, with baptism, for their children; and endorsing—perhaps emphasizing—the Cambridge Platform in its doctrine of the consociation of churches. This result was strongly and ably opposed, and was never universally accepted; but was permitted, in the Providence of God, to do vast harm; largely generating, beyond question, the Unitarianism of the present century.

The Synod of 1679–80, was also a Massachusetts assemblage. It met at Boston, 10th September, 1679, to consider "what are the evils that have provoked the Lord to bring his judgments on New England? and, What is to be done, that so those evils may be reformed?"§ Rev. John Sherman and Rev. Urian Oakes were moderators. Some time was spent in preliminary discussion, growing out of the fact that some of the churches had refused to send messengers with their elders.¶ After full

* See this Synod discussed at large, in the *Congregational Quarterly*, iv., 268–291.

† Mather's *Magnalia*, Book v., p. 64.

‡ Drake's *History of Boston*, i., 362.

§ *Mass. Col. Rec.*, v., 216.

¶ See as to this Synod, the *Magnalia*, Book v., 85–98; and Hubbard's *Gen. Hist. New Eng.*, 621–623.

discussion, the Synod specified the decay of godliness, pride, neglect of church fellowship and ordinances, profaneness, sabbath-breaking, neglect of family discipline, inordinate passions, intemperance, promise-breaking, worldliness, opposition to needed reforms, want of public spirit, and sins against the Gospel as the prominent existing evils; and suggested, towards their removal, that public men seek to be exemplary in life, that the Platform be reaffirmed, that none be admitted to the Lord's Supper without public profession of faith and repentance, that church discipline be put into more active exercise, that the tendency "to have only one teaching Officer, for the Burden of the whole Congregation to lye upon," be corrected by the reintroduction of more elders, that the magistrate take care that elders have due maintenance, that the due establishment and execution of wholesome laws be made a matter of more care, that the churches renew their covenant with special endeavor to antidote these sins of the time, that schools of learning receive more encouragement, and that all cry mightily to God for the outpouring of his Spirit. The Synod met again 12th May, 1680, in furtherance of one of their own recommendations,—Increase Mather, moderator; adopted, with a few verbal changes, the Savoy version of the Westminster Confession of Faith; reaffirmed the Cambridge Platform, and dissolved.*

The Saybrook Synod† was confined to the Connecticut churches; was called by the Legislature in consequence of the action of a previous Council which had been convened at the suggestion of the trustees of Yale College, and in furtherance of a quite general sentiment which had grown up in Connecticut in favor of a closer union of the churches; met 9th Sept., 1708; was composed of "two or more" delegates each from County Councils of elders and messengers from the local churches, making twelve elders and four messengers—sixteen members in all; had Rev. James Noyes and Rev. Thomas Buckingham for moderators, and the Revs. Stephen Mix and John Woodward for scribes; endorsed the Boston-Savoy-Westminster Confession of Faith, adopted the "Heads of Agreement assented to by the united ministers, formerly called Presby-

* See *Magnalia*, Book v., 4.

† See Trumbull's *Hist. Conn.*, i., 478—488. See also Dr. Bacon's *Historical Discourse* at Norwich in 1859, [*Contributions to Eccl. Hist. Conn.*, 33—46.]

terian and Congregational,"* to "be observed by the churches throughout this colony;" and then unanimously agreed upon fifteen articles "for the better regulation of the administration of church discipline." These are, for substance, as follows:— (1) that the *elders* should exercise discipline, *with the consent of the brethren*, taking advice of neighbor elders, in difficult cases, before censure; (2) that the churches of a County should consociate for mutual ecclesiastical assistance; (3) that cases of scandal should be referred to a Council of the elders (and messengers, if the churches see fit to send them) of such a consociation; (4) that no act of such a consociation be valid with which *the major part of the elders* present do not concur, with messengers enough to make a majority; (5) that the decision of such consociation be final," and "all parties therein concerned shall sit down and be determined thereby;" the consociation to see their judgment executed "in such way or manner, as shall in their judgment, be most suitable and agreeable to the word of God;" (6) that any pastor and church refusing attendance and obedience, be dealt with by non-communication, which the churches "are to approve" and act upon; (7) provides for a fuller Council by calling in the nearest consociation to act conjointly, when the consociation "see cause," which double consociation shall "finally issue such case;" (8) cuts off an offending brother from calling the consociation to hear his case before he is finally dealt with by the church, except "with the consent of the church;" (9) provides for the choice of standing members of these standing Councils; (10) provides for the formation of these proposed consociations, &c.; (11) adjudges "guilty of scandalous contempt," parties to, or witnesses before a consociation who shall fail to appear; (12) provides for County associations of teaching elders, to meet at least twice a year, to consider and resolve cases of importance, and examine and recommend candidates for the ministry; (13) provides for the proceeding by these associations against pastors accused of scandal or heresy; (14) orders that "bereaved churches" shall consult these associations, who shall recommend candidates to their vacant pulpits, and that the associa-

* Adopted in England in 1692. They are given in the *Magnalia*, Book v., 59.

tions shall complain to the "General Assembly of the Colony" of such churches who do not "seasonably call and settle" such nominees; (15) provides for the union of all these County associations in a General Association meeting "once a year." These doings were endorsed by the General Court, the next month, who "ordained" this result for all the churches, with the proviso that any church "soberly differing," should be "allowed to exercise worship and discipline" in their own way, according to their consciences. Some of the churches were bitterly opposed to this "veiled Presbyterianism,"* and many never adopted it, while some of those who did so, did it by "softening down the more rigid articles by construing them agreeably to those Heads of Union," whose observance the Synod had also agreed to, and which did not compel the acceptance of results of Councils, but merely consented that churches, and elders, and members "ought to have a reverential regard to their judgment, so given, and *not dissent therefrom without apparent Grounds from the Word of God.*"†

The Synod at Albany,‡ which met 5th October, 1852, and was presided over by the late lamented Dr. Wm. T. Dwight; and that at Boston,§ which met 14th June, 1865, and was presided over by the excellent Governor Buckingham, assisted by Hon. C. G. Hammond and Dr. J. P. Thompson, are too fresh in the general memory to require special mention here.

Returning from this digression respecting those larger Councils upon subjects of general interest and consequence, to which the name of Synod, in its Congregational sense, appropriately belongs, to the matter of ordinary church communion by Council in New England, where this sketch has left it, at the date of the general settling down upon the principles of the Cambridge Platform with regard to it; we are reminded, by the length to which this paper has already grown, that any minute history of the manner of such communion from that time to the present, is here impossible. Such a history would be of great interest, and not without suggestions of eminent value.

* Lealey's *Address to Suffolk North Association*, p. 43.

† *Magnalia*, Book v., 61.

‡ See *Proceedings, &c., &c.*, New York, 1852, 8vo., pp. 95.

§ See *Debates and Proceedings, &c., &c.*, Boston, 1866, 8vo., pp. 520.

By years of research the writer has succeeded in gathering together, by transcript from ancient church records, as well as by collection from the haunts of old pamphlets and the hands of sympathizing friends, say five hundred of the "Results" of such Councils; so various in date as amply to illustrate nearly every decade from 1629 to the present. And some day he hopes, God willing, to make this collection of the Christian thought and Ecclesiastical judgment of the past upon a vast variety of practical topics, tributary, in some way, to the benefit of the present, and the security of the future. But all which can be attempted in the way of conclusion of this Article is the most rapid glance possible at the most prominent facts which tend to illustrate the general position of the mind of New England Congregationalism upon this subject, for the last two hundred years.

It is clear that as disorders increased in the Colonies, by the influx of irreligious emigrants, and the growing up of a generation, lacking, more than its predecessors had lacked, the power of godliness, some prominent minds turned with hope toward the idea of a greater severity in government, and a tighter rein upon the churches, for relief. There is some evidence that John Cotton, toward the last of his life, looked with more favor upon the notion of stated councils than he had done before. Two years previous to his death, in giving the right hand of fellowship to Mitchell at Cambridge, he "seriously advised him to endeavour that that Ordinance of Consociation of Churches might be duly practised, greatly bewailing the defect of these Churches, as to that particular." * And he drew up ten propositions, which he left in his study at his decease, in which he sketched a plan for such assemblies.† But even in these he is careful to guard the rights of the local churches, and only claims that results of Council should "be received with all due respect according to God." That he never became a Presbyterian, in this particular, is evident from *Certain Queries tending to Accommodation between the Presbyterian and Congregationall Churches* which, just before his death, he sent over to Thomas

* *The First Principles of New England Concerning the subject of Baptisme and Communion of Churches* (1675), p. 28.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 28—29.

Allen, and which Allen printed in 1654; in which (a part of the fourth querie) he proposes to the Presbyterians, if it would not be well, "if their Elders in the Classis did put forth no Authoritative Act, touching the Members of other Churches, but consultative onely, &c."* Much has been made of a saying of Hooker, which Trumbull gives in this form: "About a week before his death, he observed with great earnestness, 'we must agree upon constant meetings of ministers, and settle the consociation of churches, or else we are undone.'"† But, that by this remark, he did *not* desire, or endorse, any such thing as that now known as Consociationism in Connecticut, is made sufficiently evident by his own words, when writing ten months before to Thomas Shepard at Cambridge, in reference to the Synod then in session there, from which his "yeares and infirmities disenabled" him: "I wish ther be not a misunderstanding of some things by some, or that the bynding power of Synods be not pressed too much; for, I speake it only to yourself, he that adventures far in that business will fynd hott and hard work, or else my perspective may fayle."‡

About this time Nathaniel White,§ pastor of a Congregational Church in the Somer-Isles, wrote, concerning the Congregationalism of New England, thus:—"They hold not a subordination of Churches, so that all shall be called one Church, because under one government: but a cöordination of Churches, every Church enjoying such priviledges as Christ their Lord hath vouchsafed unto them, and for this cause we hold them to be the best reformed Churches this day in the world. * * * We drew not our mould after the patern of the Churches of New England, for there is a great distance betwixt them and us: yet the Lord was pleased by a gracious providence so to direct

* *Certain Queries, &c.*, [1654, pp. 22], p. 6.

† *Hist. Conn.*, i., 479. See also the *Magnalia*, Book iii., p. 66, and E. W. Hooker's *Life of T. Hooker*, p. 121.

‡ Felt's *Ecc. Hist. New Eng.*, i., 613.

§ Not the Nathaniel White who graduated at Harvard in 1646, as has been always assumed [see *Proceedings Mass. Hist. Soc.*, 1860-1862, p. 144.]; for this one had been in the Bermudas since about 1640, and had lived for some years before that time as a clergyman of the establishment at Knightsbridge, near Westminster, in England. [*Truth Gloriously Appearing, &c., &c.*, p. 80. See also Frynne's *Fresh Discovery of some Prodigious New Wandring Blazing Stars, &c., &c.*, p. 87.]

us, that we differ not from them in any one Substantial, as we have heard by those that have come unto us from them.”*

The general position of New England feeling at this time—while, as has been suggested, there was in some minds a drift toward some conception of a more concentrated form of church government—is well exhibited in Allin and Shepard’s *Defence of the Nine Positions*, in answer to Ball. “A fraternall consociation we acknowledge; consociation we say, for mutuall counsell and helpe, to prevent or remove sinne and schism; yet fraternall onely, to preserve each others power; consociation of Churches we would have cumulative (not in words, but in deed) to strenghten the power of particular Churches—not privative, to take away the power which they had from the gift of Christ before.”† And in the preface of the same, urging their brethren in England to unite against the hierarchy, and considering the Presbyterian doctrine of rule over local churches from without, to be in the way of such union, “on the bended knees of their soules,” they “intreat their reverend Brethren to consider what power any or many Churches can challenge over another, &c., &c.”‡

The relation of the General Court to Councils had now developed itself into a general care, as the guardian of the churches, to have Councils held when needed, with something very much like the present joint action of our religious Societies with churches, before Councils when held; a committee appearing from the Court during the session. Yet they were compelled to tread gingerly their perilous way, for the churches of Massachusetts have always been jealous of their rights. Thus, 4th March 1652, learning that the Malden Church proposed to excommunicate Thomas Lynde for having testified before the Court that his minister had preached error, the Court sent to the Church, “without any intention or desire in the least to infringe the liberty the Lord Jesus Christ hath purchased for the Churches,” advising them to submit the matter to a Council before final action.§ And so, when they felt called

* *Truth Gloriously Appearing*, &c., &c., p. 52.

† *A Treatise of Liturgies, Power of the Keyes*, &c. (1658), p. 114.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

§ Felt’s *Ecc. Hist. N. E.*, ii., 60.

upon, 26th October, 1652, "considering the humour of the times in England, inclining to discourage learning, against which wee have borne testimony this Courte in our petition to the Parljament, which wee should contradict, if wee should approve of such proceedings amongst ourselves," to protest against the settlement of Michael Powell by the new Second Church in Boston; they "*advise lovingly*," although they themselves afterward interpreted their "advice" as intended "absolutely to forbiidd" the action deprecated.* The following has been preserved among the "Ecclesiastical Papers" in the Massachusetts State House; which is worth insertion as an example of the style of Letter Missive† by which, at this time, Councils were called, by the Court.

"Att a Councill [of the magistrates] held at Boston, 5th September 1656. The Councill being informed of the uncomfortable differences that of late have fallen out in the church of Christ at Sudbury, notwithstanding severall endeavors to compose the same, which have been fruitless, out of their tender care to preserve and procure peace and unity amongst them, lately wrote to the said church in an amicable way to advise and counsell them forthwith to call into their help such councill from their neighboring churches as the rule prescribes, from whose labors, through the blessing of God, a blessing might have been expected; which too great a part of the church, as they understand by their letter, is far from inclining unto: the Council judging it to be their duty to take an effectual course for the healing of these breaches, do therefore desire and order that the churches of Christ in Cambridge, Watertown and Concord, or each of them respectively, send two messengers to meet at Sudbury on the 7th day of October next, by eight of the clock in the morning, to consider and advise in the premises, viz:—to endeavor to compose and settle the distractions at Sudbury, to give their judgment in the cases of difference there. And it is expected and desired that the Church of Sudbury and all persons concerned therein give this Councill, at y^e time and place aforesaid, the opportunity of meeting with them to declare what will concern themselves, or y^e Councill see cause to enquire of them, in reference to their business; making their return to the Council of this jurisdiction what success their endeavors through the blessing of Christ have procured, and where y^e fault hath been, or is, that so, if necessity require, such further course may be taken therein as may most conduce to y^e glory of God, the

* *Mass. Col. Rec.* iv. Pt. i. pp. 113, 177.

† Compare with this the brevity of the following, of seventy years after—which called the Council that settled Jonathan Edwards:

Northampton, 20th June, 1726

Rev. Sir:—Our Church do desire your presence and attendance at the ordination of Mr. Jonathan Edwards, this day three weeks.

Your servant,

SOLOMON STODDARD.

To the Rev. Mr. John Williams, Pastor at Dearfield."

uniting of their hearts to unitie in truth and peace according to the rule of the Gospel. And it is ordered that Lieft. Goodenow, or such as he shall appointe, shall take care for the entertainment of the said Councill, and all persons concerned therein; and it is ordered that the said Council have liberty to adjourne to some other place, if they shall see cause.

By order of the Council,

EDWARD RAWSON, *Secretary.*

Endorsed—For y^e Church of Christ at Cambridge.”*

The long and wearisome troubles in the churches at Hartford and Wethersfield, with kindred, though perhaps less obtrusive, strifes and divisions in churches in the other Colonies, which Council after Council sought to heal in vain, at length so alarmed many who loved the cause of God better than they understood the philosophy of all his ways of government, as to lead them to make a vigorous effort to impress the public mind with the duty of ending such matters by something like jurisdiction over them from without. John Davenport in his *Another Essay for the Investigation of the Truth*, felt called upon to protest against this; and Richard Mather in his reply thereto, complained of the “reflexions” cast upon the Synod of 1662, and its supporters, “as if we would cast a Snare upon Churches, by straitning them in the use and exercise of their Church-power within themselves *in re propria*, &c.”†

In 1665, John Eliot—who seems to have had as much less wisdom than the average of his brethren of that day in some directions, as he had more in others ‡—printed “a few copies of a small Script,” to “be Viewed, Corrected, Amended, or Rejected, as it shall be found to hold weight in the Sanctuary Ballance, or not.” It was entitled *Communion of Churches; or the Divine Management of Gospel-Churches by the Ordinance of Councils, constituted in Order according to the Scriptures*.§ He begins: “There be two holy Publick Societies fa-

* *Eccles. Papers of Mass.*, i., 82.

† *Defence of the Answer and Arguments of the Synod, &c.*, (1664), p. 101.

‡ In May, 1660, he had recanted before the Court, and at its command, the doctrine of his *Christian Commonwealth*, then lately published in England.

§ It is a little tract of 38 pp., of the greatest possible rarity. The only copy known to be in existence (of which the writer of this Article has a written copy) is that formerly owned by Rev. Dr. Harris of Dorchester—who then judged

mons in the Gospel:—(1), a Church of Believers; (2), a Council of Churches.” The second he defines thus: “A Council is a Society of particular Churches in Communion, by their Representatives, for their well-being and well-ordering all things among them, by mutual Counsel, in Truth, Peace, and Holiness.” He says (p. 3): “After thirty or forty years experience in the way of Congregational Churches in fulness of liberty, we finde more and more need to insist upon [Councils], and *that in such a fixed and ordered way, as that thereby men may be tyed to attend unto Counsel.*” He proceeds to argue that Christ left church-power to the Apostles, and that Councils of Churches are the inheritors of church-power from them. He then seizes upon the number *twelve*, which he calls the “foundation number” (Rev. xxi., 14), and, referring to the twelve tribes, twelve loaves of shew bread, twelve jewels in the High Priest’s breast-plate, twelve Apostles, twelve gates of Heaven, &c., &c., he proposes that the churches affiliate into groups of twelve for local Council; and that twelve such Councils, by deputies, compose one Provincial Council; and twelve Provincial Councils, by deputies, compose one National Council; and twelve National Councils, one Œcumenical Council. These local Councils he would have meet once a month; the Provincials once a quarter; the Nationals once a year—for regular work, with leave for occasional sessions between, as need might require. Their expenses he would have defrayed by the churches, the State, or private beneficence—though (p. 36) he insists that the latter should not go beyond “conveniently to bear their Charges,” lest it be an inlet to evil. He calculates that £1000 per annum would “suffice for a great Nation,” which “will be less than the revenues of some one Bishoprick.” The business of this network of Councils he thus explains: “*The care of all the Churches doth lye upon them,*” (p. 23), which he specifies to include, (1), missionary oversight of destitute places; (2), securing pastors to vacant churches; (3), promotion of general edification; (4), confutation of heresies; (5), settlement of difficulties; (6), oversight of seasons

it to be *unique*—now in the collection of George Brinley, Esq., of Hartford. It was printed at Cambridge, by Marmaduke Johnson.

of public fasting and thanksgiving, &c.; (7), general attention to all exigencies. It is curious to see how—in deference to the latent sense of the community—even its own author feels compelled to undermine, in its very erection, this fair fabric of control over the churches, by the following among his fundamentals, (p. 5), “The *Power* of Ecclesiastical Councils is *only* Dogmatical or Doctrinal. Power of *Censure* is by the Lord fixed in *the Church*; and hence, when any appeal unto a Council, it is for further and more clear light from the Scripture, and for conviction thereby, *but not for the exercise of any Juridical Power!*”

The fact that so many churches proved refractory in reference to the Result of the Synod of 1662, with the general disorders before referred to, soon led the friends of the half-way covenant to push strongly the notion of danger from popular disregard of the result of Councils. John Allin, of Dedham—who replied to Chauncey’s *Antisynodalia*, in defense of the Synod—just before his death in 1671, wrote dolefully: “We see the great disorders in Churches for want of seasonable help from Neighboring Churches, and by Reason of the rejection of Counsel *without convincing their Sentence of error* ;”* as it had been one of John Wilson’s dying complaints, in 1667, to the elders met around his bed, “that the authority of Synods is not duly regarded.”†

In 1675, Increase Mather published an appeal to “the serious and Christian consideration of the Antisynodalian brethren,” in which he labored hard ‡ to heighten the popular feeling of deference for the results of Councils, without exactly going so far as to affirm—what he himself did not believe—their right of jurisdiction over the churches; or, as it has since been styled, their “determinative” function.§

It was at about this date, and as a natural consequence of the persistency of some churches in ignoring the advice of Councils, that the *ex parte* Council developed itself in New

* *First Principles of N. E.*, p. 41.

† *Felt’s Ecclesiastical History, N. E.*, ii., 417.

‡ See the *Appeal*, *passim*.

§ See Prof. Smyth’s Essay before the *State Conference of Massachusetts*, of 1865.

England. And it is curious that perhaps the first well-marked instance of it* should be in connection with the birth of a church which of late years has repeatedly declined to attend *ex parte* Councils to which it has been invited, as if they were at least irregular, and scarcely respectable—the Old South Church in Boston. The way of it was this. The First Church of Boston, which, after Norton's death, had failed in two efforts to get John Owen to be their minister, through circumstances beyond their and his control; † after Wilson's decease, voted, 24th Sept., 1667, by a majority, to call John Davenport from New Haven. The New Haven church protested against his leaving them, and a large and powerful minority of the Boston church protested against his coming, mainly on account of his anti-synodalian views. While the question was pending—at some time during the summer of 1668—the Boston church seem to have called a Council, and submitted to them the question whether those who were opposed to Mr. Davenport's coming should not receive “amicable dismission, in order to the propagation of another church,” which question was answered in the affirmative.‡ The “dissenting brethren,” pleading this Result,

* Buck says [*Mass. Eccl. Law*, 92] that “before the Cambridge Platform of 1648, the *ex parte* council was in use.” The earliest instance of anything resembling it which we remember was the Council at Weymouth, in 1646, when the neighboring elders went there, on call from a woman who had been turned out of the church for ‘distempered speeches’ But the church finally consented to submit the case to them, and the affair proceeded on a ‘mutual’ basis. The Council held at Barnstable, 4th June, 1662, which withdrew communion from John Smith and his church, appears to have come nearer to an *ex parte* movement than any other; but that seems to have lacked some of the essential elements. It is our impression, therefore, that the idea of an *ex parte* council, as we understand it, was a novel one to the churches in 1669. It certainly was so to the church in Salem, as will shortly appear. [See Winthrop's *Journal*, ii., 338; Felt's *Eccl. Hist. New Eng.*, ii., 315; Freeman's *Hist. Cape Cod*, ii., 267.]

† *MSS. Church Rec.* Graham's *Col. Hist.*, i., 228.

‡ This Council has not been set down hitherto in the history of this transaction. But the following extract from the Salem Church Records so distinctly implies it, that we venture to insert it as veracious: “On the 3d of the 2d month, [1669] was read a letter from the dissenting brethren at Boston, sent unto this Church, wherein they expressed that *the result and advice of y^e Council called by y^e elders and brethren y^e last summer, was to grant them an amicable dismission, in order to the propagation of another church.* This advice they had attended, having several times moved for a dismission, but in vain, &c.” [Judge White's *New Eng. Congregationalism*, p. 76.]

"humbly, earnestly, and frequently entreated for their dismissal before the ordination, but could not obtain it."* Davenport was ordained 9th December, 1668. Early in the following April, the "dissenting brethren" made an effort to assemble a Council on the thirteenth of that month at Boston to sit *ex parte* and devise measures for their relief, they having sought in vain from the First Church that dismissal which the Council had advised. They wrote to the Salem church "humbly, again and again," desiring them, "in the bowels of Jesus Christ," not to receive sinister reports against them, but to send their elder and messengers to meet with others in Council "to consider, consult, and give their helpful advice in their laboring case."† The Salem church deferred action until they could confer with the elders of the Boston church, and ascertain whether that church consented to this proposed Council, or would further it; to which inquiry they got a negative answer. In much perplexity, the Salem brethren—who "generally did agree in this, *that there was, and ought to be, relief against miscarriages in particular churches in the Congregational way,*" by vote desired their elder and a messenger to "go, not as members of the Council to vote therein, but to be present, and so to do what good they could; as they heard Mr. Whiting and Mr. Laiten of Lin church were desired so to go."‡ Meanwhile—for the whole Colony was stirred§—a Council of seventeen elders was held at Charlestown on 6th April, the Tuesday before the Tuesday on which the *ex parte* Council was called to meet in Boston, "to advise whether they ought not to apply themselves to the church, and acquaint them that they were deeply grieved and offended at their refusal to dismiss their brethren, and move at their desire."|| It does not appear by whom this Council was assembled, but it

* Diary of John Hull, [*Transactions of Amer. Antiq. Soc.*, iii., 228.]

† Judge White's *New Eng. Cong.*, p. 76.

‡ *Ibid.*

§ "The whole People of God throughout the Colony, were too much distinguished into such as favoured the Old Church, and such as favoured the New Church; whereof the former were against the Synod, and the latter were for it."

[*Magnalia*, Book v., 83.]

| *John Hull's Diary* (as above), p. 229.

was probably on call of the General Court. Nor is it clear what their Result was, although it was presumably in the interest of those who had called the *ex parte* Council. That Council met at Boston,* and was composed of delegates of fifteen churches—thirteen besides Salem and Lynn. The venerable Richard Mather filled the moderator's chair for his last time. The session lasted "for divers days." Three appeals were made by the Council to the Church to hear them—twice to the elders, and once to the elders and brethren—in vain. The First Church of Boston would not let Richard Mather enter their doors, "when he with sundry others waited with a letter from the Council to them."† On the third day the moderator was seized with his fatal illness, and carried out by coach to his home at Dorchester, to die—six days after. So the Council, thrice denied conference with those whom they would fain bring to a better mind, "considered of the advice of the first Council,‡ and the Scripture grounds of it, and saw cause to approve of it, viz.: that the dissenting brethren might have their dismission, and in case the Church persisted in denying their dismission, *they might take their liberty seasonably to be a Church of themselves, as if they had had a formal dismission.*"§ This result was handed, on the next Monday, to the elder of the church, who gave it to the church, but they "decline to receive any papers from such a Council, as being irregular."|| The "dissenting brethren" waited a few days, and finding that the church did not propose to budge an inch, but "refused all their applications to them,"¶ called a Council to meet at Charlestown on Wednesday, 12th May, to sanction and fellowship their use of their liberty in forming themselves into a new church, notwithstanding the contumacy of the old one. The number of churches invited is not certain. Fourteen magistrates were present, of whom eight encouraged their procedure, and six (Bellingham, Symonds, Hathorne, Leverett,

* Felt mistakes in saying *Charlestown*. [*Ecol. Hist. New Eng.*, ii, 435.]

† *Hull's Diary* (as above), p. 229.

‡ That referred to in the note at the bottom of p 292, *ante*.

§ *Salem Church Records* (as above), p. 77.

|| Felt's *Ecol. Hist. New Eng.*, ii., 485.

¶ *Hull's Diary* (as above), p. 229.

Lusher, and Tyng) opposed it. All the elders but three (James Allen, John Davenport, and Samuel Mather) were in favor of it. They therefore proceeded, "according to the advice of two Councils in their case," to embody themselves into a church, and received the right hand of fellowship "from the messengers of five Churches."* So, after severe labor pangs, and by an obstetric theory then new to New England, the Old South Church was born!

Nothing, worthy of extended mention here, occurred during the two generations which passed between the Synod of 1662, and the days when Cotton Mather published his *Ratio Discipulinæ*. The "Third way of Communion" was tried, in 1719, in the case of the church at Wenham, Massachusetts, with satisfactory results.† The legal arbitration of Wait Winthrop, Elisha Cook, and Samuel Sewall, Esquires, was applied, in 1697, effectively, by way of supplementing the Result of a Council at Salem, in regard to difficulties growing out of the relation of Samuel Parris to the "witch" troubles; which Result had, "instead of uniting, made the rent worse and the breach wider."‡ The Newbury Presbyterianism broke out now and then into troubles, which called for the intervention of the Court, and finally subsided to peace, in sheer weariness.§ The good old phrase "for substance of doctrine," which the Synod of 1679 made such sensible use of,|| but which has been so much maligned, in some quarters, of late years, was resorted to in November, 1663, by a Council at Topsfield, as an expedient of satisfaction in reference to the formation of the church there.¶

The Provincial Charter, during this period, introduced indirectly some modifications of ecclesiastical affairs. The extension of the right of voting to all of a certain estate, whether church members or not, relieved the churches of certain bad members; and the cutting off of appeals to the

* Salem Church Records (as above), p. 78.

† M.S. Records of the Church at Rumney Marsh (North Chelsea), i., pp. 8—11.

‡ Calef's *More Wonders of the Invisible World*, &c. (ed. 1861), pp. 145—163.

§ Councils were held 3d Nov., 1669; 19th April, 1670, and in the spring of 1672. [Coffin's *Hist. Newbury*, pp. 72—112.]

|| *Magnalia*, Book v., 89.

¶ Salem Church Records (as above), p. 56.

General Court in matters strictly ecclesiastical, restored the churches to their original—somewhat imperiled—independence. This latter heightened their sense of their own right to judge the judgments of Councils; and this again awakened fears in many ministerial minds lest all would go to ruin unless some way of compelling all parties to a Council to sit down acquiescent under its delivery could be devised.

Increase Mather, as has been already suggested, while he lived, went as far as he could in this direction without violating stubborn first principles. Still with all his bewailings of the bad estate of those who proved rebellious, he yet insisted that the design of Councils is not “to infringe the Liberty of particular Churches; * that lay brethren must be sent, as well as elders, by the churches as their messengers;† and “vehemently dissents” from the idea that an aggrieved person who is not satisfied with the decision of one Council shall be limited, on the Connecticut plan, in his choice of a second, to neighbor churches, or to those “directed by the Ministers of an Association,” but contends that such persons “may, and ought to address themselves to such as from whom *they* may Expect the Clearest Light in the difficulties before them.”‡ He adds, further: “For Ministers to pretend to a Negative Voice in Synods, or for Councils to take upon them to determine what Elders or Messengers a Church shall submit unto, without the Choice of the Church concerned; or for Ministers to pretend to be Members of a Council without any Mission from their Churches, nay, although the Church declares that they will not send them; is *Prelatical*, and essentially differing not only from Congregational, but from Presbyterian Principles. And now that I am going out of the World [he was now in his seventy-eighth year], I could not die in Peace, if I did not discharge my Conscience in bearing Witness against such Innovations and Invasions on the Rights, and Liberties belonging to Particular Congregations of Christ.”§

In 1700, Solomon Stoddard of Northampton published his

* *Order of the Gospel professed, &c., by the Churches of New Eng.*, p. 72.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 88—90.

‡ *Dissquisition concerning Ecclesiastical Councils*, p. 31.

§ *Ibid.*, p. xiii.

Doctrine of Instituted Churches, in which he advocated the consolidation of Congregational Churches into a society, or national church, to be governed by a Synod. He further taught that the supreme ecclesiastical authority does not lie in the local churches; that it "is too Lordly a principle, it is too ambitious a thing for every small Congregation to arrogate such an uncontrollable Power;" but that Synods are "to bind and loose, to inflict Ecclesiastical censures, or to take them off," and "every Man must stand to the Judgment of the National Synod." Yet still even he cannot close without adding this nullifying clause: "A Synod is not infallible, and therefore no Rule, or Doctrine, is to be taken up on trust from them; Men do owe that respect to a Synod, as it is an Ordinance of God, solemnly to weigh the Doctrines held forth thereby, but they are not to receive them by an implicate faith. * * * The Synod may direct him in a wrong way, and no Man can be bound to anything that God has forbidden."*

In 1705, the *Boston Association* undertook to introduce a "stronger" government. They issued "Sixteen Proposals" to the public consideration—the gist of which lay in the three propositions, (1) to give to the "minister's meetings" some ecclesiastical power; (2) to organize standing Councils; (3) to compel all candidates for the pulpit to be "licensed" by the ministers.† But John Wise so effectually exploded the project that this pleasant little innovation fell through, being "never prosecuted beyond the Bounds of *meer* proposals;" it proving that there were "some very considerable Persons among the Ministers, as well as of the Brethren, who thought the *Liberties of Particular Churches* to be in danger of being too much *limited and infringed* in them."‡ Dr. Nathaniel Whittaker of Salem made an attempt, sixty years after,§ to confute John Wise's book, and to commend the Presbyterianism of the "Proposals" to the good sense of Massachusetts—in vain.

Mather's *Ratio Disciplina* [A. D. 1726] makes clear that, so far, the churches had resisted all endeavors to seduce or

* *Doct. of Instit. Churches* (1700), pp. 25, 27, 32, 33.

† *The Churches' Quarrel Expoused*, &c. (ed. 1772), pp. 77—80.

‡ Mather's *Ratio Disciplina*, p. 184.

§ *A Confutation of Two Tracts*, &c., 1774. pp. 98.

drive them off from their two foundation principles. He says: "The Synods of New England know no Weapons but what are purely Spiritual. They pretend unto no Juridical Power; nor any significancy, but what is merely *Instructive and Suasory*. They are nothing but some Wise and Good Men meeting together to advise the Churches how to observe the Rules of the most Inoffensive Piety. *When they have done all, the Churches are at Liberty to judge how far their Advice is to be followed.*"* And, in reference to the panic, in view of prophesied confusion, which had from time to time arisen, because the Results of Councils were not held to be absolutely binding, in themselves considered (and which he had shared to the full, in his day), he adds: "The Churches had not, in Fact, seen much of this Confusion; and it may be the Prudent Servants of God had it more in fear than there was a Real need of."†

In 1732, William Homes of Chilmark came out with *Proposals of Some Things to be done in our administering Ecclesiastical Government; whereby it may more effectually reach its End in some Respects, &c.*, the main feature of which was the recommendation of the formation of the Associations of Ministers (each Pastor to have a messenger) into Presbyteries; these to be affiliated in a General Synod; votes in both of which to require a majority of both clerical and lay messengers to be carried. The determination of this Synod he supposes, "shall put an end to all controversies that may arise in our churches, unless that better information appear, which would have influenced the determination had it appeared before it was made; in that case, the parties concerned may desire a *review* of the affair, and it may be granted them."‡ About this time Dr. Colman, of Brattle Street, wrote to a friend: "in short, the Consociation of Churches is the very Soul and Life of the Congregational Scheme, necessary to the very *Esse* as well as *Bene* of it; without which we must be Independent, and with which all the good of Presbyterianism is attainable."§ What he meant by this appears in his "Thoughts on Councils," in which he advo-

* p. 172.

† p. 183.

‡ *Proposals, &c.*, pp. 7—27.

§ Turell's *Life of Coleman*, p. 107.

cates "Standing Councils," whose power "should be binding, saving only Appeals to be from them to Synods, or Superior Councils."* Samuel Mather's *Apology for the Liberties of the Churches in New England*, came out in 1738, and seems to have been aimed at the correction of the Presbyterianizing tendency that was then abroad. He says: "There may be Synods or Meetings of Pastors for promoting Peace and Concord; but there is great Danger lest such Meetings should be hurtful to the Principles and Liberties of particular Churches, and so degenerate from the good Ends which ought to be designed and pursued in them."† And so his announcement of the theory of the Result of a Council is: "They communicate their Sentiments and Advice to the Churches whose Case has bin under their attentive and prayerful Consideration, that so, *if they see meet*, they may conform to the same and be at Peace."‡

In 1725, an abortive attempt was made to secure another General Synod, at the call of the State, designed to be of a type similar to the Reforming Synod of 1679. Episcopacy had gained, by this time, foothold enough here to have some influence with the government, and that influence proved effectual first to delay, and in the end to block the project. §

Up to about this time it had been customary for churches to send as many messengers as they pleased—sometimes a considerable number—to represent them in Councils; each having his vote. Dr. Colman earnestly argued against it, and for one delegate from each church, (1) because it did not give the elders an equal influence; (2) because a multitude of messengers might be used by a designing person; (3) because one large and rich church might thus out-number and out-vote all the rest; (4) because such was custom with the reformed churches. ¶ Turell, in 1748, said: "Is it not high Time that our Congregational Scheme was mended in this Point; and that the Liberty given in the Letters Missive, and taken by the Churches called to assist in Ecclesiastical Councils should be somewhat bounded? I have observed for more than Twenty Years (and who has

* *Ibid.*, p. 102.

† *Apology*, p. 109.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

§ Hutchinson's *Hist. Mass.*, ii., 291 (note).

¶ Turell's *Life*, &c., p. 99.

not?) the Confusions and Mischiefs arising from our present Practice: Some Churches send One, others Five, others Ten or more, to the same Council, and the Vote of every Member is of equal Weight.”*

The next violent spasm in the direction of the decisive power of Councils came up in the “Bolton case,” just before the Revolution. The Bolton church, after vain attempts to get rid of their pastor, the Rev. Thomas Goss, in the ordinary way, by Council, “took the responsibility” of dissolving the relation without any Council. This stirred up the neighboring churches, or at least their pastors, and a war—not confined to pamphlets—ragged for a long time in that vicinity. The Rev. Zabdiel Adams of Lunenburg, under the title of “A Neighbor,” became very conspicuous in the conflict, and wrote soundly and strongly for the good old doctrine that councils *advise*, but do not decide.† The “Convention” took it up in May, 1773, and published their *Observations upon the Congregational plan of Church Government*,‡ in which, without naming the Bolton case, they, with great dignity and impressive gentleness, admonish the churches of their duty to take advice of Councils, and follow it—if they would be good churches.

In 1824, the same ghost lifted again its alarming head. There *were* things done in Councils, and in regard to Councils, in the days of the genesis of Unitarianism in Massachusetts, which have an ugly look, and of which all honorable Unitarians now cannot fail to be heartily ashamed. And it was when the hearts of good men were failing them through fear, in this regard; and when some of our orthodox magnates, who were old enough to have known better, were long-ing to go down into the Egypt of a “strong” government for help to crush out that heresy which flanneted on every side; that an “Ancient Document,” found among Cotton Mather’s papers, was unearthed, and pressed upon the notice of the General Association of Massachusetts. The document was an endeavor to answer the question, “how Councils may have due constitution *and efficacy*?” by proposing substantial Connecticut Consociationism, as the panacea for all New England’s

* *Ibid.* (note).

† See the pamphlets of the controversy, *passim*.

‡ Boston, 1773, pp. 21.

ills Ecclesiastical. The General Association handled the old "document" tremblingly for a year or two, and then let it drop, with a vote that "they had no objection" to the formation of Consociations by parties so disposed. But so clear and strong was the aversion of the churches to such a course, that even this qualified endorsement cost the Association the withdrawal of several of its members, and the whole matter again subsided.*

Once more it showed itself in Boston, in the May meetings of 1844, when Dr. Woods—never a genuine and hearty Congregationalist—and six other prominent divines were appointed a committee "to take into consideration what measures are necessary for the reaffirmation and maintenance of the principles and spirit of Congregationalism,"—which was the stately way of inquiring what could be done to intensify the centripetal, by weakening the centrifugal force of the denomination! The committee sat upon the subject and reported in 1845,† and re-reported in 1846,‡ and "died the same," as did the project. Their documents—they proposed that "the decision of a Council shall be final"§—are now so very dead, that only antiquaries remember that any such thing was attempted just twenty years ago; and old booksellers ask high prices for their "unique" literature!

Some slight solicitude found expression at the meeting of the General Conference in Massachusetts for 1865, lest Congregationalism is suffering for lack of a sufficiently clear conviction, in the general mind of the churches, of the fact that it is, in some cases, "an abuse of language to say that their [Councils] decisions are only advisory."|| And some symptoms have appeared, in certain quarters, of a purpose to make a new effort to convince the Congregational public that there is, and of right ought to be, something like a tribunal over every local church.

It will prove to be a hard task! The history of the past settles it that the convictions of good men may *safely* be left to oscillate between the two extremes of those cardinal principles, which

* *Panoplist*, 1814, pp. 320—8; 1815, 359—73; 1816, 369.

† *Unfinished Report of the Com. on Cong. in Mass.*, 1845, pp. 52.

‡ *Report of Com., including a Manual, &c.*, 1846, pp. 43.

§ *Report, &c.*, p. 39.

|| *Minutes*, p. 65.

make Congregationalism what it is—in distinction from bare Independency on the one hand, and Presbyterianism on the other. If sometimes, and for a few years, in certain localities, there is developed a tendency to exalt unduly the self-sovereignty of the local church at the expense of its fraternity and communal responsibility, the next revolution of the wheel will throw the protuberance on the other side, and the fair average of a safe and just medium will, on the whole, be maintained. It is poor economy to burn down the house to roast the pig; it would be an extravagance which the descendants of the Plymouth men cannot afford, to turn Presbyterian, or Prelatist, in order to hurry up the apparent settlement of some vexing local ecclesiastical trouble! The authority of Councils is one of love, and sense, and piety—which, under God, is omnipotent, at last. No man who desires illustrations of this can do better than to study the Results—to which we have space here only to refer—of two such bodies; which met, on the 7th June, 1864, at Viola, Ill., and on the 3d January, 1867, at Fair Haven, Massachusetts; which, by the grace of God, were made wonderfully effectual in *healing* church wounds.

Pardon a closing word—slightly condensed in the quotation—from famous old Captain Edward Johnson: “Now what I would men should take notice of is, that the Churches of Christ in New England have valiantly defended the truth, and cut down all deceivable Doctrine; the like hath not been done for many ages heretofore. Reverend and Beloved in Christ, could your eyes but behold the efficacy of *loving Counsell in the Communion of Congregationall Churches*, Charity commands me to thinke you would never stand for Classicall Injunctions any more. Neither Diocesan, nor Provinciall Authority can possibly reach so farre as this Royall Law of Love in Communion of Churches. Assuredly the dayes are at hand wherein both Jew and Gentile Churches shall exercise this Old Modell of Church Government. Then shall the Exhortation of one Church to another prevaile more to Reformation, than all the Thundering Bulls, Excommunicating Lordly Censures, and Shamefull Penalties of all the Lording Churches in the World!” *

* *Wonder Working Providence of Sion's Saviour, in New England.* [2 Mass. Hist. Coll., iv., 19.]

ARTICLE IV.—WARD'S LIFE OF PERCIVAL.

The Life and Letters of James Gates Percival. By JULIUS H. WARD. Boston : Ticknor & Fields. 1866. One volume. 12mo. pp. 583.

It seems but a fitting portion of the strange history of this remarkable man, that he should silently and unnoticed have passed away from life, and that years should have elapsed before the fragments of the story of his career were gathered together. Still more does the end of his history seem to answer to its beginning and progress, as we find the complete biography, which comes to us after so long an interval, to be the work, not of one who had been within the circle of his acquaintance or friendship, but of a person who, at the outset, knew nothing of him except his poetry, and who had never even seen his face. Dwelling apart from mankind, and shutting out the world from the retirement of his soul, he left at death the mystery of his living to be searched into by a stranger, with no impulse to bear him onward in the search except that which had been awakened by the contemplation of his genius. We can scarcely help feeling that, if the poet could have foreseen the future, and have known that a young man, who had been thus inspired, even in childhood, with reverence and admiration for him, would, out of mere love for his memory, devote the leisure of several years to the work of giving a faithful narrative of his life and labors, he would have been, in a measure, satisfied in the desires of his heart for an appreciative remembrance. And for this reason, as well as because the record of such a man ought always to be kept, especially in the city where he made his home, we may well be glad that the author has been sustained in his purpose and energy until the end of his work.

We propose to enter in this Article upon a brief review of
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the story, and a brief estimate of the character, as presented before us in Mr. Ward's volume.

The life of every man of letters is largely a life of retirement. Given up to the study of books or to the investigations of science, he is, of necessity, withdrawn from that sphere where political honors are gained, and where events that attract the notice of mankind are constantly exciting new interest. The narrative of such a man's career, therefore, after death has terminated it, cannot be full of incidents, like that of those who are prominent in civil or military affairs, but becomes a simple record of daily duties and of quiet progress, while the great results are seen, perhaps, only in the improved condition of the world, and often may not be traced, by those who experience the blessing of them, directly to their author. Especially must this be the case where the man of learning holds no public position, as in a university, in which his influence may be continually going out upon the pupils who listen to his teachings, but who finds his whole work within the limits of his own dwelling, and rarely or never meets his fellow-men. Of this last mentioned class was the subject of this biography. The building which, in his closing years, he designed and prepared for his residence, was a sort of symbol of his life. With no entrance upon the public street, and no opening whatever in front excepting through three narrow windows, which were covered with heavy iron blinds, it resembled, as Mr. Ward remarks, "a monastic cell more than the residence of a human being." And as we should not expect to discover in such a house much of variety, or even very much of interest to the ordinary mind, beyond the answer to curious questionings about the habits of the hermit who occupied it, so, as we follow the hermit himself through the passing years, we must be content with the study of his inward being rather than his outward history. The outward history is soon told. Dr. Percival was born just at the close of the last century—Sept. 15th, 1795—at Kensington, a part of the town of Berlin, Connecticut. This is a common country village, such as we see everywhere in New England, and, though Mr. Ward refers to the beautiful scenery near his home, we can hardly believe that any peculiar inspiration could have

been derived from the meadows and mountains there, beyond what might be drawn from the surroundings of twenty villages in our own or any one of the neighboring States. He was the son of a respectable physician, who seems, from the accounts of him still preserved, to have been both earnest and successful in his work. One of his indefinitely-removed grandmothers, on the father's side, is said to have been a daughter of John Robinson of Leyden; and, like almost everybody else of whom we have ever heard, he was the descendant of one of three brothers who came over from England, and also was able to trace his family in England to the time of William the Conqueror. His mother's name was Elizabeth Hart; but of her ancestry no record is given, except that they had lived in Kensington from the time of its first settlement. She is described—and here we use substantially the language of the memoir—as of a nervous, sensitive temperament, inclined at times to melancholy; of a strong, keen, and clear mind; and of a better education than women usually had in those days. She had also a good literary taste, which was evidenced in later years, according to the biographer, by a hearty appreciation of her son's poetical fame, and a frequent use of the volumes of his poetry. Of his father's abilities and characteristics, on the other hand, it is said, that he was the equal of his wife; that he was not liberally educated, but had a taste for letters, and was as well read as most Connecticut doctors of his time; that he was social and persuasive in society, but was noted for keeping his own counsel, and doing everything in his own way. The boy was, thus, like innumerable other children of New England, in his home and family, and, so far as we are able to discover, had nothing in his origin or the external circumstances of his early years that could, in any peculiar measure, have created or awakened the poetic power. He had great fondness for reading, indeed, and a wonderful memory, and an abstracted turn of mind, and more or less of a love of nature, but nothing that indicated a poet's soul beyond numbers of boys perchance within the circle of our readers' knowledge, from whom the world has never expected or desired the exercise of the poetic gift. Nor do his youthful efforts in verse—though, even at the age of fourteen, he attempted a mock

heroic of upwards of two thousand lines—show any extraordinary excellence, or give promise of any remarkable success in mature life. He was, in a word, simply an imaginative boy, disposed to solitude and melancholy, dissatisfied with the ordinary teaching of the schools, which the times afforded, as ill-adapted to meet the wants of his own mind, and with indefinite longings for something higher and unknown. In due course of time he began his preparation for college, and entered the Freshman Class at Yale in the autumn of 1810. After remaining here, however, for about eighteen months, he returned home, and subsequently became a member of the class of 1815, with which he was graduated at the end of their course of study. During his college life he developed, at every step, a new love of reading, and manifested more clearly a wonderful power of remembering all that he read. To the excellence of his scholarship the testimony both of his classmates and of Dr. Dwight himself are given—the latter having even spoken of him as “the most remarkable scholar he had known for many years.” The poetic impulse, also, displayed itself, in these years, so strikingly, that it became evident both to himself and others, that his life would be devoted to poetry. We say “the poetic impulse,” for, so far as we are able to learn, the verses which he had as yet written, though better than those of ordinary college students, were still, to say the utmost in their favor, more remarkable for quantity than for quality. And in view of them, his passionate declaration, on occasion of some severe remarks respecting the rejection, by a publisher, of a poem written in his freshman year—“I don’t care; I *will* be a poet”—may possibly be regarded as showing the determined energy more than the inspiration of his soul. We do not, in saying this, mean to speak depreciatingly of his college efforts, for we ordinarily expect only the beginnings and the first promise of the future at that early period. All that we mean is, that, as in his boyhood, so in these years of his education, he developed no such extraordinary power as to make his eminence in later life certain. More than one man since his time has sung quite as sweetly, and given his college associates quite as strong hopes in regard to his fame, who has either lost his inspiration afterward in the common

work of life, or, at least, has failed to gain the recognition and admiration of the world. But few, probably, have had so strong a love of poetic composition and, at the same time, so strong a purpose to bring out the power within of which they themselves felt conscious, without ardently entering "the service of song" afterward, and becoming known as consecrated to the Muses. It was thus that he came forward into mature life. But alas for inspired souls,—for all who would commune with nature as the poet does, or would dwell, as scholars, in the society of the departed great rather than of the common men of the present,—the country, at that day, had comparatively little appreciation of poetry or literature. The pressing question of daily bread forced even the most retiring and those most given to solitude to seek after some practical work of ordinary life, and, as lawyers or statesmen perchance, to crush out the nobler enthusiasm of their nature. Percival was obliged to meet this trying question at his graduation, for, though his father had accumulated a considerable property by his profession, yet at his death he had not left his children enough to maintain them in a life of literary leisure. He determined accordingly to become a physician, and immediately entered upon the study of medicine. His remarkable powers of acquisition were displayed here as everywhere else. He gave himself earnestly to the work before him, with an absorbing love of knowledge, and at his examination for his degree, he was found almost to equal his teachers in all branches of the science. Soon afterward he established himself in his native village. It required, however, but little time to show that his sphere was not that of a country doctor. Whatever he was called to do he did well. Yet his sensitive nature was unfitted for the responsibilities and trials of the work; and though he seems, in the necessities and disappointments of his subsequent life, to have turned in thought, at times, to his first chosen profession, he gave himself less to this employment than to any other into which his fertile mind led him to enter. He was now about twenty-five years of age, and his life from this time onward may be divided into two sections—in the former of which he devoted himself largely to poetry, and in the latter to language and natural science.

The poetical period of Percival's life extended over some ten or eleven years, until about the year 1831. Its record is a record of repeated efforts and publications, with the story of the lingering and slowly dying hopes of a soul that found itself, to its own view, in an unappreciative age. The age was unappreciative, indeed, but not so much so as he thought. It gave him his fair share of commendation as compared with other poets of the time. But it had not a sufficiently cultivated taste,—in other words, the country was not yet far enough advanced in its literary history, to receive with eagerness the writings even of a good poet, or to make him such returns as would enable him to live by his poetry. Nothing less than this:—nothing less than the joyful reception of his poems, with the continual testimony of the public approbation, could have satisfied his desires for fame; and, on the other hand, nothing less than such a universal reception and approbation as would have placed him beyond the necessity of any uncongenial employment could have made him live a contented life. At length, grieved and chagrined at his ill success,—to his own apprehension an entire failure,—and disgusted with the neglectful or even hostile world, he suppressed the purposes and extinguished the inspirations of his soul. With a sorrowful spirit he turned away from the beautiful pathway in which he had walked so long, and from the bright anticipations of his earlier life. He laid aside his poetic pen, to take it up but seldom in the future, and became a scholar rather than a poet. During the larger part of this period he resided in New Haven. For a few months, in the year 1822, he was engaged either in the work of lecturing on Botany, or in endeavoring to find employment as a physician, in Charleston, S. C., and, while there, he wrote many fugitive pieces in verse, which were, soon afterwards, collected and published in that city. These poems seem to have been favorably received, and to have gained him friends among the literary circles of Charleston. But the characters of the poet and the physician, as he expressed it, were so widely separated to the public apprehension, that he could not hope to gain his living there by his profession. Persons in want of medicine asked for a practical man, and not a visionary one, and they could not be persuaded that a writer of verses could see any-

thing except unreal visions. Accordingly he was compelled to return to the North, and, having been unsuccessful in securing a position, which he desired, in Harvard University, he devoted himself for some time to the publication of new volumes of poems. Among the multitude of things to which he turned for a support, it is said that he even thought of becoming an Episcopal minister; but this was, as we should have supposed, only the thought of a moment. The more fitting occupation of an editor, however, being proposed to him, he entered upon it for a short period. Subsequently, he received an appointment under the general government as Professor at West Point, or as Surgeon in the army service; and, as various favorable propositions were made to him, he became, at different times, a stated contributor to periodicals or magazines. Especially his friends in Boston interested themselves in his behalf, and endeavored to persuade him to fix his residence in their city, encouraging him that he might gradually gain there all that he desired. But nothing seems to have long held his attention or satisfied his sensitive soul, and, with every new change or disappointment, he found his way back to New Haven, the home of his early choice. Here, however, he was, though well-known as a poet and much respected as a man of genius, becoming continually more and more a stranger to the people, as well by reason of his frequent wanderings as because of his retiring disposition, which kept him from the public view. The prospect of success was, consequently, growing less as the years passed on, and, as he withdrew into himself more and more completely, and buried himself in his hermit life, his story became continually a sadder one. Nevertheless he kept up the struggle, in a certain measure, and brought to the notice of the country, during these years, the largest part of all the poems which now bear his name. It would be impossible to give the whole narrative of this portion of his life, unless we were to follow Mr. Ward through all the minuteness of his successive chapters. But one can rarely find a more sorrowful record of disappointed ambition and gradually perishing hopes,—none the less sorrowful, because we feel, at every step, that, with a less morbid sensitiveness and a more reasonable energy mingled with cou-

tentment, he might have been a happy and a highly useful man.

In the latter division of his life, commencing when he was about thirty-six years of age, Dr. Percival devoted himself mainly to linguistic studies and to natural science. Before this time, indeed, he had been extensively engaged in the preparation of Webster's Dictionary, in association with the distinguished author of that work,—a service, in which his patience and thoroughness in the examination of words seemed, at first, calculated to be of much advantage. But Dr. Webster and himself, as the biographer well remarks, were not persons adapted to work together. The former was positive, energetic, thoroughly practical, and always confident in his own judgment. The latter was cautious in the extreme; he thought only of patient study and the utmost conceivable minuteness and accuracy, while the practical and the waiting-world were wholly beyond his vision. He was always seeing new points to be investigated, and the farther he advanced, so much the more remote did the prospect seem of his reaching the end. His collaborer and superior in the work, on the other hand, believed in the end, and moved steadily toward it; he wanted help in reaching the end, and not an endless wandering into undiscovered regions. The result was that they parted company, and Percival withdrew with dissatisfaction. The translating and editing of Malte Brun's Geography had also been committed to him by a Boston gentleman, some years before this,—a work which was carefully and faithfully done, but which was protracted over so long a period that the publisher failed in his enterprise. These things, however,—though in the line of his subsequent pursuits—belonged, in time, to the former period of his life, when he was still keeping up heart and hope as a poet. When this hope was finally crushed, he turned almost wholly to these new pursuits. At first, he occupied himself especially with the languages and comparative philology. Having great facility in acquisition and an extraordinary memory, he speedily gained a knowledge of a great variety of different languages and dialects,—including, according to Mr. Ward, every one of those in use in modern Europe, excepting the Turkish. Nor was he satisfied here, any more than he was

in other lines, with what was merely superficial. The tendency of his mind, when he was engaged in any employment, was not to rest content so long as there was anything still remaining to be learned; and it is astonishing to see how much he accomplished, and how curiously he searched into all the peculiarities and mysteries connected with these studies, within the four years following 1831. A large part, even, of the scattered attempts at poetry, during his later life, was made up of verses written in imitation of those in foreign tongues, and sometimes he composed in those tongues themselves. Of his success in these imitative efforts we do not propose to speak, but the efforts themselves show the enthusiasm of his studies, and the degree in which he entered into the spirit of the authors whom he had so carefully read. Probably no man in the country, at that time, had made wider investigations, or acquired a larger knowledge. The universal testimony of those who knew him seems to have been, that he was a true scholar, and even learned men were often glad to listen to his discourse upon the themes most familiar to them in their own field.

In 1835 he was called to another work—namely, that of making a geological survey of the State of Connecticut. This work occupied his time for six years, and was completed then only because the patience of the legislative and executive branches of the government was exhausted; and he was compelled to hand in his Report, though, to his own view, by no means finished. Of the minuteness and carefulness of the survey no better account can be given than by quoting a few words of his own from a letter addressed to Governor Baldwin, then a member of the State Senate, with reference to what had been accomplished during the first five years of the work:—

During this period, he says, "I had twice surveyed the whole State on a regular plan of sections from east to west, reducing the intervals in the last survey to an average distance of two miles; thus passing along one side of each of the nearly five thousand square miles of the State. In the first survey I had employed seven months, in the last nearly a year of constant travel. I had examined all objects of geological interest, particularly the rocks and those including minerals, with minute attention. I had scarcely passed a ledge or point of rock without particular examination. I had completed eleven manuscript volumes, amounting to nearly fifteen hundred pages, very finely written in abbreviation. I had collected specimens from at least eight thousand localities, accord-

ing to a very reduced calculation from actual enumeration of one town, and several specimens from each locality—each specimen intended to illustrate something peculiar and noticed in my notes—all my specimens marked on the papers enclosing them, and checked in my note-books, so that I know their precise locality, and could again trace them to the spot where I found them. In all these researches, from the commencement, I had had in view the determination of the geological system of the rocks of the State. All these researches had been a continued process, not only of particular examination, but of comparison and reflection, all tending to the determination of the great system. * * * While engaged in the survey, I can confidently say I have been laborious and diligent. While traveling, it was my practice to rise early, in the longer days generally at dawn; in the shorter generally I got breakfast and was on my way by daybreak. I continued, scarcely with any relaxation, as long as I had daylight, and then was generally obliged to sit up till midnight, not unfrequently till one o'clock, A. M., in order to complete my notes and arrange my specimens. This was continued, not only week after week, but month after month, almost without cessation."

Of the value of his report and the success of his work Professor Charles U. Shepard, who was his associate in the Survey, says: "The report will ever remain a monument to the scientific powers of its author. It describes every shade of variation in the different rocks, and their exact distribution over the surface of the State. This it accomplishes with a minuteness never before essayed in any similar work." And Professor Dana, in a letter to the author of this memoir, speaks of it in terms of respect and commendation.

Percival was forty-six years of age when his labors on the Geological Survey were brought to their conclusion. For several years after this he lived in his old home, New Haven, and again gave himself to literary pursuits,—and now also to music, to which he became as enthusiastically devoted as he had been to science and language. Two extracts from letters, written by those who were associated with him at this time, give a somewhat striking as well as amusing account of his efforts in this line. One of these, from Mr. William G. Webster, is as follows:—

"Percival was no musician himself, but his inquisitive mind was for months penetrating the mysteries of musical science. Almost every evening, during the intervals between the meetings of our musical club, he came to my house at a very early hour (frequently before tea), and going immediately to the piano, he would sit at arm's length, and with a single finger pick out the notes of some simple strain of his composition the previous day, and request me to record it for future use. A tedious process for him and me, as he might strike a dozen keys before

the proper note would be produced, and sometimes a whole evening might thus be spent on a single theme; and after all, on playing or singing the air myself, I would find it to be only a reminiscence of his earlier days." He adds, "Sometimes Percival would bring his accordion and amuse me with the result of his studies since his previous visit. Placing his fingers on the keys he imagined that sounds were elicited, when to my acute ear not a tone was audible. On one occasion, with his poetic eye upon the ceiling, he went off into an ecstasy of imaginary melody, of which I did not catch one note in three, and continued playing, or rather manipulating, so long that I fell asleep, but was soon aroused by his asking me whether the air he had been playing were a reminiscence or not."

The other extract is from a letter of Richard S. Willis, Esq., who says, speaking of the club referred to in the preceding quotation :—

"I recollect on one occasion our club was to sing at a little gathering of friends, and Percival, quite to our astonishment, had consented to accompany us—for he had shunned all general society for years. Still more were we astonished when he expressed his willingness, while there, to sing a song of his own. He had brought his accordion. In a retired corner of the room sat his gaunt, thin figure, bent over the instrument. To me he had never looked half so weird-like; that noble Shakespearian head of his, the sharply cut, spiritual features, his eyes so full of the wild fire of genius, the thin, curling locks, all gave him the appearance of a minstrel come down from another age. We had already quieted the room for the expected song. Standing near him, I soon knew, by the motion of his lips, that he was singing. But no one heard him; for I myself could distinguish only the soft breathing of a melody of his that was familiar to me. After a while, the company, supposing that he was not quite ready to begin, commenced talking again. The bard sang on, and the song was finished; but few beside myself at all suspected that he had been singing, most supposing, at last, that, for some reason, he had given up his intention. But his own soul had floated off upon his melody, and he had that sufficient reward which many a bard has—the silent rapture of song. But I believe and hope Percival was convinced that we shared the pleasure with him."

This Musical Club was composed of a number of young men, who met together to sing the patriotic songs so well known in connection with the election of General Harrison as President of the United States, and Dr. Percival seems, at this time, to have had his old poetic impulse awakened once more for a short season, as in the days gone by. He wrote large numbers of these songs, which were set to music and did service in the cause. But after the campaign was over, and the short triumph of the Whig party was ended by the death of the President,

his song became silent again, and we hear nothing farther of his special devotion to music. He retired more completely than ever within the narrow limits of his hermit life, and little or nothing is known of the character or results of his labors, except that they were in the line of linguistic studies, until, in 1853, he was called to the West on a scientific service. A year later, he was appointed State Geologist of the State of Wisconsin. He entered upon the work with all the energy and care which had characterized his similar labors in his native State. After carrying on the survey, however, for a portion of two years, he was compelled, in December, 1855, to suspend his labors on account of an illness, which continued between five and six months, and then terminated in his death, on the 22d of May, 1856. Within the time of his residence in the West, his more especial friends in New Haven had, in accordance with his desire and advice, erected the singular house, to which allusion was made at the beginning of our hasty review of his life. It was built in the hope that he might find in it a quiet resting-place for his closing years. The design of the building was his own, but it was so peculiar as to render it useless for any one except himself, and consequently the building was destroyed soon after his death. The record of his death is a very simple one. There was little expression of any kind. There was no desire manifested to see his old home again, and even no wish uttered that he might be buried in New Haven. There were words of prayer and a calm outlook upon the future; but the rest—all that was in his soul—was hidden, as it had been in life and as we should have anticipated it would be at the end, from every one but himself and God. Thus, at the age of sixty-one, he passed away from earth, leaving the record of his life behind him as it was, and finding his grave in a land of strangers far removed from his early home.

If we now turn from the narrative to retrace and carefully study the career of Dr. Percival, we think it must be admitted by all that it was by no means a successful career. The poet himself felt this most deeply during his lifetime, and his biographer, with all his admiration for him, cannot hide from himself or his readers this lamentable fact. Even his poetry failed to gain, either before or after his death, the praise which he

asked for, and here, if in anything, he approached most nearly to success. It becomes a point of much interest to inquire into the causes of his failure. Were they in the age or in the man? Were they in the outward circumstances or in the inward life? We believe they were largely in the latter, and, in endeavoring to show that they were so, we shall have occasion to notice several points of his character. So far as his poetic fame is concerned, it seems to us, that he failed of his hopes for the simple reason that he overestimated himself. No doubt, the time in which he began to write was, as we have already intimated, to some degree an unfavorable one for the true appreciation of poetry. But his contemporaries, as we think, notwithstanding this gave him all the commendation that he deserved, if not more than he deserved. Percival, to our view, was not a poet of a very high order, and, consequently, it was impossible that he should go down to future times with the name of one. He had, indeed, a certain measure of the divine gift. He was in advance of those who had gone before him in the preceding generation. He wrote some things which will find a place in every collection of American poetry. But when we have said all in his favor, we leave him quite outside of the highest ranks. And we think that the judgment of mankind proves our view to be right, for the knowledge and the estimation of his works have diminished steadily from the beginning until now. The growth of poetry in this country has been a gradual growth. The poems of Barlow and Dwight and their associates, in the last century, were only the first attempts of a new people, whose minds were mainly forced away by the practical necessities of their age from all departments of literature. Those writers would hardly have claimed great things for themselves. They were only the pioneers—the beginners—who must appear before the way is prepared for others of larger opportunities and greater powers. They were worthy to be remembered for what they did, but they ought not to be compared with the best poets of England, or with the most illustrious ones in our own land at the present day. Percival was at a stage of development decidedly beyond theirs, yet only at a certain advance beyond them. The nation was destined to pass beyond him, also,

at a later time, and to leave him, like those who had gone before him, as a man of the past history and the early beginnings. It has been passing beyond him, even within these thirty years since the portion of his life which he gave to song was ended, and in the future he may probably be lost sight of far more than he is to-day. As the great poet who may rise among us, in the coming time, shall take his place in the company of the great of other lands and other ages, the memory of him, like that of those in the generation before him, may fade away—except so far as the student of history may recall the progress of this divine art. Percival himself, on the other hand,—and his biographer seems to fall into something of the same mistake respecting him,—took a much higher view of his own merits. He believed himself to be a poet deserving of a wide-extended and long-enduring reputation. He felt that his countrymen ought always to bear him in their hearts and sound aloud his praises. He demanded more than the wise and impartial judgment of the world could bestow upon him, and, of necessity, he was deeply disappointed. No reader of this volume can fail to see, everywhere throughout the earlier chapters, the evidence of his self-esteem in reference to his poetic power, and his almost angry dissatisfaction when the results of his efforts at publication were made known to him. He scolded the public unsparingly to his friends, and became so disgusted with mankind in general, that he shut himself up in his solitary life, to brood over the dullness and selfishness of the world. We can easily realize how a mind, which had so much of real enthusiasm and even of true inspiration as his had, and, at the same time, so much determination to be what he thought himself capable of being, could become grieved and disheartened and even impatient under the trial of what seemed to him a too low appreciation of his genius. But the trial was in large measure, if not wholly, owing to himself. As we read Mr. Ward's account of these years, we are impressed with the fact that he was not, in reality, neglected by the literary public. His poems were not received, indeed, with the eagerness with which a new volume from Tennyson would now be welcomed, and they certainly ought not to have been so received. They were not received even as willingly

as a novel, or perhaps as a treatise or, to use his own language, a "heavy-blank-verse melody" on doctrinal theology, was then received. But it must be remembered, that men, in all ages, run after novel-reading, and that, at that day, they were unusually devoted to theological controversy. The true way of deciding the question is to compare his case with that of other poets, and, approaching the matter thus, we again submit that he was fairly treated by his contemporaries. They certainly ought to stand acquitted of all unjust depreciation of his merits; and we question whether his poems were not more favorably accepted by the public, even if somewhat less widely circulated, than they would have been, had they been published a quarter of a century later. The number of readers has become greater, indeed, since that time, but it must not be forgotten that the standard of poetry has become higher also. We would give all praise to Percival for what he did. We would acknowledge his genius and the beauty of some of his verses. But we cannot place him where he placed himself, nor can we wonder that his largest desires were ever unsatisfied. Had he estimated himself as he ought to have done, we believe he would have found a voice in song, and a joyous one too, even to the end of his life, and that the blessing of many happy years might have come to him, as it came to those other poets whose fame has descended to us from his own time, and some of whom are still enjoying their reward in old age, as they are conscious of the esteem and praises of their countrymen.

The failure of his hopes in this loved and chosen sphere, and the necessity of finding the means of support led him, as we have seen, into other lines of working. But he seems to have carried his disappointed ambition with him everywhere, and, as the result of it, to have been dissatisfied with every employment which his friends—sometimes with infinite pains—secured for him. We hazard nothing in saying that, among the numerous things which he undertook, no one found him with a contented mind for more than a few months. Either the work itself became thoroughly irksome to him, or the remuneration for his services, which had been agreed upon, became so small to his apprehension, in comparison with the labor to be perform-

ed, that he felt and openly intimated that his employer was over-reaching or defrauding him. Cases continually occurred where, on the presentation of his grievances, a new and more favorable pecuniary arrangement was made, but a short period only elapsed before he became as discontented as before. And almost universally the final result was, that he abandoned the work, if not in the most sudden manner, yet with the most deeply injured feeling. He saw no fault in himself at such times, but laid the blame wholly upon others, or upon the inconsiderate or ignorant world. A very striking instance, as exhibiting his character in this regard, is found in connection with his appointment to certain services under the War Department of the United States. As his friend, Prof. William C. Fowler, in the year 1823, was leaving New Haven for a short residence in Washington, Percival "requested him to make some efforts to obtain for him a situation under the general government." After his arrival in Washington, Professor Fowler had a number of interviews with Mr. Calhoun, then Secretary of War, and made interest with him to such a degree that a choice of three positions was offered to the poet,—a professorship of chemistry and kindred sciences in the Academy at West Point, the post of surgeon in the army, and some office—as a clerkship—at Washington. He preferred the position at West Point, became very earnest to secure it, endeavored to press Mr. Calhoun's half-promise upon that gentleman's attention, when political influences would have given the place to another, and finally fell into such a state of anxious suspense, that he was wholly unable to bear it, and actually made a journey to Washington, notwithstanding his extreme poverty, in order that he might learn his fate at the earliest moment. At length the nomination was made by Mr. Calhoun, though, as Professor Fowler remarks, "at the loss of political favor on his part," and the appointment was confirmed by the Senate. This was about the first of March, 1824. On the fifth of the following May, Percival wrote from West Point to his friend in Washington—we quote his language almost verbatim—that he was altogether dissatisfied with his quarters; that he was equally dissatisfied with his duties; that his work was much more laborious than he had antici-

pated, and in fact was mere drudgery ; that the employment was unhealthy ; that he hated chemistry, and had no notion of stifling himself with the stench and poison of a laboratory ; that he had been entirely deceived in regard to the place ; and that of all the disappointments of which his life had been full this was the worst. How long he had been in the new office we cannot determine with absolute certainty, but it is evident that it was not more than two months, and he distinctly says that it was the very first evening of his entrance upon the quarters of which he speaks. A few days later, he discourses to the same friend in the following strain : " I have been disappointed. I have been exposed to a loss of reputation ; and yet I believe you have had the very best intentions. I indulge no resentment. I regret that you were so hasty, that you were not better informed. I am sure, if you had been, we should at once have agreed that the surgeon's place was far preferable," &c., &c.,—that is, in a sort of magnanimous mingling of forgiveness with reproach, he throws the blame of bringing him into such an unpleasant position upon the one who had endeavored to render him a great service, which he had himself especially desired. The burden of his letters now was that he might be relieved from his professorship, and be transferred to the post of surgeon in the army, the second of the three positions suggested to him at the outset. Notwithstanding the delicacy of approaching Mr. Calhoun again with this new request, after he had exposed himself to ill-will by bestowing the West Point appointment as he did, Professor Fowler did so at Percival's urgent desire ; and the request being granted, Percival was stationed at Boston,—the very station which he had wished for. He seems to have left the Military Academy in June. Six months afterward, in January, 1825, we find him writing again to the same friend, that his new place was disagreeable in itself, and was one in which his compensation was reduced more than one-half without any chance of improvement. He adds, " I have regretted, ever since I felt myself obliged to leave West Point, that you had not at first directed the patronage which was granted me last winter to the situation of a clerk at Washington,"—and, after some further remarks, he says, " Of course I cannot be willing to continue here." Professor Fow-

ler once more interceded in his behalf, bringing his third proposition to the notice of the government, but, to use that gentleman's own language, the matter was not followed up because he (Percival) became, just at this time, gradually engrossed in certain literary engagements. So far the story of his relations with the government. We may add, in a single word, that the first of these literary matters, to which Professor Fowler refers, was an abridgment of Lempriere's Classical Dictionary, which he was to accomplish in ninety days. But this, also, was given up, almost as soon as undertaken, and he began to support himself by contributions to various periodicals. His whole history is full of such instances of dissatisfaction and such changes of purpose,—generally with a similar feeling that he had been either unintentionally deceived or intentionally cheated. Of course, under such circumstances, his poetry was not the only thing that failed. No life could be successful which proceeded on these principles. No efforts of others could help it to success when the man himself threw away every opportunity that was offered to him, from every side, and even every opportunity that he had himself urged his friends to secure in his behalf.

This, however, was not the only obstacle which hindered his progress. Every man's prosperity or triumph in his career in this world is largely dependent on his relations to others. But Percival was as sensitive in his social relations as he was prone to find fault with his condition and his work. We venture to affirm that it was impossible for the most gentle and considerate and Christian person to be sure of living upon comfortable terms with him for a period of years. His was one of those suspicious and easily offended souls, which often interpret the most innocent and harmless remark as a designed slight to themselves. The past alone, therefore, could be safe to any of his acquaintance; no one could imagine what the immediate future might bring to pass. The idea is believed to have prevailed in some quarters, and seems to have been in the poet's own mind, that the citizens of New Haven were neglectful of him, and willingly excluded him from their society. But we see no evidence of this—except so far as, by reason of his readiness to take offense where none was intended, he put it

almost beyond their power to treat him with farther attention. An instance in point has recently been brought to our notice. During the time—about the year 1840—when he was much interested in music, he requested of one of the prominent citizens of New Haven the privilege of using his piano for the purpose of musical practice. The request was readily granted, and, accordingly, Percival appeared at this gentleman's residence one evening not long afterward. With his habitual regardlessness of the lapse of time, he continued playing upon the instrument until two o'clock in the morning. Of course, the repetition of such a thing could not be allowed, and the gentleman politely said to him, that his instrument was at his service on any occasion, whenever he might be inclined to make use of it; but that, as he felt it necessary to close his house at ten o'clock at night, he hoped he would make it convenient to use it at some earlier hour. Certainly this was not an unreasonable request, and yet Percival was so incensed by the remark that he would never enter the house again. We know not how such a man, after a residence in any city that was long enough to have given him the opportunity of coming into frequent intercourse with its inhabitants, could be anything besides a hermit; and this not because his fellow-citizens turned away from his society, but because he, foolishly and without reason, turned away from theirs. Of his feeling in regard to the people of Hartford, and his reception there in his early manhood, Mr. Ward speaks in the following paragraph:

"He was invited by his classmate, the late Rev. Horace Hooker, to visit him at Hartford, and enter into the literary society of his acquaintances. He gladly embraced the opportunity, and prepared himself to talk elaborately on particular topics. But he was not a favorite. He was too shy and modest to adapt himself with readiness to different circles. He wanted confidence, and at social gatherings he talked at great length on single subjects, but in so low a tone that people could not hear him. He was not treated as he expected to be; it seemed to him that he was not appreciated, and he came away in disgust. How keenly he felt this disappointment may be seen from one of his early poems, entitled *An Imprecation*. His wounded sensitiveness grew morbid in the brightness of his imagination. The following are the first and last stanzas:

"Ismir! fare thee well forever!
From thy walls with joy I go,

Every tie I freely sever,
Flying from thy den of woe.

“ ‘Ismir ! land of cursed deceivers,
Where the sons of darkness dwell,
Hope, the cherub's base bereavers,—
Hateful city ! fare thee well.’ ”

Surely this was not very encouraging to others elsewhere, who might open to him an entrance into their own circle of society. The severe manner, also, in which he launches out, in “the Suicide,” upon his maternal uncle, the Reverend Seth Hart, gives similar evidence in regard to the question of his social adaptations and of his liability to misjudge others. This gentleman was an ordinary, good-natured, common-place, Episcopal minister, at whose school on Long Island, Percival passed a year or two of his boyhood. He quite probably had a very moderate knowledge of the subjects which he professed to teach, and, perhaps, far less appreciation of the peculiar nature and needs of his imaginative and melancholy nephew. In a word, he was, quite probably, a second rate teacher. Moreover,—though we have no indication of this in the biography,—he may, possibly, have interfered at times with the youthful poet's desires or even with his favorite studies. In addition to this, he is said to have enjoyed good living, and, finding that the timid and strange boy did not partake as largely of the provision set before him upon his table as he thought he ought to do, he heartily urged him to eat less sparingly ; and, on one occasion, he even offered him “a glass of spirit,” a thing which, as Mr. Ward remarks, “was in perfect accordance with the custom in those days.” But by this act he offended him, “in his sense of perfect virtue for the whole of his past life,” beyond all forgiveness. One might naturally suppose that a person of a mind like Percival's would have looked back, in after years, upon the time spent in this school as not very profitably employed, and upon the clerical uncle as no very helpful or useful guide in learning's paths. We could not have blamed him had he done so. But when we find the good rector called, in this poem, an “arch moral murderer,” and bidden to “gorge and wallow in his priestly sty,” or to “crawl and die with his kindred reptiles,” we discover a

violence of passion in the mind of the writer, which easily explains how he may have fallen out of the notice or society of his fellow-citizens, with little fault on their part. We wonder rather, at the end of his history, that any friends continued to bear with his strange perverseness and to give him aid and encouragement through so many years, than that many left him to his solitude. He made it, in fact, impossible for others to be to him what he persistently demanded that they should be, and we feel compelled to say that he lived and died a hermit mainly because he made one of himself.

In one of his letters to his friend, Mr. Yvonnet, he seems to have had, for a moment, a vision of what it was that he needed. After discoursing for some time upon his failures and disappointments, he says,—“But I must stop these complaints and be a man.” This manly resolution,—this bold meeting the necessities and the trials of his condition, together with an energetic pressing on in the paths that were opened to him and a belief that other men would deal with him, in general, as kindly and considerately as he would deal with them, would have changed his whole life. Instead, however, of having this heroic energy and purpose, he complained of everything and of everybody; he gave up every new employment almost as soon as he had entered upon it; he lived in a ceaseless state of disgust; and his life became a perpetual weeping over his hard fate. Now we would not, by any means, maintain that a man must succeed in life, in order to give evidence of superiority of mind or even of greatness. Many men of the finest character shrink from the roughness and conflict of the world, and fall into disappointment and obscurity, because destiny does not open to them any sphere for which they are fitted. But Percival did not fail, as it seems to us, on this account. He did not want opportunities for working, or capacity for doing the things that were presented to him to do. He failed of his hopes in the poetic field because, as we have said, he overestimated himself, and he failed everywhere else because he would not do the things, which he was perfectly capable of doing, with any persistence or determination. He had not, in any department of his life or work, so far as we are able to discover, anything of what we may call the “sink or swim, live

or die, survive or perish" element; and no man can be a great man, or even in the truest sense a man, in whose nature this element is wholly wanting. Percival's inability was in his will and not in his powers. Indeed, after reading the story of his career, the conviction is forced upon us, that if he had been a man of abundant wealth,—freed from all the difficulties and discouragements of poverty, and at liberty to follow out his own tastes through his whole lifetime,—he would never have accomplished any great results. He would never have been satisfied with the measure of approbation which the public bestowed upon him. He would have changed from one employment to another, and would never have carried his work, in any line, to its completion.

Such, we believe, must be the judgment of all who examine Mr. Ward's biography of the poet with impartial minds. The world around him might have remained precisely as it was, and yet an abundant success would have been secured for him, if he had only been altered, within himself, into a reasonable and determined man. But had he continued as he was, we do not conceive it possible that the world around him could ever have been so far changed as to have made his life and fame satisfy the desires of his heart. He must necessarily have been an unhappy and unsuccessful man, because he was himself and could not escape himself. This was the simple great fact of his history. But, as we are obliged to make this declaration concerning him and to lay the charge of the failure at his own door, we think our judgment respecting his responsibility, or the degree in which he was to be blamed—his character in this view of it—ought to be as lenient as possible. Percival, as it appears to us, was a man essentially of unsound mind. He had a morbid sensitiveness and an overpowering melancholy which amounted to a sort of derangement, and these were, in large measure if not wholly, the gift of nature. When, some twenty years after the event, Professor Fowler endeavored to apologize to Mr. Calhoun, in his friend's behalf, for his singular course in respect to the appointments in the government service, to which allusion has been made, that distinguished gentleman replied, as if no apology were needed, "Oh, Dr. Percival was a poet, Dr. Percival was a poet." It

was true. He was what Mr. Calhoun meant by a poet, or even more than he meant. He was a man whose character was to be judged by no ordinary rules, for his soul was not like those of ordinary men—it was disordered, from his earliest life. His friends knew this, and they dealt with him accordingly, enduring all things and hoping all things. And those who become acquainted with him now, for the first time, must follow the example of his friends, in some measure, if they would be both just and kindly to his memory. They cannot, indeed, deny the facts, which are as clear as the sunlight. They cannot reproach the age in which he lived as an unfeeling age, or the community among whom he established his residence for so many years as a heartless community. They cannot respond, as we think, to the sentiment of the biographer, who says that his “reverence for his genius and attainments has increased with a riper knowledge of his character.” They can only feel that, while he was a perpetually complaining and weak-spirited man, who did not manfully rise to the emergencies of his condition, he was yet to be pardoned for what would have been a blameworthy, as well as grievous, weakness and fault in other men, because he was diseased in mind. And, feeling thus, they will speak more sorrowfully than sternly over his grave.

If we now turn our thoughts more directly to some of the characteristics and peculiarities of Dr. Percival, it should be noticed, first of all, that he was a man of wide-extended adaptations. This, indeed, has been incidentally referred to on the preceding pages, and is manifest in every part of his history. That he had the poetic gift in no inconsiderable degree none will question. But he was equally successful, and almost as enthusiastic, in his pursuit of science or language as he was in that of poetry. Every employment, among the many that were opened to him in the course of his career, found him, so far as the powers of his mind were concerned, ready to enter it and prepared for all that it demanded of labor or of research. The same man, who wrote the sweet verses of the poem called “Seneca Lake,” or the lines to which the biographer alludes in his preface as having first excited his interest in the poet, was the author of a Report on the Connecticut Survey, which

was "so close and brief in its descriptions," that it is declared to be "one of the driest productions ever issued on geological science." The same man, who astonished his examiners, by his proficiency in the science of medicine, in his early manhood, was, at one time, an eager student of twenty languages; at another, was wholly engrossed in music, so that his soul seemed to find its highest delight in the charms of melody; and at still another, was ready to think of entering the service of the Church as a preacher of the gospel. His poetry, thus, seems to have been but one of the many out-goings of his versatile mind—not the creation of a genius that was inspired by the Muses only; and, with a child's enthusiasm, he joyfully turned his thoughts to every new department of knowledge, as a new field for the play of his active powers. The danger to which every such mind is exposed, is, of course, that of falling into instability and losing the steadiness of a well-ordered intellectual life. It is evident that Percival failed in this way—that he knew the child's weariness and changeableness, as well as the child's ardor at the outset; and therefore he can scarcely be counted among the few great men of the world's history, who have been especially distinguished for this all-embracing knowledge and all-penetrating zeal.

A man of such wide-extended research was also, of necessity, a man of wide-extended information. But he had not only the love of investigation; he had, in an equal degree, the power of remembering all that he had ever learned. Instances are recorded, in the volume before us, where he astonished his friends by the minute exactness of his knowledge in regard to subjects which he had not examined for years, and, when he presented his remarkably accurate Geological Report to the Legislature of Connecticut, he wrote it hastily and almost entirely "from recollection, with but occasional reference to his materials." Nor did he desire to keep all this varied information to himself. On the contrary, he was always ready to impart what he had to others, whenever they were desirous of receiving it. In fact, he was almost too ready to do so, for, on such occasions, being wholly absorbed in his subject and in his own thoughts, he lost sight of all things else. He became utterly regardless of the passage of time, and poured forth an inces-

sant stream of words until the person, who listened to him, was obliged to leave him alone. And, even then, he did not lose his hold upon his listener, but, at his next opportunity, seized upon him again, and, with some remark referring to the interrupted discourse, he commenced anew upon the old subject. Of course he was not, in any proper sense, a conversationalist. Few great talkers are so. He was, rather, a lecturer to a single auditor; and, though he was sometimes interesting and instructive, yet, like all lecturers in ordinary society, he was sometimes, also, wearisome and dull. We cannot wonder that the young gentlemen and ladies in Hartford were not enchanted, in his early life, by his carefully-prepared and elaborate talk upon various topics; or that the elder Professor Siliman, at one of the meetings of the Connecticut Academy of Sciences, when he had discoursed at interminable length, politely intimated to him, as he hesitated for a moment, that the members would be glad to have the conclusion of the subject at another time. Beyond all doubt, there was something in him, from the very beginning, of the character of the "Old Man of the Sea," who troubled the poet Holmes so much in one of his waking dreams; and men of this character cannot expect to be universally attractive or universally courted.

As a scholar, Dr. Percival seems to have been large-minded in his views; a believer in progress and hopeful for the future; disposed to penetrate into the deepest mysteries; and willing to regard nothing as settled, so long as any shadow of uncertainty remained, or even the minutest point had not yet been examined. The field enlarged itself, in every direction, the moment he first entered it, and grew still wider and wider at every step of his course afterward. So far, even, did he carry this spirit of inquiry as to interfere very greatly with the attainment of those results, without which a scholar's labors do the world comparatively little good. Could he have lived a hundred and fifty years, he might have finished something according to his own desires. But, unfortunately, he died at sixty, and the world gained almost nothing from him, because the time was not half long enough. He was fitted simply to pore over books in his own library, and curiously to seek out the most curious things of literature and science. But, inas-

much as he never, at any moment, to his own view knew anything, quite as he ought to know it, he never was ready to publish his knowledge to mankind; and, as a necessary consequence, the generation, that has followed him, does not know that he knew anything, except as it finds the fact recorded somewhere in the testimony of his friends. At the same time, he may have had a certain beneficial influence upon his contemporaries, by the mere example which he set before them, of "self-abnegation and devotion to study," as one of his friends claims for him; and the words of that friend may be true—though we think not in his later years—that "his presence in the scholastic community where he lived was a perpetual incentive to industry and manliness, and that thousands yet live to thank him for lessons derived from the simple survey of his daily life." If this be indeed so, as a scholar he did not live in vain.

In regard to his feelings and sentiments toward the world, we agree with Professor Shepard, whose reminiscences of the poet are given in this volume, that he was not a misanthrope. He was a hermit, not because he hated or disliked his fellow-men, but because he thought they thrust him out of their association and approbation, and because the continual disappointment and poverty of many years made him shrink, more and more, from the public view. Gradually, of course, he came to love his retirement, and was, at last, unable to live outside of it. But, in early life, he was even willing to enjoy the society of women; he was susceptible to the charms of personal beauty, and would have married, had he not been disheartened by the failure of his efforts to win those whom he loved. He was not, as some men are, designed, through the very solitary tendencies of the natural character, to be a bachelor, and yet it would seem that no woman could have been designed to be his wife. But he was not otherwise than of a kindly spirit, in general. He bore no hatred or perpetual ill-will toward individuals. He was a well-wisher of the race, and he loved both his home and his country.

As we remember him, in his later life, he was an object of curiosity to all—rarely showing himself in the public streets, and almost as unknown to the daily life of the world as if he

had been of an earlier age. Of his appearance and general bearing we can give no better account than that which Professor Shepard has presented, in his description of him. He says, "The impression made on me by his singular person and manners was vivid and indelible. Slender in form, rather above than under the middle height, he had a narrow chest, and a peculiar stoop, which was not in the back, but high up in the shoulders. His head, without being large, was fine. His eyes were of a dark hazel, and possessed uncommon expression. His nose, mouth, and chin were symmetrically, if not elegantly, formed, and came short of beauty only because of that meagreness which marked his whole person. His complexion, light without redness, inclined to sallow, and suggested a temperament somewhat bilious. His dark brown hair had become thin above the forehead, revealing to advantage that most striking feature of his countenance. Taken all together, his appearance was that of a weak man, of delicate constitution,—an appearance hardly justified by the fact; for he endured fatigue and privation with remarkable stanchness." He adds, "Percival's face, when he was silent, was full of calm, serious meditation; when speaking, it lighted up with thought, and became noticeably expressive. He commonly talked in a mild, unimpassioned undertone, but just above a whisper, letting his voice sink with rather a pleasing cadence at the completion of each sentence. Even when most animated, he used no gesture except a movement of the first and second fingers of his right hand backward and forward across the palm of his left, meantime following their monotonous unrest with his eyes, and rarely meeting the gaze of his interlocutor. He would stand for hours, when talking, his right elbow on a mantel-piece, if there was one near, his fingers going through their strange palmistry; and in this manner, never once stirring from his position, he would not unfrequently protract his discourse till long past midnight. An inexhaustible, undemonstrative, noiseless, passionless man, scarcely evident to you by physical qualities, and impressing you, for the most part, as a creature of pure intellect."

It remains only to speak of Dr. Percival's religious character. This was peculiarly hidden from the world. We find some expressions in his earlier poetry, which were disturbing

to many of his friends and of the people of his own day; and, from occasional remarks in his letters, it would seem that he differed from the doctrinal views and system held in the region where he lived. But we have no record of his later years, in this regard; and, as we have seen, he died with prayer, but with the utterance of no words that might have borne witness respecting his spiritual life. We can only say that we believe the Divine work often goes on, gradually and silently, in the heart of such a man through the progress of many years, and that, while men see nothing but darkness and doubt, to the eye of God the light, though faint at first, becomes brighter and brighter until it fades into the perfect day. And we cannot but hope that, amid all his searchings into the mysteries of science and learning, he may have found, in his lifetime, the unfolding of the mystery of Divine truth,—and that out of all the trials and disappointments of his years on earth he may have passed, at the end, into the happiness and peace of those who are satisfied forever. After so sorrowful a beginning it would be sad indeed, were there no joyful ending.

We lay aside Mr. Ward's volume with a mingled feeling of pleasure and regret that it has been published. A man like Percival, of so strange a history and of so much genius—a poet and a scholar—ought not to pass away, as we said at the beginning, without any record of his life to recall him to the knowledge and remembrance of men. And it is fitting—when his friends had followed him to the grave, and thus could speak of him no longer—that even a stranger should tell of what he did and what he was. But there is so much of weakness revealed in the narrative, and our idea of the man is so pitifully lowered, as we discover the causes of his failure and the secrets of his inward being, that we are almost led to feel it would have been better to have left him in the solitude of his hermitage—revealing himself to mankind only through his poetry, and carrying with him even into the unseen world all other knowledge of himself. It was a reverential hand, indeed, that lifted the veil, and a kindly heart that inspired the story. But we fear that it is the saddest thing that could have befallen the poet's memory or his present fame, that the veil was lifted at all, or that the story was ever told to those who had not known it before.

ARTICLE V.—THOUGHTS ON PUBLIC WORSHIP.

WORSHIP springs from a need of our nature to express the reverence we feel toward God. This, in union with the social instinct, which compels man to a fellowship with others even in his most spiritual acts, gives rise to Public Worship. The springs of worship are in ourselves, but the end of worship is God. "Whoso offereth praise glorifieth me." God, we believe, delights in the worship of his creatures when it springs from the heart, and is a true expression of the gratitude and praise of beings he has made; not that he desires praise for self-glorification, but because his infinite perfections and glorious works deserve praise, because to give them praise is the duty and impulse of every good heart, and because the goodness of God is identical with goodness itself. "Praise honors God, and therefore puts a distinguishing honor upon this duty. Prayer is an expression of our indigence and weakness. Thanksgiving expresseth our relish of the sweetness of benefits received; but praise rises above all selfish regards, and directly terminates on the goodness and amiableness of God himself. He loves our prayers, he loves our penitential tears and groans; but nothing pleases him so much as the cheerful adoration and praise of his people. Nay, penitential tears are no otherwise valuable than as they purge our eyes from the filth of sin, that we may behold more clearly the loveliness of God, and give him that glory which is due to his name. All the other duties of devotion are only means of preparation for this sublime exercise. The habitations of the blessed continually resound with the high praises of God. There the most perfect creatures, in their most perfect state, have this for their constant unwearied employment, 'they rest not day nor night, saying, Holy, holy, holy, Lord God Almighty, which was, and is, and is to come.' " *

* Robert Walker—Sermons, p. 370.

Worship is not precisely religion itself, but it is the expression of the religious sentiment in an act that comprehends the offering up of the whole man to God. Vinet says that worship is "the assemblage of all the elements of our being in an act of pure religion." * All parts of our complex nature enter into this act of worship, and are all of them fitly represented in the great common act of Public Worship. The *physical* nature is represented by the actual bodily presence in the house of God—by the attitude of devotion—by the formal ordinance which appeals to the eye and sense. This is that symbolic element in worship to which belongs the form of expression, and the whole external method of devotion. There is also the *emotional* part of our nature which enters into Public Worship—the rendering up of the sensibilities and affections to God. This expresses itself in the penitential confession, the sacred lyric, and the adoring prayer. It is the pure liturgical element in worship, that which is essential to its life and fervor, the essential fire, the very heart of worship. Genuine feeling is the soul of worship—and above all, the feeling of dependent trust and affectionate devotion to God—the true *Sursum Corda* of the primitive Church. We can indeed think of many other things which come into, and must come into Christian worship, but if feeling, if what we call the *heart*, is wanting, all is wanting. The intellect and conscience enter largely into rational Christian worship, but worship in its innermost sense is not intellectual instruction, nor is it the definite action, at the time being, of the moral sense, *i. e.*, doing acts of duty or benevolence—but it is the lifting up of the heart to God in humble, penitent, joyful adoration.† It is the true and fervent expression of the love and willing service of God—a readiness and yearning to receive spiritual gifts from him. The heart of the worshiper must be in a fit state to receive blessings from God. It should be in a receptive as well as active state. It must indeed be in part in a passive condition, one of love and faith and trust, one able to receive, as well as to give. It must be able to lose sight of self, and to fix the eye of fervent affectionate confidence

* Pastoral Theology, p. 180.

† Hagenbach's Liturgik und Homiletik, c. i., § 3.

on God, and thus be ready to obtain grace and peace and inward refreshing from on high. And again, the intellectual or *rational* nature, including both the conscience and will, has also its appropriate place in the solemn act of the public worship of God. This is the didactic element in worship which instructs the soul in religious truth, and builds it up in the very spirit and life of Christ. Vinet, quoting from Harms, says "that preaching is only an accidental adjunct of worship, not an integral part of it."* We cannot agree to this, and we would prefer to take the larger and higher view of worship which has already been given, and which is in fact carrying out Vinet's own thought, that it is "the assemblage of all the elements of our being (the rational as well as the emotional) in an act of pure religion." Protestants rightly view "preaching of the Word" as a main part of Christian worship; but we should not at the same time lose sight of the fact that it *is* worship—that God, and not the human preacher, is the great end of preaching—that preaching itself is a part of the praise and service of God. Preaching as an element of public worship is a somewhat different thing from the instructive lecture, or the popular address, however useful and needful, upon any purely ethical subject. It has some peculiar features which constitute its proper relations to the worship of God's house, which make it also praise, and which do not permit it to stand isolated as a mere effort of the human mind, or as exclusively addressed to the intellect, or as a simple lesson in the instruction of Divine Truth. True worship is the edifying or building up of the people in all Christian faith and godliness; but it does this *by leading them to God* in prayer, song, reading the Scriptures, and preaching; by developing the Divine life, the real Christian feeling, the true spirit of Christian love, that exists in the congregation. It is bringing out this consciousness of the life of God and Christ that is in the souls of the people—giving expression to this—and thus warming to new growth and activity every power and quality of the Christian life. True worship makes men better Christians, purer, more self-sacrificing and courageous workers in all good things,

* Pastoral Theology, p. 181.

because the heart has been kindled by contact with the heart of Christ. In the same way preaching to save the souls of the impenitent finds its highest impulse in the praise and glory of God,—that those darkened and silent spirits may, by the renewing power of Christ given to them, break their chains of sin, and join in the universal song of praise that continually goes up from all holy hearts to the blessed Lord and Redeemer of our nature. This deep inter-relation of preaching to the whole idea of Divine Worship is, we think, a very important one, and settles many mooted questions in regard to the subject-matter, style, length, manner, and entire character of the sermon which is spoken on the Lord's day in the public service of the sanctuary. Then, lastly, to carry out fully this theory of worship, the more purely *spiritual* element should, above all, not be wanting. This draws out the highest nature of man in the adoration of God, raises man to a participation in spiritual things, and promotes a real and present union with the spirit of Christ. This is that deep soul-element which constitutes the true spiritual worship of God, as contradistinguished from all merely human, formal, ritual, and outward modes of worship; which, in fine, fulfills the words of the Saviour when he said: "But the hour cometh and now is, when the true worshipers shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth." This is the worship which Christ himself and his disciples rendered to the Father of all mercies, and which now, in the name and through the faith of the Son of God, is rendered by true Christian believers, the world over, to the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. The whole conception of Public Worship which has been thus set forth, summoning the varied nature of man to a high and joyful act of praise, consecrating his entire being, body and soul, as a reasonable offering to God, meets, we believe, the highest enlightened Christian consciousness, as we find it developed in the New Testament, and in the history and worship of the universal Christian church.

And none of the elements which have been mentioned should be wanting in the great and solemn act of Public Worship; all should have their proper place; the loss of even one of them would seriously impair the unity, beauty, and truth

of the worship. Without the outward form and bodily presence, we run into the purely subjective, inexpressive, and spiritualistic idea of worship, which tends to degenerate into no worship at all, and evaporates in silence and nonentity. In the absence of the emotional, or more purely devotional element, the worship becomes lifelessly formal or fatally rationalistic; so that if a man goes to church with the sole idea of gaining instruction, of having dark points cleared up, and obtains no new light on the dark things of truth, he might very well say, "It would be about as well for me to stay at home—I have books written by master minds—I get no food here." And if the intellectual or didactic element were taken away, the worship would sink into a bald ritualism without a ray of the divine intelligence shining through it, and about equal, for all power to help the soul to rise to God, to the "sounding brass" and senseless mummeries of a Buddhist temple.

Having thus set forth briefly this general theory of Public Worship, let us now look for a moment at its actual form and expression. The mere outward form of worship, where it does not embrace actual error, is, we hold, left substantially to the choice and regulation of the church itself; therefore, we think it profitable to inquire after all the legitimate sources of power, interest, fervor, and truth in worship.

There can be no doubt that the more spiritual the church, the less actual need it has of outward forms of worship; yet even this principle cannot be carried too far, for in Heaven, where it is supposed that forms will not be needed, there is represented to be something like order, form, harmony, and communion in worship. It is the four and twenty elders who give praise to the Lord God Almighty. It is the hundred and forty and four thousand who sing the new song, and the harpers join with them. There is a definite theme of praise, and a defined number who sing and praise together. If this be some true image given to us of the praise of Heaven, it would seem as if some form were needful for those who still possess human bodies and sympathies, and who are still creatures of time and place. The question then is, how much and how little form is needed in the public worship of God? The general testimony of the New Testament is certainly in favor of

simple forms of worship—of the simplest frame-work required to sustain the tender plants of devotion, lest they be trampled in the mire of common things, and no longer shoot upward in the light and sunshine of Heaven. But in the New Testament itself there is evidence of considerable variety in the matter of form, and the whole subject of public worship was evidently left pretty much to the needs and will of the churches, or of those who presided over them. But towards the close of the Apostolic period we have the fact developed that there was something like a regularly organized public service of God, consisting of distinct parts, and special directions are given in the later epistles respecting the order of exercises, the whole course of public worship, and the behavior of those engaged in it. In writings both sacred and profane, immediately succeeding the Apostolic age, the same fact is confirmed, until the period when form usurped the place of spirit, and worship became utterly corrupted. But we will not go over the historical ground. We would only say a word in regard to the Lord's Supper, which has been sometimes thought to be the historic germ of all Christian public worship. But this can hardly be, for there is strong proof that when it was celebrated every time Christians met together, and every day by the Church of Jerusalem, it was then connected with the "Agapæ" or "Feasts of Love," and was not therefore strictly to be considered as forming a part of divine worship; but it was rather a feast of Christian Love and Friendship in which Christ formed one—a simple continuation of the first supper, only recognizing Christ in a more formal manner as the real bond of love and friendship. We do not believe that an argument can be drawn from this that the Lord's Supper ought to be looked upon as the sole originating cause or centre of Christian worship, or that it should be celebrated every Sunday. The historian Cave, it is true, takes the ground, that the growing laxness in celebrating the Lord's Supper, first every Sabbath, then every month, then every two months, is evidence of the gradual decline of faith in the primitive church. But even in Justin Martyr's day, we find that the Lord's Supper was already separated from the "Feasts of Love," and did not therefore form the direct object or occasion

of every assemblage together of Christians, whether for social purposes or worship. This very idea, however, seized upon by the Romish Church, of clustering everything about the Eucharist, has led to the Romish superstition of the Mass, and in fact to the whole vast system and structure of the Romish Church. The Lord's Supper is undoubtedly the highest and tenderest act of Christian public worship, but it is not the only, or even the seminal act of all Christian public worship, nor do we believe that our Lord would wish it to be so regarded.

Some kind of outward formal worship is then to be considered as essential. Even Quakers admit this by their coming together in regular places of solemn assembly. Every Christian body or denomination has its regular form of public worship just as truly as the Roman Catholics or Episcopalians have theirs. Our Congregational worship is as much a form as that of any other Christian body, only a much simpler, and, as we hold, more scriptural form. In many instances we have even fixed forms of words, though taken from the Bible, as in our benedictions and formulas for Baptism and the Lord's Supper. There is a strong tendency to run our very prayers into set forms of words, showing that there is a certain current toward permanent methods of expression even in the freest systems of worship.

The question next arises, what kind of formal public worship (humanly speaking) is best adapted to meet the true ends of worship, to produce, sustain, and develop the spirit of praise, and the feeling of true devotion and adoration?

There are, it seems to us, three great principles drawn from our mental constitution, that should enter into the actual operation or carrying out of all true Christian public worship of God. The first of these, which is not only a natural but a scriptural principle, is *order*. While we continue to be infirm, imperfect, irregular, semi-sensual beings, there should be surely, for such weak creatures, an invariable element in worship. And even when we become perfect beings in heaven (if so be this is granted us) there probably we shall find the same grand law of order. This is the same principle that manifests itself in the regular recurrence of the Sabbath,

in the periodic celebration of the Lord's Supper, in the repetition of the fixed order of service whatever it may be, in the rehearsing of the doxology and benediction. The liturgical Churches have certainly appreciated this simple law of our mental being—order, uniformity—and made more of it than we do. Their forms of worship are a fixed quantity. Might we not make more use of this principle? Might we not avail ourselves of the treasures of what is old—of praise, prayer, and song gathered in past ages—and not have the desire so strongly and often painfully excited to produce so much that is new and varied at every service? There should be in every form of worship, however simple, some permanent basis, something of the old, the familiar, and the invariable, some worn pathway for the feet of simple worshipers to tread in. The next great principle is that of *freedom*, or spontaneity, which is the peculiar glory and beauty of our own unliturgical form of worship. This is an essential element of all true worship. It forms a chief element of its life and power. Where there is no freedom of intercourse with God, no individuality of thought or desire, no opportunity for the expression of present want, sorrow, temptation, thankfulness, then how can there be any living truth in worship, or any real communication established between God and the soul? The last principle which we would mention is *union*, or fellowship, in a word the social principle, which cannot for a moment be lost sight of in the great common act of Public Worship. When we worship by ourselves the more solitary we are the better, and we should "shut to the door" and be alone with "our Father which seeth in secret;" but when a multitude worship together in the common name of Christ, then the principle of individualism should merge itself into the higher principle of Christian love and communion. All that tends truly to unite many hearts in one act of devotion, to make them flow together in one common channel, aids true public worship. It is here perhaps that the greatest want of our Congregational form of worship is sometimes felt. Even in the sanctuary of our common Lord we are apt to remain too independent of each other, too individual, too much broken up into separate fragments. One member is unpenetrated by the devotional feeling which

glows in the heart of his next neighbor, and the whole mass is not sufficiently fused and made one. An intelligent English clergyman who recently visited our country remarked that our public religious services struck him as being highly interesting in an intellectual point of view, but cold. We have certainly more of intellectual, than of apparently simple, heartfelt, affectionate life, in our public religious exercises. It is with us the idea of the knowledge of God, rather than the love of God and of one another. It is the edifying rather than the purely devotional element. We are not now saying that other denominations have what we may sometimes fail in. We are not saying that there is not as much of pure devotion in our worship as in that of any other body of Christian believers; but we are only noticing some of what perhaps it is rash in us to call our deficiencies, in order to draw thought and earnest attention to their remedy, if indeed they really exist. Vinet says: "As for us, our worship is too much a confession of faith—a discourse; everything is articulate, everything is precise, everything explains itself. The effect of this tendency has gone so far as to determine the idea we have formed of temples. We regard temples as a place for hearing. We go to them to hear some one speak."* He says again: "Preaching has its place under the Gospel, but it does not suffocate worship. Our word is a prism which decomposes the light."† He means by this we suppose that preaching is analytic and addressed principally to the understanding; whereas he would have more of the simplicity of feeling, contemplation, and trust, in worship. As to the worship of the primitive church Vinet says: "It seems to have been a medium between preaching and devotion. We see in it nothing of the anxious precision of a confession of faith, nothing of the profusion of rites of the Romish Church."‡ We have introduced these quotations to show that in the worship of the reformed Swiss and French Churches very closely resembling our own, something of the same want is evidently experienced.

Men of fine abilities and undoubted piety have left our denomination and become Episcopalians because as they declare

* *Pas. Theol.* p. 180.† *Ibid.* p. 182.‡ *Ibid.* p. 181.

our Congregational worship does not fully satisfy them—their sympathies or tastes—and hence they feel that they cannot develop themselves or their spiritual life with perfect freedom and happiness within our system; it is easy enough to say, “let them go—they are not true Congregationalists and never can be.” * But all kinds of minds should be met, and their wants kindly appreciated. Is it not better to strive to retain such men, and to learn if possible what may be the imperfections of our own worship, and what is the peculiar power or attraction of another form of worship to such minds. Whether these persons find the perfect satisfaction that they anticipate in the Episcopal Church, and the opportunity to make more rapid advance intellectually and spiritually, is another question; but it must be conceded that if our own system cannot satisfy all the needs of man’s nature in its worship, and cannot unite “all the elements of his being,” all his powers and sympathies and affections in the act of praise, then there must be some deficiency.

It is possible, we think, for us to profit from whatever of good there is in a form of worship which is even the most totally unlike our own, without becoming ourselves Episcopalians, or believing with Dr. South, that there is but one prayer lacking in the Prayer Book, and that is that the Prayer Book itself should continue to be used in public worship forever!

It is sometimes said by us, and oftener perhaps thought, that there can be little true worship under the Episcopalian form, because it is nothing but a form; yet devout Episcopalians, we believe, can maintain the genuine attractions of that form of worship to the pious mind from some such reasons as these—that the Episcopal liturgy is admirably fitted to meet the religious sympathies of all classes of worshipers, as presenting, mostly in Scriptural language (whence its much lauded beauty), an embodiment of the great truths of the Christian faith, such as the Incarnation, the Atonement, the Resurrection, Repentance, Forgiveness—holding up those truths plainly to the view of all so as to enkindle religious feelings; and that in the regular recurrence of these words of faith, and petitions for common wants, both temporal and spiritual, there is devotional power. Here is the law of uni-

formity of which we have spoken. We talk of how touching are old hymns, and of the influence of familiar words of the Bible, and of the moving nature of old scenes and places, and in the same way devout feeling runs along more easily in familiar words of prayer and praise. Then there is the social element in Episcopal worship, the diffusion of the social principle, giving all something to do, uniting all the congregation in the responses and singing. We have no doubt that many pious minds do more readily worship God in the channels of these liturgical forms, when they have been educated from childhood to do so, than *they* could in our mode or any other mode. We are also equally open to see the marked deficiencies in the Episcopal mode of worship. The liturgical part of the service is too long, especially in the English Established Church, where, in the morning, there are, as it were, three services in one, and the Lord's Prayer is repeated five times. This does not allow room for the faithful preaching of the Gospel. It thrusts it into a corner. It makes it a subordinate thing. Then, too, the absence of the spontaneous element is an almost fatal defect. This gives little opportunity for spiritual growth, for the expression of new truth or fresh feeling, and for the satisfying of the emergencies of the present. It fixes the mind on the past—on the faith of the founders of the church, or the makers of the liturgy. It tends thus to narrow religious life, and to lead it to want no more religion than can be found in the Prayer Book. And there is, above all, the dangerous temptation to rest in the written form, and to think that when the prescribed words of devotion are uttered and the service gone through with, that one has truly worshiped and the duty is accomplished—that one has done his devotions. As a matter of taste, also, while the responses and chants are extremely devotional, and have moreover the authority of great antiquity—even Justin Martyr himself speaks of the Litany being responded to by the whole people—the practice of alternate readings of the Scriptures by the pastor and people is not, we believe, so ancient, nor is it so impressive, and the sense of Scripture is utterly confused and destroyed by it. Nevertheless may we not at least study with profit the Episcopal form of worship for its propriety, its dignity,

its solemnity, its rich flavor of antiquity, and its social element?

In regard to the question of the true method of increasing the life, interest, and fervor of Congregational worship, we will only add one or two remarks, hoping at another time, under a more definite topic, to give this subject a fuller treatment. The following general conclusions, we think, should, first of all, be admitted and firmly settled in our minds as Congregational Christians, viz: that our Congregational form of worship is a genuine form of public worship, is a true historic "cultus," however simple, and that it combines most if not all of the great essential elements of a true Christian public worship; also, that as nothing human is perfect, our form of worship, like others, may in some respects be incomplete, may lack some subordinate elements of power, may still be open here and there to improvement or at least to development, without at the same time losing its great distinctive characteristics; also, that any improvement or reformation which may be needed is not to be made by giving up our Congregational form of worship, by surrendering its historic and characteristic order, which is as true a product of the religious feeling and thought of centuries as any other form of public worship in existence—for this regular order, let it be ever so simple, is itself a power, and, therefore, even greater uniformity should be striven for, both in the public worship of the same church, and in that of all Congregational Churches; and again, that as forms of worship are matters of growth, springing from the hearts, wants, faith, and emergencies of the people through long periods of time, they cannot be transferred, at the pleasure of the individual church or pastor, from one to another denomination whose types or ideas of worship essentially differ. We cannot adopt the Episcopal form or liturgy without becoming Episcopalians. Whatever form of worship we have, it must be genuinely our own.

Dr. Bacon, in his Article on "The Puritan Ritual" (*New Englander*, Aug. 1855), has stated this principle with almost axiomatic and conclusive authority. He says: "Nothing like a formal liturgy after the manner of the Anglican Churches, or even after the manner of the Reformed Churches on the

European Continent, is possible in the Congregational Churches." He also says in the same Article: "Yet the churches of the New England polity have an interest in the discussion of the order and decencies of public worship. There are not a few devout and gifted men most earnest in their attachment to our doctrinal theology and our polity, who feel that our public worship is at present less becoming, and therefore less edifying (see the Pauline rubric, 1 Cor., xiv., 26, 40) than it ought to be, and who are looking in various directions for a remedy." Strengthened by such an admission from so important a source, we would reaffirm this want, and ask if there be no remedy, if there can be no development of our system to supply its own deficiencies, to enrich its barrenness, to round out and complete its simple yet noble ritual, to give unity, harmony, fulness, and vitality to its public worship of God, not in an æsthetic sense merely, as lending outward attractiveness, but as affording a true medium to the spiritual devotion of the people? If the only possible answer to these questions is the adoption of a formal liturgical form of worship throughout, thus radically and vitally changing our whole system, then we would say that Christianity is more important than Congregationalism, and Congregationalism must bend to higher interests, and could and would do so. Or if the introduction of the liturgical element in some modified and subordinate form were an adequate answer to these questions, then this should be done. But we believe that we have not yet arrived at either of these dilemmas. The question lying back of both of these is yet to be satisfactorily settled, whether in an essentially unliturgical form of worship, the elements of power, truth, and beauty that a liturgical form may possess, may not be equally secured, and the evils which are wrapped up in the latter system be at the same time avoided? This is the interesting and difficult question, which, in the presence of an advancing civilization, of a more general cultivation of the æsthetic sense, of the power of the *human* element which is making itself more and more felt in all religious things, of the lowering of the high tone of primitive piety, or its assumption of other phases that are apparently a decay of the highest spiritual life—this is the practical question that the Congrega-

tional Churches of New England and the West have now to meet and work out.

The time may come when in all these questions of church worship, polity, benevolence, and life, Christian men of all bodies and sects may be able to rise above their denominational platforms, and have regard only to the interests of their "common faith;" when they may be able to aid each other in arriving at the truest method of serving and glorifying God; when one body of Christian worshipers may impart to another whatever portion of truth or power it is more peculiarly in possession of; when the name "Christian" may be above every sectarian name, and all who love Christ may delight to walk, and counsel, and toil, and worship together.

ARTICLE VI.—THE LATE REV. DR. DUTTON.

A Discourse delivered January 31, 1866, at the Funeral of the Rev. Samuel W. S. Dutton, D. D., Pastor of the North Church in New Haven. By LEONARD BACON, Pastor of the First Church in New Haven. 8vo. pp. 32.

THE necessary delay in the publication of Dr. Bacon's Discourse prevented us from recording on these pages our sense of the bereavement which the friends of the *New Englander*, in common with the rest of the community, have suffered in the death of Dr. Dutton. We propose to present, now, neither an extended analysis of his character nor a description of his services; but, availing ourselves of the sermon before us, we would connect with passages from it a few observations of our own. Of the early life of Dr. Dutton, Dr. Bacon says:—

Samuel William Southmayd Dutton was born at Guilford, March, 1814, the fourth child and the second son of the Rev. Aaron Dutton, long the faithful and honored pastor of the First Church in that ancient town. His training for the ministry of the gospel may be said to have commenced at his birth. He was born into a home where the old strictness of domestic discipline—instead of being a harsh bondage, as no doubt it has been in the experience of some households—was administered in love, and was the security of all domestic happiness; and where a mother, (O, how many such have there been and are there now in the homes of New England pastors!) gentle, firm, intelligent, appreciative of knowledge as better than riches, and of religion as better than all human wisdom,—was the guardian angel of her children, and her husband's light and joy. From the first opening of his mind to receive knowledge and to be moulded by moral and religious influences, he was carefully taught and carefully restrained and guided; he became familiar with the religious sanctions of all duty; he breathed an atmosphere of intelligence and devotion as well as of love; he felt that the daily prayers were as much a matter of course as the daily meals; he saw what the work was of a faithful minister in the charge of a great parish; and through the hospitalities of his father's house, he saw many other ministers from far and near, and often heard them talking about their studies and the books and controversies of the time, their work, their trials and discouragements, and their joys. All who knew him in his ripest manhood, may easily understand what he was as he grew up in that old town of Guilford, an active, bright, frolicsome boy, sometimes mischievous in play, but never malicious; brave, honest, chivalrous, and the best wrestler on the village green.

Some traits of his boyhood I have happened to know, which are strikingly identical with the noblest features of his character as a man. There was a boy of the same age, but of a more delicate frame and of a less muscular force, with whom he formed a close friendship, which never has been broken till now. Of that schoolmate and playmate, whose very delicacy and sensitiveness exposed him to jeers and occasionally to violence from stronger and ruder boys, he made himself the champion; and often (as I once heard him say), has he stood concealed, waiting for his little friend to pass a particular point, and then darting out to give battle in his defense, at the first appearance of the enemy. Of course it is not strange that, through all after years, he loved old Guilford with the characteristic affection of a "Guilford soul." Some things occurred, it is true, which might have estranged him. His father, while not yet an old man, was constrained to resign the charge of the parish; the dear homestead that looked out upon the Green, passed into other hands; he could not think of his departed mother but with the thought,

"Children not thine have trod our nursery floor;"

there was no family tie drawing him to the old place; but to him it was old Guilford, after all and to the last; the graves of mother and father, and of sisters and brothers who died long ago, were there; and his conversation was always enlivened with vivid and hearty remembrances of the place, in all its peculiarities and all its traditions.

Among those "vivid and hearty remembrances" were numerous anecdotes of a humorous character; and all who knew him well will recollect the zest with which they were given. Prepared for college chiefly under the tuition of his elder sister at home, he attained high rank as a scholar and was graduated at Yale in 1833. In the revival of 1831, while a member of College, he personally consecrated himself to the service of Christ. His guide in this critical period was Dr. Taylor, whose lucid instructions he ever remembered with thankfulness. When his mind was confused and hesitating, he resorted to Dr. Taylor, and as he said himself, 'Dr. Taylor told him so clearly what he had to do to be saved, that he felt he could go right to his room and do it.' After teaching for a year in Baltimore, he became Rector of the Grammar School in New Haven—a classical school, of a high order, for boys—and in 1836 he became one of the tutors in Yale College. When the question of his appointment to the tutorship was brought before the College Faculty, some one mentioned that he had been known to take his stand on the door-stone of his school-house and allow the boys *en masse* to try to push him off. "And did they succeed?" inquired Professor Silliman.

"No," was the reply. "Then," said the Professor, "I think he will do." Dr. Dutton's theological studies were prosecuted during the period in which he was Rector of the Grammar School and Tutor. He entered with great zeal into the study of Dr. Taylor's system, comprehended it fully, and adopted it in its main features. His theological opinions underwent no essential modification afterwards, though he deviated in some particulars from the tenets of his revered instructor.

Under Dr. Taylor's influence, says Dr. Bacon,

He acquired the invaluable habit of thinking for himself, not with irreverent audacity, not in contempt of other men's thinking, but with no implicit deference to any authority other than that of God's oracles in the Bible. As a theologian he was never eager to find or to follow novelties, always impatient of mystification, new or old, always in earnest to find the clearest and most definite statement of the truth, and always careful not to bring the statements of theology into conflict with the conscience and the common sense of men. Questions merely speculative, in theology, had no great charm for him. His theology was in its aim, what all theology ought to be, the elucidation of God's government over the world, and of the gospel as a revelation of the way in which sinners may be saved.

On the 27th of June, 1833, he was ordained as pastor of the North Church in New Haven, and remained in this office until his death, which occurred on the 26th of January, 1866. From Dr. Bacon's remarks on the character of his ministry, we cite the following paragraphs:—

His most attractive simplicity of character, his ability in the pulpit, his gentleness and earnestness in all the intercourse between the youthful shepherd and the flock, commanded the affection and kindly respect of aged men, distinguished in public life; and when I mention such names as Daggett,* and Baldwin,† (the honored father and the more honored son), and Edwards,‡ and Ives,§ and remind you of the fact that those men were from the first, and so long as they lived, his fast friends, it is enough on this point. At the same time, the same qualities

* Hon. David Daggett, formerly a Senator of the U. S., and afterwards Chief Justice of Connecticut.

† Hon. Simeon Baldwin, formerly M. C., and afterwards a Judge of the Superior Court of Conn.; and Hon. Roger Sherman Baldwin, Governor of Conn., and a Senator of the U. S.

‡ Hon. Henry W. Edwards, Senator of the United States, and Governor of Connecticut.

§ Dr. Eli Ives, long an eminent Professor in the Medical School of Yale College.

began immediately to give courage among those who had been discouraged; and the readiness and heartiness with which he entered into the traditional character and spirit of this Church as a daughter of "the great awakening" in the last century, and into the arrangements for the promotion of religion, which characterize these later times, gained for him the confidence and ready coöperation of those who were most active to do good. The day of his ordination, June 27, 1838, was the beginning of a pastorate longer than any other in the history of this church, and not less rich than any other in those results which are to the faithful pastor the crown of his rejoicing in the day of the Lord.

The time will not allow me to speak of his ministry as I might wish. Yet I must say a few things, freely, from my intimate knowledge of him through all these years, appealing to your personal knowledge and memory for the proof that what I say is true.

First of all, then, and more important than anything else in the estimate of his ministry, is this fact, which all who knew him know. He has constantly and faithfully preached the gospel of Jesus Christ—the old gospel, as old as the Bible—the gospel which the Apostles preached—the gospel of a Divine deliverance from sin and from the wrath to come—the gospel of salvation through the incarnation and the sacrificial death of the Son of God. This gospel, in the simplicity and purity in which the inspired Scriptures have recorded it—this gospel, unobscured by the traditions and commandments of men—this gospel, in its manifold adaptedness to the moral and spiritual need of human nature—has been the constant burthen of his ministry. Your consciences bear witness for him, this day, that he has gone to his account, "pure," in this respect, "from the blood of all men."

At the same time it is to be remembered that the gospel which he preached was not a puny and inefficient sentimentalism, but a living power, applying itself to all human duty, in every human relation. This is implied, indeed, when we say that he preached the gospel in its simplicity, without the encumbrance of human commandments and traditions; for mere sentimentalism, however evangelical in its phrases or its traditional dogmas, is not the pure and simple gospel. I say, then, more distinctly, that the gospel, as he preached it, was not a word only, but a power. Nobody that heard him was allowed to feel that religion has nothing to do with human affairs. His preaching was as far as possible from the absurd theory that religion has nothing to do with the hearer's conduct in business and trade, or with his conduct as a citizen sharing in the guidance of a self-governed commonwealth. Above all, nobody that heard him was allowed to believe that Christianity has no protest to offer against the oppression of the poor. It was no part of his gospel, that when the poor man has been robbed of everything, and lies, as it were, by the roadside, helpless and dying, the minister of Jesus Christ, if they who do wrong cry "Politics," is to pass by, silent and frightened, "on the other side."

From first to last his ministry was courageous, because it was conscientious. He sought to please God rather than to please men. Popularity, or position, or support, was nothing to him in the way of inducement to swerve from the right onward course of duty in his ministry. He loved his people, and would not needlessly displease any of them; he respected them, and desired their good opinion; he valued his eminent position as pastor of this church, but he never compromised

truth or duty for fear of displeasing his people. Early in his pastorate, a member of the congregation ventured to remonstrate with him, in a friendly way, about some position which he had taken, and to suggest that there was some imprudence in it,—that the people would take offense,—that his usefulness might be impaired,—that he might be under the necessity of leaving his place. But he had taken his position conscientiously, and his answer was, "I thank God that if I cannot preach in the North Church, I can drive a hack."

He was once or twice disturbed by an ebullition of the sensational element in his parish, which craved a more imaginative and exciting style of sermonizing; but, on the whole, he enjoyed to the last the confidence and affection of his people in no ordinary measure; and it is safe to predict that, as time passes, the solid and sterling qualities which commended him to their esteem will be more and more appreciated in their grateful memories.

Any notice of Dr. Dutton would be incomplete which failed to mention his life-long interest in the welfare of the blacks, whether slaves or free, and his labors in opposition to the institution of slavery. He was an anti-slavery man, not from hatred to the master, but from love to the slave and from hatred to wrong. In good report and evil report, when parishioners approved and when they forsook him and frowned upon him, he defended by word and example, and by pecuniary contributions, the anti-slavery movement. In the domain of practical religion and social ethics, this was the subject that more than any other absorbed his attention.

The most obvious quality of Dr. Dutton, the quality that would first impress a stranger, was his thorough good-humor and geniality. In his manners and deportment, there was nothing of what is called clerical starch. He carried good cheer into whatever company he entered. His exterior did not belie his character. A warm benevolence, an unselfish, disinterested fellow-feeling with his kind, pervaded his nature. The freshness of his sympathy endeared him to his friends and qualified him to soothe and console distress wherever he met with it. A remarkably frank and out-spoken man, he found it hard to control his thoughts. To communicate whatever he had was the instinct of his heart. His unrivaled honesty and perfect courage gave full effect to this native tendency. Though so kind in his feelings, he was blunt, and might be thought by

some to be over-candid, in expressing his opinions upon men and things. A gentleman in his feelings, and always observant of propriety in the performance of his official duties, he was yet exceedingly heedless of conventionalities. Where he did not see the reason for a custom, and where it seemed to him to interfere with the comfort of those who observed it, he did not hesitate to choose his own path. He was one of those men who are said to have a great amount of human nature in them. Nevertheless, he was a prudent counselor, a judicious guide, a discerning observer of character. All this he was enabled to be, not only through the quality of his intellect, but also, still more, through the impartial and just feeling which he brought to the consideration of practical questions. It should be said that he was capable of indignation in view of wrong-doing; but emotions of this class had no such permanent lodging-place in his spirit that sunny and kindly feelings were supplanted or eclipsed by them.

Of his literary labors, Dr. Bacon says:—

Early in his ministry, when his success as a college tutor was still recent, one of the professorships in Yale College was proposed to him, but he would not entertain the proposal. More lately he was solicited to accept the presidency of a thriving college in one of the North-Western States, but he promptly declined the overture.

Yet he was active in many relations outside of his own parochial charge; and thus he became more widely known than many other pastors of equal or perhaps superior ability. His various essays and criticisms, published in the *New Englander*, have made thousands of intelligent persons, in all parts of our country, acquainted with his clear, earnest, and independent thinking. Looking to see what he had written, I was surprised to find that his contributions in the first twenty volumes of that periodical are more numerous than those of any other writer save one. The subjects on which he wrote show clearly what was the course of his studies and his sympathies. For the most part he wrote on current questions of immediate interest to the Church of Christ or to the public welfare,—never on the old questions which divide one evangelical body from another, and concerning which men's minds may be presumed to be made up. While he held earnestly all the points of doctrine which constitute the commonly accepted evangelical system, he rejected with equal earnestness whatever demanded his assent in the name of ecclesiastical tradition merely, or in the name of any human authority, however venerable. While he was heartily loyal to the polity of the Congregational Churches, believing it to be more conformed than any other to the ecclesiastical polity of the New Testament, he had no sectarian narrowness. By nature and by grace his soul was too large and generous for that.

We might say much more in honor of our departed friend, without transgressing the bounds of truth. All that Dr. Bacon has so well said, in the Discourse before us, of the excellencies of Dr. Dutton will find a hearty response from many who recall the hospitable home which was broken up by his death—preceded by that of his gifted and accomplished wife, a lady of rare talent and virtues;—and a like response will be given by all who were familiar with him in other relations. A paragraph towards the conclusion of Dr. Bacon's sermon is valuable as a tribute from one who knew him well:—

After twenty-eight years of intimacy with him,—the relation between us having been almost like that between colleague pastors in one church,—it is my privilege to testify that I cannot remember to have heard from him, in all the freedom of our intercourse, one malignant word, nor a word indicative of ill-temper, nor a word which for any reason I could wish to forget. Others, almost equally familiar with him, give the same testimony. As I think of what he has been to me, and that our intercourse this side of heaven is ended, the feeling swells in my heart, and rises to my lips,—

“Would I had loved him more.”

Let me say to all who are connected with this ancient church, a better minister, more faithful, more affectionate and more able,—better in the entire combination of his gifts and graces,—has never been given to you or to your predecessors. I say this not to disparage any of the men—some of them worthily distinguished—who have labored here in word and doctrine. In the catalogue of your pastors there is one name especially memorable, a name inseparable from the history of theology, of religion, and of sound learning in our country,—the name of the second President Edwards. Yet I am free to say, reviewing and summing up the beautiful life which is now just ended, that *here* the name of Samuel Dutton is not less worthy to be held in perpetual and grateful remembrance than the name of his more famous predecessor, Jonathan Edwards, the younger. He will be remembered here when these gray heads shall be here no more. He will be remembered when those who are now young shall have grown old. The children in the Sabbath-School, and in every family, will remember, all their lives long, his winning words and ways; and, in their latest years, the grave which is now opened for him will be to them a hallowed place.

ARTICLE VII.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

ECCE DEUS.*—This work was evidently prepared in haste for the market—so far at least as its form is concerned as distinguished from much of the matter which it contains. Many of the thoughts which it presents, and the lines of argument which it enforces, are obviously the products of the most earnest consideration. Some of them embody the results of the thinking of a lifetime and are marked by great ability. It is most unfortunate however for the interests of the truth as well as for the reputation of the writer of *Ecce Deus* that he should have been induced to put his opinion forth in the form of a supplement or critical reply to *Ecce Homo*.

The assumption or postulate which is the key-note to this treatise is this—that the life and character of Jesus can be satisfactorily interpreted and understood only on the supposition of the Incarnation; and that the author of *Ecce Homo* committed a fatal mistake in commencing his "Survey of the life and work of Jesus Christ" at that point in his history when he meets the eye as a "young man of promise, popular with those who knew him and appearing to enjoy the Divine favor." This mistake he regards as fatal to the success of the work and as necessarily vitiating the arguments and interpretations which it embodies. As this critical objection to *Ecce Homo* is the key to all that is controversial in *Ecce Deus*—as indeed it seems to have occasioned and inspired the book—it deserves a moment's attention if we desire to do justice to either.

It does not appear as yet that the author of *Ecce Homo* does not agree with the author of *Ecce Deus* in holding that the Incarnation is essential to the correct and satisfactory interpretation of the life and work of Jesus. He has never said or implied that he

* *Ecce Deus* Essays on the Life and Doctrine of Jesus Christ. With Controversial notes on "*Ecce Homo*." Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1887. 16mo. pp. 363. New Haven: Judd & White.

does not. He has expressly implied if he has not declared that he has much in reserve to say concerning the higher nature of Jesus and the higher relations of his person and his work. It remains to be seen whether he will not insist even more emphatically than the author of *Ecce Deus* that the Incarnation can alone fully explain the very peculiarities of the life and doctrine which he has chosen first to survey from the human side and, in the relations of human history. Meanwhile it should be left with him to decide whether it may not be for the advantage of his argument to start from the lowest assumption which he chooses to make, or rather to start from no postulate at all, and to reason out a partial exposition of Christ's life and work. It will be proper to complain of his argument and its results, when the argument is complete. It is not even fair to criticise any defects of method till the method is fully developed.

The author of *Ecce Deus* shows very strikingly his unfairness by the special criticisms which he offers upon a few passages from *Ecce Homo*. These are by far the weakest part of his book. They indicate either indisposition to interpret his aims with charity, or incompetence to appreciate the nature and method of his arguments, or a desire to use his supposed defect as a foil to set off his own interpretations of Christ's person and work. We discern moreover a certain conscious or unconscious effort to imitate his style and to copy the boldness of his attacks upon many features of the current Christianity.

But when we have said all this, we take great pleasure in acknowledging the power and excellence of the volume. Though as a continued argument in support of its avowed theme it has by no means the closeness and continuity which we might desire, it contains many very able and impressive exhibitions of the higher nature of Christ. The author has thought profoundly and thought independently on this most attractive theme. He is no stranger to the difficulties of the problem. But he bows with reverent and adoring conviction before the transcendent excellencies of the life, the sayings, and the work of him who "became flesh and dwelt among us." He does not indeed make the bearing of many of his views upon the question of the Deity of the Lord so prominent as his title would indicate, but his discussion of these topics is none the less effective. Viewed aside from the unfortunate attitude which it assumes with respect to *Ecce Homo*, *Ecce Deus* is a work of interest and importance.

VAUGHAN'S "CHARACTERISTICS OF CHRIST'S TEACHING;"* AND "CHRIST THE LIGHT OF THE WORLD."†—We take great pleasure in calling the attention of our readers, both lay and clerical, to the series of very neat volumes from the pen of Dr. Vaughan, of Doncaster, which are published by Mr. Strahan of London and New York. Most, if not all, of these discourses have been previously published in "Good Words," and in that way have been made known to many of our countrymen. They are worthy a closer attention than a casual reading of them would be likely to attract, and it is for the very reason that they are in some danger of being passed over as in no way superior to the great mass of goodish books of the sort that are daily issued from the press, that we give them this special notice. They are designed for common readers. They make no pretensions to discuss with profoundness points of theological doctrine, or to answer any subtle questions in the philosophies of the schools. They are not ambitiously eloquent in style, nor exciting in their appeals, nor startling in their imagery. Their tone and manner in all these respects is strikingly, if not studiously, quiet and unambitious. A modern sensation preacher, whether of the more vulgar or refined class, would pronounce them tame and common-place, and wholly deficient in originality and eloquence. The most of our American audiences who are accustomed to be stimulated by exciting doses of tawdry rhetoric, vulgar allusions, and overstrained appeals, would reject them as very good, but not in the least original. A careful perusal of them will show that they are the productions of a thoughtful and highly cultured mind, and are therefore eminently instructive to all who think. The transparent thought, the simple diction, the quiet imagery, the unimpassioned earnestness which characterize these short discourses are easily discerned to indicate the clear, rich, and refined liquor which has been purified by the first and second fermentations, or rather the bright metal that gushes from the furnace freed from every oxide and alloy, pure, rich, and glowing. Perhaps no more serious danger threatens the religious life of our churches, and the dignity and self-respect of the clerical profession, than the systematic degradation of the style of pulpit

* *Characteristics of Christ's Teaching, Drawn from the Sermon on the Mount.* By C. J. VAUGHAN, D. D., Vicar of Doncaster. London and New York: Alexander Strahan. 1867.

† *Christ the Light of the World.* By C. J. VAUGHAN. London and New York: Alexander Strahan. 1866.

oratory under the guise of ambitious originality, tawdry rhetoric, strained imagery, silly conceits, vulgar allusions, cheap learning, political demagogism, and affected emotion. If the Lord is ever to deliver his people from these modern defilers of the sanctuary, it will be in part by the example of discourses like these of Dr. Vaughan.

LANGE'S CRITICAL, DOCTRINAL, AND HOMILETICAL COMMENTARY. VOL. IV. ACTS *—This is the third, in the order of publication, of the volumes of this valuable Commentary. It is translated from the German by Prof. CHARLES F. SCHÆFFER, D. D., of the Lutheran Theological Seminary at Philadelphia. In its general characteristics it is like the volumes which have appeared heretofore, consisting of three classes of comments and annotations—exegetical, doctrinal, and homiletical, and being as faithful a presentation in our language, as possible, of the original work. The translator has added a few notes, which he marks as his own, and has inserted, near the beginning of the volume, a chronological chart, taken from Meyer's Commentary on the Acts, which presents the dates of the principal events of Paul's life, according to the views of most of the leading scholars who have discussed that interesting subject. Dr. Lange and his associates in this work have rendered a service, whose value has been fully recognized in their own land; and the gentlemen who are engaged upon the American translation, are already receiving the commendation and gratitude of their ministerial brethren. As a critical and exegetical Commentary, it can hardly claim a place in the very first rank, and yet, in the several portions which have thus far been published, it compares quite favorably with anything that we have in our language. From the suggestions of a more practical nature, however, which are added to the explanatory annotations, it becomes useful in a peculiar way to large numbers of those for whom it is designed, and gains for the homiletical

* *A Commentary on the Holy Scriptures; Critical, Doctrinal, and Homiletical, with special reference to Ministers and Students.* By JOHN PETER LANGE, D. D., in connection with a number of eminent European Divines. Translated from the German, and edited with additions, original and selected, by PHILIP SCHÄFF, D. D., in connection with American Divines of various Evangelical denominations. Vol. IV. of the New Testament; containing the Acts of the Apostles. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1866. 8vo. pp. 480. New Haven: Judd & White. Price \$5.

student an interest which is unknown in ordinary Commentaries. Few clergymen, we presume, will wish to be without it,—but those to whom it is not known already, through a personal examination of it, should understand just what its merits are, and just the place which it is intended to fill in the department of biblical learning. By far the best scholarly work on this part of the New Testament, to which we have access in this country, as it seems to us, is that of Prof. Hackett; but the present volume, in connection with that excellent work, will be of advantage to all who make a judicious use of it.

LIFE AND DEATH ETERNAL.*—This volume is written with the design of proving the doctrine of eternal punishment, especially with reference to the arguments and objections of those who advocate the theory of annihilation. The author begins with a statement of the view of his opponents, and of what he calls the fundamental vice of their mode of interpreting the Scripture language—namely, that they give a low and material construction of the phrases and passages, in which this subject is introduced, that is in direct contradiction to their real and well-understood meaning. He then enters upon an extended investigation of the terms “death” and “life,” and other terms employed in the Bible, as bearing upon the errors and fallacies of Mr. Hudson and the class of writers to which he belongs. Following upon this investigation, he examines the difficulties in regard to the permanent existence of evil under the government of a God of love, and endeavors to show that the existence and continuance of evil for a time proves its continuance for eternity to be compatible with God’s perfections, provided sufficient reasons exist, and that no one can deny that such reasons may exist—unknown perchance, to us, but manifest to God. Here he leaves the refutation of the annihilationist’s arguments. In the second part of the volume he takes up the more positive disproof of their doctrine—making a careful presentation of the evidence that the Jews, both before the coming of Christ, and in his time, believed in a future existence, and then setting forth in several chapters the teachings of the New Testament upon this whole subject. The book closes with a discussion of the tendencies of the annihilationist’s system

* *Life and Death Eternal; A Refutation of the Theory of Annihilation.* By SAMUEL C. BARTLETT, D. D., Professor in Chicago Theological Seminary. Published by the American Tract Society, Boston. 1866. 12mo. pp. 390.

toward rationalism, universalism, materialism, and sensualism. Such, in brief, and somewhat in the author's own language, is the course of thought in this new treatise upon one of the great questions of our religion. The book is published by the American Tract Society of Boston, and, as will naturally be inferred from this fact, is of a popular character—adapted to meet the wants and difficulties of ordinary minds. At the same time, it approaches the consideration of the various texts in a scholarly way, and leads the reader to a clear understanding of the reasons for the common orthodox view of their meaning. The argument is carried on, as it seems to us, with fairness and force. The author meets both the strong and the weak points of his adversaries with skill, and shows himself to be, in no small degree, master of his subject. From our examination of the volume, we heartily commend it to those who would find, in a brief and concise form, the evidence in proof of this doctrine of the Scriptures, and in disproof of the theory of a body of recent authors, who, beyond all doubt, are doing very much to unsettle and disturb the minds of many of our people.

POND'S LECTURES ON CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.*—Men who distinguish themselves in their generation by surpassing achievements usually have an intense avidity and a vast capacity for labor. Dr. Pond has this characteristic of greatness. During his long public life he has been an earnest and indefatigable worker. He has been occupied, without interruption, with the duties of a laborious profession, first as pastor, then as editor, and finally as professor. In addition to these labors, he has published a large number of volumes, several of which have passed through repeated editions, and been widely read; he has been a frequent contributor to the various theological Quarterlies; and his newspaper articles are without number. While editor of the *Spirit of the Pilgrims*, he was himself the author of a large portion of the Articles in that spirited and efficient periodical. The churches owe him a large debt of gratitude for long, multiplied, and valuable services.

These lectures, seventy in number, were delivered in his regu-

* *Lectures on Christian Theology.* By ENOCH POND, D. D., Professor in the Theological Seminary at Bangor. Boston: Congregational Board of Publication. 1867.

lar course of instruction in theology in Bangor Theological Seminary. They are published in a handsome octavo of 747 pages, and treat in order the topics belonging to the entire course of systematic theology. It is felicitously dedicated to the memory of Dr. Emmons, Dr. Pond's instructor in theology.

To estimate these lectures aright, it is necessary to understand Dr. Pond's method of teaching, to which they are happily adapted. When entering on a topic, he first gave out a list of books to be read. Afterwards a lecture was read, and the subject freely discussed. On some topics two or more lectures were read, and the discussion continued. Each student was then required to put his conclusions, and the reasons for them, in writing. At a subsequent session these essays were read and criticized, and thus the views of each on the subject brought into discussion before the class. It is the testimony of many efficient ministers that the middle year at the Bangor Theological Seminary, under this method of instruction, was invaluable in giving them discipline of mind, and teaching them to think independently.

The lectures, therefore, make no pretension to large erudition, or to an exhaustive treatment of the several topics. They were intended rather to stimulate and guide the student in investigating the subject for himself. They are characterized by a remarkable perspicuity of thought and style, which continually remind the reader of Dr. Emmons, and demonstrate that the Professor attained, as a theological teacher, some of the best characteristics of his own revered instructor. They are characterized, also, by robust good sense, clear appreciation of the practical bearings of doctrine, a catholic and liberal spirit, simplicity and directness of argument, and sound scriptural truth.

The lectures are adapted to be read and studied not by ministers only, but by all intelligent Christians. We wish for the book an extensive circulation.

SCHAFF'S CHURCH HISTORY.*—Dr. Schaff has wisely chosen to write the history of the second period of the Church, extending from Constantine to Gregory, in two volumes, instead of one, and

* *History of the Christian Church.* By PHILIP SCHAFF, D. D. Vol. II. and III. From Constantine to Gregory the Great, A. D. 311-600. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1867. New Haven: Judd & White.

on a scale conformed rather to his "History of the Apostolic Church," than to the volume on the first three centuries, which immediately preceded these. Able and valuable as the earlier parts of the series have been, we think that the new volumes are even better,—as if the author had become thoroughly warmed with his theme. Some of their distinctive peculiarities we may briefly indicate:—

1. They bear witness on every page to a zealous and conscientious study, on the part of the author, of the Fathers and the other original sources of information. There is everywhere a certain freshness which, to an experienced reader, is full evidence that the historian has not taken his facts at second hand, but has resorted to the fountains of knowledge,—has obtained a mastery of the materials on which every authentic narrative must be founded.

2. With the historical writers who have dealt with the same theme, Dr. Schaff is remarkably familiar. At home in the German literature in this department, which, as far as modern works is concerned, is richer than the literature of any other country, he is also familiar with the French and English books that bear on his subject. Not unfrequently we are furnished with an instructive comparison of the views taken by a wide list of critics, as is the case in the discussion respecting the character and motives of Constantine

3. One excellence of these volumes is the biographical matter and the information upon Christian antiquities, which impart a lively interest to their pages. The leading Fathers are described not only as authors, but in the characteristic features and events of their lives. The profounder discussions of theological doctrine are relieved by chapters of more lively interest to the general reader.

4. The portions of the work which are devoted to the history of Christian doctrine, are marked by learning, discrimination, and candor. The Arian controversy, the Pelagian controversy, the Christological controversies, and the Origenistic disputes, are fully described; and the judgments of the author we deem to be in the main correct. The exposition of Nicene orthodoxy in particular is quite satisfactory. Dr. Schaff knows—what most English writers on theology and doctrinal history do not know—how to distinguish between the declarations of the Nicene symbol itself and the metaphysical conceptions of Athanasius. Though these con-

ceptions may be inevitably deduced from the Nicene creed, when logic is applied to it, it does not follow that the Council made this deduction on all points, or gave their explicit sanction to the theories and reasonings of Athanasius. Some features of the theological system of Augustine—for example, his theory of sacramental grace which essentially modifies the aspect of his doctrine of Predestination—are brought out by Dr. Schaff, as they are not brought out commonly by the historians of doctrine.

5. The tone of this work is animated, the style is lucid and flowing, and the narrative is so drawn up that it is adapted to the taste not only of professed theologians, but to that of cultivated persons generally. Dr. Schaff is much indebted to the painstaking skill of his translator, Mr. Yeomans. After the foregoing remarks we hardly need add that they have made a solid and a creditable addition to American literature.

THE STORY OF JONAH THE PROPHET.*—Not a few of our readers will remember with interest Dr. Raleigh as one of the delegates from the Congregational Union of England and Wales to the National Congregational Council in 1865. Some of them may have been delighted with hearing one or more of his pulpit discourses, so exquisitely wrought as they were, and yet so delightfully simple, fresh, humble, and Christian. Here and there some person who reads these pages may remember to have heard him preach in the "Old South" in Boston a discourse from "the story of Jonah," of rare pictorial power, joined with the most sober and searching practical applications. The last named discourse forms one in the unique and delightful volume which we commend to all our readers as worthy their reading. It is a genuine product of a truly original and Christian mind, whose gifts are peculiar, and who conscientiously and earnestly works the rich vein of "native gold" with which the master has enriched his soul into products of rare and refined beauty.

Some of the critical and historical interpretations of the author may not please our fastidious and sometimes over-nice exegetes. Some of the turns and applications which he makes might possibly offend the rigor of those hearers who are nothing if not logically critical, but the many finely wrought passages which so hap-

* *The Story of Jonah the Prophet.* By ALEXANDER RALEIGH, Canonbury. Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black. 1866.

pily unite æsthetic and spiritual beauty will, we are sure, delight all who are so fortunate as to possess this volume. For the gratification of those who will not meet with it, we copy the following :

"We dwell 'in a great city'—the greatest in the world, the greatest of any age. What a stupendous power this city has to be one thing or the other; to be partly one thing and partly another! What forces lie in her bosom—some of them latent, but most of them active. What patriot, what Christian, will not lament with heavy and dolorous sorrow the strength and increase of the great sin-force of this city of our habitation! The 'violence' of Ninevah would not be suffered in it. The vices of the cities of the plain or some of them would be hunted out of public sight as men hunt wild beasts. But for all that, the terrible sin-breeding force is active and fruitful in a hundred ways. A luxury as enervating as that of Babylon is lolling or reveling in too many of her great houses. Impurities, like those of Corinth, stain, and consume while they stain, large portions of her society. A flippancy like that of Athens rules the most pretentious and popular parts of her literature. The selfishness of Cain walks the streets of London, saying all day long, 'Am I my brother's keeper?' The rapacious greed of Ahab works along the line of her commerce. The folly of the worst fools of old still laughs in her giddy, godless multitudes, who say, 'Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die.'

"I know the salt of the earth is here, working as potently in this great city as anywhere in the world. But the thing to be salted is wide and deep. Worlds upon worlds of human life and interest are within this city. When you touch one world, you are far from another. The resistance of sin is terrible. The putrescence of sin is swift. Are we gaining or losing? That is the awful question. Is the salt arresting the decayed, and nourishing the springs of life? Or is the decay eating up the salt?

"If we are gaining, although it may be very little, so little as often to be imperceptible, then there is life for the great city in the future, and hope for England, whose deepest roots and springs are here. If we are losing—losing here, and in the other great cities of the land, where the pulse of national life beats most strongly and most symptomatically of the nation's state—then *all* is being lost. The nation's life is ebbing. The judgments of God are mustering unseen, and—supposing the process of degeneracy unchecked—will expend themselves in swift calamities, or by slow decays, until London, with her sister cities of England, shall have passed away like so many cities once 'great to God,' now little more than shades and names in human history."

PHILOSOPHICAL.

MANSEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED.*—The formal attack of Mr. John Stuart Mill upon Sir William Hamilton and his Philosophy might very naturally summon his chief theological

* *The Philosophy of the Conditioned*, comprising some remarks on Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, and on Mr. J. S. Mill's Examination of that Philosophy. By H. L. MANSEL, B. D., &c., &c. Alexander Strahan, London and New York. 1866.

disciple and exponent to the rescue and defense of the honor of his eminent teacher. Especially would this be required in view of the fact that Mr. Mill had made a special onset upon Mr. Mansel himself for the ethical inferences which he had sought to derive from the "Philosophy of the Conditioned." The counter-criticism of Mr. Mansel was first published in the *Cotemporary Review*, and is now revised, and with some additions published in a very neat volume by Mr. A. Strahan. This statement and defense of the Manselian version of the Hamiltonian Philosophy has the very great advantage over any other which has proceeded from the author, in being more brief, more clear, and more to the point, as well as in being framed to meet many of the objections which are currently urged against it. We cannot say that the author has successfully answered these objections. They remain in our opinion in full force, but this is no fault of Mr. Mansel, but entirely that of the theory which he defends. We ought to say also that Mr. Mansel's expositions of Hamilton's philosophy are not always to be trusted as embodying the doctrines or reasons of his great master. He is not always so precise in the use of philosophical terms for himself, nor in the interpretation of those of his teacher, as we might fairly expect. Sometimes he foists in upon the original doctrine, a "private interpretation" or addition of his own, which adds neither to the strength or symmetry of the original structure. But the discussion as conducted by him has this special interest, that it applies the Philosophy of the Conditioned to theological questions in a direct and logical way, and does not leave the reader at all in doubt what views the author holds for himself. Mr. Mansel knows also very well how to make the most of the inherent difficulties of the subject-matter, and to turn them dexterously to his own account in the argument. As for Mill, he fares no better than he deserves in the hands of a critic who knows how to give blows as well as to parry them. A better philosophy of theology would enable Mr. Mansel to bring attacks still more damaging against this opponent of Christian truth and sound metaphysics, but Mr. Mansel does the best possible with his one-sided and defective theories. Those who would find the system which he holds, and which has made so much noise in the world, stated in a brief and intelligible form, would do well to procure and read this volume. It will not only assist them to understand Hamilton, but it will place them in a good position to study the difficult problems which all thinkers must encounter in one form or another.

PROF. H. N. DAY'S ELEMENTS OF LOGIC.*—This very elaborate treatise by Professor Day has grown out of the abridgment of Hamilton's Lectures on Logic, which was previously made by him, and has been used somewhat extensively in colleges and high-schools. Though the author in this volume borrows from Hamilton somewhat freely with acknowledgments, he has yet wrought out a treatise which is substantially his own. It does great credit to his ingenuity and perseverance, as well as to the philosophical literature of the country. It has been elaborated with careful painstaking, and is, in general, so far as we have been able to examine it, consistent, rigorous, and thorough. It is in many particulars original in its principles and method, particularly in its treatment of induction, and in its doctrine of method.

The author not only adopts most completely the views of Hamilton that Reasoning, Deduction, and Induction may be explained by, or rather resolved into the relations of quantity, but asserts for himself the distinctive peculiarity of having accomplished "the rigid reduction of all [the processes of] thought to its one essential principle—that of identity." Accordingly quantity is the sole relation by which he explains the formative process of judgment, the resultant synthesis of the concept, the explicative analysis of reasoning and the explanatory interpretation by causation. We accept the doctrine that under this relation all these processes may be expressed and exhibited, and that therefore a formal logic may be constructed by the use of this alone. But we do not believe that because it is possible it is therefore desirable, nor that the greater apparent simplicity and unity of the systematic view which is gained will at all compensate for the inconveniences which must be the certain penalty to be paid in the application. Formal logic should not be studied for its own sake, but for its application. The readiness with which it can be applied to the various subjects matter for which it is required is one most important test of the soundness of its fundamental principles. It has ever been found difficult, in fact, to separate its forms entirely from the underlying psychological and metaphysical relations. Of what avail is it to explain the process of induction by the relation of one

* *Elements of Logic*; comprising the doctrine of the laws and products of thought, and the doctrine of method, together with a logical praxis. Designed for classes and for private study. By HENRY N. DAY, author of "Art of Rhetoric," &c. New York: Charles Scribner. New Haven: Judd and White. 1867. Price \$1.50.

"complementary part to another," or to the completed whole, and to show that every strictly logical requisition and test may be in this way satisfied if, when the mind comes to analyze or test inductions, it needs to consider other relations than these—if it asks how it happens that the mind views one of these parts as "complementary" to the other. We hold as against the author that in the elementary process of judgment quality or relation is present as truly as quantity, that the subject properly expresses the one and the predicate the other, and that to regard, or to treat this process as a simple recognition of identity makes a wrong beginning which will be certain to vitiate or misdirect all the subsequent steps and their results. We are well aware that Hamilton has given his sanction and authority to this general view by his doctrine of the "quantification of the predicate," as well as by his doctrine of Reasoning; but we are not convinced even by the opinion of one so learned and illustrious. Professor Day has his authority and example, and will not be displeased by the dissent of all the world beside.

But we may not prolong these critical suggestions, which are scarcely in place in a brief notice. It is with great pleasure that we call the attention of our readers to a work which so well deserves their consideration.

PROFESSOR ATWATER'S MANUAL OF ELEMENTARY LOGIC.*—Professor Atwater's Manual of Elementary Logic is strikingly contrasted with Professor Day's Treatise, in respect to its aims and its method. It purports to be and is simply a manual for elementary instruction, and it has been prepared in and by the experience of the class-room, with a free use of the best recent treatises accessible in the English language. Archbishop Thomson's Outlines of Thought has been followed more closely than any other treatise, but with no servility on the part of the author. We could have desired the fuller explanation of some topics and a somewhat more liberal use of examples and illustrations. But the author has left them to be supplied by the instructor. We congratulate our much respected friend upon his success in the preparation of this useful manual.

* *Manual of Elementary Logic.* Designed especially for the use of teachers and learners. By LYMAN H. ATWATER, Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy in the College of New Jersey. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1867. 16mo. pp. 244.

MISCELLANEOUS.

FÜRST'S HEBREW AND CHALDEE LEXICON.*—Dr. Davidson's translation of this Lexicon, for some time past in course of publication in monthly parts, is now complete, and the present is a fit time for an examination of its claims to the attention of Biblical students. The author himself, moreover, in his preface, challenges such an examination. He claims to represent an "advanced philology," while the method followed by Gesenius, and which most Semitic scholars still prefer to follow, is pronounced "antiquated." The essential features of Dr. Fürst's lexicography are already familiar to us from his earlier publications. In his Concordance to the Hebrew Scriptures, published in 1840, his peculiar theories work little harm, since they are introduced rather by way of addition, are easily separable from the body of the work, and may be altogether disregarded in its use. But in the present case, they are wrought more closely into the texture of the work, and therefore cannot be so lightly dismissed. Many of the peculiarities of Dr. Fürst's scholarship are to be explained by the fact of his rabbinical training. Upon this there is engrafted a certain acquaintance, not often met with in Jewish scholars, with modern philology, Semitic and Indo-European, but he seems never to have thoroughly comprehended its methods; and the semblance of scientific form, in which his work is cast, will deceive only those who have not yet learned to distinguish the true from the false. The great advance which Dr. Fürst supposes himself to have made in Hebrew philology, is the reduction of the tri-literal roots which are so marked a feature of the Semitic languages to primitive bi-literal, or as he styles them, organic roots. That the Hebrew once passed through a bi-literal stage, the analogy of our own family of languages would lead us to suppose; and, furthermore, there are apparent traces of such a stage in the present form of the language. Not to speak of the verbs *Ayin Vav* and *Ayin* doubled, there are certain groups of words of the same or similar meaning which differ from each other only by one variable consonant. The substantial idea

* *A Hebrew and Chaldee Lexicon to the Old Testament*, with an Introduction giving a short history of Hebrew Lexicography, by Dr. JULIUS FÜRST, Professor at the University of Leipzig. Third edition, revised and enlarged. Translated from the German, by SAMUEL DAVIDSON, D. D. New York: Leypoldt & Holt. 1867. 8vo. pp. 1511. Price \$11.

seems to reside in the two constant elements, while the modification of this idea, which each word takes on, seems due to the added radical. It is not an unnatural supposition that these nearly related forms sprang from a common bi-literal root; but beyond this the more sober Semitic scholars have not ventured to go. The further investigation is one of exceeding difficulty, if not altogether hopeless. Dr. Fûrst has, however, undertaken it, and by the very simple method of dropping the first or last radical, as convenience requires, has obtained what he calls the organic roots of the language. But how arbitrary his method is, how little value his etymologies possess, the slightest examination is enough to show. Nearly every letter of the alphabet may serve in turn both as prefix and affix. The occasional rules for such use, being constructed for the most part to meet the case in hand, are of small consequence. Renan in his *Histoire Générale des Langues Sémitiques*, Liv. V., Chap ii., has exposed the unsoundness of such a mode of procedure, and has given the reasons for the want of confidence which, outside the small circle of Dr. Fûrst's immediate disciples, is felt in its results. The same criticisms apply to the comparisons which our author makes between Semitic and Indo-European roots. Gesenius ventured, though in a far more cautious manner, upon the same field, but it is questionable whether any relationship between the two families has been established. The correspondences are for the most part such as may be readily explained without resort to this hypothesis.

If now we pass from the etymologies to the definitions, and the interpretations of difficult passages, we are equally unable to discover in what respects this Lexicon is an advance upon its predecessor. In the logical development of the significations, and in the clear and orderly arrangement of them, it is inferior to Gesenius. Make the attempt to find any one of the several uses belonging to a word, and the difference will at once be felt. The greater fullness of Fûrst is more apparent than real, the additional space being occupied in great part by repetitions, unnecessary synonyms, fictitious stems, and the like. That there are some grains of wheat among so much chaff, we readily admit, but most of those who will use the Lexicon will be quite incapable of separating the two. Dr. Fûrst's preference for Jewish above Christian authorities, however little credit it does to his philological judgment, is naturally enough accounted for by his rabbinical training and his Jewish faith. His pupil, Delitzsch, though he has renounced the

latter, is unable to escape from the influence of the former. But we might at least have been spared the absurd rabbinical whims on points of grammar or interpretation, which are so often cited, sometimes with dissent, sometimes with approbation. As an illustration of the lack of sound judgment in which more than in want of learning lies the weakness of Dr. Fürst as a lexicographer, we may cite the articles devoted to the separate letters of the alphabet. He everywhere takes care to guard against the association of the form of the character with that of the object after which it was named. The first letter was called *Aleph*, because it was the initial sound in that word. True, but its form requires explanation as well, and this is found in the fact that it is a copy more or less complete of the object from which it was named. In the case of *Aleph* only the *head* of the ox was represented. Because the Hebrew alphabet is purely phonetic, we must not overlook the fact that the idea of such an alphabet was disengaged from an earlier hieroglyphic writing, such as the Egyptian, a trace of which remains both in the names and the forms of the present characters.

And yet, in spite of its defects, we shall not be surprised to see this Lexicon usurp among us, to some extent, the place of Gesenius. We have already seen the grammar of Gesenius give place in some of our seminaries to a more recent though inferior one. But it is an evidence of the low state of Hebrew studies in our country. In Germany, where it has to contend with far more formidable rivals than the grammar of Dr. Green, it still holds, as a school grammar, the supremacy (v. statistics in "*Zeitschrift für Gymnasialwesen*," December, 1866). To beginners, Fürst's Lexicon will be attractive, from the large number of inflections and forms, with suffixes, which it gives, and which are omitted by Gesenius, unless they present some irregularity. To others, the apparent ease with which many difficult problems of the language are solved will prove enticing, though it is well for such to remember that, in philological science especially, the shortest way is not likely to prove the safest. These causes, joined to the prestige which naturally belongs to the latest work in any department, will doubtless give this Lexicon a degree of prominence which it does not deserve, and which it will not be able ultimately to sustain.

DIXON'S "NEW AMERICA."*—This purports to be a book of travels in the United States. The author of it is known as the author of several other books of a popular cast, and better known as the editor of the "London Athenæum." The present work not only abounds in misstatements which a person careful of the truth would never be guilty of, but the whole drift and intent of it are likewise false. In his preface, and in various places in the course of the volume, he insinuates that the phenomena which he describes are the forces now at work in remoulding American thought and society. Thus, in regard to the Shakers (p. 319), adverting to their insignificance in point of numbers, he says that "they seem to be of small account; and this would be the truth, if the strength of spiritual and moral forces could be told in figures, like that of a herd of cattle and a kiln of bricks. No one can look into the heart of American society without seeing that these Shaker unions have a power upon men beyond that of mere numbers." Wonderful power of the Shakers! Strange that none of us have ever discovered it! An Englishman, reading these pages, might well imagine that this country is in a fair way to be Shaker-ized. This is one specimen of the silly misrepresentations which are strewn thick on Mr. Dixon's pages. More than a hundred pages are devoted to the Mormons; the Spiritualists, the Oneida Communists; and other sporadic and extravagant phenomena occupy a large portion of what remains of the book. The statements about the barbarism of Colorado, about the terrible dangers of the overland route, and about the Mormons, have been shown by competent witnesses to be largely mixed with falsehoods. On page 307, we have an allusion to "the magnetic power" which Shakerism is exerting upon "American thought;" on page 288, the profound observation is made that "Oneida Creek and Salt Lake City—communities founded by Vermont men—are practical replies to the one great question of our day,—what shall be done to reform the abuses of our social and domestic life?" On page 248,—see, also, the context,—it is affirmed that American women are so averse to having children, that the native stock is in the process of being supplanted by the Irish and Germans! We are comforted with the confession that these national-

* *New America.* By WILLIAM HEFORTH DIXON, Editor of the "Athenæum," etc. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1867. New Haven: Judd & White. Price \$2.75.

ities have not yet turned the scale! "Some ladies," writes our voracious traveler, "set the fashion of laughing at mothers; nay, it became in Boston, Richmond, and New York, a sign of high breeding to be known as a childless wife." "In a score of different places, people have founded an annual baby show, at which they give prizes for the best specimens of baby beauty; so many dollars (or the dollars' worth) for fine teeth, for bright eyes, for chubby cheeks, for fat arms and hands, for the thousand nameless merits which a jury of ladies can assert in these rosy yearlings. What do these facts imply? Is infant beauty becoming rare?" "Do the facts suggest that babies are growing scarce on American soil?" (Page 425). "In the passing moment, America (I am told) is wasting for the want of mothers." When Dixon speaks of the South, he repeats the stale falsehoods about the gentle blood and chivalric origin of the planters. They were "of pure old English blood, offspring of men who had been the glories of Elizabeth's Court." If the traveler would only look into Smollet and Fielding—would glance at the remarkable history of "Moll Flanders"—he would know better than to characterize thus the early settlers of Virginia and the South. But we have no space for further quotations. It is mortifying that a book so full of caricatures and misstatements should have found so much applause from the American press.

MR. G. W. GREENE'S STRICTURES ON MR. BANCROFT'S NINTH VOLUME.*—In a pamphlet composed of upwards of eighty pages, Mr. George Washington Greene undertakes to vindicate his ancestor, Gen. Nathanael Greene, against certain statements, reflecting upon portions of the military conduct of the latter, which have been put forth by Mr. Bancroft in his last volume. One of the main points concerns the omission of Gen. Greene to evacuate Fort Washington, and the surrender of that post. Mr. Bancroft alleges that the fort was held in contravention of the intentions of Washington, and was lost through the misjudgment of Greene in failing to abandon it. Mr. G. W. Greene quotes Washington's letter of Nov. 8th, 1776, giving his views respecting the need of evacuating the post; and from the phraseology of that letter, infers that Washington was only "wavering in the opinion which he had previously held, and again authorized Greene to decide, because

* *Nathanael Greene.* An examination of some statements concerning Major-General Greene, in the ninth volume of Bancroft's History of the United States. by GEORGE WASHINGTON GREENE. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1866.

Green was on the spot and he was not." After adverting to the passage of three vessels up the North river in spite of the fort, Washington says:—"What valuable purpose can it answer to hold a fort from which the expected benefit cannot be had? I am therefore inclined to think that it will not be prudent to hazard the men and stores at Fort Washington, but as you are on the spot, I leave it to you to give such orders as to evacuating Mount Washington, as you may judge best, and so far revoking the order given to Colonel Magaw to defend it to the last." Mr. G. W. Greene also maintains that as Washington was at Fort Lee, or in the neighborhood, from the thirteenth to the morning of the sixteenth of November—the fort was attacked on the sixteenth—all responsibility for not drawing off the garrison must rest upon him.

The letter of Washington to General Greene, of the eighth of November, is also quoted by Mr. Bancroft. It is agreed on all hands that Washington did not give a peremptory order to Gen. Greene to abandon the fort. But that Washington thought it should be evacuated, and gave what may be properly called a discretionary order to that effect, are facts which Mr. G. W. Greene has not succeeded in disproving. Says Marshall (*Life of Washington*, II., 512): "General Greene had not withdrawn the garrison *under the discretionary orders* he had received on that subject." The same historian attributes to Greene "too great a confidence in the strength of the fort." In regard to the letter to Greene of Nov. 8th, Mr. Sparks observes (*Life of Washington*, p. 215), that Washington could have uttered "nothing more decisive without giving a positive order, which he was always reluctant to do, when he had confidence in an officer in a separate command." On the proper construction of that letter, Mr. G. W. Greene is therefore wholly at variance with Mr. Sparks, whose name he cannot write "without a thrill of tenderness and gratitude" (p. 33). Moreover Mr. Sparks adds, in regard to the surrender of the fort,—"that there was a great fault somewhere has never been disputed." "It seems plain that the loss of the garrison, in the manner it occurred, was *the consequence of an erroneous judgment on the part of General Greene*. How far the Commander-in-Chief should have overruled his opinion, or whether, under the circumstances of the case, he ought to have given a peremptory order, it may perhaps be less easy to decide" (*Life of Washington*, pp. 214, 216). But we have the most decisive evidence from Washington himself, that Mr. G. W. Greene's interpretations of the letter of November 8th, are incorrect. In a letter

to his brother, dated November 19th, only three days after the attack, Washington says:—"What adds to my mortification is that the post, after the last ships went past it, *was held contrary to my wishes and opinions*, as I conceived it to be hazardous." "I had given it as my opinion to General Greene, under whose care it was, that it would be best to evacuate the place; but as the order was discretionary, and his opinion differed from mine, it unhappily was delayed too long, much to my grief." (Sparks's *Writings of Washington*, iv., 183). Mr. G. W. Greene omits to quote these passages, although he cites another passage from the letter which contains them. Had he quoted them, he would have given his readers the opportunity to choose between Washington's interpretation of his own letter, and that affixed to it by the author of this pamphlet. But we are in possession of still more full and explicit testimony from the pen of Washington. It is found in a letter to President Reed, under date of August 22, 1779 (*Writings of Washington*, vi., 328). In that letter Washington speaks of the concern which the loss of the fort had occasioned him, on account of the number and value of the prisoners taken and of the cruelties afterwards inflicted upon them. "But this concern," he adds, "received additional poignancy from two considerations, which did not appear; one of which will never be known to the world, because I shall never palliate my own faults by exposing those of another; nor indeed could either of them come before the public, unless there had been such a charge, as must have rendered an inquiry into the causes of this miscarriage necessary. *The one was a non-compliance in General Greene with an order sent to him from White Plains*, before I marched for the eastern side of Hudson's River, to withdraw the artillery and stores from the fort; allowing him, however, some latitude for the exercise of his own judgment, as he was upon the spot, and could decide better from appearances and circumstances than I, on the propriety of a total evacuation." The other consideration was the resolve of Congress, of October 11th, 1776, urging him, if it should be practicable, "by every art and at whatever expense," to obstruct the navigation of the North River, and keep the enemy's ships from passing and repassing. "When I came to Fort Lee," he says, "and found no measures taken towards an evacuation, in consequence of the order before mentioned; when I found General Greene, of whose judgment and candor I entertained a good opinion, decidedly opposed to it; when I found other opinions so coincident with

his; when the wishes of Congress to obstruct the North River, which were delivered in such forcible terms, recurred; when I knew that the easy communication between the different parts of the army, then separated by the river, depended upon it; and, lastly, when I considered that our policy led us to waste the campaign without coming to a general action on the one hand, or suffering the enemy to overrun the country on the other, I conceived that every impediment, that stood in their way, was a means to answer these purposes; *these, when thrown into the scale with those opinions, which were opposed to an evacuation*, caused that warfare in my mind, and hesitation, which ended in the loss of the garrison; and, being *repugnant to my own judgment of the advisableness of attempting to hold the post*, filled me with the greatest regret. *The two great causes which led to this misfortune*, and which I have before recited, as well, perhaps, as my reasoning upon it, which occasioned the delay, were concealed from public view," etc.

Here is Washington's own account of the transaction. His judgment had been decidedly in favor of the evacuation; he had given a discretionary order to General Greene to abandon the post; but on arriving in the vicinity, the opposition of Greene and others, coupled with the resolution of Congress, and certain considerations which gave plausibility to the opposite opinion, rendered it impossible for him to make up his mind immediately to issue a peremptory order for the removal of the garrison; and soon the attack of the enemy made it impracticable to do so. It is plain that this indecision did not begin until he reached Fort Lee, and that then it was largely due to the opinions and the representations of Greene and his fellow officers. Now Mr. G. W. Greene says nothing of this most important letter of Washington to President Reed! Several of the positions which he takes in his pamphlet are overthrown, as our readers must see, by this testimony of Washington, which bears on the face of it the stamp of truth. Why is Mr. Greene silent in regard to this letter?

Whether the strong terms which Mr. Bancroft uses respecting the mistake of General Greene, are required by the occasion, is an open question. The loss of that Fort was unquestionably a very disastrous event. The great services of General Greene, although they make his name illustrious, do not preclude a fair criticism of his military career.

As concerns the other topics brought forward in Mr. Greene's

pamphlet, it must be conceded that he makes out a *prima facie* case; but after the example which we have just given of his suppression of evidence, we prefer to wait for further light, before assenting to his conclusions. It is possible that Mr. Bancroft may be possessed of documentary proofs which are sufficient to sustain the statements which Mr. Greene attempts to impugn. If so, the public will probably, in due time, be presented with the whole case. If injustice has been done to General Greene, in any particular, let the error be rectified; but his fame will not be advanced by a one-sided representation of his cause.

The foregoing notice was in type, when Mr. Bancroft's Letter, in the "North American Review," for April, fell under our eye. In that letter, Mr. Bancroft reproduces the letter of Washington to Reed, which we have given above, together with other testimonies, to which we have also adverted, respecting the surrender of Fort Washington.

MEMOIRS OF MADAME RECAMIER.*—These fascinating memoirs of one of the most fascinating women of her time introduce us not only to an intimate acquaintance with her own interior life and character, but also to a knowledge almost as intimate of the best society of Paris and of Europe for a period of some fifty years. The volume would be invaluable for no other reason than this, that it enables us to understand that peculiar phase of society which is nowhere so brilliant and powerful as in Paris, if indeed it exists elsewhere at all. It presents in brilliant review many of the most exciting events in the political history of Europe as they affected the fortunes and reflected the sentiments of some of the most distinguished men and women of their time. We may not justify or approve every act of the distinguished person who was the center of this brilliant circle, but we are none the less interested in following her in the various intimacies which she forms, and in the revelations of character and incident which their correspondence unfolds. Though a woman of society and of fashion, her admirers and devoted friends were among the most cultivated and high principled men of her time. It is to her distinguished honor

* *Memoirs and Correspondence of Madame Récamier.* Translated from the French and edited by ISAPHEM M. LUYSTER. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1867 12mo. pp. xxii., 408. New Haven: Judd & White.

that she maintained a life-long and most intimate friendship and correspondence with some of the purest and noblest spirits that France and Europe have known in the present century.

KING RENE'S DAUGHTER.*—We have to thank the publishers for bringing before American readers this exquisite dramatic poem. It had indeed been translated into English for several years, and once reprinted in this country in a cheap form. It is not often in these days of sensational literature that a book appears which is so sweet and quiet in its effect, and so beautifully proportioned in all its parts. The story is briefly this: King René's daughter, Iolanthe, is blind from birth. She was betrothed from infancy to Tristan, Count of Vendemont. When a child of a year old she lost her sight. This mischance for reasons of state was concealed, and Iolanthe was trained in a secluded palace and grounds, fitted for the object so skillfully that she was kept in entire ignorance of her loss, and that there was anything in which she differed from other mortals. Hope had been excited by a skillful physician that at her sixteenth year her sight might return. The time had come, and this is the time selected for the scenes of the drama. Her lover strangely finds himself within the grounds, and more strangely encounters her unattended without knowing who she was. Fascinated by her beauty, he discovers that she is blind, and discovers to her that she lacks some wondrous gift possessed by other mortals. Surprised and confounded, she is not grieved at the discovered loss, but still is haunted by the mystery of what she might be. Under the force of this awakened desire, and the potency of the physician's skill, she is restored to sight, and sees the lover whose voice had won her heart.

The story is simple enough, but the interest of the poem arises entirely from the sentiments expressed at these strange turns and surprises. To understand the sweetness and pathos one must read for himself. We congratulate the publishers on the taste which directed to the selection of this as the first of a series of choice translations, and which promises Frithiof's Saga for the next.

* *King René's Daughter*. A Danish Lyrical Drama. By HENRY HERTZ. Translated by THEODORE MARTIN. New York: Leypoldt & Holt. 1867. 16mo. pp. xii., 100. New Haven. Judd & White. Price \$1.50.

THE LAWYER IN THE SCHOOL-ROOM.*—Poison for schools! It is scarcely to be believed—but the lies of that old Tory, *Samuel Peters*, have turned up once more in a new shape! We cannot but laugh in the midst of our vexation!

The enemies of New England, generation after generation, ever since his "history" was published, have tried to use his silly stories in their various political, theological, sectarian, and sectional assaults, and then have thrown them aside, utterly abandoned them, and even laughed at them. For years we have not heard them alluded to, except in connection with the stories of the distinguished traveler—Baron Munchausen. It did not occur to us, when we saw the other day a magnificent new edition of the baron's "Travels," profusely and splendidly illustrated, that, not to be outdone, the "blue laws" of the "historian" Peters were to be also brought out afresh! But why are there not here, too, "illustrations" to match those of the aforesaid ponderous folio? What a capital subject for the artist would have been the famous iron crowbar mentioned in the "History," floating on the waters of the Connecticut, as they became "consolidated harder than marble" in passing through the narrow channel at Bellows Falls, while that unfortunate and insensible Indian maiden could be introduced as she glided in her light canoe down the "irresistible" stream! We regret that Peters has been thought unworthy of "illustration." It is our opinion that he has suffered cruel indignity at the hands of his friends. Still there is a slight compensation; and one which would doubtless have delighted the heart of the old man if he could have foreseen it. His book is now to be used for drugging the food of the rising generation! The teachers in our schools all over the land are in a fair way to be crammed with his falsehoods, so that we may expect that for the next fifty years the minds of their scholars will be poisoned, and the spatterers of mud will always have a supply on hand with which they can soil the reputation of the fathers of the New Haven Colony. A Bachelor of Laws, of the New York Bar ["M. McN. Walsh, A. M., LL. B., of the New York Bar,"] professes to have "carefully compiled, arranged, cited, and explained" in a book which he calls "The Lawyer in the School-Room," "the laws of all the

* *The Lawyer in the School-Room*: comprising the Laws of all the States on important Educational Subjects. Carefully compiled, arranged, cited, and explained. By M. McN. WALSH, A. M., LL. B., of the New York Bar. New York: J. W. Schermerhorn & Co. 1867. 12mo. pp. 161.

States on important educational subjects; and among them, with all soberness, he quotes, in this year, A. D. 1867, on the authority of *Peters*, the following as veritable *laws* of the New Haven Colony! From the pile of rubbish we take a sample or two:

"7. No one shall travel, cook victuals, make beds, sweep house, cut hair, or shave on the Sabbath-day. 8. No woman shall kiss her child on the Sabbath or fasting-day."

Why Mr. Walsh, who is so anxious to have his collection complete, did not look up and quote that other reputed law concerning *the working of beer barrels on Sunday*, with the terrible penalty attached, we cannot divine. However, we will hold him accountable only for the "laws" which he has actually "cited," and for the way in which they are "explained." That our readers may have an opportunity of judging of the manner in which this has been done, we subjoin an extract, the refreshing naïveté of which we know will be enjoyed. We quote from page 85:

"It is said by *Peters*, in his *History of Connecticut*, that these laws were the laws made by the people of New-Haven, previous to their incorporation with Saybrook and Hartford colonies, and were, as he says, very properly termed 'blue laws,' that is, bloody laws; for, he adds, they were all sanctified with excommunication, confiscation, fines, banishment, whipping, cutting off the ears, burning the tongue, and death. We do not reproduce these laws with pleasure, and have given only as many as seemed necessary to convey a proper idea of the spirit with which Connecticut laws were made in those days."

As Dr. Samuel Peters seems to be the only authority relied upon, we will take the liberty of advising "Bachelor" Walsh to consult Knickerbocker's *History of New York* for further information on the subject.

It is too bad that in consequence of that book of *Peters*, which was written in England, that he might vent his spleen upon his native State, after he had "left his country for his country's good," the New Haven colony, the most free of all the New England Colonies in its legislation from attempts to control in matters of dress and behavior, should be the one which is always selected for such kind of ridicule as this. And now the old dead falsehoods are once more brought to life! They have been set agoing afresh; and it would seem as if they were to be scattered broadcast everywhere! The book is advertised as on sale in New York, in Philadelphia, in Chicago, in London, and, in fact, it is sold by booksellers generally!

What vitality a lie has? Who shall stop it? We acquit Mr.

Walsh entirely of any malice. It is evident that he suspected no wrong. But a "member of the New York Bar" ought certainly to know something more about the value of the authorities he quotes, in matters of *law*! At any rate it does not speak well for him that he has been caught with such chaff!

REPRINT OF THOMAS LECHFORD'S "PLAIN DEALING."*—This Thomas Lechford—who is known as the "first Boston lawyer"—had been a "practiser at law" in London. In 1637, he incurred some kind of punishment for having assisted in the defense of Prynne, the famous author of *Histriomastix*. At that time he seems to have been an attendant upon the ministry of Hugh Peters. In 1638, he came to Boston, with the intention of "joining" the "churches" there. But from the hour of his landing he was regarded with distrust; partly because he was a lawyer, and partly because he "differed from the received belief of the Massachusetts churches," in that he held "that the Apostolick function was not yet ceased: but that there still ought to be such, who should by their transcendent Authority govern all churches." It can easily be imagined that a lawyer who sought to propagate such views could not live long in harmonious relations with the good people of Boston. We do not propose to follow the editor—Mr. Trumbull—through the details of the story, which he has given in full. But at the end of some three years, it appears that Lechford had become so established in his unpopular views, and so satisfied of the error of the New England Churches, that he gave up in disgust; declared that "all was out of joint in Church and Commonwealth;" confessed his own error in having taken part in England against the bishops with Burton and Prynne; went back to London; and "returned humbly to the Church of England."

After reaching his old quarters at Clement's Inn, of course he "put out his book," which he called "*Plain Dealing, or News from New-England.*" And it is this old book, now grown extremely rare, that has been published as "No. IV." of the "*Library of New England History.*" It has had the good fortune to fall into the hands of the Hon. J. Hammond Trumbull, and it bears throughout, and especially in its numerous annotations, the

* *Plain Dealing, or News from New England.* By THOMAS LECHFORD. With an Introduction and Notes by J. HAMMOND TRUMBULL. Boston: J. K. Wiggin and Wm. Parsons Lunt. 1867. 8vo. pp. xi, 211.

marks of his careful and accurate editing. Of Lechford's book, Mr. Trumbull says: "It is a view of New England—more particularly of Massachusetts—taken upon the spot by an intelligent observer, who, though unsympathizing, was not in the main unfriendly; and who, while he certainly did 'naught extenuate,' cannot justly be charged with setting down aught in malice. His mistakes are comparatively unimportant; and the information he gives of the country, civil and religious, from 1638 to 1641, is valuable enough to render this book nearly indispensable to the study of New England institutions."

PALGRAVE'S ESSAYS ON ART.*—The most of Palgrave's "Essays on Art" appeared originally in the *Saturday Review*. On looking over the titles, and considering the subjects of these papers, one is tempted at first to infer that they must be uninteresting and unprofitable for American readers, from the circumstance that they consist so largely of criticisms on particular works of English painters as presented from time to time in the public exhibitions. But as we look more closely into their contents, we find that these personal and special criticisms, into the spirit and meaning of which most American readers cannot fully enter, involve principles that are so fundamental and important as to impart a permanent interest and value to what would otherwise have a merely local and transient interest. Of one thing we are certain that there is no description of criticism which is so unprincipled and extravagant, so ignorant and pretentious, so positive and malicious, as the productions of many, not to say most, of the so-called art-critics in our American newspapers. If the republication of these Essays should serve no other purpose than to furnish an example of art-criticism of a better sort it would be of immense value to the country,—provided the example should be followed.

THE OPEN POLAR SEA.†—The name of Dr. Hayes, so familiar to the readers of Dr. Kane's narrative of the second Grinnell expe-

* *Essays of Art*. By FRANCIS TURNER PALGRAVE, late Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 1867. 12mo. New Haven: Judd & White. Price \$1.75.

† *The Open Polar Sea*. A narrative of a voyage of discovery toward the North Pole, in the Schooner United States. By DR. I. I. HAYES. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 1867. pp. 454. New Haven: Judd & White. Price \$2.75.

dition, is invested with a special personal interest to the thousands who, in 1858-9, in various parts of the country, listened to his lectures on Arctic Explorations and Scenery. In the handsome volume before us we have a most interesting narrative of the Expedition to which those labors pointed. Starting from Boston in July, 1860, in a little schooner of 133 tons, with fourteen companions, he made his way to Smith's Sound, penetrating the ice with his vessel as far as $78^{\circ} 17'$ N. L. Here he was closed in by the ice and made his winter quarters in a bay which he called Port Foulke. His plan had been to reach a higher point on the Western Coast, and thence push over the land and ice in dog-sledges, carrying boats, with the view of reaching the Pole either by land, or (what he more expected) by the Open Polar Sea, whose existence was in dispute. The narrative repeats the old story of disappointments to which Arctic explorers seem doomed. He was forced by the ice upon the *Eastern* side of the Sound, which proved a serious obstacle to success. A pestilence had just swept off the dogs of the region so completely that it was impossible to obtain anything like the number he required. Having with great effort collected thirty-six, all but nine died on his hands. His second in command, and main reliance, Mr. Sonntag, a young man of brilliant talents and acquirements, undertook a journey to remedy the loss and perished in the course of it. Finally, by the opening of spring, he had been able to get together fourteen dogs in all, good, bad, and indifferent, not one-third the number he required, had all the conditions been favorable. With these, and with twelve men, he set out April 3d, 1861. His first effort was to cross Smith's Sound to the West Coast. The distance was eighty miles. In 1854 he had crossed in two days, but so terrible was now the condition of the ice that it occupied him thirty-eight days—barely two miles a day! The account of this journey across the Sound is of the most exciting interest, and discloses a resolution, fortitude, and perseverance against overwhelming difficulties and trials, worthy of the highest admiration. The ice was piled in enormous masses, so that climbing over it "was like crossing New York on the house tops." The attempt to get the boat across was soon given up as an absolute impossibility. After twenty-five days of incredible struggle, less than forty miles having been accomplished, his men were broken down and could go no farther. He sent back all but three, and with these and his dogs toiled on. Two weeks more of fearful labor brought him to

the Western Coast. His progress northward was now far easier, but was by no means free from difficulty. His best man became disabled by an accident, and after two or three days' effort to carry him, he was forced to leave him behind in charge of a companion with five dogs. With one attendant and nine dogs, and a scanty supply of food, he pressed northward. At length, May 18th, 1861, his progress was arrested by the open water. In latitude $81^{\circ} 35'$, he saw the Open Polar Sea—saw, but could not navigate. Returning without delay, he picked up his disabled man, and made good his retreat across the Sound (the ice in which was now rapidly breaking up) and reached his vessel after two months' absence, alive but utterly exhausted.

The schooner being too much injured to push farther north, Dr. Hayes resolved to return home, refit, and the next year renew the attempt to reach and navigate the Polar Sea by the aid of steam, and a hunting colony, to be established at Port Foulke, as a base of operations and supplies. Full of this design, he returned to Boston. He arrived there at evening, and went immediately on shore.

"A news boy passed me. I seized a paper, and the first thing which caught my eye was the account of the Balls' Bluff battle, in which had fallen many of the noblest sons of Boston. * * * I turned back sad and dejected, and found my way on board again through the dull, dull fog. * * * Before I had reached my cabin, while my friends were yet in ignorance of our presence in the Bay, I had resolved to postpone the execution of the task with which I had charged myself; and I closed as well the cruise as the project by writing a letter to the President, asking for immediate employment in the public service, and offering my schooner to the Government for a gun-boat."

The style of the narrative, though in places rather overburdened with "fine writing," is, on the whole, very good and appropriate. The story never flags nor wearies, and maintains (as what Arctic narratives do not?) an absorbing interest to the close.

We cannot refrain from alluding to Dr. Hayes' naïve account, in the preface, of the trap into which he fell by generously presenting, on his return, his principal records and materials to the Smithsonian Institute "for publication." More than five years later, no part of them having been printed, he proposed "to embody some leading facts" in a short appendix to his volume, and was coolly informed by the Secretary that they could not be published except by the Institution. The chart which he had perfected, and which he had relied upon for the correction of the maps in his book, was in like manner withheld, so that he is compelled to

apologize for any inaccuracy that they may exhibit. "This explanation," he quietly adds, "is made in view of the possible contingency of the Smithsonian Institute publishing the map for some years past in its possession, an event which I think unlikely to happen." We heartily sympathize with the Doctor in his manifest disgust at this scientific quackery and snobbishness, qualities which are sufficiently hard to bear when displayed in similar cases by a Government "Department;" but which, when exhibited by an Institution founded by private endowment, expressly for the Diffusion of Knowledge, and especially toward the donor of the very materials which it is desired to make available, are, to the last degree, discreditable. We imagine that, after the experience of Dr. Hayes, very few explorers in the field of science will trust any information they may wish "diffused," within the jaws of the Smithsonian Institute.

WAR POETRY OF THE SOUTH.*—The South in itself is an object of thought and interest at the present time, to almost every mind, and anything which comes from that portion of the country and bears witness of the sentiments of its people, is calculated to awaken attention. The poetry of the South has a peculiar interest, because, like all the literature of which it is a part, it has so peculiar a character—a character which distinguishes it from that of all other countries, and renders it easy to trace the authorship, whether it appears in Virginia or in England, in the *Richmond Enquirer* or the *London Times*. But the war poetry of the South—how many things it suggests to us, and calls up to our remembrance from the past years! The martial enthusiasm with which South Carolina called upon her sister States to join her in a conflict with the Northern barbarians, that was to end only in their complete overthrow, and in the full establishment of the new independent confederacy; the sublime contempt for Yankees and hirelings with which each "noble Southron" marched forth to battle, ready to meet in the deadly affray any number of the pusillanimous cowards who had been accustomed, for so many years, to submit to his dictation, but were now attempting to resist his lordly will; the heroic spirit which led them to the desperate resolution to perish "in the last ditch," rather than lose the cause for which they strug-

* *War Poetry of the South.* Edited by WILLIAM GILMORE SIMMS, LL. D. New York: Richardson & Co. 1867. 1 vol. 12mo. pp. 482.

gled, or be brought under the dominion of their hated foes ; the terrible picture of the fate of their wives and children—a fate worse than death—should the chances of war, by any possibility, bring them final defeat, by which they nerved their energies in every hour of despondency or misfortune ; in a word, the firing of the Southern heart—that mysterious thing, so long prophesied and threatened, which was to bring the most direful evils upon the rash and presumptuous men who believed in freedom ;—all these things come back to us, as vivid realities, as we see those words—the War Poetry of the South—and we open any volume that bears these words for its title with much of the old feeling, with which we used to read the fulminations of the Southern newspapers or the Southern orators. We confess there was always something of special interest to us in all those fulminations, so that when the armies of the Union captured one after another of the larger cities of the Confederacy, there was intermingled with our joy over the victory a sort of regret, that we were losing the opportunity of reading the fiery words of the fiery heroes, and seeing, as it were, upon the very faces of the pure aristocracy, their withering scorn towards the mercenary soldiers of an ignoble race. The historian, in future times, we are sure, will linger over this Southern literature with no ordinary emotions, and will feel that he has discovered a rich and rare treasure. Would that some one of those martial spirits, who survives the war and its “resolutions,” would devote his energy, now that the conflict is over, to the work of collecting all these productions for the edification and instruction of the present and the future generations.

The poet Simms has done a work of this sort in collecting some of the specimens of Southern poetry written during the war. His character and reputation are of themselves an evidence that his collection includes only the better portion of such poems. The more fiery and intense portion, which would have an interest of its own, is excluded because of its inferior merit in the poetical line. And we may judge, accordingly, that the present volume is as good a selection as could be made. If we look at the poems thus, we must, in all fairness say, that they are more reasonable and respectable in their tone and character than most of the Southern prose writings, which it has been our fortune to see, within the past few years. Of course there is a liberal sprinkling of such words as “dastards,” and “slaves,” and “barbarians,” and “fiends,” applied to the Yankees, but, on the whole, the pieces are

somewhat worthy of the name of war poetry, and not mere scurrilous abuse, like most of their newspaper articles during the war. As poetry, the collection has, prevailingly, a wooden or machine character. Very little of it, as it appears to us, can claim to be genuine poetry, or to compare with many of the war songs of the North. Very little of it is worth printing or preserving in a volume. It is rather impressive, and somewhat amusing, to read the confident declarations of the justice of their cause, and the predictions of its success, now that all is over, and the Southern rebels are claiming to be as loyal as anybody, and as full members of the Union as their Northern enemies. But such confirmed braggarts, as they have always been, are apt to change their tone pretty easily, when they are thoroughly worsted. Mr. Simms seems to think that he is rendering a good service in gathering these songs together, because they will hereafter be recognized as "a legitimate part of the national literature." But we cannot agree with him. They seem to us to be the second-rate effusions of the day, and hereafter they will perish from the knowledge of all but the most curious investigator of the history of these wonderful times. They are not worthy, most of them, of a place in our literature now, and no progress of time will place them on any higher level than they reach to-day. The editor errs, also, as we believe, in another point. Like all his Southern brethren, he has the idea that the South and the North were equally noble combatants in a cause where right was as likely to be with the one party as with the other. But the future generations are not going to view the subject in this way. To them it will appear what it was in fact—a contest between a gigantic wrong on one side, and the freedom of mankind on the other—and the world will not sing the Southern war songs hereafter with much enthusiasm, or read them except with wonder that any people of the nineteenth century could have fought or written in such a cause.

The book, we believe, is published by subscription, and we suppose, therefore, it is not expected that it will find many readers; a conclusion to which we are also led by the fact that, even after it was announced in the newspapers, we found the greatest difficulty in procuring a copy. We give two specimens from the volume, of different kinds—favorable ones, as we think, as showing the feeling of the Southern people in two different lines:—

A FAREWELL TO POPE.

"Hats off," in the crowd ; " Present Arms " in the line !
 Let the standards all bow, and the sabres incline—
 Roll, drums, the Rogue's March, while the conqueror goes,
 Whose eyes have seen only " the backs of his foes "—
 Through a thicket of laurel, a whirlwind of cheers,
 His vanishing form from our gaze disappears ;
 Henceforth with the savage *Dacotahs* to cope,
Abiit, evasit, erupit—John Pope.

He came out of the West, like the young *Lochinvar*,
 Compeller of fate and controller of war,
Videre et vincere, simply to see,
 And straightway to conquer Hill, Jackson, and Lee ;
 And old Abe at the White House, like *Kilmansegg père*,
 With a monkeyish grin and beatified air,
 " Seemed washing his hands with invisible soap,"
 As with eager attention he listened to Pope.

He *came*—and the poultry was swept by his sword,
 Spoons, liquors, and furniture went by the board ;
 He *saw*—at a distance, the rebels appear,
 And " rode to the front," which was strangely the rear ;
 He *conquered*—truth, decency, honor full soon,
 Pest, pilferer, puppy, pretender, poltroon ;
 And was fain from the scenes of his triumphs to slope,
 Sure there never was fortunate hero like Pope.

He has left us his shining example to note,
 And Stuart has captured his uniform coat ;
 But 'tis puzzling enough, as his deeds we recall,
 To tell on whose shoulders his mantle should fall ;
 While many may claim to deserve it, at least,
 From Hunter, the Hound, down to Butler, the Beast,
 None else, we can say, without risking the trope,
 But himself can be parallel ever to Pope.

Like his namesake, the poet of genius and fire,
 He gives new expression and force to the *lyre* ;
 But in one little matter they differ, the two,
 And differ, indeed, very widely, 'tis true—
 While his verses gave great Alexander his fame,
 'Tis our hero's reverses accomplish the same ;
 And fate may decree that the end of a rope
 Shall award yet his highest position to Pope.

THE TEXAN MARSEILLAISE.

Sons of the South, arouse to battle!
Gird on your armor for the fight!
The Northern Thugs, with dread "war's rattle,"
Pour on each vale, and glen, and height;
Meet them as Ocean meets in madness
The frail bark on the rocky shore,
When crested billows foam and roar,
And the wrecked crew go down in sadness.
Arm! arm! ye Southern braves!
Scatter yon Vandal hordes!
Despots and bandits, fitting food
For vultures and your swords.

Shall dastard tyrants march their legions
To crush the land of Jackson—Lee?
Shall freedom fly to other regions,
And sons of Yorktown bend the knee?
Or shall their "foot-prints" base pollution
Of Southern soil, in blood be purged,
And every flying slave be scourged
Back to his snows in wild confusion?
Arm! arm! &c.

Vile despots, with their minions knavish,
Would drag us back to their embrace;
Will freemen brook a chain so slavish?
Will brave men take so low a place?
O, Heaven! for words—the loathing, scorning
We feel for such a Union's bands:
To paint with more than mortal hands,
And sound our loudest notes of warning.
Arm! arm! &c.

What! union with a race ignoring
The charter of our nation's birth!
Union with bastard slaves adoring
The fiend that chains them to the earth!
No! we reply in tones of thunder—
No! our staunch hills fling back the sound—
No! our hoarse cannon echo round—
No! evermore remain asunder!
Arm! arm! &c.

ANCIENT AND MODERN GREECE.*—These two neatly printed volumes contain the courses of lectures delivered by the late President Felton, in the years 1852, 1853, 1854, and 1859, before the Lowell Institute of Boston. The work of an author who ranked second to none in this country as a Greek scholar, and who was so well known for his love of the Greek people and their history, they can scarcely fail to commend themselves to the attention of all who are interested in the progress of nations or in their struggles for freedom. In themselves a warm-hearted, appreciative, earnest, truthful setting-forth of the glory of the distant past, of the terrible bondage and oppression of later times, and of the reviving life and energy of the present, they must render a good service to the cause of classical learning, as well as to the cause of Greece itself. They have appeared at a favorable moment, when the mind of the world is again turned to the conflict with Turkish despotism, and the sympathies of the world are called forth by the heroic efforts and the sad sufferings of the people of Crete. We hope that many of our readers will look into these volumes, and we feel sure that none, who do so, will rise from the perusal of them without something of the enthusiasm of the author himself.

The four courses of lectures are upon "The Greek Language and Poetry;" "The Life of Greece;" "The Constitution and Orators of Greece;" and "Modern Greece." The second and fourth courses will be found, we think, to have the most general interest for all classes of readers—the one on the Life of Greece, because the author has so gathered all the notices and hints of the ancient writers as to present quite a complete and vivid picture of the early times; and the one on Modern Greece, because so few travelers have brought to us any accounts of the Greek people of to-day, and consequently so little is known of their recent history or their present life. The other courses relate to subjects which are, in a sense, more entirely within the field of the classical scholar's thoughts, and yet, even here, the method and style of the author are so successful, that every one will find pleasure in examining them. We cannot but welcome such a popular and attractive presentation of the story of both the ancient and the

* *Greece, Ancient and Modern.* Lectures delivered before the Lowell Institute. By C. C. FELTON, late President of Harvard University. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1867. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 511 and 549.

modern times, because we think that many who have been disposed to question the usefulness and desirableness of Greek learning may find themselves, in the reading of these volumes, led to a more just appreciation of it. The object of education is not simply to qualify a man for success in a particular profession or employment. It is not merely to make him useful in some practical way to his fellow-men. It is to develop the man himself in his inner life, and so to give him knowledge of many kinds and open his vision to all that is beautiful as to make him, as far as possible, a full and perfect man. And the present growing opposition to the study of the ancient classics among our people is largely owing to a false idea on the whole subject—as if a lawyer needed to know nothing but law, or a merchant nothing but the prices of goods or the state of the market—as if a man had no work in the world beyond that of a common operative in a manufactory, who is limiting all his efforts and thoughts to sharpening a pin or filing a piece of steel. The utilitarian spirit of the age is a good thing, if guided by a reasonable judgment, and the principle of division of labor is essential to the greatest advancement of the world. But when we measure all things by their immediate or apparent usefulness, or make a man a mere portion of a great machine, we lose sight of that which is highest and noblest in himself, and sacrifice the growth of his own soul for the material growth of society. We believe this is a mistaken view of the subject, even with reference to society—a shutting out from our thoughts all that is not on the surface and manifest to the most inconsiderate observer—for who can estimate the blessing to any community of the presence within it even of a single individual, who is a widely, and, in the truest sense, a liberally educated man;—and how, in the presence of such a man, does the mere tradesman or workman in any profession sink into insignificance in his capacity for doing good. The study of the classics, it is said, is not practically useful, and a man can gain influence over the masses of the people better without any knowledge of them than with it. But is it so certain, after all, that his influence is as elevating an influence, or that this knowledge is not helpful, in the highest degree, toward the development of the intellectual life, and thus more useful than anything else outside of the moral and religious field? This is not the place, however, for the discussion of this great question. We only wish to say, that we are glad President Felton's book has been given to the public, because we think every such book

—written with all the enthusiasm of a classical scholar, and showing the refining influence of such studies—must, in itself, speak to every candid mind of the value of a classical education.

The Lectures on Modern Greece are so largely devoted to a review of the long period of decline and downfall, that but little space is left for the most recent times. We think this is to be regretted, and we could wish that the author had given from the results of his own observation and journeying a more complete account of the country as it now appears. But, as it is, there is very much to recall the old recollections of those who have seen what he describes, and to excite the interest of those who have not. Of the government of Otho we think Mr. Felton has too favorable a judgment. As it seems to us, nothing was done by the late king, in comparison with what might and ought to have been done, for the development and growth of the country. It is a disgrace—and beyond all excuse—that, after a reign of more than twenty-five years, no liberal system had been adopted in regard to the revenues and the material products of the country, and only four roads which were practicable for carriages had been opened in the whole kingdom. Those who traveled in Greece a few years ago will remember how thoroughly disgusted the people were with the Bavarians, and how gladly they saw them take their final departure from the country; and we cannot wonder that the king himself was obliged to abandon his throne at last. Surely the Greek people are worthy of no little regard and sympathy from all liberal and free nations. The reader of these lectures—as he traces out their history through the centuries of oppression and slavery of the worst sort, and sees the love of liberty still surviving and waiting its long-deferred opportunity;—as he follows the course of their revolution forty years ago, and hears the story of the meanness and neglect of the other European powers even to the end;—as he surveys their really wonderful progress in education and civilization since their independence was established, and recalls to mind how, at every step, the royal government has failed to do its whole duty—cannot help feeling that they are, with all their faults, a noble people, and that the responsibility for their debasement and weakness lies mainly with their oppressors. No people in Europe have more of that peculiar intelligence in their faces which belongs to the English and Americans; and, as it seems to us, no people show more clearly than they do, how the being down-trodden for ages may degrade but cannot destroy the powers of the soul. The centuries of

bondage do not lose their influence in a moment, but the soul rises into new life, with the gift of freedom, and in the progress of time will reach out, once more, toward the fullness and glory of the golden age of the past.

President Felton's volumes are somewhat remarkable, as we remember that they were written largely in the brief intervals between the lectures. Few men in the country could have produced such a work from the mere fullness and overflow, as it were, of their knowledge. The style—excepting the cases of colloquial expressions and of small witticisms, which seem unworthy of the subject—is an easy, flowing, rich style, perfectly adapted to the popular lecture, and admirably fitted to bear the reader pleasantly on from page to page. The story of the ancient life and customs is charming and instructive—exhibiting a rare power of representing a former age. The essays and criticisms on the orators and political constitutions of Greece, and those on its language and poetry, are carefully and thoroughly written, and give an interesting survey of the subjects of which they treat. The views presented respecting the Homeric poems and the station and education of their author will receive the attention of those who have investigated this disputed question. And of the whole book—as especially of the part relating to Modern Greece—we can heartily say that we wish it were longer. We cannot doubt that the volumes will add to the high reputation of their author, and will deepen the general regret that a scholar of so much enthusiasm and so much learning should have passed away while yet in the vigor of his life and powers.

THE SOLITUDES OF NATURE.*—"Overdoing," said Richard Baxter, who was a tolerably "Liberal Christian" for his time, "is the devil's way of undoing." If this is true, then this book, in many respects able and interesting, is very thoroughly undone. It is overdone in style, as any reader will see who essays to read the first sentence. It is overdone in its conceptions and illustrations. It is overdone in its portraitures of solitary men, many of which would be exceedingly felicitous, were it not for the excessive intensity and exaggeration which characterize them. It is overdone in its liberalism,—*corruptio optimi pessima*—as may be seen in the extremely, not to say the outrageously, bad taste which led

* *The Solitudes of Nature and of Man*; or, *The Loneliness of Human Life*. By WILLIAM ROUNSEVILLE ALGER. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1867.

the author to introduce the character of Jesus into his group of the lovers of solitude, and to turn a professed portraiture of his peculiar personality as a man into an elaborate exposition of the author's "private interpretation" of his nature and work.

There was a time when the orthodox were reproached by their fastidious critics of the liberal school with committing a serious offense against propriety by taking every occasion to display "their theological flag." The indecorum is no longer peculiar to them. Liberal Christians, like Mr. Alger, not only hang out their flag on all occasions, but not infrequently flaunt it unpleasantly in the eyes of those who choose to carry another.

JOHANN KARL PASSAVANT.*—This biography from the fertile pen and the many-sided mind of Prof. Adolf Helferich, of Berlin, is scarcely less interesting than the Life of Perthes, so much read and greatly admired in England and this country. Passavant was an esteemed physician, who spent the most of his life in Frankfort-on-the-Maine, which was the place of his birth. He was not only eminent as a physician, and greatly beloved for his humanity and usefulness, but was prominent as a writer in several branches of science. He devoted himself with great zeal to the investigation of the phenomena of animal magnetism, making many personal observations and experiments on the cases which came to his knowledge as a physician, and availing himself of its aid for the cure of diseases. The work which he published on this subject is esteemed one of the ablest and most discriminating that has ever been published, and in all his studies and inquiries he had the countenance and sympathy of some of the ablest men of his time, *e. g.*, Schelling and Schleiermacher. His interest in theology and philosophy was ever active. He hesitated long whether he should not select one or both of them for his career in life. Though born and educated a Protestant of the Reformed Communion, yet his religious life was formed under the fostering influence of an eminently pious and evangelical prelate of the Romish Church, with whom he maintained, till the death of this spiritual father and guide, the most intimate, friendly, and Christian intercourse. One of the most valued and chosen friends of his youth, and of his life, was Diepenbrock, who through the influence of the Bavarian gov-

* *Johann Karl Passavant*. Ein christliches Characterbild. Frankfurt, Christian Winter. 1867. 8vo., pp. 422.

vernment was made Cardinal, but who never lost his reputation for humble piety, nor his hold upon Passavant's Christian heart. Passavant remained a Protestant till death, with the full consent and under the direction of his truly evangelical advisers, who, like many other German Catholics, lay and clerical, knew how to reconcile their personal preference for their own communion with the complete recognition of the Christian and ecclesiastical rights of their Protestant brethren. The Paulist society in our country might do well to follow more closely in the path of Sailer and his school than they seem yet prepared to do. The glory of Dr. Passavant was, however, the "troops of friends" who held him in the highest esteem, and upon his singularly gentle and loving nature, attracted strongly to himself. The history of his friendships, and the record of his correspondence form the principal charm of this most attractive volume, which we commend to our readers as worthy, for interest and instructiveness, to be placed by the side of the memoirs of Niebuhr and Perthes.

CHARLES WESLEY'S POEMS.*—The editor of this volume claims, in his preface, that the reputation of Charles Wesley as a poet has suffered injustice from the one-sided character of the selections which have usually been made from his poems. As originally published, they "occupy three thousand closely printed pages; and of this mass hardly more than one-fifth (and that in an altered and fragmentary shape) is before the world, chiefly in the Methodist hymn books of England and America." In the preparation of this new volume, therefore, the editor informs us, he has sought to bring together such pieces as have most merit from the whole range of his poetry; though, other things being equal, he has given preference to those that are little known, or not at all. He has also taken pains to give each piece as it was originally printed, "unaltered and unabridged." The design of the work is a good one, and it has been creditably carried out, so that the volume is a valuable addition to our collections of religious poetry; but we can hardly agree with the editor in his views respecting the value of the new matter. Although much of it is good, and some of it is of a high order of poetic merit, we do not think it will add

* *Charles Wesley, seen in his Finer and Less Familiar Poems.* New York: Hurd & Houghton. 1866. 16mo. pp. 398. New Haven: Judd & White.

materially to the reputation of the "Sweet Singer" of Methodism. After all, it would seem that the public have been pretty well acquainted with his best pieces. Among the poems in this collection, those to which is assigned the title "autobiographic" are specially interesting, for the reason that they illustrate the progress of the poet's religious character, and exhibit the thoughts to which he turned for consolation in the hours of doubt, and bereavement, and danger. Some of his "polemic" pieces, too,—poems we can hardly call them, for though there is fire enough in them, it is certainly not *poetic* fire—we are not sorry to find here. They are so characteristic of the times in which they were written, and illustrate so well the nature of the unavoidable theological contests with the high Calvinistic divines of the period, that their omission would have been a mistake.

VENETIAN LIFE.*—The author of this volume has succeeded admirably in doing exactly what everyone is desirous to have done with regard to foreign cities and countries. Books of mere travel we have in abundance. They are all very well in their way; but most readers crave to know something of the characteristic life of the different European cities whose names are so familiar. The merit of this work is that it brings the reader into direct contact with every-day Venetian life in all its phases. Mr. Howell was for some years American consul in Venice, and he has succeeded in making the reader of his book share with him all his various experiences; first, as a bachelor at various lodgings in the different quarters of the city, then, as a married man at housekeeping,—if so it can be called. There is nothing of the guide book here. It is the very farthest remove possible from "Murray." It will take rank with Sir Francis Head's best book, "Bubbles from the Brunnen of Nassau."

REBELLION RECORD.—The sixty-first number of this invaluable documentary History of the Rebellion has now been published.

* *Venetian Life*. By W. D. HOWELL. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 1867. 12mo. pp. 401. New Haven: T. H. Pease. Price \$2.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

The Papacy; its historic origin, and primitive relations with the Eastern Churches. By the Abbe Guettee, D. D. Translated from the French, with a biographical notice of the author. With an introduction by A. C. Coxe, Bishop of Western New York. 12mo. pp. 388. New York: George W. Carleton.

The Last Warning Cry. With reasons for the hope that is in me. By Rev. J. Cumming. 12mo. pp. 327. New York: George W. Carleton.

Dr. Bushnell's Orthodoxy; or an inquiry whether the Factors of the Atonement are recognized in his "Vicarious Sacrifice." With a Defense of the New England Doctrine from his misinterpretations. By Rev. O. S. Taylor. 16mo. pp. 87. New Haven.

The Episcopate the Missionary Order of the Church. By a Presbyterian. 12mo. pp. 58. Pott & Amery.

The Life of Jesus. According to the original Biographers, with notes. By J. R. Gilmore (Edmund Kirke). 12mo. pp. 297. Boston: Lee & Shepard.

American Ecclesiastical Law; the Law of Religious Societies, Church Government and Creeds, Disturbing Religious Meetings, and the Law of Burial-Grounds in the United States. With practical forms. By R. H. Tyler. 8vo. pp. 539. Albany: W. Gould.

Heaven and its Wonders, and Hell. From Things Heard and Seen. By Emanuel Swedenborg. 24mo. pp. 453. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co.

A Letter to a Preacher of Universalism. By the late Rt. Rev. George Burgess, D. D., Bishop of Maine. 24mo. pp. 54.

Two Sermons on the Completion of Twenty Years of Pastoral Service. By R. S. Storrs, Jr., D. D. 8vo. pp. 57. New York.

A Sermon preached in Old Lyme on the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of his Pastorate, July 1st, 1866. By D. S. Brainerd. 8vo. pp. 26.

The Great Pilot and his Lessons. By the Rev. Richard Newton, D. D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1867. 16mo. pp. 309.

The Parable of the Prodigal Son; with Notes by James Hamilton, D. D., F. L. S.; and illustrations by Henry Courtney Selous. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1867. 12mo. pp. 196.

The Good Report. Morning and Evening Lessons for Lent. By Alice B. Haven. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1867. 12mo. pp. 318.

Curfew Chimes; or, Thoughts for Life's Eventide. By J. R. Macduff, D. D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1867. 24mo. pp. 71.

Catena Dominica. A Series of Sunday Idyls. By John H. Alexander. Second Edition. 16mo. pp. 177. New York: A. D. F. Randolph.

Manual of the Evidences of Christianity. For classes and private reading. By Stephen G. Bulfinch, D. D. Boston: William V. Spencer, 1866. 16mo. pp. 147. [To be noticed hereafter.]

Notes, Critical and Explanatory, on the Book of Genesis. From the Covenant to the Close. By Melancthon W. Jacobus, Professor of Bible History and Exe-

gesis in the Theological Seminary at Allegheny, Pa. New York: R. Carter & Brothers. 1866. Vol. II. 12mo. pp. 268.

Hymns of Faith and Hope. By Horatius Bonar, D. D. New edition. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1867. 12mo. pp. 375.

Dr. Noyes's "Translations." [The American Unitarian Association offer a new and revised edition of the whole of Dr. Noyes's well-known and valuable translations of the Hebrew Prophets, the Book of Psalms, Job, Ecclesiastes, and the Canticles, in four volumes of uniform style, for \$1.25 a volume, and will also make a discount from this price of twenty-five per cent. to clergymen of every denomination.]

HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL.

Philip II. of Spain. By Charles Gayarré. With an Introductory Letter by George Bancroft. 8vo. pp. iv., 366. New York: W. J. Widdleton.

The History of King Philip's War. By Benjamin Church. With an Introduction and Notes by Henry Martyn Dexter. 4to. pp. l., 205. Boston: J. K. Wiggin.

The Government of Sir Edmond Andros over New England in 1688 and 1689. Read before the New York Historical Society. By John R. Brodhead. 8vo. pp. 40.

The Life and Times of Sa-Go-Ye-Wat-Ha, or Red Jacket. By the late William H. Stone. With a Memoir of the Author by his Son. With Portraits. 8vo. pp. 509. Albany: J. Munsell.

The Journal of Maurice de Guérin, with an Essay by Matthew Arnold, and a Memoir by Sainte-Beuve. Edited by G. S. Trebutien. Translated by Edward T. Fisher. 16mo. pp. 158. New York: Leypoldt & Holt.

Famous Americans of Recent Times. By James Parton. 8vo. pp. 473. Boston: Ticknor & Fields.

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MISCELLANEOUS.

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THE
NEW ENGLANDER.

No. C.

JULY, 1867.

ARTICLE I.—AMUSEMENTS.

Religion and Amusement; An Essay delivered at the International Convention of Young Men's Christian Associations, held in Albany, N. Y., June 1st, 1866. By Rev. MARVIN R. VINCENT, Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, Troy, N. Y. pp. 32.

Christian Amusements; A Discourse delivered February 11th, 1866, at the annual meeting of the Young Men's Christian Association of St. Paul. By Rev. EDWIN SIDNEY WILLIAMS, Pastor of the Congregational Church at Northfield, Minn. pp. 31.

Amusements; Their Uses and their Abuses; A Sermon preached in the First Congregational Church, North Adams, Mass., Sunday evening, Nov. 26th, 1866. By Rev. WASHINGTON GLADDEN, Acting Pastor. pp. 31.

Social Hints for Young Christians, in three Sermons. By HOWARD CROSBY, Pastor of the 4th Avenue Presbyterian Church, New York. [Published by request of the Young People's Christian Association.] 1866. pp. 56.

In the World, Not of the World. Thoughts on Christian Casuistry. By WILLIAM ADAMS, D. D., Madison Square Church, New York City. pp. 64.

The Atlantic Monthly, August and September, 1866. "The Chimney Corner," VIII., IX.

Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, December, 1866. "Our Amusements."

A Sermon on Christian Morals in Social Life; Preached in the Stone Church, [Cleveland, O.], March 13th, 1859. By Rev. WILLIAM H. GOODRICH. pp. 22.

The Scriptural Principle of Total Abstinence; A Sermon preached in the Central Church, Bangor, on Sunday, August 7th, 1859. By SAMUEL HARRIS. pp. 12.

IN the announcement of new plans for the improvement of the New Englander, somewhat more than a year ago, it was stated that "there are grave questions relating to the Christian Life, to the subject of Amusements, for example, and to Worship, which are in danger of receiving less consideration than from their relative importance they deserve." The number and variety of the papers on the subject of Amusements, which have appeared since that sentence was written, indicate that this theme is one which demands a new discussion, if not a change of position. The literature, treating upon this subject from a Christian point of view, has been exceedingly meager and unsatisfactory. The few attempts to approach the subject by religious writers have usually taken the form of special dissuasives from particular classes of amusement as involving the soul in perils. These notes of warning have made little allowance for recreation, and have given such undue prominence to the sober side of life as to prejudice many against religion, as if it required a surrender of all entertainment. The one sidedness with which this subject has been treated is not too strongly described by Mrs. Stowe:

"With all the telling of what the young shall *not* do, there has been very little telling what they shall do. The whole department of amusements—certainly one of the most important in education—has been by the church made a

sort of outlaws' ground, to be taken possession of and held by all sorts of spiritual ragamuffing; and then the faults and shortcomings resulting from this arrangement have been held up and insisted on as reasons why no Christian should ever venture into it.*

And Mr. Vincent says :

"We have heard more about keeping unspotted from the world, than of going into *all* the world and preaching the gospel to every creature. More about coming out and being separate, than of knowing the truth which shall make us free. More of separating wheat from tares, than of leavening lumps. The false instinct of self-preservation, which sent the Romanist into cloisters and convents, and tore him from the sweet sanctities of domestic life, has perpetuated itself more than some of us think in Protestant thought and church legislation. And in nothing has this tendency revealed itself more distinctly than in the matter of amusements. For amusement, having the effect to make men feel kindly toward the world, and, more readily than duty, falling in with human inclination, has been regarded as unsafe, and therefore as a thing to be kept at arm's length by the church, and admitted to her folds only under the strictest surveillance, and in gyves and handcuffs."†

The time of reaction seems now to have come; the subject is fairly open for debate, and the disputants are ranging themselves; on one side, those who claim to exercise Christian liberty; and on the other side, those who fear the evil tendencies of pleasure-seeking, in respect both to religious life and mental culture.

While all Christians must agree that immoral and sinful pastimes are invariably to be disallowed and condemned, two questions are constantly recurring, which open the way for difference of opinion; first, what things are immoral and forbidden by scripture; and, secondly, whether certain recreations, not positively and forever forbidden, are universally inexpedient.

It has been specially characteristic of Puritan, Methodist, and Moravian churches, to discountenance amusements, particularly those amusements which are most universal and captivating; while periods of religious awakening and reform almost invariably give rise to crusades against fashionable entertainments and vain recreation.

It must be conceded, however, that in respect to certain amusements, as dancing and games involving chance, there

* *Atlantic Monthly*, p. 339.

† *Essay*, p. 6.

have been great fluctuations of sentiment; and even now changes of opinion are going on, mainly in the direction of giving greater liberty for individual judgment and action. Where forty years ago parents sought to shield their children from evil by a strict *regime*, and the utter prohibition of certain recreations, the attempt is now made to protect another generation of children from evil by qualified indulgence in amusements deemed innocent in themselves, but harmful if carried to excess.

Some illustrations of these fluctuations may help our further discussion of the general subject.

In President Edwards's noted sermon on Joseph, he takes to task the young people who, after the great revival, had begun to set up again their old custom of frolicking, and spending the greater part of the night in it, in a disorderly manner; evidently not taking exception to dancing under all circumstances, but rather to the way in which it was practiced late in the night, to the neglect of family prayer, and violation of family order.

Connecticut customs of the last century are thus described by a recent historian :

"In that middle period between the strict Puritan times and the Revolution, dancing was a common diversion of young people. Balls and midnight revels were interdicted; but neighborly dances, either with or without a fiddler, often a part of the company singing for the others to dance,—contra-dances, reels or jigs, improvised on some oak floor in kitchen or hall,—ending in a treat of nuts, apples, and cider,—these were allowable pastimes for the winter evenings. Dancing, also, to a greater extent and with more elaborate display, was permitted, as we have seen, at weddings and thankgivings, doubtless, also, at other large and ceremonious entertainments, but without the objectionable accompaniment, except in very rare instances, of late hours. *An ordination ball*, strange as it may sound, was allowed in some places as a finale to the festivities on the occasion of settling a minister; but there is no proof that this enormity was ever perpetrated in Norwich."

The customs of people a generation later are indicated by some notes in the diary of a Senior in Yale College in 1796. "I think that, upon the whole, I have never spent a vacation more agreeably than the last. * * * I have attended four balls, or, more properly, one ball and three dances." And,

* Caulkins' History of Norwich, p. 331.

again, a few months later: "It was my intention to have attended a family ball this evening, but indisposition prevented."*

Though for a considerable time after this there was a college law forbidding any student to attend a dancing school or dancing assembly in New Haven in term time, balls at Commencement and at the Junior Exhibition were customary until a recent period. The Juniors, in 1841, made their arrangements for a ball as usual, but a great revival in the college that year interfered with their plans to such an extent that the managers issued a card stating that "from circumstances which could not have been foreseen or avoided, they have found it necessary to postpone the ball." Succeeding classes made no attempt to revive the usage, though in what respect "the promenade concerts" of modern times differ from the ancient balls, it is hardly possible to say.

It was very natural that in such revivals of religion as began during the first decade of the present century, there should be a decided and extreme reaction against this particular amusement, and that dancing should be held up to view as a badge of wordliness which youthful converts must by all means refuse to wear. And so when Orthodoxy began to make a stand in Boston against the Unitarianism then latent and widely spread, the influence of evangelical preachers was pointedly and positively directed against amusements which the Unitarians allowed.

This attitude of opposition to worldly amusements was not peculiar to Boston. In 1818, the pastoral letter of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, used this language:

"With respect to *dancing*, we think it necessary to observe that however plausible it may appear to some, it is perhaps not the less dangerous on account of that plausibility. It is not from those things which the world acknowledges to be most wrong, that the greatest danger is to be apprehended to religion, especially as it relates to the young. When the practice is carried to its highest extremes, all admit the consequences to be fatal; and why not then apprehend danger, even from its incipient stages? It is certainly in all its stages a fascinating and an infatuating practice. Let it once be introduced, and it is difficult to give it limits. It steals away our precious time, dissipates religious impressions, and hardens the heart."†

* Memoir of Prof. Silliman, 1., 32, 41.

† Digest, p. 262.

In a volume of "Letters on Practical Subjects," from a New England clergyman to his daughter, published in 1820, the author says: "With respect to *dancing*, there seems to be a change in public opinion gradually taking place, which will probably result before many years in its exclusion from the list of genteel amusements."*

This was the period, too, in which the Tract Societies began the circulation of "tracts calculated to receive the approbation of all evangelical Christians," and embellished their arguments against "fashionable amusements" by horrid pictures of men and women, dancing hand in hand, unconscious of peril, on the very brink of a precipice, while a serpent lurked among the roses under a card-table with its cards and dice which they had left. Awful stories of death in the ball-room, and of decisions to dance which grieved away the Holy Spirit, were used by revival preachers with great effect. Communications in such periodicals as the *Christian Spectator* and the *Spirit of the Pilgrims*, rung the changes "upon theaters, balls, and card parties." The Commentaries of Thomas Scott and Adam Clarke furnished arguments against indulgence in worldly pleasures, and "the unmixed, moral evil of dancing;" and a state of public sentiment was reached which led the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church (New School) to adopt, in 1843, the following resolution, which was reaffirmed in 1853:

"*Resolved*, That the fashionable amusement of promiscuous dancing is so entirely unscriptural, and eminently and exclusively that of 'the world which lieth in wickedness,' and so wholly inconsistent with the spirit of Christ and with that propriety of Christian deportment and that purity of heart which his followers are bound to maintain, as to render it not only improper and injurious for professing Christians either to partake in it, or to qualify their children for it by teaching them the art; but also to call for the faithful and judicious exercise of discipline on the part of Church Sessions, when any of the members of their churches have been guilty."†

It is doubtful whether any such resolution would be considered expedient to-day.

Before proceeding to point out signs of reaction from this

* *Christian Spectator*, 1822, p. 597.

† *Digest*, p. 268.

extreme view of the evil of dancing, we must quote some of the opinions of leading men concerning other forms of amusement. Let us hear, then, Dr. John M. Mason on *games of chance*, in which he includes cards, dice, and other games of which the *lot* is the essential part. He says :

"The universal and decisive objection to them in every form and under all circumstances is that they are *profane appeals to the divine throne, and a wanton prostitution of a divine ordinance.*" "The game of chance and downright gambling are but different stages of the same iniquity." "An ordinance which God has appointed for the holy and reverend acknowledgment of his superintendence over the affairs of men, has been perverted to the ends, first, of amusement, then of lucre." It is hardly to be supposed "that naturalists, divines, and statesmen—Jews, Greeks, and Romans—political legislatures and ecclesiastical councils—public principle and private virtue—would all unite in reprobating an *innocent* amusement. But they have united in reprobating games of chance—a combination which seems impossible unless upon the ground of some common and strong conviction of their intrinsic immorality." "The immorality which we attribute to games of hazard does not arise from *circumstances*; but is *essential* to their nature. We pronounce them immoral and unlawful, precisely on the ground of their *abuse and profanity of the lot*, which is an institution of God for special religious and moral purposes."*

President Dwight, also, though on different grounds, as positively condemns this class of amusements :

"If then our *gaming for amusement* be what it cannot fail to be, a cause of inducing others to game for money, * * * in gaming for amusement we sin against Christ by wounding the conscience of our weaker brethren, and becoming the direct means of tempting them to sin. The supposition here made is, however, false. Gaming for amusement, *in such as are either partially or wholly games of chance, particularly with cards or dice*, is not and cannot be innocent. It is, almost of course, a sinful waste of time. As an amusement, it is unnecessary and useless. It refreshes neither the mind nor the body, and fails therefore essentially of being a lawful amusement. Better amusements can always be substituted for it, particularly exercise, reading, and conversation. * * * Gaming for money is almost always the consequence of an addiction to gaming for amusement. The expectation that we shall be able to withstand the allurements by which others have fallen, is a mere and ruinous presumption. * * * The probabilities that we shall fall where so many have fallen are millions to one, and the contrary opinion is only a dream of lunacy."†

Now it must be obvious to those who watch the signs of the times that the tide of public sentiment has turned. Whether we approve or disapprove the change, it cannot be denied that

* J. M. Mason's Works. Vol. 3. Considerations on Lots.

† Theology. Sermon CXXIV.

Christian people and Christian teachers do not stand together on the ground taken by Dr. Mason, the General Assembly, and the Tract Society.

In 1846, the American Tract Society published a premium tract on "Dancing as a social amusement by professed Christians or their children,"* in which the position is taken that "God's word pointedly condemns dancing as a social amusement," and it is affirmed that "the great mass of the most worthy and devoted ministers and private Christians believe dancing to be *utterly inconsistent* with a profession of the religion of the gospel. They are grieved, deeply grieved, that a few continue it." Dr. James W. Alexander, one of the most learned, eminent, and cautious clergymen which the Presbyterian Church has ever had, was a member of the publishing committee at that time, and must have given at least a tacit approval of the tract. But what does he say in 1849?

"I am half afraid I am under some hallucination, or morbid judgment, but for several years I have sickened at the common way of outcry against specific amusements; sermons and tracts anent them, &c.; in one view, all the meetings of our unconverted hearers are frivolous; but are they worst when they are merriest? This is dangerous ground, and I suspect myself; but my error is corrigible, and it surely does not grow out of any disposition to practice on the light fantastic toe. I believe, however, that sourness, moroseness, censoriousness, malice, lust, envy, and two or three other things, may eat as doth a canker in people who never danced."†

At a meeting of the Synod of New York and New Jersey, in October, 1866, the subject of dancing came up in the form of a request for counsel, the question being this: "When a candidate for church membership is understood to be fond of dancing, and refuses to give a pledge of future reformation, has the Session a right, *upon this ground alone*, to refuse to receive such candidate?" The Committee on Bills and Overtures presented the following reply: "No Session has a right to debar from Church Communion any one whom they have good reason to believe a subject of divine regeneration, and the habit of dancing becomes a ground for exclusion only so far as it furnishes evidence that conversion has not taken place. On this

* Tract No. 491.

† Familiar Letters, ii., 109.

point the Session is to judge. As to the propriety of the practice of dancing among Christians, we refer to the frequent declarations of Synods and General Assemblies concerning this subject." The report, however, was indefinitely postponed, on the ground that the points involved were *in thesi*, and not bearing on any particular case before the Synod.**

Mr. Vincent speaks in these pointed terms:

"When the church has touched the subject of amusements, it has generally done so, I think, in a censorious spirit. It has selected certain amusements as sinful, and issued decretals and resolutions against them; it has prescribed penalties against church members who should engage in them; leaving the question in its broader relation untouched. It has fenced off this and that corner of the field of recreation, and put up signs: '*All church members are warned against trespassing on these grounds, under penalty of the law*,' instead of trying to teach Christians how to avail themselves with profit and safety of any part of the field." "For one, I am glad that certain Christian families of high standing in the church, of all denominations, have at last asserted their right to act out their own convictions in this matter, and have demonstrated that even this much belated amusement may be elevated, refined, and made a source of social pleasure and profit by the infusion of Christian principle." "One more case in point. When our Young Men's Christian Association of Troy furnished their new rooms, they did so on the principle that prayer meetings and religious periodicals, though important in their place, would not, of themselves, suffice to attract young men from without. * * * The Association engaged large, airy, pleasant rooms, in a central position. It kept its prayer meeting room neatly and appropriately furnished, but it added a large social parlor, its walls adorned with pictures, a fine piano invitingly open, the best current periodicals, secular and religious, upon the tables, and games of checkers, chess, and dominoes distributed about the room. * * * For one I thanked God with all my heart. I thought the Association had done a great Christian deed. I hailed it as a happy omen that the Christianity of our city was beginning to see that the devil had tools which it might use to advantage, and was going to take them away from him. But so did not think others who turned their backs on the Association, and denounced it as *encouraging gambling*," Essay, pp. 14-17.

From Mr. Gladden's sermons we select the following paragraphs:

"There is a large class of popular amusements about which there is much discussion. Among these are billiards, cards, bowling, checkers, chess, backgammon, and dominoes. Concerning the four last named, there is not, perhaps, so much difference of opinion. I have been astonished recently to find that some Christian parents discard them, and forbid them to their children; the argument by which they justify this prohibition I have not yet heard. In most Christian families they are freely admitted. When they are used only for recreation and

* New York Evangelist, Oct. 26, 1866.

without excess—when they are not permitted to occupy time that ought to be devoted to more serious pursuits, they may be safely commended. Billiards, bowling, and cards are for the most part unhesitatingly condemned by Christian people. And why? Is it because there is anything essentially wrong in these amusements? I think not. As for the two first named, they are certainly most excellent gymnastic exercises. I know of no games more healthful, more beautiful, more completely free in themselves from all that is vicious or harmful, than these games are. They are purely games of skill; they cultivate physical strength, agility, and precision of movement, and they furnish a wholesome diversion for the mind. They are not only not sinful amusements, but they are among the very best amusements now offered to the young. A question is raised in regard to the morality of games with cards. * * * But in a matter of mere sport, when nothing hinges upon the appeal but our enjoyment of the hour of recreation, I do not see the wrongfulness of it."

"There can be no doubt that the round dances now in practice in society are essentially wrong. The waltzes and polkas and all that variety are a moral abomination. * * * Neither is there any doubt in regard to the wrongfulness of balls and dancing parties. * * * But the evil of these balls and parties is not in the dancing (unless indeed the indecent dances already mentioned are admitted), but in the excesses and abuses connected with them; in the late hours, the gormandizing, and the drinking, and the promiscuous society." "The children of Christian parents have been freely permitted to attend parties where the company tarried just as late, and ate just as much, and where all the abuses connected with dancing may be found; and added to them various other abuses too nauseous to be mentioned here—abuses compared with which even the round dances are decent and respectable. Those who denounce dancing, and countenance forfeit parties, may truly be said to strain at a gnat and swallow a camel. Now the truth is, that while balls are sinful and disgraceful—and while parties even in parlors, in which dancing is kept up until the time is late and the company is tired out, are an evil that ought to be rebuked by all good men, yet they are both evils because of the excess and the dissipation and not because of the dancing; and that the simple square dances, in private houses, where the company is select—if they do not occupy the whole evening, but are merely resorted to as *one* of the pastimes by which the evening may be made to pass pleasantly—are in no way sinful, but excellent, and ought to be allowed and encouraged by Christian people." pp. 16-26.

Dr. Howard Crosby, in his *Hints to Young Christians*, published by the firm in New York which represents the Tract Society of Boston, takes the same view:

"Just here properly came the question: 'What of the dance? Is dancing right? Can a Christian dance?' Well, let us hold fast to the principles laid down, and so answer the question. Let us avoid all prejudice and blind stubbornness. First, then, is dancing a sin in itself? Certainly not. * * * Now, then, dancing being no sin in itself, is there any sin in its ordinary forms in use? We have here to be very practical, and come down to particulars. There are two classes of dances in vogue, entirely different in their character—the one called

the square dances, the other the round dances. In the former are cotillions, quadrilles, and the old contra dances; in the latter, the waltzes, polkas, and such like. In the former, the sexes meet with perfect propriety; in the latter, they publicly embrace. The former are modest—the latter immodest, and still worse. In regard to these latter, a Christian ought not to hesitate an instant, any more than he should about thieving or lying. It is a fearful thing that fashion has so perverted the sense of Christian parents, as to allow this enormity to be practiced in their houses and by their children, or else to make them guilty of the grievous inconsistency of forbidding it to their children while furnishing it for the children of others. The foundation for the vast amount of domestic crime, which startles us so often in its public outcroppings, was laid when parents allowed the sacredness of their daughters' persons and the purity of their maiden instincts to be rudely shocked in the waltz. * * * Now, then, without further expansion, I think our premises would warrant the conclusion that square dances among Christians, without excess in hours or dress, would form a perfectly appropriate part of a festivity."

"*Games* form our second head of remark. The principles laid down and already dilated on can be readily applied to this class of amusements. All gambling games are at once excluded. * * * But ought games to be used which are generally used for gambling, but which we would use without gambling? As a rule, *yes*. The sin is in the gambling, not in the game. If you leave out the gambling, you leave out the sin. There may be a question of simple propriety in taste, or a question of expediency, but those questions (as we have seen) are to be decided not by a general law, but by individual conscience and the special dictation of the Holy Spirit." pp. 46-49.

So much for published opinions, to which it would be easy to add numerous specifications showing that ministers, elders, and deacons, besides many godly and upright men who hold no official position in the churches, are practically occupying very different ground in respect to dancing and other amusements from that which we have received by tradition from our fathers.

Now this series of extracts shows an entire change of front on the part of a great many evangelical Christians. Mr. Vincent does not stand where the Presbyterian resolutions require. Dr. Crosby does not accept the views of Dr. Mason and Dr. Dwight. Mr. Gladden does not agree with the Tract Society. The sessions of the Fourth Presbytery of New York are not likely this year to pass ecclesiastical censure on those members of their churches who allow their children to learn the art of dancing. What Christian men and churches in the first half of the century denounced, Christian teachers and doctors in the second half allow.

Yet in respect to how many other things have equal fluctuations been seen! Christmas celebrations are in vogue. The spires of churches are finished with crosses; their basements are furnished with pantries and cook-stoves. What offense this would have given thirty years ago! The sentiment of Christian men concerning the use of wine has been very unstable, and seems more likely to retrograde than to advance. The popular sentiment concerning the place of women on the public platform and at the polls, is changing every day. The Tract Societies very likely continue to publish indiscriminate condemnations of novel reading, but the columns of religious newspapers are crowded with advertisements of novels, and Sabbath School libraries abound with works of fiction, good and bad. Once no psalmody could compare with Rouse's Version; and afterwards a psalm was an essential part of public worship; now, the popular hymn books make no discrimination between the psalms and hymns. Forty years ago, a writer complained of being shocked at the irreverence of a family in not returning thanks after eating; the custom is now unknown. *Tempora mutantur, et nos mutamur in illis.*

From all this review, then, we may learn that *the prejudices and opinions of Christians are not conclusive in respect to duty, and that one generation cannot lay down the law for another.*

Passing now from the historical, let us look at the ethical view of the subject.

Amusements have sometimes been summarily put down by a mere definition, as if, making recreation one thing and amusement another,—one right and the other wrong,—the whole subject could be disposed of by calling names; “dancing is an amusement, and therefore virtually forbidden in the Scriptures.” We do not concede this point, but endorse what is well expressed in Blackwood: *

“The true idea of amusement is, of course, *recreation after work.* * * * What is wanted in our busy life is some means of honest and hearty recreation for mind and body, which shall unbend the strained faculties from time to time, and send the toiler back to his duties a healthier and a happier man.”

Is it right then for Christians to seek amusement ?

Those views of the lot which led Dr. Mason to denounce all games like backgammon, dominoes, and cards, we suppose to be generally repudiated ; and no one can pretend that billiards, croquet, chess, ten-pins, cards, base-ball, and picnics are expressly discountenanced in the Bible ; it does not follow that they are wrong because they are not commanded.

Concerning dancing as a social amusement, the Tract Society school are fully committed to the position that it is pointedly condemned by God's Word.

"Two kinds of dancing are mentioned in the Bible. One was a *religious act*, expressive of grateful joy for some signal deliverance, and in the performance of which the sexes did not unite. * * * The other was a *social amusement* to which a religious service had been perverted ; and those were deemed vile and impious who indulged in it. * * * The only instances of social dancing to which the Bible alludes are so mentioned as never to indicate approval, but usually distinct disapproval. The propriety of it is left as little doubtful as that of Noah's drunkenness, or the causing a son or daughter 'to pass through the fire to Moloch.'"

This line of argument rests on the assumption that wherever dancing is spoken of in the Bible *without censure*, it denotes not a social amusement, but an act of worship. Hence, when the Psalmist says, (lxxx. 11), "Thou hast turned for me my mourning into dancing," "the dancing is an expression of religious gratitude and joy." (See Tract No. 172. "A Time to Dance.") When we read in Jeremiah xxxi. 4, "Oh, virgin of Israel, thou shalt again be adorned with thy tabrets, and go forth in the dances of them that make merry," we have again "the expression of religious joy." "We have piped unto you, and ye have not danced," say the children in the market place ; that is, "they do not rejoice with the usual tokens of religious joy." And most amusing of all is the exposition of Luke xv. 25 : "Now his elder son was in the field, and as he came and drew nigh unto the house, he heard music and dancing," *i. e.*, say these expounders, "the return of the prodigal was a joyful event, for which the grateful father (!), according to the usages of the Jewish church, and the exhortation of the Psalmist, 'praised the Lord in the dance.'"

Now we count it the merest sophistry to interpret Scripture in this style, and the less we have of such exposition the better. Dancing probably entered into the festivities of the Jews in our Saviour's time. Some of it, like that of Herodias, may have been as bad as anything seen upon the stage in Paria. Some of it was probably as innocent as gymnastic exercises; and the picture which our Saviour draws of the prodigal's reception at home with mirth and music and dancing, is, to say the least, more of a warrant for social dancing than it is a rebuke.

Failing to find specific condemnation of this form of amusement in the Scriptures, shall we condemn dancing on the ground that it is unseemly and immoral? There is at present a disposition to make a marked distinction between the round and the square dances. The quotations we have given show how severely Dr. Crosby and Mr. Gladden condemn the waltzes and polkas. Mr. Vincent agrees with them, and Dr. Goodrich pours in his broadside thus:

"When, some years ago, a distinguished citizen of Philadelphia, who was at the very summit of society, first saw the waltz, then just introduced from France, he broke out in indignation, and declared, that if any man should offer to dance after that fashion with his wife or daughters, he would horsewhip him on the spot. He spoke bluntly out an honest instinct of our nature. Nothing but the overbearing insolence of worldly custom has persuaded any who pretend to modesty, to practice that and other similar dances of modern date. I should think the worse of womanhood, if I did not believe that the novice in such pleasures often feels the silent protest of a native delicacy against the indiscriminate contacts, if not unusual freedoms, to which these and even simpler forms of dancing are liable. Certainly, any man who should offer to approach and half embrace, no matter how gracefully, a true woman in the quiet of her parlor, would be thrust with indignation from the dwelling, never again to enter its door. But if such a freedom is insolent in private, what makes it tolerable in public? If an embrace is not to be endured in the decorum of a parlor, why is it to be endured, with prolonged indulgence, in all the swaying throng and pressure of a ball room, or a more select assemblage? If it would be an offense and an outrage in an evening call, why is it permitted in the presence of invited guests, at a full dress party, falsely so called? Why, but that the power of a worldly custom has strangely marred the pure instinct which God has put in us, and worn away, with polished and persistent impudence, the finer sense of modesty." pp. 17, 18.

We give place to these criticisms upon the round dances with the belief that much of the condemnation uttered is

merited, and yet we are not satisfied with a rule which would unreservedly allow the cotillion while absolutely forbidding the waltz. Circumstances alter cases. "Unto the pure all things are pure; but unto them that are defiled and unbelieving is nothing pure, but even their mind and conscience are defiled." We think some persons might waltz and look upon waltzing with innocence, and that square dances and ballets may be such as to suggest impure thoughts to those who are lookers on. No one can safely transgress the line of purity. No one can innocently participate in any form of this amusement from which he is consciously receiving detriment, or be a spectator of scenes which he knows are demoralizing to himself. Least of all, can a virtuous woman safely participate either in the waltz or in the cotillion with any man whose reputation gives room to the least suspicion that he touches her hand or seeks to come in contact with her person with impure thoughts. If this is what the General Assembly meant by the uncertain phrase "*promiscuous dancing*," the Christian world will say "Amen" to the end of time.

But it does not by any means follow that all dancing is evil, because certain forms in which the amusement is practiced are open to criticism; and it is quite possible that much sweeping condemnation of dancing comes from those who know very little about it. Mr. Vincent tells of "an amiable and most excellent clergyman who happened to be present one evening when some young ladies went through a quadrille. He looked on with great apparent pleasure. The next morning he was rallied by some of his townsmen on having countenanced dancing by his presence; when he roundly denied the charge, and asserted that no dancing had taken place, but only, as he expressed it, '*a most beautiful exercise*.'"

The opponents of dancing, when the direct scriptural arguments fails them, have another resource, and declare that for two reasons it is inexpedient; it sets a bad example, and offends Christian sentiment. The former argument is strongly urged by President Harris:

"Why may I not have a quiet dance with a few friends in my own parlor? Not because dancing is a sin in itself; but because my example may lead some young friends to practice it in scenes where parents have no power to select the

company, or to shut out pernicious influences; to practice it to the extent of dissipation, protracted far into the night—wasteful of money, hurtful to health, debilitating to the intellect, stimulating to frivolity, enervating to lofty purpose, and serious thought, &c. * * * And why should I not teach my children to dance? Because it leads them into temptation, by awakening a fondness for an amusement, which, as society is, is continually practiced amid dangerous surroundings,—and which, however guarded in my family, will occasion others to sin.”*

But other practical Christian men, under very different circumstances, having to bring up their families amid the temptations of large cities, reject this argument *a terrore*, and say that by allowing their children to dance they save them from inordinate love of dancing, and restrain them from things that are far more perilous.

Then in respect to the degree of concession due to the sentiments of one's fellow Christians, the duty of following Paul's example is generally urged, as if there was only one side to the case. But even if the *general* sentiments of a community must be regarded, are all the whims and prejudices of every man to be consulted before I decide to use my liberty? Was this our Saviour's way when he went to visit publicans and sinners? Did he not offend the pious sensibilities of the Pharisees? Did they not come and beg him to rebuke his disciples? Did he not teach them that wisdom is justified of her children, whether they eat with unwashed hands, or pluck grain in their Sabbath day walks? Is it clearly a doctrine of scripture that we are to fix our standard of duty by other people's views of right and wrong? Paul somewhere recorded his enthusiastic readiness to eat no flesh while the world stood; *did he abstain from eating meat?* Do his words contain a twelfth commandment? Is it to be enforced on all men? Suppose a kinsman of mine to think I transgress in eating animal food; shall I yield to his judgment and become a vegetarian? Suppose a Christian brother, eschewing all confectionary, thinks it extravagant and sinful to spend a dime on sugar plums, shall his tender conscience be the law for all Christian households to follow? Some good people think the ornamental working of muslin and worsted is a “frivolous employment;” shall our daughters, therefore, cease to employ

* Sermon, p. 8.

their leisure hours in fancy work, whose sale may help the support of a missionary in China? Many people are grieved by the extravagance which has resulted from conformity to the tyrannical exactions of fashion; will it therefore be wise for the church to prescribe a costume for its members, and for individuals to insist on wearing hats and coats so quaint and old as to make them a laughing stock? Have we not erred by attempting to stiffen into an inflexible rule the utterance which Paul made in the warmth of his soul?

The sentiment of Christian people in respect to things not clearly and forever forbidden, varies from time to time, and as we go from place to place. To set it up as a law for the conscience, is like the farmer's direction to his boy to run his furrow toward yonder heifer: the direction literally obeyed took the boy over the whole field.

Sometimes the objection to specific amusements grows out of denominational or class prejudice, especially in country towns where sectarian feeling has some sway. The Methodists, perhaps, will not have tea-parties with a dance at the close, because the Universalists do that sort of thing; or the Orthodox frown on *tableaux vivants* because the Unitarians approve of them. Such prejudice may grow out of ignorance or training, as dogs bark at strangers. Dr. Crosby tells of a call he made "on one of the godliest men in New York, a man whose talk was full of Jesus, and whose works testified to his warm faith and love. He was an ardent mission school teacher, self-denying and indefatigable in the labor for souls. My visit happened to be only a few days before his death. He was then well, though a very old man. As I entered the parlor, he was playing cards with his family. I inwardly started at the sight, but instantly recovered myself with the rebuke, 'Who art thou that judgest another's servant?—to his own Master he standeth or falleth.' I sat down by his side, and as the family went on with their game, our conversation was concerning the things of the kingdom. I went out of that house with a lesson of liberality written on my heart which I trust will never be effaced."*

* Social Hints, p. 50.

We happened once to know of an assembly of ministers who were pretty nearly at one in their objections to dancing, though no one of them was able to tell what a polka was, and some did not know what was meant by round dances, and others when they heard a cotillion described, said that ought not to be called dancing but promenading. We think their judgment ought not to be conclusive in respect to the right or wrong of dancing.

A frequent objection to attractive amusements is, that they are of evil tendency. The fact may be true, and yet not conclusive as an argument for the restraint of Christian liberty. It may be replied with equal truth that undue restraints upon mirth are of evil tendency, and that the peril of youth is all the greater if they are forbidden to have amusements in a reasonable degree; and that some cases of excessive passion for gaming and gayety are but the natural reaction from unreasonable prohibitions and a neglect of parents to provide suitable recreation and entertainment for their children.

"Is there no evil," says Mr. Gladden, "in following the other policy of exclusion and prohibition? Look about you. How many young men can you count who, from Christian families, have gone down the path of dissipation and inebriety? All the influences that surrounded them were good; good examples were before them, good instructions have been given them—why have they fallen? In my judgment, their ruin has often—not always—been accomplished by this very system which was honestly intended to restrain them. Take an example. A young man is taught at home that the game of billiards is sinful; that it is not only wrong in bad places and among evil companions, but that it is *essentially* wrong, that even those Christian people who introduce it into their houses are committing a great sin. After a time he passes the night in such a Christian family as this. He sees the father and his sons engage in this pastime, and he witnesses the game at first with an uneasy conscience; but at length he begins to look into it. The game is explained to him and he sees that it is a beautiful exercise; that it is interesting, but not exciting nor fatiguing; and he is utterly unable to find in it any trace of wrong, or any mischievous tendency. Before retiring he kneels with the rest around the family altar, and he cannot see that the religious life of this household is injuriously affected by this amusement. He is puzzled and confounded by this experience, and when he comes to reflect upon it he concludes that his parents have deceived him in this matter. . . . He has lost all confidence in their teachings upon *this subject*, saying that they are either totally ignorant in regard to it, or else perversely strict with him. And therefore he resolves to have this amusement whenever and wherever he can get it, without any reference to the wishes of his parents. Their influence over him

is gone. And since there are no places but bad places where this amusement can be found, he rushes off to the bad places after it, and thus is ruined."^{*}

One of the most common objections brought against amusements is, that they take time which is too precious to be devoted to such pursuits. "Fashionable amusements occasion loss of time. And who that considers the consequence of such a loss would not avoid it with religious care?" "Are Christians, the followers of the Saviour, at leisure so that their work is done long before their sun is set? Do they perform all that is needful for the young, for the aged, for the church, for the world, and then find leisure to unite with gay companions in moving to the sound of the viol, amid the mazes of pleasurable dissipation?" "Most persons feel the necessity of occasional relaxation from business; and are disposed to seek it in the social circle. There is, however, no necessity of *wasting time* even here."

But to this charge of encroachment on time, the answer is obvious. Recreation after work is not only allowable, but necessary. Whatever the recreation is, it requires a certain amount of time. A contra-dance may take no longer time than a promenade; a game of billiards no longer than martelle or croquet; backgammon no longer than checkers.

We notice that provision is made for card playing in railway smoking cars, and travelers on the way from Boston to New York while away the time with games of cards. We should prefer to use almost any other dissuasive plea than the *time* they spend upon their games. The very fact that the time hangs heavy on their hands, when conversation lags and reading is pernicious to the eyesight, is the best argument for the games they are pursuing, and certainly neutralizes the objection that time is too precious to be wasted on such trifles.

Other common arguments are based on the injunction "avoid all appearance of evil," and "be not conformed to this world." But what exactly is the world? Who shall say? Who shall decide for any one beside himself?

"The ethical distinctions (says Mr. Vincent) are positively bewildering between balls of ivory and balls of wood; between mallets and cues; between

green baize and green grass. A Christian household must not sit down and play at whist, but they are engaged in a Christian and laudable manner if they spend an evening over Dr. Busby or Master Rodbury's cards. * * Youth must not dance, but they may march to music in company, and go through calisthenic exercises, involving a good deal more motion than dancing. But if people may march to music, and be guiltless, it is very hard to see how skipping to music converts the exercise into sin." p. 8.

Many of these distinctions between the allowable and the forbidden, especially with reference to what ministers may do, seem to us arbitrary and unreasonable in the extreme. We quote once more from *Blackwood*:—

"It is a very popular notion that the clergy have no occasion for amusement; in fact that anything so frivolous is inconsistent with their serious calling. The unwritten law against clerical amusements has, as might be supposed, some very curious anomalies. Their lawfulness or unlawfulness depends, in some people's minds, upon the very oddest distinctions." "One may see how entirely conventional many of these kinds of objections are, by the revolutions which have taken place from time to time in public opinion on the point of smoking." "In other points, too, the line drawn between things permissible and non-permissible to the parson is of the most arbitrary and zigzag sort. According to some authorities, he may play chess, but not cards; croquet, but not cricket; bagatelle, but not billiards. He may perform upon almost any sort of musical instrument—flute, piano, violin, (sackbut and dulcimer, of course, if he can get hold of them), but not, we believe, upon the key bugle," &c.

These quotations show the difficulty of deciding, at least for others, what conformity to the world is; and the difficulty is not diminished when we remember that the Scriptures record no rebuke uttered by the Master against the pastimes and recreations of his day, and that he was a guest at great feasts with publicans and sinners. We are exhorted to abstain from every *form*, not from every *appearance*, of evil. But that constant looking out for appearances which some affect, we believe to be opposed to the Scriptural rule. The Pharisees pray and give alms that they may be seen. The prayers and the gifts and the lives of Christ's followers are to be unostentatious. Their light is to be allowed, not made, to shine. When one avowedly acts, or refrains from acting, *for appearance's sake* alone, the power of his example is paralyzed. "*Take heed that ye do not your alms (righteousness) before men, to be seen of them.*" A deed of kindness may have a most excellent

effect in this evil world, so long as it appears to be the genuine fruit of love; but proclaim that it is done merely for the sake of example, and what is it worth?

Some of the arguments against specific amusements are so inconclusive as to remind us of Tertullian's arguments against the theatre, who after inveighing against its vices, adds "that at least the Almighty can never pardon an actor, who, in defiance of the evangelical assertion, endeavors by high heeled boots to add a cubit to his stature." *

The subject before us becomes one of very great importance in relation to the questions what ground the pulpit should take, and what terms of communion our churches ought to advocate.

I. It is clear to our mind that *we must not only concede, but recognize the need which human nature has of amusement and recreation.* Several of the authors whom we have quoted are right in laying it down as Christian duty to bring recreation within the pale of Christian thought, and to make such provision for innocent enjoyments as to protect our youth from sinful indulgences and perilous amusements. John Newton had a very wise saying: "There is a man trying to fill a bushel with chaff. Now, if I fill it with wheat first, it is better than to fight him." † It is a valuable hint in respect to the course which Christian parents should pursue in all the arrangements of their homes.

Without knowing all the facts in the case of the Christian Association at Troy, we are at least free to commend their attempt to provide reasonable attractions and recreations for young men, under the controlling influences of religion. Why should a Christian Association, in furnishing a parlor for clerks, mechanics, and students, who have no homes to resort to, put nothing on their tables but a pile of tracts and a file of religious newspapers? Is not the Christianity of a town equal to the problem of providing legitimate attractions by which to save young men from the wickedness and vice to which the unchristian club room must inevitably lead? Is it not far better for young men to have the opportunity of playing chess, back-

* Lecky's Hist. of Rationalism, 2. 289.

† Atlantic, p. 343.

gammon, and billiards even, under Christian auspices, and amid all the other attractions of books, and music, and Christian society, than that, repelled from these, they should be left to wander where Christian young men will not go, and drink of stolen and forbidden waters to the peril of their souls? Is it not a duty of Christian men to provide and superintend such measures as these?

II. We think it clear also that *it is not the province of the ministry or the churches to draw lines restricting individual liberty*. It is commonly assumed that there must be a line drawn somewhere between the church and the world; i. e., *that in order to secure a broad line of demarcation*, Christians must abstain from things allowable in which the world indulges. The church decides that certain innocent things shall be badges of worldliness and signs of allegiance to the devil.

Now if public opinion is unanimous on such a matter, it is of course conclusive in respect to individual action, just as no loyal woman, during the rebellion, would have consented to wear such an arrangement of ribbons as would have suggested the colors of the Confederate States. "The world," says Dr. Adams, "is perpetually pushing its own custom and requirements over its own line into the province of its opponent, as distinctive tests to which it demands or solicits concession. *

* There are many things now, which by general consent are understood as in such a sense belonging to the world, that partaking of them is universally construed as an act of fellowship with the world on its own ground, in compliance with its tests, and in concession to its claims."*

What these are he does not state. For *argument's* sake he concedes that "there is no sin in shuffling about certain pieces of paper distinguished by a variety of spots in the shape of hearts and diamonds and spades," and "nothing wrong in salutory motions, made in accordance with prescribed figures and in unison with music." But in respect to these very things Christian sentiment is not unanimous. The Tract Society and the General Assembly preach one doctrine; Dr. Crosby and the Christian Association of Troy, another. It is the avowed pur-

pose of some to recapture certain forms of recreation that they may no longer be badges of worldliness.

But while public opinion has such power, Christ gives us no dominion over the faith and practice of believers. Who has the right to draw such lines, and call on Christians to stand within them? And is it not true that vast evils grow out of the intolerance of public sentiment, and out of ignorant and indiscriminate condemnation? It is a cardinal point in our creeds that the Word of God is the *only* rule of practice, but some Christians issue a new series of commandments, and then require A, B, and C, to abstain from certain things because it grieves *them*. But on the other hand A, B, and C turn round and say "your denunciation of amusements which we certify to be innocent is a stumbling block to many. You set up a rule, and wound consciences by enforcing it. You cut off from church membership, and exclude from the table of Christ those who do not think as you do, and it is for you to change, by leaving us to our Master and our own consciences, and ceasing to impose upon us a yoke of bondage."

Where then shall we draw the line in respect to things indifferent? We will not draw the line so as to say to any one, "on this side you are safe, but cross the line and you transgress God's commandment." We cannot lay down precise rules by which to judge the conduct of men. The church has no authority to rule the consciences of men.

And not only so, but it is ordered by Providence as part of the discipline of life, that we should every one of us, after we put away childish things, have responsibility for carrying out the principles of Christianity in our own conduct. Men like to shirk this duty, to lean on infallible counselors, to leave doubtful cases to the decision of the doctors, and bind their neighbors to the precise tithe of mint, anise, and cummin. But this is not the Bible way. "Why is my liberty judged of another man's conscience?" And why should we enact laws to be binding for a century to come from the Atlantic to the Pacific?

III. It is equally clear that *different persons need different forms of recreation*.

There are some who need excitement, while others need quiet. Some need bodily exercise, others need to have their

minds diverted and soothed. No one garment will fit all men, and no man's idiosyncracies are to be made binding on his neighbors.

Robertson gives some wholesome advice to one of his correspondents, which is not out of place here. He says,

"I pray you to grasp my principles, not my rules: for to say *this, that, and that* are exciting, and leave nothing behind, is to give dead rules. Remember the spirit and philosophy of that which I say. The life you are now about to enter will be one of an exciting character. * * What you want in your other life is a corrective and emollient. It matters little that you avoid the theater and music, if in their stead you substitute Gavazzi, with his theatrical *pose* and voice, and his exciting orations. I do not say that under no circumstances it would be desirable to hear him. Were you for months in a dull country town, I should say it might be well to vary its monotony by such an excitement, and its exaggeration might even be wholesome as the counteractive of an extreme; but under present circumstances, if you are really in earnest to discipline your spirit, and get the peace which can alone come from watchfulness, I should say it is one of those indulgences which must be pernicious." *

IV. We lay down as one more principle that recreation should be under the control of Christian principle and be made subservient to holy living.

In showing what claims this subject has upon our thoughts, we do not mean to concede that amusement is the chief end of man. "Whether ye eat or drink, [or abstain from eating and drinking], or whatever ye do, do all for the glory of God." This is the grand idea which is to be combined with every occupation. Whether we go into a desert place to rest awhile, or cross the ocean to wander in other lands; whether we mingle with our fellow-men in social festivities and holiday recreation, or lay aside our work and books for the enjoyments of the domestic circle, whatever the method by which we divert our minds from care and alleviate the load of responsibility, our aim must be to serve God and to become better fitted for our work. The spirit of worldliness is forgetfulness of God, an element that makes any amusement and any occupation sinful. That the people of God, while in the world, are in danger of worldliness is not to be forgotten or denied. This peril may come to them on the side of amusement, though not on that side alone. The fascination of billiards, or of dancing,

* Life and Letters, 2. 27.

may be infatuating, but so may be the passion for stock gambling, or enthusiasm in politics. And those who, by long asceticism, have choked all desire for "vain recreations" and "frivolous employments," or who have a grudge against somebody for the restraints under which they have been compelled to live, may look with an exacting and censorious spirit on others who enjoy a larger freedom in respect to things indifferent, and find their recreation healthful and salutary. We are not without apprehension that the modern reaction in favor of amusements may be carried to an undesirable extreme. We would not rashly oppose the cherished sentiments of Christian men in claiming liberty of action for themselves, but we heartily agree with Dr. Adams that it is a perilous thing for a Christian to experiment how far he may go in the use of his liberty without infringing upon what is sinful. Still our security against these perils must be found not in unreasonable prohibitions, nor in tirades against two or three particular forms of worldliness, but in holding up to view the higher principles of holy living. We have not kept worldliness out of our churches by setting up some arbitrary distinctions by which a few specific amusements are tabooed. The objections drawn from a waste of time, extravagant expense and late hours, and most of the common arguments against dancing, are quite as applicable to parties and ordinary visiting in which few Christians refuse to participate. To make dancing, or card playing, or a game of billiards, or private theatricals, a disciplinable offense will not arrest them. It is not by that line of policy that we can best war against objectionable amusements. We must strike nearer the root, if we would eradicate worldliness from the Church. We must make the tree good, in order to have good fruit. We must cultivate the higher aspirations. To wash the outside of the cup and platter, does not suffice. "Christ did not teach from the outward to the inward, but from the inward to the outward. It is better to give a man a good principle than a good practice; it is better to be good, than merely to behave well; the one is character, the other is convenience." *

When good men come to the *application* of Christian prin-

* *Eccs Deus*, p. 148.

ciple, we expect that they will differ. Circumstances alter cases; what is lawful is not always expedient; and what is permissible to-day may be forbidden by the circumstances of to-morrow; but if "love is the best casuist," the instinct of Christian love will solve many questions which abstract reasoning cannot reach, and its solutions are not to be reviewed in any different spirit. Having taken the ground of individual responsibility in the use of individual liberty, we would leave each man to stand or fall to his own master, while we exhibit all the attractions of virtue, all the loveliness of virtue, and all the blessed influences of Christianity hallowing our domestic and social life. And so we would seek to make headway against the tide of worldliness in the church and out of it, not with sour faces and unfeeling hearts, but with sympathy for all that belongs to humanity, seeking in all our solemn and in all our festive hours, to do everything for the glory of God.

ARTICLE II.—OPENINGS FOR CHRISTIAN EFFORT IN
CENTRAL AFRICA.

Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the Nile. By JOHN HANNING SPEKE. New York: Harper & Brothers. 8vo. pp. 590.

Narrative of an Expedition to the Zambesi and its Tributaries; and of the Discovery of the Lakes Shirwa and Nyassa. 1858–1864. By DAVID and CHARLES LIVINGSTONE. With Map and Illustrations. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1866. 8vo. pp. 638.

The Albert Nyanza; Great Basin of the Nile, and Explorations of the Nile Sources. By SAMUEL WHITE BAKER. London: Macmillan & Co. 1866. 8vo. pp. 509.

A Journey to Ashango-Land; and Further Penetration into Equatorial Africa. By PAUL B. DU CHAILLU, Author of *Explorations in Equatorial Africa*. New York: 1867. D. Appleton & Co. 8vo. pp. 501.

THE recent frequent travels in Africa have an interest for the Christian world, and not for Royal Geographical Societies alone. That country has long been the centre of curiosity, and the cause of numerous expeditions, both public and private, undertaken for the purpose of unraveling the mysteries connected with its formation and natural history. That land of torrid heat has for many years divided the attention of explorers with the regions of Arctic cold. By a sort of fascination men have been led to tempt, first the dangers of frost and then of fire. One week, a stout bark sails from its port for a two or three years' cruise among icebergs and ice-fields, perhaps to leave its splintered hull among them; and the next, a single stout-hearted man leaves his home for a three years' struggle with the fevers, the thorns, the reptiles, the wild beasts, and the society of the degraded natives of interior Africa. Which has the easi-

er lot, or, rather, the more *difficult*—for in either case ease is out of the question—it would be hard to say.

But dangers and inconveniences do not daunt the brave explorer: and such books, on the one hand, as Dr. Kane's, and, more recently, Dr. Hayes' Arctic Explorations, and the Travels of Barth, Burton, Speke, Du Chaillu, Baker, and the lamented Dr. Livingstone, on the other, seem only to kindle a new zeal for discovery. Let us look for a little at the *moral* and *Christian* side of these African explorations.

Glancing back almost a hundred years, we find James Bruce, the earliest of modern discoverers, landing in Alexandria, and setting out on his perilous journey seeking the head-waters of the Nile. His travels gave as the chief result some knowledge of Abyssinia, and the countries in northeastern Africa, and the course of one branch of the great river—the *inmost* secret of which, however, he was not permitted to learn. Twenty-five years more, and Mungo Park traverses the western region south of the Desert, and looks out on the broad Niger, destined on a subsequent expedition to become his grave. Burckhardt followed in 1813, and gave still fuller notions of Upper Egypt, Nubia, and Abyssinia; though death intervened, cutting off his intended expedition to seek the sources of the Niger,—itself, though in a less degree than its eastern counterpart, long a mystery to the scientific world. The journeys of Hugh Clapperton, twelve years later, added large stores to the knowledge of the regions on the mid course of that river; unfolding also to Europeans Lake Tsád, with its marshy borders, and opening a highway across the Desert into interior Africa. He too, like Burckhardt and Park, left his bones in the country he had sought to open to the world. So likewise did the Landers, whose successful researches in the same field, immediately followed: and Laing, and many another; and now, it may be, the good and energetic Livingstone far away to the south.

It will be seen that at first the chief attention was long directed to unfolding Northern and Central Africa, and especially the great tract south of the Sahara. Following many other adventurers, Richardson, Barth, and their companions between the years 1845 and 1856 occupied the same field, and their labors gave the richest results. Large and important cities were

brought to light and thoroughly described ; the great opportunities for trade revealed ; the character and capacities of the inhabitants noted ; and Africa rose at once in importance in the view of the trader, the man of science, and the philanthropist.

Meanwhile such discoveries had been going on in other parts of the continent as had greatly increased the interest felt in that country. Missionaries, traders, and scientific explorers had entered from every side, all intent on bringing to light the wonders hidden within the borders of that land. Krapf, Rebmann, and Erhardt, under the English Church Missionary Society, spent many years on the east coast, making many journeys inland, and brought a good stock of information regarding that portion. At the same time Dr. Livingstone was traversing the southern part of the continent and mapping out the Zambesi. Before his death he had gone back and forth through all that region many times, and was perfectly at home among its tribes. Its water-courses, its lakes, its productions were brought to light by him ; and by his two valuable works, which he found time to write, are set before the world. To Dr. Moffat, too, we are greatly indebted for a better knowledge of South Africa. Andersson also follows in the same section ; and Du Chaillu, further north, entering from the west coast, has laid open new tracts of territory. Next we find Burton piercing to the heart of the continent from Zanzibar ; and, finally, the remarkable and crowning discoveries of Captain Speke and Baker, who have at last given us the sources of the Nile.

The mystery of more than two thousand years is thus dispelled. The full, free-flowing, mighty Nile—hiding its head-fountains from the civilized world ever since the creation—has been found to issue from two great lakes, one lying chiefly south of the equator, and the other just north of the same line. To the former Captain Speke gave the name Victoria N'yanza, and the latter was christened by Baker the Albert N'yanza, in memory of the late Prince Consort. It remains for others to exactly define these lakes, and trace the small streams that feed them ; but the problem is solved ; and the general form of the surface of interior Africa is pretty well ascertained. The customs of the natives over a large extent of the country

are also known, together with their means of livelihood. The track of the slave-trader is frequently crossed by these lines of travel, and misery and want and terror are found wherever he has gone. So that Africa in her afflictions and degradation, as well as her capacities for good, is being better understood.

What now do these discoveries teach the church of Christ as to its own duties and prospects of success in respect to that land? What shall be the means employed? In what manner and by what agencies shall it work? and what may we hope for that long-tortured continent in a brighter future that we trust is before it?

1. In the first place, all the discoveries show that Africa is possessed of *commercial* advantages that will sooner or later be improved, and give it the basis of a permanent importance and prosperity. From whatever side it is approached, there are found a richness of soil, and water privileges, and choice products, sufficient to warrant at length the prospect of a remunerative trade, apart from the horrors of slave-driving, and after that has been wholly rooted out. Many tracts are found indeed to be desert, and comparatively worthless; but there are also valleys teeming with the richest stores, and rivaling in wealth, if not extent, that of the Amazon. The Niger and its tributaries, in all their course, flow through the richest lands, even now set with cotton and sugar-cane, and promising in the future the largest returns in those profitable products. Their banks in some places are lined with precious woods, and palm-oil, ivory, rhinoceros horns, indigo, rice, wax, and hides are only a part of the stores that would find their way to other countries in case of the establishment of a regular trade.

This question, of the prospects of *commerce* in that land, is intimately connected with its future civilization and Christianization. This will determine how soon and how thoroughly Africa will be brought under better influences. Trade itself will not *convert*, but it will open the way for the missionary. Dr. Barth, in his minute descriptions, speaks in the highest terms of the fertility of the country on the Bénouwé—the chief eastern branch of the Niger—and of all that section to the south and west of Lake Tsád. Corn and cotton fields abound, magnificent tamarind and tulip trees rise in majestic beauty,

and the butter-tree and giant *Asclepias*, with a multitude of other varieties, fill the valleys, while the luxuriant pastures support large herds of milk-white cattle. Birds of every hue fill the air with music; and in many cases the tilled fields, the groups of fowls and domestic herds, great bowls of milk, and dishes of butter and honey, testify to the generosity of the earth, and show that one day that region may rejoice in material wealth and happiness.

DuChaillu also, after long journeys in the dense forests of western equatorial Africa—forests of ebony and other valuable timber—would often come out on great prairies pasturing their immense herds of buffalo. Animal and vegetable life fill that region in surprising affluence. And along the Zambesi and its branches, traversed by Dr. Livingstone in his iron steamer, lay valleys filled with cotton, and sugar-cane, and the indigo plant, while *lignum-vitæ*, ebony, and other valuable trees abounded on every side. Captain Speke, also, once beyond the coast-line west of Zanzibar, and especially around the Victoria Lake, found a soil of remarkable depth and fertility, ready to repay labor most amply,—the natives almost living on its spontaneous productions. Of the country on the Kitangulú River, which flows into the lake on the west, Captain Speke says that it is “a perfect garden of plantains.” Sweet potatoes, yams, sugar-cane, Indian corn, and rice also abound; and goats, fowls, pigs, sheep, and cows, together with great quantities of wild game, the buffalo, the rhinoceros, and several kinds of antelope—some extremely beautiful—are found on every side. The same he found to be true in Uganda, a kingdom on the north border of the lake, where he made a long forced stay with King Mtéssa.

This varied testimony from all sides assures us that Africa, under the proper influences, may at length support in comfort an immense population, and pour its wealth through its rivers into foreign ships, to be amply repaid in the treasures of civilization.

2. The *character of the native population*, again, is an important item in the future prospects of that country. Among the great number of tribes there is of course a great diversity of character. *Position*—whether on the coast or in the inte-

rior—whether in the north, the south, or directly under the equator—exerts a great influence in this respect. So likewise the exact locality occupied, whether on the borders of a desert tract or in the midst of fertility and abundance, affects the development of the dweller and his mode of life. So, too, the fact whether his district lies in the midst of very fierce and warlike or more peaceable tribes. And, again, whether he belongs to a strong, or a weak and down-trodden clan. And still further, his *extraction*, whether he is of pure negro, or of mixed negro and Arabic, or some other blood. But in general what may we hope for the native of Africa? or what must we fear for him? Does he belong to a race that will make advances, or die out before civilization? Is he fitted *physically* for a long and improved course under better influences? And *mentally* is there ground for any good expectation? What do these researches teach?

To answer briefly these questions, it seems to be true that there is little cause of fear in regard to the native African's adapting himself to new circumstances. It appears to be established that the North American Indian cannot fit himself into and thrive under the manners and restraints of civilization. The fibers in his nature run the other way. The Sandwich Islanders as a race may become at length extinct. Time, of course, must test this question in regard to the African. But we get the impression, as we study his nature, that, in respect to many tribes at least, they will bear improvement, and rise and fit themselves for and flourish under a different state. We see no reason—contrary to the opinion of some—why Africa may not attain to and *hold* at length a respectable position among the nations. There is a great difference between the condition of migratory savages and that of civilized men. But where there is native force of character, time and favoring circumstances will work the change. The ancestors of the Anglo-Saxon were once wandering, armed with bow and shield, through the thick woods of Germany. And the common opinion that Africa is inhabited *only* by low, stupid, and inbruted tribes, is far from correct. Where Dr. Barth traveled, the population partook largely of the Arabic character. They were not negroes proper. And the quick, supple,

ready natives of the Desert and the countries south seemed adapted physically and intellectually for a better state. Indeed, many of them possessed much intelligence; some had traveled extensively, and had good experience in trade and the ways of the world; and strangers coming often among them from Morocco or Egypt, had diffused much knowledge among those tribes. In these parts, indeed, have been found good Arabic scholars. Mohammedanism prevails over all this section, and there is great bigotry. Dr. Barth was often in peril of his life. He says that the Vizier of Bórnu was willing that Bibles should be brought in to some extent, and bestowed as gifts, but not offered for sale; and the Psalms of David, in an improved Arabic version, were especially desired. This was about sixteen years ago. The American Bible Society has now nobly provided for this want.

So, too, the Arabic blood is discernible in large measure among the tribes on the east coast and in the interior. The result is energy and quickness, mingled with softness of temper. Captain Speke met with many noble tribes—strong, well-built, and hardy in person; and though frivolous, indolent, and capricious, it was often to be ascribed to their position, under bad rulers, with no worthy motive in life to stimulate and direct their energies, rather than to any want of natural quickness of mind and intelligence. The Wahuma, in particular, supposed to be the same as the Gallas or Abyssinians, are a powerful and haughty race, and form the ruling class in a large extent of territory, which they seem to have occupied by conquest, to the south and southwest of Abyssinia. The common negro in this section is less intelligent and spirited, but not destitute of good qualities, physical and mental. Morally, the native African is extremely superstitious,—wearing charms, watching for signs, consulting magic powders, worshipping fetishes, and wholly in the power of the magician.

The great Kafir family, in the south of Africa, of which the Zulu is a single branch, is also doubtless of Galla origin; and their form, features, and habits, says Dr. Mann, a resident in Natal, all “point toward the possibility that the same law, which has been made influential in the evolution of the highly-endowed Anglo-Saxon race, through the admixture of blood,

may also have had to do with the production of the Kafir development; and that the remarkable combination of qualities, by which that development is marked, may be attributed partly to an Arab and partly to a negro source."

Doubtless, then, there is a large admixture of Arab blood in Africa; and, as before said, the result is a higher type of character, giving energy for trade and enterprise, and a capacity for a profitable reception of the truth. Notwithstanding the existing indolence, treachery, theft, knavery, falsehood, and the presence of every vice, the African in his native home—be he of the higher or lower races of his country—may doubtless rise to and enjoy a far nobler position. Dr. Livingstone finds in him no incapacity in either mind or heart. And as to his vitality and power of endurance, it is the testimony of this traveler that "he is nearly as strong physically as the European, and, as a race, is wonderfully persistent among the nations of the earth." Neither the diseases nor the ardent spirits which have proved so fatal in other cases, he says, seem capable of annihilating the negroes. It is truly wonderful, also, what a power they possess of withstanding the crushing influence of servitude and incredible hardship. These facts may point to important events in the future history of that race.

3. A word upon the *forms of government* met with in Africa. These have a bearing upon opening the country to civilization. In the north, where Mohammedanism bears sway, the rulers have oriental titles. At Agades, Dr. Barth found the Sultan chosen by the principal chiefs of the neighboring tribes, and by them invested with power, and then brought before the people for their recognition. At Kúkawa, in Bórnu, Sheik Omar was ruling nominally, his Vizier being ruler in fact.

In the interior, about Victoria Lake, there are kings and courts, and a body of counselors always attend the royal head. The strictest etiquette is observed, and a slight inadvertency dooms the unfortunate offender, however high his station, to execution. Life and death are in the king's hand, and depend on his wildest and most capricious whims. His treasury is filled by the simple practice of accusing at any

moment, on any pretence or no pretence at all, some of his wealthy subjects, and permitting them to buy their lives with heavy fines, or dragging them off to death and confiscating all their property. Slave-hunts, too, bring wives, and servants, and riches into the kingdom. In other portions of the country the government is chiefly patriarchal,—the various tribes having district-chiefs, whose orders are issued by bodies of counselors to the lower village-chiefs, and obedience enforced by fines.

Polygamy everywhere prevails, and is a fertile cause of war by raising disputes about succession. Of course its effects otherwise are demoralizing to the last degree, and the sacred ties of family are little known. Captain Speke, indeed, with true British instinct, declares that, such is the disorganized state of the country at present, under these various causes of strife, a strong rule from abroad, like that of England in India, is indispensable to bring about a new order of things. For ourselves, we do not advocate such interference, but believe that other motives will better work to develop that country. However, after witnessing the endless troubles to which travelers must patiently submit who would journey in Africa, we cannot much blame his anxiety for some strong hand to bring order there out of chaos. Intercourse with foreigners, by regular trade and the establishment of missionaries in that country, must at length lead to organized government; and if it can be sustained by the natives themselves, so much the better.

4. The *slave-traffic* is an important question in considering the welfare of Africa. It is the source of untold misery, directly and indirectly. Not only the present pangs of parting, when families are dissevered; not only the horrid butcheries often enacted; not only the life-long wretchedness of multitudes, are to enter into the account; but the *terror* everywhere diffused through that unhappy country by this infernal practice,—not a moment of rest or a feeling of security to many tribes—no heart to sow, or build, or reap—the approach of every stranger regarded with dread—the miserable beings fleeing for their lives to the hills and thickets, leaving their dwellings to the mercy of passers-by, fearing a worse fate; these things show that slave-hunts must in some way be

brought to an end before confidence can arise and peace dwell in that land, and its energies be turned to productive and stable labor.

The origin of these wicked excursions is two-fold. On the one hand *domestic* slavery calls for them. To fill the harems of the kings, and chiefs, and nobles; to provide servants for the house and laborers for the fields,—this induces the powerful to war on the weak and carry them away captive. Again, these tribes often make raids into the villages of the defenseless, and enslave the dwellers for the purpose of selling them to the Arab traders, who scour the whole country in this inhuman traffic. Or these traders themselves, with a few guns and a handful of men, lurk everywhere, ready to seize the youth of the villages and hurry them off to the sea-coast in gangs—half starved, bruised and mangled—and put them on ship-board. Thus have the Spanish West India and South American slave-markets been supplied from time immemorial; and thus were British and United States marts once filled. The chief *foreign* trade we hope will ere long be discontinued. *Domestic* slavery in Africa will only cease with the introduction of the Bible and its truths; for it is not likely that any Christian nation will attempt to take and rule that land in any part as England holds India.

5. Now, finally, what are we taught by these discoveries and the facts growing out of them, regarding the probable course of missionary effort there? An immense territory has been opened; it must, it will be, at length, missionary ground, and the Christian world will endeavor to redeem it to God. Here and there are missions upon the coast, and great good has been done. But there is no foothold gained yet in Interior Africa. Till now it has not been possible. A very few years, as we have seen, have witnessed the pioneer-labor of tracing water-courses, unraveling paths, and getting the bearings of and an acquaintance with the inner portions of the continent. None had been so indefatigable in this work as Dr. Livingstone. From beginning to end, a period of twenty-six years, he had kept the missionary enterprise in view. Since 1849, when he gave himself up to exploration, most of his time was spent in actual travel, and all his labor was devoted to throwing up a

highway for the Lord in Africa. His work was that of the pioneer, the explorer, and he served Christ thus with all his powers;—ever the wise, humane Christian, his heart full of tender sympathies, and his strength and life not counted dear, if he might save some from suffering and sin. It is scarcely too much to say, that by that one man has been forwarded by many years the day of Africa's liberation.

His last volume, devoted to the lower Zambesi and its tributaries, gives some hints as to where missions may at length be placed under prospects most favorable for an extended influence. Follow up the southeastern coast from Port Natal to about latitude 19° south, or opposite the centre of Madagascar. Here the Zambesi empties. A hundred miles from its mouth the Shire flows into it from the north. Dr. Livingstone could not ascertain that any European had ever explored this branch. The Portuguese, who have foothold here and there on the Zambesi, and lay claim to all that section,—and who, moreover, are the greatest obstacle to Christian labor there,—knew nothing of it.

In January, 1859, Dr. Livingstone turned his steamer's head up the Shire, and held on an unobstructed course for two hundred miles. Extensive cataracts cut off further progress. But afterwards he passed them on foot, and a few days' journey further brought him to a noble lake, out of which the Shire flows. Lake Nyassa, about two hundred miles long, and its greatest width fifty or sixty miles, is a fine sheet of water. Filled with a great variety of fish—its shores thickly settled—the adjacent lands also giving good returns, and the position healthy—somewhere in this vicinity seems the point for a missionary station. Indeed, a few miles below, near a smaller lake, the Shirwa, a little to the east of the Shire, but not connected with it, the English Universities' Mission was planted in 1861. The disasters that shortly came upon it, resulting in the death of good Bishop Mackenzie, its head, are well known. But they were the result of a combination of causes, many of them, we trust, temporary. The slave-trade, and especially as connived at and supported by the Portuguese, was the direct cause of that sad blow. That traffic cut off, and the narrow strip of land between the above-named lakes—the regular

path of the slave-dealer—being barred, there is no reason, as Dr. Livingstone has shown, why here may not be the grand centre for missionary operations in these parts. Every thing is favorable. Steamers could run up almost to the spot. The land is high—from fifteen hundred to three thousand feet above the sea—and a small steamer on the Nyassa, like the one Dr. Livingstone attempted to place there in 1863, would afford safety and easy communication above and below. British labor will undoubtedly occupy this point; and American missionaries may also find room somewhere in the vicinity.

Again, four hundred miles further up the Zambesi, the village Zumbo lies at the junction of the Loangwa—coming in from the north—with the main stream. Long ago here was the seat of a Jesuit mission, of which now scarcely a memorial remains. It is described by Dr. Livingstone as “the most charmingly picturesque site in the country;” and he believed that when the river was in flood a steamer might pass the magnificent rapids below, and reach it. “The chapel,” he says, “near which lies a broken church-bell, commands a glorious view of the two noble rivers—the green fields—the undulating forest—the pleasant hills, and the magnificent mountains in the distance.” But “it is an utter ruin now, and desolation broods around.” A purer faith might make a permanent impression, and form here one of a chain of stations on this noble river.

We pass on still four hundred miles, and in the neighborhood of the Victoria Falls—the greatest cataract of interior Africa—is a site that at length may be of great importance,—being reached either by a land journey from the south, or by the river. In the lowlands around, and to the west of the Falls, the African fever prevails, and is extremely fatal where proper remedies cannot be procured. But, a little way to the north-east, the country rises into a fine extended table-land. Over these Batoka highlands invigorating breezes blow; and in July, when the sun is north of the Equator, the Doctor found hoarfrost on the ground, and thin ice on the pools, in the morning, on this elevated tract. “Here, on the cool and bracing heights,” he says, “the exhilaration of mind and body was delightful, as we looked back at the hollow beneath, covered with a hot sul-

try glare, not unpleasant now that we were in the mild radiance above. We had a noble view of the great valley in which the Zambesi flows. The cultivated portions are so small in comparison to the rest of the landscape that the valley appears nearly all forest, with a few grassy glades."

The Makololo inhabit the territory around the Falls, a people with whom our traveler was familiar. Some of them were in his employ on the Lower Zambesi, and these he accompanied back to their homes. They were able-bodied, intelligent, and faithful; and were advised with their chief to remove from the unhealthy valley to the higher ground in their vicinity. Their neighbors, the Batoka, are brave hunters, and at the same time till the earth with good success, and raise large crops of *mapira*, or native corn; while numerous granaries form a part of every village. They are at pains also to preserve the various fruit and oil-bearing trees of the country—even setting them out in rows, and in some cases introducing new varieties from a distance. Their approach to something like refined feeling may also be seen in their having permanent grave-yards, either on pleasant hill-sides, or under large shady trees; while the graves of the dead are adorned with tusks of the finest ivory.

Missionaries on these Batoka hills, dwelling with that peaceful tribe and the Makololo, might, it would seem, be well situated in respect to health, a comfortable livelihood, and the means of influencing a promising people. It may show the interest every movement of the missionary kind awakens in Africa, to state, that Dr. Livingstone himself, when in the parts just referred to, heard of the steps Dr. Moffat had just taken to establish a mission some hundreds of miles away. His efforts and teachings,—as for instance, that it was wrong to kill men, and that he desired the natives to enter into regular trade,—were understood and quickly conveyed far into the interior. Such labors, and the truth of God's Word, which Word they are easily taught to respect, with its humane precepts, may have wrought more effectually on some of the interior tribes than we are wont to think.

We have thus pointed out a few places along the Zambesi, where, as it would appear from the narrative, missions might perhaps be advantageously planted at no very remote time.

Whether at these exact localities or not, we must first, in general, it would seem, locate the stations—where climate admits—on the great *rivers* and *lakes*, as easier of access; and make them the centres of operation.

We turn now to the regions far north, under the Equator. Captain Speke, upon his last return to England, advocated most zealously the establishment of a mission on Lake N'yanza, the source of the Nile. His volume of travels gives full particulars of the soil and climate there, to which we have already referred. Though under the Equator, he has shown that from the height of the lake above sea-level—over three thousand feet—the climate is both healthful and pleasant. The temperature ranges only between sixty-five and seventy-five degrees. It is the testimony of the Arab traders that no part of Africa is so healthy as the equatorial regions. In an address made at Taunton, England, on his return after spending three years in the neighborhood of the lake, Speke urged the above facts, with others, as a ground for making that point the headquarters of missionary work in Central Africa. The people are of noble race, sprung of Abyssinian stock, and have the germ of Christianity within them. The kings assured him they would gladly receive and protect missionaries, if sent to them; and the power of these rulers is such as to enable them, if won, to keep their promise. They desired Speke to take some of their children with him to England and educate them. Fearful that, if he did so, they would not be willing to return to their homes, he pledged himself to use his endeavors to send teachers to them. And he said that without doubt those kings were then expecting the fulfillment of his promise. He strongly recommended that missionaries be sent thither, "under such able guidance as that of Dr. Livingstone."

Again, in a letter to one of the English Church papers, he advocated a union with the Scandinavians in missionary effort. "For my own part," he wrote, "I should wish for no better plan than that of a 'United Church Mission,' for opening those extremely fertile and beautiful territories at the head of the Nile to Christianity, and so to commerce and civilization. The three kingdoms, Karague, Uganda, and Unyoro, are in my opinion the key to Africa, and the centre from which the light

ought to radiate. A mission thither, if properly managed, in combination with government officers having authority to maintain the rights of the kings of those countries against the violence and fiendish oppressions of the White Nile traders, would prove of the greatest benefit both to ourselves and the Africans. The great fault which has hitherto existed and dispirited missionary enterprise, is that of selecting places where no strong native governments exist, and where the land is poor in consequence of its being subject to periodical droughts and famines. In the three countries I have mentioned, neither of these two evils at present exists; but if they are not attended to at once, there is no knowing what will happen as the White Nile traders push farther south. In short, I am inclined to believe that the traders themselves will bring down those semi-Christian governments, and ride over those splendid lands, as the Moors of old made their way into Spain. Hitherto the traders have confined themselves to the poor lands without the fertile zone, but now they are entering into this, and the result will be *conquest*,—accompanied, of course, by the firm establishment of that more stubborn foe to Christianity than Judaism itself—Mohammedanism. I would strongly advise the Zambesi Mission, and also the Zanzibar Mission, to be moved up to the equator.”

Though we make allowance for the partiality with which an explorer naturally regards his own field, there is evidently much force in what is here said. No one can read the account of the country on the N'yanza without being impressed with its amazing capacities for production, as also the importance of its position; and it seems a duty to occupy at the earliest moment—for many reasons—that inviting field.

Here, then, are some hints, drawn from the recent discoveries of two African explorers, regarding the immediate future of Christ's work there. They respect the most important parts of Central Africa, if we except the northern portions,—parts that considering the hold Mohammedanism has in the north, will doubtless be first occupied, and with the best hopes of success. Now Captain Speke has passed away, and likewise Dr. Livingstone, as there is too much reason to fear. But both have undoubtedly pointed out from their full experience such points as will one

day be occupied to the salvation of Africa and the glory of Christ. The discoverer of the head-waters of the Nile himself offered £100 toward aiding any missionary who would go to instruct the people of the Wahuma kingdoms. In a word—that we may fix attention upon this subject—these men and others have strongly advised the occupying at the earliest day of central points in the *interior*, and of striking thus at the *root* of slave-trading, of superstition, and cruelty. They counsel hiding the leaven *within* the measure of meal, until the whole be leavened. We may now at length begin to look for this work in furtherance of that on the coast.

Africa is a noble continent. Discoveries have revealed vast resources there; and at no distant day, we believe, Christian blacks from this country, prepared by the teachings of such societies as the American Missionary Association, and others, will be hastening thither to carry the bread and water of life. England has done much toward opening the field, but she cannot, neither will she desire, to occupy it all. We believe that not many years will elapse before new and far more extended measures will be taken to save that land. Africa is fast becoming the chief point of interest to the Christian world; and it is but right that the Church should know its history, and watch the opening of the doors there to Christ. The coast has for some time been partially occupied by the missionaries of various nations. Now is speedily drawing near the day when the inner portions of that land may be seized and held for God. When the set time is come may the Church of Christ not be found wanting!

It will indeed be *missionary* work of the most laborious and self-denying kind. There must be exposure to fatal fevers, such as bore Mrs. Livingstone to her rest, and such as prostrate the strongest frame in a day. There must be separation from kindred, and a long struggle to surround even the little mission-premises with something like the features of civilization. There must be contact with the repulsive aspects of Paganism. The labor will be hard, the fruits perchance long deferred. A nation will not be born in a day, even after the experience gained in long years in such work in other fields. And though men and treasure are ready from the numbers and wealth of

Christian churches, it will be a long, hard struggle, at the best. Many will fall on the field. Some may be discouraged. These things are too well known to admit of any romantic notions as to the salvation of Africa. And the practice of domestic slavery, so long continued, so firmly rooted in the ideas and customs of all the tribes in all parts of the country, will be doubtless one of the most difficult obstacles to be overcome.

But this is not the day to inquire whether there are perils or hardships connected with such a work. There are hearts ready—there will be more—to do all and suffer all, if they may hasten the time of a nation's redemption. The grace of God "makes willing." The men and women laboring in Micronesia have chosen their sphere, and rejoice that God counted them worthy to enter it. So in India, and China, and Turkey. So it will be in the heart of Africa. Let the field be opened, let different localities be compared,—the Church following the steps of the explorer with this in view, ready and eager for the work—and God will send laborers. And at length, what that faithful servant of Christ, Mr. Grout, is now permitted, with others, to see around him in Zulu-land, will be seen, we trust, on the Zambesi, and on all the hills and lakes and rivers, and in all the valleys of inner Africa. Her forests, we may hope, will one day resound with the praises of God, and her fertile plains be dotted with Christian villages guarding the school-house and the church.

ARTICLE III.—TYRANNY IN TAXATION.

The Science of Wealth: A Manual of Political Economy. Embracing the Laws of Trade, Currency, and Finance. By AMASA WALKER, Lecturer on Public Economy in Amherst College. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1866.

Taxation: Its Levy and Expenditure, Past and Future; Being an Inquiry into our Financial Policy. By Sir S. MORTON PETO, Bart., M. P. for Finsbury. 1863. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1866.

Report of Hon. DAVID A. WELLS, Special Commissioner of the Revenue, to the Secretary of the Treasury. Washington: Government Printing Office. 1866.

THE events of the past six years have given, unhappily, an increased importance, but fortunately a new impulse also, to the study by Americans of the general economy of public revenue and expenditure. However a few advanced philosophers might discern the principles which control the subject, however this or that commercial class might seek to control the subject for its own interest, the theories of the one and the greed of the other seldom stimulated the public mind into earnest political action, or into positive partisan schism. Even when rival parties proclaimed opposite systems for the levy of revenue as almost their sole subject of difference, the electoral mass refused to arrange itself by the line the politicians had laid down. From the date of the Missouri Compromise the consciousness never left the popular mind, never ceased to guide the popular action, that questions of duties and bounties were after all not the main questions; so that many a man who would have put special industries under the patronage of the state, voted invariably with the party which professed to condemn such state interference; and many another who longed for the liberation of commerce was unswerving in faithfulness to the opposite faction. While the

nation found itself, with few forms and low rates of taxation, burdened with an income so excessive that no better method for disposing of it could be found than a distribution, men could not easily be persuaded that the price of their tea, or the sale of their wares, concerned them more than the black cloud gathering in the southern sky. While politicians set up financial questions for party tests, the instinct of many men taught them that if finance was important, there was something in the background more important, and impelled them to action discordant with their financial notions. Men who would avert the coming trouble by mere concession, fell in with the party which was for conceding all: men who would avert it by withstanding it, could not well act but with the party which made some show of resistance. Thus many an earnest free-trader, in Massachusetts or New York, found himself a Whig; and ardent protectionists, in Pennsylvania and Virginia, adhered by necessity to the party called Democratic.

But time and the war have changed all that. On the one hand, slavery no longer exists; slave-owning politicians are dead, exiled, or disfranchised; their former bondsmen have civil rights and political powers; of all those states whose influence was once dominant in our government, the whole social order has been overturned, the territory laid waste, the inhabitants pauperized; and whatever delays or disorders may yet attend the establishment there of such institutions as the conquering government may think fit, no brave man need fear a reassertion of the old insolent supremacy. On the other hand, our surplus revenue, our almost imperceptible taxation, have given place to a mountain of public indebtedness, and to devices of exaction remarkable for variety, severity, and magnitude of gross results. In these altered circumstances it cannot be wondered at if men, thinking the old question well fought through, begin to turn to new ones; nor if questions of finance are driven in upon their thoughts in such a way that they cannot refuse to receive them, study them, wrestle about them, and not drop them until they are settled. We believe that the current of popular thought is already setting strongly in this direction; that issues lately the greatest must soon be content to become historical; and that existing parties must

either arrange themselves about the new lines of separation, or give place to others.

Concurring in this drift of popular thought, we purpose, without discussing the broad subject of Political Economy, to say something upon this particular subject of Taxation ; of the relation sustained by the State to the property of the Citizen ; of the principles, whether of morals or of expediency, which should govern the assumption of private property by the State ; and how such principles may be contravened in practice. Let us first introduce the works named above, to which we may have occasion to refer as we go on.

There is much besides the elegant bodily form in which Mr. Walker's book is put forth, to induce us to regard it as the worthiest contribution which American literature has yet made to the Science of Wealth. We do not use this phrase as intending the highest eulogy possible ; for, with full confidence in the capabilities of the American mind, we are among those who think its greenest laurels have been won in other fields than that of Political Economy. But while the work makes little pretence of announcing new principles, or of exploring the wilderness of unclassified facts much more thoroughly than others have done, it is yet entitled to high praise as a compact, orderly, lucid statement of the best results of the best and latest thinkers in this branch of philosophy. These results, moreover, are enforced by many excellent illustrations of the author's own choosing, and are applied by him, with admirable judgment, to the special circumstances of this country and the present day. A striking and commendable feature of the book is the free use of diagrams as a means of impressing upon the mind (*oculis subjecta fidelibus*) important arithmetical or statistical facts, the mere proposition of which in language might wholly fail of effect. We are aware that there may be a temptation to undue use of so convenient an application of geometric figures ; we remember the ingenious one that demonstrated the wisdom of the Abbé Sieyès' constitution which never worked, and the mathematical scale which that no less daring theorist, Bentham, would have presented to every witness upon the stand, that he might say to what degree upon the scale, from zero upward, his belief of

the facts testified to corresponded ; and we admit that the device may mislead. But we do not think it possible to give in any other way so distinct an idea (to say nothing of giving the idea so instantaneously) of the relation, for example, between the volume of currency in a nation and its imports for consumption, as is given by the scaled lines in Diagram No. 8. And this very use of simple means for enforcing great truths, goes far to justify the title of a Hand-book, or "Manual" of Political Economy.

We cannot complete this hasty notice of a book so valuable upon the whole, so correct in general principles and special facts, so worthy to fill the educational place from which the progress of the science alone has been able to dislodge Dr. Wayland's excellent treatise, without adverting to a singular error, or rather complication of errors, upon that entangled subject, however, which excuses almost any error, of American coinage and British exchange. Mr. Walker explains the well-known anomaly thus :

"When the American government was first formed, the old Spanish milled dollar was in use ; and \$4.44 were equal to the British gold coin called a sovereign or pound sterling. And Congress enacted that \$4.44 should be the rate at which the pound sterling must be computed at our custom-houses.

"Since that time, important changes have taken place ; the relative value [qu. *values ?*] of gold and silver have changed. The latter has advanced, or the former declined. The American dollar, too, has been altered, so that it has a less quantity of silver ; and our gold coins, also, proportionately. It therefore now takes \$4.86'6, in American coin, to be equal to a pound sterling. Thus the

Actual value of a pound sterling is.....	\$4.86'6
Legal valuation,.....	4.44'4

Difference,.....	.42'2
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which, it will be seen, is equal to very nearly nine and one-half per cent ; so that when exchange is quoted at nine and one-half per cent. it is really at actual par.
 * * * * The late Secretary of the United States Treasury, Mr. Chase, tried to induce Congress to rectify the great difference between the nominal and the real value of our coins, as compared with foreign coins ; but the proposal was not sustained by legislative action."—*Science of Wealth*, pp. 247-9.

Now let us take that rapid glance at the actual legislation of Congress upon this subject, the omission of which is hardly pardonable in an author of Mr. Walker's substantial character, and which would have saved him and his readers from serious inaccuracy.

The earliest statute upon the coinage is that of 1792. It fixed the dollar at "the value of the Spanish milled dollar," to contain $371\frac{1}{4}$ grains pure, or 416 standard silver; and the eagle at $247\frac{1}{4}$ grains pure, or 270 standard gold; that is, the relative commercial values of the two metals were assumed to be exactly, as no doubt they were very nearly, as 15 to 1. (In the time of Julius Cæsar, they were as 12 to 1.) In 1834, the gradual alteration of relative values had advanced still further. Independently of any personal recollection of that time, we are not afraid to assert that before 1834 there had been a marvelous disappearance of gold coin from circulation. We draw this inference from the record that in that year it was enacted that the gold coinage should be reduced in weight, the eagle to contain 232 grains pure, or 258 standard gold, being in the ratio of value to the silver coinage (which remained unchanged) of exactly 16 to 1. But in 1848, the California mines checked this continued appreciation of gold as compared with silver; and very soon the profuse supply turned the current back, so that an ounce of gold was worth less than sixteen ounces of silver. Of course, the silver, in obedience to a law as inexorable as gravitation, rushed abroad, or to the melting pot, and debts were paid in the cheaper currency. In 1852, there was a universal destitution of silver coin; the equivalency of the two coinages must be restored. To reverse the enactment of 1834 would have done it; but it seems a historical impossibility for governments ever to appreciate their coinage. On the other hand, Congressional financiers were possessed of a vague, though just idea, that the silver dollar was the standard, or pivot, of the system, and must not be tampered with. Leaving this, therefore, untouched, they enacted, in February, 1853, that all smaller coins should contain at the rate of but 384 grains of standard silver to the dollar; providing, however, as with an honest suspicion that there might be something not quite right about it, that these false fractions of the dollar should be legal tender for no sum above five dollars. As an inevitable result, from that day to the disappearance of all metallic money in the days of Chase, the traditional "almighty dollar," however vital in the breasts of its supposed votaries,

has had no material existence outside of numismatic cabinets.

It is evident, then, that the American dollar has *not* "been altered." Let us see what Congress has done with the pound sterling.

The act of March 2d, 1799, prescribed the rates at which the coins of certain foreign countries should be current and a legal tender in the United States. The pound sterling was there rated for this purpose (*not* for computation "at our custom-houses" only) at \$4.44, which no doubt was its exact value. In 1834, our gold coinage was reduced in weight, while the British remained unchanged. Of course, no one ever after that tendered sovereigns at \$4.44 in payment of a debt; and, in 1857, the currency and legal tender of all foreign coins was abolished. But for some years after 1834 our revenue was impaired by the reduction of invoices of British goods into dollars at \$4.44 to the pound, until the act of July 27th, 1842, which enacted :

"In all payments by or to the treasury, whether made here or in foreign countries, where it becomes necessary to compute the value of the pound sterling, it shall be deemed equal to four dollars and eighty-four cents; and the same rule shall be applied in appraising merchandise imported, where the value is by the invoice in pounds sterling."—5 Stat. at Large, 496.

What further legislation Mr. Chase would have had upon this subject we are at a loss to imagine. It is to be regretted if, in urging it upon Congress, he wasted any of the energies which might have been exerted to rectify the great difference between the nominal and the real value of our paper money, "as compared with" the coins it represents.

Sir Morton Peto's thin octavo is not, as its title would indicate, a treatise on the abstract principles which should govern the levy and expenditure of public revenue. It is rather a careful digest of concrete facts of British administration, which are discussed, item by item, by the member for Finsbury, as if he were himself a Committee of the Whole House upon the Budget. But his criticisms, while they seem rather like those of a member in opposition, recur continually to sound philosophy for their support; and the commercial shrewdness which has made the baronet, at least until his late

complications, a demi-god of success, gives a value to his comments upon devices for raising revenue of which many are become familiar to us.

Mr. David A. Wells, already well known as a student of finance, was appointed a Special Commissioner under the act of July 13, 1866, which required him to report "such modifications of the rates of taxation, or of the method of collecting the revenues, and such other [*sic*] facts pertaining to the trade, industry, commerce, or taxation of the country, as he may find, by actual observation of the law, to be conducive to the public interest." His able and compendious report, however it may have been without effect upon the financial action of Congress, is rich enough in facts and in ideas to deserve thorough study by every participant in our government, from the cabinet of the statesman to the cabin of the humblest voter.

Reverting now to the inquiry with which we set out, we ask, By what right is it that that entity called the State, whatever be its concrete form; whether its powers are exercised by a single man, by a particular class, by a majority of citizens, or in some composite method; by what right does the State take from the individual that which hitherto was absolutely his, annul his ownership, and convert the thing of value to its own use? Titius is to render to Cæsar that which is Cæsar's. But when Cæsar comes to take the shock of wheat, or the firstling of the flock, Titius may well ask as he gives them up, why are they Cæsar's rather than mine? What right to them has Cæsar, and not my neighbor Mævius?

We think it may be assumed as historically true that the Cæsar, or the State, however named, has in fact exercised the prerogative in question from the very origin of human society. This date, moreover, we further assume to be synchronous with the origin of mankind; for it is convenient to say here that if there be extant any who speak of an ante-social state, and a resulting social compact, it is not with them that we debate. We shall simply presuppose that in some form that substance which we call the State, the *Civitas*, has always existed. Assuming this, we are saved from vain speculations concerning hypothetical conditions of mankind prior to positive history.

And as the remotest reach of history touches no time when the State has not taken valuable contributions from its constituents, its *Cives*, we have, by the exclusion of exploded social compact theories, eliminated and got rid of a common error, dependent upon those theories, though equally obsolete; the error, namely, that finds reason for the levy of taxes in a supposed bargain of exchange between State and citizen, by which the State supplies a certain amount of protection from violence, or of other negative or positive good, in return for which the citizen pays an equivalent in money, goods, or services. We know that such a theory, express or implied, influences many speculations upon political science, even unconsciously to the thinker, and it may be thought worthy of a less summary dismissal. But the notion is as unsubstantial as the kindred notion of a social compact; it is vulnerable to every argument by which the latter has been overthrown. If we have no historical example of the one, still less have we of the other. If we do not find one man saying to another, "Go to, let us be a community," still less do we find community and individual agreeing, "I will protect you if you will pay me for it;" and "Content; protect me, and I will pay you money." We discard, therefore, this commercial theory of taxation; the theory which likens the state to a joint stock company, the members of which have consented upon entering it to submit to assessments for the common benefit. The right of the State to take the citizen's property must be put on higher ground, if it is to stand on safe ground.

Of course, such higher ground is not to be found in the pretence that the right in question is the simple right of might; that the ruling power, whether monarch or majority, is physically able to take and apply as it chooses all that the individuals ruled over call their own; and that because it physically can, it morally may, take whatever part it thinks fit. With such simple ethics the leviens of taxes, whenever they are a distinct class, are wont to content themselves. But whatever countenance they have received from such moral philosophers as venerate successful force, the principle will hardly serve those who study the matter as tax-payers.

Nearly akin, though more plausible in its form, is the theory

that as all rights of property are conventional and not natural, as without the intervention of the State by its laws, prohibiting violence and fraud, and actively assisting the assertion of them, such rights could neither be enforced nor protected, and therefore could hardly be said to exist, the State is therefore the source of all title ; the individual holds only by grant, or rather by bare sufferance, from the State ; and whatever limitation, either in quality or extent, the State chooses to set upon his owning, it may set without gainsaying, as the absolute proprietor upon the simple gratuitous licensee. It is seldom, indeed, in these days, that the proposition is put so frankly as by that eminent economist, Louis XIV : " Kings are absolute lords naturally possessing the entire and uncontrolled disposal of all property, whether belonging to the church or to the laity, to be exercised at all times with due regard to economy, and to the general interests of the State."* But in some shape this theory has still to do duty for many political speculators, unconscious often that their fancies are reducible to this formula.

It should not be difficult, however, to find a satisfactory way of justifying that which all mankind, except those few fanatics who denounce all civil government as unrighteous, agree in assuming to be just. Although the State has a higher origin than in the mere agreement of its members ; although society is as ancient as humanity ; yet that the State exists for distinct purposes, even though they be difficult of precise limitation, is as certain as that there is a definite purpose in the institution of the family, or in the law of gravitation. Further, although natural rights of property, like natural rights of liberty, are independent of, may even be anterior in time to, the interference of the State to declare and protect them ; although, therefore, the State has no ultimate title to all values created under its supervision, just as it has no right to the unrestricted disposal of the lives and liberties of its subjects ; yet, for its legitimate purposes, whatever they may be, it may, in accordance with the universal law of necessity, just so far as is absolutely necessary to fulfill those purposes, first, abridge individual liberty ;

* Works of Louis XIV., quoted by Say, *Polit. Econ.*, Am. Ed., p. 411.

secondly, take individual property. Those purposes being once ascertained or assumed, the righteousness of any specific interference by the State with individual rights may be tested by the question, is it *necessary* (not is it convenient, nor is it suitable) for any of those purposes? If the interference transcends that which is absolutely essential for fulfilling the rightful purposes of the State, so far it loses its sole justification, that of necessity, and becomes tyranny. If it abridges the freedom of a single citizen, if it takes a dollar of a citizen's property, beyond the requirements of this necessity, so far it becomes tyrannical. Further, if the State, even to promote its legitimate objects, so imposes its restrictions of freedom that they bear more hardly upon one man or class of men than on another, instead of being an equal burden upon all; or so takes that amount of property to which it is entitled that one man or class gives less, and another more, than its just share; in these cases again, the action of the State is tyranny.

It is no part of our purpose—nay, it is wholly foreign to our purpose—to ascertain the philosophical limitations to the rightful province of government. Restrict it to the barest functions of criminal prevention and foreign defense to which fantastic theorists would reduce it; extend it to the most inquisitorial intermeddling with domestic affairs which the Areopagus ever dreamed of; to the most comprehensive system of public largess, and the weariest Sysiphean struggle against the laws of commerce, we accept, for the present, any theory and any practice. The rightful object of government once assumed, the abridgment of individual liberty, and the assumption of individual property, necessary to that object, follow inevitably as an equal right. If the purposes of government are few and simple, its need of wealth will be small; if vast and manifold, its need will be very great. But in any event it must have wealth, which, as the government cannot create it, must be taken from the citizen, who has created it. If it takes this amount equitably, it is, so far as taxation is concerned, a just government. If it takes it inequitably, unequally, so that any one citizen pays more than his just share of the requisite amount, whether great or small, it takes that to which it has no right; it does what, if done by a citizen in defiance of law,

is called robbery ; if done under color of law, is called fraud or extortion ; but for which in a government, which makes law, there is only the name of tyranny.

Let it be carefully distinguished that the tyranny of taxation is wholly independent, in principle at least, of the form of the taxing government ; of the magnitude or tenuity of the revenue raised ; and of the uses to which that revenue is put. The grossest despotism, levying its fifty per cent. by edict, and spending it on seraglios and janissaries, may (though it is very unlikely to) apportion its demands with such philosophical impartiality that no subject shall pay a farthing more than his due share of the gross amount. If this should be done, frightful though the tyranny be, frightful even in the magnitude of the sums it consumes unprofitably, there is no tyranny in its taxation. On the other hand, the government may be the serenest fraternity ; may content itself with moderate sums, determined by popular voice, and applied to the most useful ends ; yet if even this pittance is apportioned so that one citizen must pay more than his just share, exactly so far is the fraternal taxation a tyranny. We dare to deny the demagogic phrase which has so flaunted itself uncontroverted for a hundred years, that "Taxation without Representation is Tyranny." Representation is no doubt indispensable to really good government ; but whether government be good or bad, if it exists, it exists by right ; "the powers that be are ordained of God ;" and no less has it a right to take by taxation such wealth as is requisite to fulfill its task. There was more truth in the opposing phrase which that coarse tory, Samuel Johnson, set to his pamphlet in defense of the British government. The function of taxation cannot be denied to a government exercising all other proper functions ; and if exercised by such a government, in accordance with ethics and economy, it is indeed "No Tyranny."

If now the principles of morality and polity be sought for, which should control the exercise of this truly divine right of the State, it appears that the most eminent philosophers have laid down each his own canons for taxation, but without entire accord one with another, nor always with the precision which should belong to the axioms of a science. There are, for in-

stance, the famous four maxims of Adam Smith, pronounced by Mill "to have become classical," adopted by him, and in turn transferred with approval to Mr. Walker's pages. The treatise of Say, as much more lucid and precise than his English precursor as his French mind gave him a right to be, gives his own five rules, not greatly differing in substance from those of Smith, though reduced to a small fraction of their volume. But while the formulas of such masters are not to be mentioned without respect, we believe that above them all, no less in the logic of theory than in importance of application to the governing systems of to-day, is one which, though it has not so much as a prophet yet, contains within itself, as a gospel, all minor truths of governmental finance. It is this:

Let the true ends of civil government be what they may, the acquirement of wealth, or money, is not one of them. Money is but an indispensable means; taxation is the process of obtaining money, and an expedient justifiable only by its adaptation to that purpose. Now, if it be sought to make taxation, which is a fit contrivance only for raising revenue, an instrument for effecting some ulterior purpose, be it never so just and legitimate a purpose, the means is distorted from its sole fit object to one for which it is less fit. As in every misuse of an instrument, the work aimed at is ill-done, the work it is fit for is ill-done or left undone, and perhaps the instrument itself is injured for future use. To seek, therefore, to make use of taxation for the attainment of any other advantage than the obvious one (and that advantageous only as a means to future good) of raising money, is to lose sight of the first principle of governmental economy in the pursuit of a delusive phantom.

It is evident that the principle thus laid down does not touch a single question aside from the simple one of the distribution of the public burden upon those subject to it. It is granted, for this purpose, that the State may legitimately and beneficially interfere with the operation of the laws of trade, control the citizen's preference in production and in consumption, repress one form of industry and stimulate another, and discourage, even to prohibition, the indulgence of such tastes or passions as it may judge detrimental to itself or to the individual; and, of course, that it may expend its revenue for all

these purposes without limitation. But, granting all this, we maintain that the State may not, without violating the simple principle of justice which prescribes equality of taxation, so use its processes of raising money as to promote any one of these objects, or to do anything whatever except to raise money. We hold this, indeed, to be almost mathematically demonstrable. Given a certain sum as requisite for all State purposes, including the stimulation of certain industries and the discouragement of certain forms of consumption. Suppose this amount to be imposed, as we hold that it should be, in that manner, whatever it be, which will produce the result with absolute justice to every citizen. This method may at the same time incidentally promote the industrial purposes or the sumptuary purposes of the State, though it has been adopted from no such motive. But if, as will probably happen, it does not promote those purposes, and if the State seeks another distribution which will, it must, by the very supposition, seek one less just, less equitable; must impose upon some citizen an undue share of the general burden; and must, therefore, though its administration be in every other respect the climax of utility and beneficence, become to just that extent unjust and tyrannical in taxation.

We regard this, then, as an elementary principle—that taxation, the instant that it essays to become anything but taxation, to produce any conceivable advantage, direct or indirect, other than that of transferring from the citizen's pocket such portion of his gains as the State must have for its expenditure, becomes inevitably delusive, inequitable, and tyrannical. It follows, therefore, that if it be the policy of the State to stimulate the production of a particular commodity, it is the first dictate of justice to levy the sum which it chooses to pay the producers for that purpose, not upon the class which consumes the commodity, but upon the community at large, in the same equitable manner in which it is bound to raise its other revenues. It is only upon the ground of public interest, of advantage to the State, that such special stimulation is pretended to be vindicated. Let the State then pay the cost of it; and let it raise the money for the purpose, as it raises the money to pay its salaries, in the cheapest and fairest way. If wood

screws, for example, can be imported cheaper than they can be made here; if the State judges it for the public good that they should nevertheless be made here; if it determines to encourage their manufacture by giving the makers the difference between what their wares will fetch in a fair market and what they can be made for; let the State pay fairly and honestly from the public fisc the requisite sum, and not filch from the consumer of wood-screws, for the public good, the sum which the public wealth is in honesty bound to make up. The consumer is no more interested than any other citizen, no more, certainly, than the producer himself, in the artificial maintenance of this industry. To compel him to pay all the cost of it, is to exert the mere power of government in defiance of simple equity; and such taxation, by whomsoever exercised, is tyranny.

We have carefully avoided, as not necessary to the subject, the question whether the interference with production, to which we have been alluding, and which goes commonly under the pseudonym of "Protection," is in accordance with just principles of government or of finance. We content ourselves with insisting that if it be done at all it should be honestly done. If certain classes are to be "protected" for the good of the country, let the universal wealth of the country pour straight into the public coffers the vast sums which now the protected classes deem essential to their existence, so that the same amount, precisely, shall be turned over to them in bounties by the treasury. If it be answered that to try the experiment would be to present the whole system before the popular mind so that its utter and remediless overthrow would instantly ensue, we can only say, so much the worse for the system. And the signs thicken and multiply that these States of New England, which have been held responsible for so many of the errors of that system, but which, as Mr. Walker shows, were the last to assent to it, will be the first in rejoicing at its downfall.

We have spoken of efforts to make taxation a means of regulating production. It is quite as often sought to make it yield advantage in restraining such consumption as is deemed wasteful or demoralizing. To this the principle we have laid

down is as applicable as to the former. Here, too, we have nothing to say against the right of the State to discourage or prohibit the use of commodities detrimental to itself or to its citizens. But we deny the justice of doing it by means of taxes. If there be a commodity which the State would outlaw or annihilate, of which it would make a *caput lupinum*, having no rights, and incapable of being lawfully exchanged or possessed, let it effect this by straightforward statute, enforced by penalties as severe as its tribunals will inflict. If it recognizes the commodity as having a value in the community, but regards its use as wasteful of the wealth, pernicious to the health, or demoralizing to the souls, of the people, and therefore to be discouraged by state interference, let it punish transgression or reward compliance with the governmental ideas of economy, of hygiene, or of morality, in whatever direct, honest way it sees fit. But when it comes to adjust the burden of taxation, let it regard this commodity in no other light than as a tributary to the public revenue; let it give it such a place upon the schedule of taxed articles as it is entitled to by the principle of bare equitable distribution (and there is little doubt that such a commodity will, by that principle, be heavily taxed); but if the attempt be made to combine the raising of revenue with the regulation of consumption, it is as certain as anything historical can be, that both objects aimed at will be widely missed.*

Ignoring the principle which we have ventured to lay down, Mr. Walker has added to the maxims of Adam Smith a fifth, for which he makes no further argument than that it "has been adopted in every country having any considerable taxation." The proposition is as follows:

"V. The heaviest taxes should be imposed on those commodities, the consumption of which is especially prejudicial to the interests of the people."

Now, submitting that the wisdom of tax-leviers has hardly been such that their practice, as cited by Mr. Walker, should suffice to establish a principle, we may refer to the preceding

* See Sir Morton Peto's review of the excise duties on spirits in the United Kingdom, and their influence, at different rates, on revenue and consumption, at pp. 83-88 of his work.

pages as containing our protest against this maxim. Unsound, however, as in any case we believe it to be, all semblance of reason for it disappears in the attempt to apply it to the revenue measures of our Federal government. That government, by our peculiar organization, is excluded from all responsibility for the internal order or morality of the States. When, therefore, it assumes to inquire what are the articles "the consumption of which is prejudicial to the interests of the people," and to embody the results of such inquiries into its measures of revenue, so that, while providing means for the support of federal administration, it is also enacting sumptuary laws, and imposing taxes, not in accordance with any rule of equality, but by some arbitrary notion of how the citizen ought to live, dress, eat, and drink, it undertakes that which, in a State government, might be oppression, and in the Federal government is also something like usurpation.

Thus far, we have endeavored to illustrate the injustice which must result from every attempt to use taxation for any other purpose than the raising of money. But even where the taxing power is striving to administer its revenues for this sole legitimate purpose, without regard to incidental or ulterior results, it may yet, through ignorance or indifference, be practicing extortions which are no less tyrannical if practiced by a majority than by an autocrat. Some of these, without pretending to give a catalogue, we shall mention.

Few forms of governmental oppression are so universal, or reappear in all ages so incessantly, as that which imposes upon articles of common use and prime necessity a disproportionate share of the public burden. To the unphilosophical levier of taxes, the temptation is strong to lay heavy imposts upon articles, the use of which, as for example of salt, is both universal and indispensable. But though every living thing must consume salt, the wealthiest man can hardly consume more than the poorest; and the seemingly equal tax upon it, if utterly imperceptible to the rich, falls with grinding weight upon the poor. While there is little danger of seeing repeated here the savage and futile insurrections into which the French peasantry were tortured by the *gabelle*, or salt-tax, a few generations back, yet recent Congressional legislation proves that such

devices are limited neither by age nor place. But unjust and oppressive as such a tax must be, it is, when carried beyond the lowest imaginable rate, or imposed upon other than articles absolutely essential to existence, no less subversive of its own ostensible end. For it may be laid down as no less a fundamental maxim than Smith's four or Say's four, that where a moderate duty upon an article in general demand is raised and made oppressive, the public revenue is inevitably impaired; and that when an oppressive tax on such an article is reduced, the revenue is always benefited; that from the knife of retrenchment, pruning unfruitful boughs, the remaining part gathers new vitality and productiveness:

"ab ipso

Ducit opes animumque ferro."

We should be glad to transfer to these pages, did space permit it, the forcible demonstration of this principle which Sir Morton Peto gives from the financial history in England of two articles, at all times favorite subjects of taxation, tea and tobacco. The fluctuations in the duties upon these articles are closely followed, in the former case for a century and a quarter, so as to set forth the invariable effect of high rates in a diminution, and of low rates in a corresponding increase, both of consumption and of revenue. (Peto, *Taxation*, pp. 15-30). If these few pages could be made familiar to the people and their servants, there might be fewer legislators meddling with finance, of whom it could be said as of an English Chancellor of the Exchequer:

"Mr. Vansittart did not understand his business; and no one seems to have been able to teach it to him, or anxious to bid him learn it. He seems never to have perceived that to double a tax is not to double its proceeds. * * * He never could see that if a tax was doubled—a tax on any commodity or usage—a certain number of persons would give up the commodity or usage, from inability to pay the heavy tax; and that those who would cease to pay would be the poorer, that is, the larger class. If Mr. Vansittart wanted more money, he doubled a tax, reckoned on double the former amount of proceeds, prepared and presented his estimates on this supposition, and was, of course, disappointed. * * * It was clear that the pressure of taxation was now too great to be borne; and that something must be done to arrest the demoralizing discussion of the question, whether the debt could not somehow be got rid of." (Martineau, *History of the Peace*, Vol. ii., p. 368).

We hold, then, that it is tyranny to lay upon necessities, things necessary, that is, not to absolute existence, but to the ordinary popular ideas of comfort, a disproportionate share of the public burden. No less is it a needless hardship to assess the sum required for the public expenditure in such a way that the cost of collecting that sum is greater than upon some other plan it might be. If two hundred millions be needed for national expenses; if a plan of revenue can be devised which, being in other respects unobjectionable, will produce that sum at an additional expense to tax-payers of five millions; and if, nevertheless, a system is adopted which produces the net two hundred at a cost of ten millions; the five millions needlessly added to the cost of collection are extorted dishonestly by the government from its citizens; and in this too frequent event, as in every other where it needlessly abridges individual liberty or takes individual property, the most paternal or the most democratic government becomes tyrannical. We have chosen not to point our argument by needless criticisms of the ways and means of raising revenue prevalent among us. But if any one will point out to us a government, either here or elsewhere, which maintains three tax-gatherers where two could do their work; which selects such officers, not as a landlord selects his stewards, solely for their qualifications, but as a reward for party services; which suffers them, when once selected, and partly habituated to their duties, to be capriciously dismissed for a new set of tyros upon a change of parties, instead of retaining them in ever growing efficiency until old age gives them a title to retirement; which consequently obliges itself to pay for the slovenly services rendered under these conditions of uncertainty, vastly more than would secure efficient servants holding during life or good behavior; if any one will show us such a government, we will undertake to show him one which pillages its citizens of the sums which better administration would render needless.

Again, it may happen that the State, misled by the fallacy to which we have alluded, that doubling the duty doubles the revenue; or, still more likely, falling into that other grievous error of seeking to make use of a tax for the regulation of production

or consumption instead of its sole proper purpose, multiplies and cumulates a tax so as to make the premium upon successful evasion amount to many times the cost of producing the article taxed. In our own day and nation, no form of governmental injustice is more bold and shameless than this. Certain moralists at Washington have suggested, for instance, that the use of distilled spirits being noxious, and the government being in want of money, a duty of two dollars per gallon, or five hundred per cent. upon the cost of manufacturing, should be levied for the double purpose of discouraging whisky-drinking, and of making money out of whisky-drinking. With what result? Look at Commissioner Wells's figures:

"The consumption of distilled spirits in the United States was shown by the investigations of the revenue commission, in 1865, to be about forty millions of gallons per annum, from which, with a tax of two dollars per gallon, there should accrue an annual revenue of eighty millions of dollars. The result, however, of the last fiscal year shows that the entire revenue which the government actually received from this source was less than thirty millions of dollars (\$29,198,578); or, in other words, for every *three* gallons that paid the tax, *two* evaded its payment. As the average ruling price of spirits in the market during the year was, moreover, not much short of the average cost of manufacture, plus the tax, it is also evident that almost the entire tax imposed by law was paid by the people, although the government failed to receive it.

"This circumstance should also be noted, namely, that notwithstanding the more perfect organization and working of the internal revenue system, the government received, for the fiscal year ending June 30th, 1866, with a tax of two dollars per proof gallon on distilled spirits, only \$766,780 more than it did for the fiscal year ending June 30th, 1864, when the tax was from twenty to sixty cents per gallon; the aggregate for 1866 being \$29,198,578, and for 1864, \$28,431,798."

Now we have nothing to do, at present, with the virtue or the immorality of the use of distilled liquors. We know that such use has not yet been denounced as a crime by the laws of the United States, nor of all the several States. And while this is so, what right, we demand, higher than the right of the corsair, has the government of the United States to take from the pockets of those citizens who make use of spirits, whether for drunkenness, or for manufactures, or for the fomentation of bruises, these fifty millions of dollars, and put them in the pockets of such distillers as are shrewd and dishonest enough to evade or bribe the revenue officers? Again, it is estimated

by the Revenue Commissioners (Walker, p. 120) that the frauds in invoicing goods for importation (of course those goods only upon which the duty is enormous enough to balance the risk of detection) amount, at the New York Custom-House alone, to from twelve to twenty-five millions, and in the whole country to forty millions a year. No one pretends that the saving of duty by this fraud is for the consumer's benefit; he gives the dishonest trader for his smuggled goods the full price of those which have paid their share to the public treasury. These forty millions, then, which we should be the last to grudge to a government struggling out of the insolvency of a great war, we charge that government with cruelly wresting from a patient people for the rewarding of frauds and perjuries, and the crippling of honest industry.

But there are processes more direct and less dissembled than these, by which the State, making taxation an instrument, transfers wealth from one citizen to another, without recompense from the latter, and without advantage to itself. Looking at recent experience for examples of this injustice, we shall find one transient and temporary in its action, yet enormous in its effect. When our Puritan legislators at Washington, in 1964, made their fierce onslaught on whisky which raised the duty from sixty cents to two dollars, at that instant one dollar and forty cents was added to the price of every gallon of spirits in the country. It can hardly be supposed that less than a half-year's product is on hand at any time. To the holders, therefore, of these twenty million gallons of spirits, the Government of the United States made a free gift of not less than twenty-five millions of dollars, which it extorted from the pockets of the consumers. Is it easy to conceive a grosser violation of the rights of property by governmental interference? This unrequited transfer of value, however, was only instantaneous in its action; another operates daily, incessantly, and in millions of transactions. In all the larger towns in the country are passenger railroads, the fares upon which are limited by local legislation, in most cases to five cents. We neither affirm nor question the expediency of such limitation; enough, that it is within the legitimate and undoubted authority of the State government. The Federal government now levies

upon these corporations a tax of two and a half per cent. of their gross receipts; a measure to which we make no objection. Further, it authorizes them to add the tax thus levied to their rates of fare. Here too, although the constitutional right of the general government thus to meddle with an ordinance of mere local police is more than questionable, the special wrong we speak of does not appear. But the tax-bill goes on to authorize the corporation, "whenever the addition to any fare shall amount only to the fraction of one cent," to "add to such fare one cent in lieu of such fraction." The ordinary authorized rate of fare is five cents: the tax upon this is one-eighth of a cent. For every hundred thousand dollars, therefore, which the passengers by street railroads contribute to the public revenue, they are compelled by this legislation, which is marked by a defiance alike of constitutional restrictions and of equity, to contribute not less than seven hundred thousand to the dividends of the corporations. No wonder if, while the agents of every trade and manufacture are besieging the Capitol to obtain an alleviation of their particular taxes, the sole endeavor of this "interest," an endeavor which last March was crowned with success, has been to repeal the clause which limited "until the 30th day of April, 1867," an impost which yields it seven dollars for every one that goes to the government!

We shall not take time now to consider how oppressive may be that means of raising money to which a state *in extremis* may resort, of emitting vast amounts of its own promises to pay money, and enforcing their currency in the place of money. Mr. Walker's work presents a sufficiently truthful, though brief and meager exposition of how a credit currency is in effect a direct tax of a most onerous kind. (Pp. 136-8.) We are aware that the first article in the symbol of "Republican" orthodoxy declares a faith that greenbacks and not manly patriotism saved the republic, and that, but for the inestimable privilege of paying double prices for our rifles and our soldiers' clothing and subsistence, we should shortly have succumbed to a more fortunate and higher-priced confederacy. We know something of the compliments in store for any who question the wisdom or the virtue of the dominant party.

They do not greatly differ from those which confuted the opponents of the dominant party fifteen years ago. Then, the *New Englander* was Abolitionist, Incendiary, Disunionist. As it may not care now to be saluted as Disloyal, Secessionist, Johnsonite, Copperhead, or, more hideous than all, British Free-Trader, and cast out into the companionship of Valandigham and Fernando Wood, we shall refrain from the financial impieties which are near our lips.

But however we may choose to keep silence upon the errors or the crimes of the party under whose auspices, nevertheless, the nation was saved from death, the time is coming, we sometimes almost fancy that it now is, when the good name of that great body can no longer be made a cloak for contrivances to strangle the national life; when true men may proclaim their truths, whether economical, or political, or moral, free from bewildering fear that they may be embarrassing their country or strengthening its enemies. And if that day of emancipation shall come, it may safely be assumed that a sufficient impetus to the study of financial principles exists in the pressure of our present debts and expenditures, without the need of enhancing them so rapidly as the party now dominant seems to deem advisable. It is common to compare our public debt with those of other countries, and especially with the British, with a result which is positively humiliating to that class of statesmen who believe that "a national debt is a national blessing." But a little arithmetic will cheer such patriots into the assurance that we are not so far behind our cousins, after all. The British debt is in round numbers \$4,000,000,000, which amounts, among 30,000,000 of people, to \$133 a head. Our own national debt is \$2,600,000,000 or only \$82 a head among 32,000,000. So far, we are sadly behind. But it is overlooking a prodigious advantage to lose sight of our innumerable public debts of a kind unknown abroad. The eight hundred millions sterling is all the British debt. There are no States; counties do not exist as bodies politic; while municipal corporations are usually great proprietors, seldom or never borrowers. See, on the other hand, the rate *per capita* of public indebtedness of the inhabitants of a single American city, se-

lected merely for convenience of access to the facts. The citizen's share of the Federal debt, as above, is - \$ 82.00

The State of New York, population 3,800,000, has a debt of \$52,000,000. His share is - - - 13.70

The county of Monroe, population 104,000, has a debt of \$1,500,000, of which his share is . - - 14.42

The city of Rochester, population 51,000, has a debt of \$1,001,000. His share of this is - - - 19.62

Making his proportion of the entire public debt, \$129.74
or within \$3.59 of the *per capita* share of the more favored British subject. Perhaps even this slight inferiority may disappear in localities with whose balance-sheets we are less acquainted.

When such is the aggregate burden upon the citizen, does it not become the dominant power to consider, we do not say, whether that burden should be lavishly increased, for that topic is expressly excluded from our discussion, but, whether it can afford to collect the revenue necessary for meeting these debts and the expenses of the government in any way other than that which will produce that revenue with impartial justice and exact economy? And yet this very moment is the one chosen by those who claim to be leaders of the ruling party for casting aside every maxim, not only of frugality in the expenditure, but of equity in the levy, of the public revenue, and for enforcing, in the interest now of this and now of that class of producers, a system of spoliation of consumers, the iniquity of which is palliated, if at all, only by its universality. There have been times in history when the name of tax-gatherer concentrated all that was most atrocious in the popular mind. It was no less shameful for Jesus to consort with publicans than with harlots. When Voltaire was called upon for some story that should thrill his hearers by its compact recital of horrors, he began, "There was once a Farmer-General of the Revenue," and stopped; for no detail could heighten the picture which that single word suggested. We may be sure that in this country taxation cannot be so distorted into tyranny as to produce effects like these. But it may do no harm to remind the politicians, of whatever creed,

who are binding heavy burdens and grievous to be borne, and laying them upon men's shoulders, that endurance may be exhausted. An inhabitant of the city we have already mentioned, if he happens to own anything, will pay this year in taxes levied under State authority, besides all that he contributes in any form to the national revenue, *eight* per cent. upon the assessed value of his property. If he has real estate, an arbitrary undervaluation will reduce this rate to little more than three per cent. upon its actual value; if certain other possessions, they will entirely escape assessment; but if his wealth is in the form of certain evidences of debt, which the law subjects to taxation, but which cannot be assessed at less than their nominal value, the tax-gatherer will take from him the whole seven per cent. which they bring him, and one per cent. besides; unless, indeed, he ventures to counteract this public pillage by a private fraud, and withdraws his property from the knowledge of the public officers. It cannot be wrong nor unpatriotic, in the face of such facts as these, to remind the makers of our laws that, while we expect to be taxed, and heavily taxed, we object to being plundered. We are willing, every honest man is willing, to pay his just share toward the support of good government and the sustenance of the burden imposed by rebellion; but no intelligent man can consent to pay the share that belongs to another, or to pay one dollar for that purpose and another which lodges in the hands of useless officials, or is diverted into the pockets of other citizens without ever reaching the public chest. We think, and say, with Joseph Hume, that an inequitable tax "is in fact, as far as the inequality goes, a confiscation. A partial, an unequal, or an uncertain tax unsettles the security of property and paralyzes industry;" it "will diffuse a general sense of insecurity in the minds of all persons possessing property, as no one can see how far a system which violates the principle of equitable taxation may be carried; * * * and no trouble or efforts to render the system of taxation equitable can be too great for the sake of justice."

ARTICLE IV.—THE RISE OF THE EPISCOPATE AS A DISTINCT OFFICE IN THE CHURCH.

THERE are two theories as to the origin of the office of Bishop, as distinct from that of Elder, in the Christian Church. One makes the office coeval with the Church, of Apostolic institution, and therefore,—as it is claimed, though this is by no means a logical consequence,*—an essential part of the church organization. The other supposes an original parity in the ministry, and that the Episcopal order grew up by degrees out of the Presbyterial, after the death of the Apostles. It will be the main object of this Article, to weigh the evidence between these two views. This evidence must, from the nature of the case, be purely historical, and is to be sought in the New Testament and in the writings of the early Fathers.

In the New Testament we find both the words *bishop* and *presbyter*—ἐπίσκοπος and πρεσβύτερος—frequently used. It is now agreed by all that these terms are there used interchangeably—being applied to the class who were afterward called presbyters only. In the Episcopalian view, the Apostles themselves at this time filled the place of bishops, the title ἐπίσκοπος not being applied to them.

All agree that the Apostles did exercise a general supervision and control over the whole Church. The question is, did they appoint successors to themselves in this authority, who were to appoint their successors, and so render the office a permanent

* If the Apostles did appoint bishops, why does it follow that they intended the office to be perpetual? In the latter part of this Article, we have tried to show that the Episcopal system grew up rapidly and spread widely, because it met the wants and feelings of the age in several important respects—in giving a concentration of power which the dangers from persecutions and heresies seemed to require, etc. That, under these circumstances, the generation after the Apostles established Episcopacy, seems no reason at all why that form is binding on us now and here. Suppose it was established by the contemporaries of the Apostles—by the Apostles themselves! Did they not establish it, if at all, for the same reason for which we have supposed that their successors did—because it suited the time! We see no more evidence for its necessary permanence in this case than in the other.

one—or was this authority peculiar to themselves personally, as the founders of the Church, and was their office thus to terminate with their own lives?

In support of the former position, is urged the fact, which is shown by some of the New Testament epistles, that there were certain men,—Timothy, Titus, and others,—who were empowered by the Apostles to ordain elders, and in other respects exercise an authority similar to their own. This indeed proves that the exercise of these functions was not strictly confined to the thirteen Apostles. But its extension to Timothy and others may have been due to the same temporary necessity by which we account for the official position of the Apostles themselves. Besides, it is important to observe that Timothy and Titus were not *local* officers,—as were the earliest bishops of whom we have distinct mention afterward,—but traveling missionaries. This is evident from such passages as that (2 Tim. iv. 5) where Timothy is bidden to “do the work of an evangelist”—i. e. of a traveling preacher. So it is said (Tit. i. 5), that Titus was left in Crete to “set in order the things that [were] wanting, and ordain elders in *every city*,”—Crete being an island 120 miles long, and thickly populated. Clearly, neither of these men was a “bishop,” as the word was used in the second century.

Next, the first chapters of Revelation are appealed to, on the ground that the seven angels of the seven churches must represent the bishops of those churches. This interpretation seems unnatural, as giving an unaccountable prominence to seven individuals not otherwise known. John says that he saw “One like unto the Son of Man, in the midst of seven golden candlesticks,” and “having in his right hand seven stars.” He is told “The seven stars are the angels of the seven churches, and the seven candlesticks are the seven churches.” The message proceeds, “Unto the angel of the church of Ephesus write; these things saith he that holdeth the seven stars in his right hand, who walketh in the midst of the seven golden candlesticks.” Is not this image of the seven stars too exalted to be referred merely to the seven men presiding over the churches? There seems no occasion in the context for this personal reference. And what is addressed to the “angels” in the second person, is applicable only to the churches themselves—“I will

remove thy candlestick out of his place except thou repent,"—addressed to one of the "angels"—is manifestly said to a church; and so throughout. The natural interpretation seems to make these "angels" *personifications* of the churches, and this view is now adopted by most commentators.

We find in the New Testament, then, not a single distinct reference to bishops, as that term was used in the Episcopal system. In that system, which we find existing soon after the close of the New Testament period, the bishop was the presiding officer of the local city church. In the New Testament we have the officers called *ἐπίσκοποι*, between whom and the presbyters no difference can be traced; the Apostles, whose authority was not local, but universal;* the class represented by Timothy and Titus, who were not local church officers, but traveling missionaries;—and no others. The silence of the New Testament, then, gives a presumption against the existence of any distinct order of bishops during the time in which it was written.

It may be said in reply to this, that as the local bishops were to supply a need occasioned by the death of the Apostles, it is natural that we should not hear much of them while the Apostles were living. We think there is some force in this. Yet, it is claimed that the first local bishops were ordained by the Apostles; and as their appointment would hardly have been left until the last two or three of the Apostles were on the verge of the grave, there must, therefore, on the Episcopalian theory, have been a large number of them in office before the close of the New Testament period. So the silence of the New Testament regarding them is, after all, noticeable, and has no small weight as an argument against their existence at that time.

* James, however, resided long at Jerusalem, and was head of the church in that place. Gieseler says the Episcopate was "foreshadowed" in this arrangement. What we wish to show above is, that in the New Testament period there was nothing like the fully developed Episcopal system of the next century. We suppose the authority exercised by James, just as in the case of the other Apostles, to have been due to his personal acquaintance with Our Lord, and his own character. This personal fitness of the Apostles corresponded to the great fact, that for the *founding* of the church there was needed such a central authority as could be dispensed with when education and the possession of the New Testament Scriptures had fitted the churches for self-government.

We come now to the evidence of the early Church Fathers, whom we take up in their chronological order. The first is Clement of Rome, who flourished about the close of the first century. We have an epistle written by him to the church at Corinth, undoubtedly genuine, and probably written in 96 or 97, A. D. Its especial object was to compose the dissensions in the Corinthian church. In this epistle we have frequent reference to the Presbyters, and they are referred to almost unmistakably as the *only* rulers of the church. Thus, in the forty-seventh chapter, it is said, "Shameful, my beloved, yea, very shameful is it, and unworthy of the life in Christ, that it should be heard that the most firm and ancient Church of the Corinthians is led by one or two persons into a sedition against its Presbyters." In the fifty-fourth chapter, "Who, then, among you is noble, who is tender-hearted, who is full of love? Let him say, 'If through me there be sedition, and strife, and schisms, I will depart, I will go away wherever you wish, and will do what is commanded by the majority; only let the flock of Christ live in peace, with its appointed Presbyters.'" In the fifty-seventh chapter, "You, then, who have laid the foundations of sedition, submit yourselves to the Presbyters, and receive correction unto repentance, bowing the knees of your hearts."

Ἐπίσκοποι are also spoken of, who are, beyond a doubt, the same as the presbyters. In the forty-second chapter occurs this passage: "They, then, [the Apostles], preaching the word throughout provinces and cities, appointed their first fruits, [i. e., the first converts], when they had proved them by the Spirit, as bishops and deacons of those who should believe." It cannot be that a first and third order are mentioned, while a second is omitted. "Bishops" here clearly means Presbyters. The next sentence goes on, "And this not as a new thing, for ages before it had been written concerning bishops and deacons; for thus, somewhere, saith the Scripture, 'I will establish their bishops in righteousness, and their deacons in faith.'" This is a free rendering of Isaiah lx. 17, where the Septuagint translates the Hebrew words for "officers" and "kings" by *ἀρχόντας* and *ἐπισκόπους*.

Clement, then, uses the words *ἐπίσκοποι* and *πρεσβύτεροι* inter-

changeably, just as they are used in the New Testament. Does he recognize another order in the ministry, above these? The passage just quoted, certainly, gives the impression that these two were all.

The object of this part of the Epistle is to reprove the Corinthians for wrongfully deposing from office some worthy presbyters. The forty-fourth chapter is as follows: "Our Apostles also knew through our Lord Jesus Christ that there would be strife about the bishop's office. For this reason, then, having received full foreknowledge, they appointed those whom I have mentioned;" i. e., the *ἐπίσκοποι* and *διδάσκαλοι* spoken of two chapters before—"and afterward gave commandment that when these died other approved men should receive their ministry.* Those, then, who were appointed by the Apostles, or afterward by other distinguished men, with the approval of the whole church, and who have blamelessly ministered to the flock of Christ with humility, peacefully and honorably, and who have many times received favorable witness from all, these we think it unjust to depose from their ministry. For it will be no small sin in us if we cast forth from their episcopal office those who have nobly and blamelessly discharged its duties. Blessed are those presbyters who have finished their course, and received a rich and perfect release; for they have no fear lest any one should remove them from their appointed place."

* The interpretation of this sentence is disputed. Rothe, as cited by Dressel, takes it thus: "Quasi Apostoli vi testamenti ordinassent, ipsis (Apostolis) defunctis, (τὰν κοιμηθῶσιν, ipsorum (Apostolorum) munus (τὴν λειτουργίαν αὐτῶν), presbyteros et diaconos eligendi, ad alios probatos et eximios viros (i. e., *Episcopos* nostro sensu) transire debere."

There seem to us to be three strong objections to this interpretation. In the first place, *Λειτουργία* means *service, ministry*, not "munus," as Rothe gives it. In the next line but one, we have the verb (*λειτουργήσαντες*) "*having ministered to Christ's flock.*" Again, it is hardly supposable that so important a class as the official successors of the Apostles, should be thus briefly and obscurely alluded to, and mentioned nowhere else in the whole epistle. Thirdly, according to Rothe's interpretation, the Apostles ordered that *after their own death*, other men should receive their authority—this is quite different from the supposition that they *themselves ordained* those who by that ordination received instantly Episcopal authority in the highest sense. Such a proceeding as Rothe understands from this passage, is in keeping with neither Episcopalian nor Presbyterian theory.

Notice, first, that in this passage the words bishop and presbyter are freely interchanged, showing that they were then equivalent in meaning; and, secondly, in the whole passage there is no reference to any order in the ministry above this. And nowhere in the Epistle is there any mention of such superior order.

Now this silence is a weighty argument against the existence at this time of such an order, if we consider the purpose and contents of the Epistle. There were dissensions and strife in the Corinthian church; blameless presbyters had been wantonly deposed from their office. Suppose there had been in the church one officer superior to the presbyters, the head of the whole church? Is it conceivable that Clement should have written a long epistle, full of exhortations to unity, to respect to the presbyters and submission to their authority, and not a single word about the chief officer of all, or their duties toward him?

This epistle, then, seems to show almost beyond doubt that there was as yet no Episcopate, in the later sense, in the Corinthian church; and that the office, therefore, in the case of this church, must have grown up later.

Our next witness is Ignatius. We have seven epistles bearing his name, and generally regarded as genuine, which were probably written about 115 A. D.—ten to twenty years later than that of Clement. In Ignatius we seem to find a strong witness at least for the very early establishment of Episcopacy. His epistles are full of such injunctions as the following: "Be subject to the Bishop as to the commandment [of God], and also to the Presbytery." (Trallians, 13). "When ye are subject to the Bishop as to Jesus Christ, ye seem to me to live not after the manner of men, but according to Jesus Christ." (Trallians, 2). "It is needful then, just as ye do, to do nothing apart from the Bishop; but be subject also to the Presbytery as to the Apostles of Jesus Christ." (*ib.*)

An examination of all these Epistles leads us to the following conclusions:

1. The terms "presbyter" and "bishop" are always distinguished, the latter being used of the superior officer. In no case, we believe, are the words used as equivalent.

2. These epistles, assuming them to be genuine, seem to establish beyond doubt the *existence* of an Episcopal organization, with the three orders of Bishop, Presbyters, and Deacons, in each of the churches, except Rome, to which they were written, i. e., in Ephesus, Magnesia, Tralles, Philadelphia, and Smyrna.* This is evident, because Ignatius, in addressing these churches, continually *assumes* the existence in each of a bishop, superior to the presbyters. If we say that his own idea of the bishop's proper prerogatives was exaggerated, nevertheless he must have written in such a way as to be understood by those he addressed—and his epistles would have been simply unintelligible, if such an officer had not existed. It would be easier even to question a direct assertion of the fact, than to explain away this constant assumption of it.

3. As to the precise *degree of authority* which was exercised by these bishops, the epistles give very little evidence. Ignatius himself has a strong disposition to magnify the office, and the exhortations to obey the bishop are repeated almost endlessly. But he rarely omits to unite with each of these an injunction to obey the presbytery also—and this conjunction of bishop and presbytery is so frequent, and indeed almost invariable, as to suggest the inference that there was in fact a close connection between the two. As to the exact relation between bishop and presbyters, there is almost nothing definite. The subordination of the latter is implied, but in such terms that we cannot determine its degree, nor can we learn anything as to what were the special prerogatives of the bishops.

4. As to the *origin* of the Episcopal office, we have in Ignatius no direct testimony. The most noticeable circumstantial evidence is this : that the *presbyters*, and not the bishops, are

* It is noticeable that these churches are all in the very region (Asia Minor) where Episcopacy is supposed to have first arisen, by those who think that it grew up gradually. It is also noticeable, that while six of the epistles are overflowing with injunctions of obedience to the bishops, that to the *Romans* alone, contains nothing from which we could even know that that church had a bishop. This looks as if the system had not yet got a foothold in Rome. This last point seems to us to afford some evidence of the great antiquity and probable genuineness of these Epistles. If forged in a later age, in the interest of Episcopacy, they would hardly have been silent as to the form of the church in Rome itself.

frequently spoken of as the representatives of the Apostles—the bishop, in such cases, being represented as standing in the place of Christ or the Father. Thus, in *Magnesians*, 6, “I exhort you to strive to do all things in divine concord, the bishop presiding in the place of God (*ὡς εἰς θεόν*) and the presbyters in the place of the College of the Apostles.” We have a similar representation in numerous other places (*Trallians*, 2, 3; *Smyrnæans*, 8, etc.), except that the bishop is more frequently represented as standing in the place of Christ, than in that of the Father. He is never made a successor of the Apostles.

Ignatius is a great advocate of authority; the unmeasured language he uses in enjoining submission to the church rulers, and especially to the bishops, is surprising, and wholly unlike anything in the New Testament. That he never attempts to support the bishops’ authority by an appeal to the Apostolic institution of the office—as Clement appeals, in behalf of the presbyters’ authority—seems a reason for supposing that such institution was not believed in his day.

To sum up his testimony in a word, it shows that in 115 A. D. there were in numerous churches in Asia Minor, bishops, superior to the presbyters; the degree of their superiority being unknown, and the origin of their office no less so.

We have assumed the genuineness and substantial integrity of these epistles. Yet there are grounds of grave suspicion in regard to them. The unnaturalness of their sentiments makes them suspected. As Neander says, a man going to martyrdom, like Ignatius, would have had something else to say than all this about “obeying the bishops.” In a later age, there was a strong motive to forgery in the interest of the then established system; and, in fact, we have a longer version of these very epistles, now generally considered as interpolated—suggesting that the others may be interpolated also.*

* Into the vexed question of the integrity of the Ignatian epistles, we have not entered at length. It has long divided scholars, and still does so. The external grounds for decision seem very slight. The chief ground of suspicion is the nature of their contents. The reiterated, unending injunctions to “obey the bishop as God,” “do nothing without the bishop,” are in a slavish spirit, sometimes almost blasphemous in its forms of expression, most unlike what we know

We have dwelt at length on Clement of Rome and Ignatius, because their time was so soon after the New Testament period that their testimony is very important. We have no other important witness until Irenæus, seventy years later than Ignatius. (*Contra Hæreses*, written 182-88, A. D.)

In Irenæus we find abundant evidence of the acknowledged fact that in his time the churches generally, if not universally, were under Episcopal government. But we also find, for the first time, the important additional idea that the first bishops had been appointed such by the Apostles, so that the authority of the office was directly transmitted from them. Thus, mention is made (*Contra Hær.*, I. 27, 1) of a bishop of Rome, "Hyginus, who held the eighth place in the Episcopal succession from the Apostles." So (in III. 3, 1) he speaks of "those who were by the Apostles appointed bishops in the churches, and their successors until our time." And (in III. 3. 3) he gives a list of the bishops of Rome, from Linus, appointed by the Apostles, down to his own time—twelve in all, Clement being one of them.

Can this direct and positive statement be accounted for on any other supposition than its truth? To answer this, we must consider two things; that there was at this time a strong motive for deriving the authority of the bishops from the Apostles; and that the circumstances of the time admitted of easy mistake as to the facts.

1. As to the motive. It is a natural tendency in the supporters of any existing form of government, civil or religious, to seek to trace its authority to some legitimate source in the past. In the time of Irenæus, this tendency must have been especially strong in the Church, because it was an age of heresies, the bishops were regarded as the guardians of the orthodox faith, and therefore support for their authority would be highly valued and eagerly sought. Irenæus, in the very passages cited above, refers to the Apostolic authority of the bishops, to

of the temper of the age, and what is supposed to have been the character of Ignatius. Yet the transfer of Apostolic authority to the presbyters, instead of to the bishops, is so inconsistent with the ideas of the succeeding centuries, that it seems a strong argument for the great antiquity of the Epistles—and so far, their genuineness in their present form.

give weight to their testimony against the heresies he is combatting.

2. Further, there would have been the opportunity for easy mistake. There is no trace of carefully kept church records of the first century; close attention to governmental forms, and careful transmission of them, do not seem to have been characteristic of the New Testament age. The very scarcity of allusions to the subject in the New Testament, which so limits our knowledge, shows that it had not then a prominent place in the heart and mind of the Church. In an age when printing was unknown, the history of all events which had not deeply impressed contemporaries, descended by tradition only; and soon grew vague and plastic, unconsciously moulded by the wishes of the present.

If, as we believe, the Episcopate, as a distinct office, grew up by degrees; having been at first a mere presidency among the presbyters, with no superior authority attached; then there may have been such a head-presbyter at an early period in the Roman church. A century later, when there had been for many years a *ruling* bishop in that church, tradition would with the greatest ease transform the first chief-presbyter into a full-sized bishop, in the later sense—and thus complete the connection of the office with the Apostles.*

We can understand then how this tradition of Apostolic institution might have grown up in Irenæus's time, and been adopted by him—and in view of the tenor of the other evi-

* An illustration of the way in which the record of the past was unconsciously altered, so as to reflect the usage of the present, is found in the passage where Irenæus refers to the parting interview at Miletus between Paul and the heads of the Ephesian church. His information is evidently derived from the same source as our own, the twentieth chapter of Acts, for he quotes Paul's language as there given. Now in this chapter in Acts the same men are called *πρεσβυτεροι* in one verse and *αρχιερεες* in another; and the passage is one of those which all now admit show that these words are used synonymously in the New Testament. Yet in Irenæus's account, borrowed from this passage, he speaks of bishops and elders,—clearly supposing the same distinction which the words expressed in his own time. In this case, the testimony even of a written record was changed, doubtless unconsciously, so as to represent a state of things like that in Irenæus's own time. How much easier for unwritten tradition to be shaped by the feelings of the time! (See Iren. III. 14, 2).

dence on the whole subject, this seems the most rational explanation of his account.

It is noticeable that Irenæus sometimes uses the words bishop and presbyter as interchangeable.* The present seems a natural place to consider the bearing of the use of the words *ἐπίσκοπος* and *πρεσβύτερος*, in successive authors, on our question. In the New Testament both are applied to the same persons indifferently. In Clement we find the same usage. Ignatius uses *ἐπίσκοπος* only of the superior officer, *πρεσβύτερος* of the lower. This is the general usage of subsequent writers; yet for a time, as in Irenæus, the bishops are still sometimes called presbyters.

Now suppose that there was at first no order in the ministry above the presbyters; that, by degrees, individuals from this class were elevated above the others, at first very slightly, as *primi inter pares*; then more and more, until a distinct order grew up, with superior authority and peculiar prerogatives. In that case, it was perfectly natural that of the two terms applied indifferently while there was but one office, that one which was in itself the more expressive of authority should be appropriated to the superior order which gradually arose; the use of the words becoming fixed as the distinction in the things became more marked; yet the old use of the terms, as equivalent, occasionally recurring, and not disappearing until after the original identity of the offices had been completely forgotten.

But the Episcopalian theory supposes that *from the first* there was an order above the presbyters. This superior order, according to this view, had for many years no name of its own, but two names in common with the other order. That is, we are to suppose that there was from the first an entire distinction in the things, and an entire confusion in the names. It is hard enough to suppose that two wholly distinct and familiar things

* The most striking instance of this usage in Irenæus, occurs in a letter from him to Victor, Bishop of Rome, quoted by Eusebius (Ecc. Hist. v. 24). In this he speaks of "those presbyters who governed the church before you," and goes on to mention the very men whom (in Adv. Hær. III, 8, 8) he elsewhere enumerates in the line of Roman *bishops*. In two other places, in the same passage, the same usage occurs. To suggest a misquotation here on the part of Eusebius, would imply that Eusebius himself (225 A. D.) used the words interchangeably, which would be still more remarkable.

should receive but one name in common. But that *two* different names should be applied indiscriminately to two wholly different things, which had never been identical, is too extraordinary for belief. From such a supposition there is in the present case no escape, but by supposing that the two things were once identical—that the earliest bishops *were* presbyters, and the earliest presbyters, bishops.

Space forbids us to enter into any close examination of early writers subsequent to Irenæus. Hardly any of them throw any valuable light on the *origin* of Episcopacy, though all show it as henceforth generally prevailing, and steadily increasing in strength. Some traditions occur as to the Apostolic institution of the first bishops; but none of them bear marks of authenticity. Church writers of the succeeding centuries generally adopt and insist on the theory of Apostolic Succession. In accounting for this we must remember, in the first place, that the order of bishops came into existence at an early period; and in the absence of exact record as to its origin, the idea of Apostolic institution, when it had once obtained a foothold, would be the natural resort of all earnest advocates of the system. Secondly: along with the external conception of the church, which, in the third century so generally prevailed, was the idea that the power of the Holy Spirit was specially transmitted in the line of the regular rulers of the church—i. e., the bishops.

To the completeness of this theory it was essential that that line should have sprung from no less a source than the Apostles. The idea of formally transmitted spiritual power, inevitably involves that of the Divine institution of the existing church order. Cyprian, then, and the writers near him in time, are, to us, anything but reliable witnesses to the actual, historical origin of Episcopacy. If we accept their belief in the formal transmission of divine grace through a certain line of men, we must also adopt their belief as to the origin of this line. If we reject the former doctrine, their belief as to the latter has little weight with us.

To this general current of testimony, there is one very important exception. Jerome, at the end of the fourth century, the first scholar of his age, declares the original parity of the

clergy, and supports this view by the striking case of the church in Alexandria, where, down to the middle of the third century, the presbyters continued to choose and install their own bishops.* Hilary gives the same view of the matter.

Clearly these presbyters *made* one of their own number bishop—not merely nominating, but installing him. If “nominabant” meant only “nominated,” the practice in this church would have been the same as everywhere else. Jerome mentions it as an *exception*—the exception clearly being, that the authority of the Bishop was conferred by the Presbyters.

The illustration in the case of an army and of the choice of an archdeacon, clearly shows that this is meant—“just as if an army should make its general”—i. e., choose and confer authority on him.

The historical evidence which has now been considered, shows that the office of bishop, as distinct from that of presbyter, grew up after the Apostolic age. The question naturally suggests itself, How do we explain the early origin and universal prevalence of the Episcopal system in the ancient church?

As to its origin, we quote from Neander: “Since the presbyters constituted a deliberative assembly, it would of course soon become the practice for one of their number to preside over the rest. * * * * Soon after the Apostolic age, the standing office of president of the presbytery must have been formed; which president, as having preëminently the *oversight* over all, was designated by the special name of *ἐπίσκοπος*, and was thus distinguished from the other presbyters. Thus the name came at length to be applied exclusively to this presbyter, while the name presbyter continued at first to be common to all; for the bishops, as presiding presbyters, had no official character other than that of the presbyters generally. They were only *primi inter pares*. The aristocratic constitution will ever find it easy, by various gradual changes, to pass over to the monarchical; and circumstances where the

* Jerome's statement as to the Alexandrian statement is clear. “Nam et Alexandriae a Marco Evangelista usque ad Heraclum et Dionysium episcopos (240 A. D.) Presbyteri semper unum ex se selectum, in excelsiori gradu collocatum, episcopum nominabant. Quomodo si exercitus imperatorem faciat, aut diaconi eligant de se, quem industriam noverint, et archidiaconum vocant.” (Epist. ad Evangelum—146th in Benedictine ed.)

need becomes felt of guidance by the energy and authority of an individual, will have an influence above all things else to bring about such a change."

In this last sentence, it seems to us, Neander indicates the great cause of the rapid spread and speedy general prevalence of Episcopacy in the early church. We are familiar with the idea that times of danger in a community *favor* the concentration of power in the fewest possible hands. In the early Church, there were continually occurring heresies within, and persecutions from without. To repress the former with authority, to rally their forces to withstand the latter, need was felt of acknowledged and capable single leaders in every church. In the great Decian persecution, for example, the ardor and wisdom of Cyprian would make men turn to him as a leader, and gladly submit to his authority. When the immediate danger was past, it was unnatural that this authority should be relinquished.

Again, popular self-government was a thing unknown in the political life of the time. All civilized men were subjects of the great Roman Empire. The idea of central authority, of order and peace secured by strong and absolute government, must have been continually present to all minds. There is a strong sympathy between men's feelings as to political and ecclesiastical matters. And so the drift of the church toward a compact organization may have been partly due to the influence of the existing constitution of the state.

It is not the province of this Article to balance the advantages and evils of the Episcopal system of church government against each other. We have considered simply the historical question, "What was the origin of the Episcopate, as a distinct office?" That it was not of Apostolic origin, seems shown by the facts, that there are no traces of the system in the New Testament; that the next earliest authority, Clement of Rome, says nothing of it, and strongly implies its non-existence in the Corinthian Church; that Ignatius, the first known advocate of the system, furnishes no proof that the Apostles founded it; that the first assertion of this is found at a time when there was a strong motive for believing it, and the opportunity for mistake; that Jerome gives a clear and well-sustained account of the *gradual*

rise of the Episcopal order; and that the interchange of the words *ἐπίσκοπος* and *πρεσβύτερος* proves almost certainly the original identity of the offices. It appears that the distinct office of bishop did originate in a simple presidency over the presbyters, at first adopted for convenience sake; that its growth in importance and its general establishment were due to the circumstances of the age, especially the various dangers which led to concentration of power, and the influence of the political habits of the time upon the ecclesiastical organization.

Thus far, mention has been made only of that Episcopacy which arose soon after the Apostolic period. In this first stage of the system, each bishop was, as has been said, the head of the entire church in one city, and had no further authority. It may be well to state in a few words the successive changes by which this system grew into the fully developed hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church.

The Roman Empire was divided into provinces, and each of these provinces had a capital city. As this city was the largest and most important in the province, its church was naturally the largest and most influential in the province. When meetings of all the bishops of the province began to be held, at first for consultation, rather than the exercise of authority, the bishop of the church in the capital city, or metropolis, was naturally the president of the assembly. From being a mere presiding officer, he came at length by degrees to exercise authority over the other bishops; just as the bishops had come to have authority over the presbyters. Thus a new class of rulers came into existence, called "Metropolitans."

The process went on. Certain churches were famous as having been the scenes of the labors of the Apostles, and the centers from which Christianity had been diffused to the others. The superior dignity of these churches caused all others, throughout the neighboring provinces, to appeal to their judgment in cases of perplexity, and pay much deference to their example. Their bishops came to be first among the metropolitans, and to exercise authority over these, just as each metropolitan was the head of the bishops in his own province. "Primate" or "Patriarch" was the title given to them; and their number at first was three—the patriarchs of Antioch, Alexandria, and Rome.

The climax was reached when the Bishop of Rome was exalted above all others. To trace even briefly the separate steps in this exaltation, would require a separate Article, or rather a volume; but its chief causes are easily understood. Rome occupied a position among other cities which is without parallel or likeness in modern times. From her had gone forth the power that had reduced the world, and marked it with the name of her dominion. She was the home of the Cæsars—the glory of the past and the power of the present were alike hers. Whatever had been the origin or early history of her church, it must have been one of the most important in the world, by virtue of its size and position only. But with the political pre-eminence of the city, the historical glory of the church coöperated. Undoubtedly the scene of Paul's labors, the earliest tradition made it the scene of both his and Peter's martyrdom. By its missionaries had been founded most of the western churches. Its liberality in times of prosperity, had been equalled by its steadfastness in the persecutions which naturally broke first on its head.

Thus all causes combined to give fame to the Roman church; and in that time, as we have seen, with fame to a church came superior authority to its bishops. The assertion of a superiority, of some sort, of the Roman bishop over all other primates, though at first denied, and only slowly conceded, had taken firm root before the seat of government was transferred to Constantinople. When Rome fell before the barbarians, the power of the Papacy survived and triumphed over the shock, and grew in extent and degree until its culmination under the great Popes of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

There was thus a steady and regular progress in the development of the hierarchy. How much was true and healthful growth—how much was corruption? Of that which was healthy and natural for the church under the Roman Empire, or in the Middle Ages, how much is suited to the wants of our own time? These are the questions on the answer to which should depend our decision as to our own practice; these are the practical problems of church government. Only partial data for the answers, and not the answers themselves, are to be found in the history of the past.

ARTICLE V.—DIVORCE.

PART III.—LAW OF DIVORCE IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE, AND IN
THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH.

IN the last number of the *New Englander* we attempted to set forth and explain the declarations of Christ and of the Apostle to the Gentiles on the subject of divorce. Our present object is to give a compendious view of the law of divorce in the Roman empire down to the time of Justinian, and of Christian opinion until it became the canonical law of the Catholic church.

In our first Article on divorce, we were able to do little more than allude to the legislation of Augustus, by which an effort was made to check some of the leading social evils of Rome, and which remained on the whole, ever afterwards, the groundwork of Roman legislation respecting marriage. The emperor and his advisers were, without doubt, alarmed by the wide-spread violations of the rights of marriage, but to improve morals was not the only end they had in view. Population was beginning to decline; young men and old were averse to the marriage state, rather choosing to keep mistresses than to be encumbered with the expensive cares, and tried by the vexations of a family; and persons of the higher ranks preferred in some instances to marry freedwomen rather than the proud and costly descendants of the aristocracy. Hence it was enacted in these Julian laws that an unmarried man between twenty and sixty, and an unmarried woman or widow under fifty, should be debarred from sharing in inheritances or legacies, except where the testator was a very near relative. And, on the other hand, married men, especially those who had three children, enjoyed special privileges and honors. They had better seats than others at the public shows, they had advantages in obtaining office, and took precedence of their colleagues who had no such merit; they were exempted from certain burdens, and enjoyed certain rights of inheritance

from which others were excluded; they incurred a milder penalty, when they had committed offenses calling for confiscation of property. Married women, too, who had borne three children, or, if freedwomen, four, had special privileges of their own in cases of inheritance, and were exempted from tutelage. It was enacted, also, to keep up the respectability of senatorial families, that senators and their sons should not marry freedmen, play-actresses or women of ambiguous character. Other men could ally themselves to freedwomen, and, as we have seen, when a patron contracted such a marriage, his wife, being his former slave, could not separate herself from him without his consent.

A very revolting part of the legislation of Augustus concerning marriage, was the legalizing of concubinage, as a state between lawful marriage and mere sexual intercourse. This was done, it would seem, in the hope of increasing population. This condition of life began and ended without formal notice or agreement; and the children had no legal father but only a mother. They therefore were incapable of being their fathers' heirs, but it would naturally happen that bequests would be made to them. Restrictions were put on the validity of legacies of this sort, by the early Christian emperors, on moral grounds, but Justinian took a milder course, and the way was opened for the legitimation of such children. This relation between the sexes seems to have been very common under the empire, so that even free women of the better classes were found willing to take the place of concubines.* To the man it brought, as being a legal relation, no loss of respectability, and it was held to be more seemly for the patron

* A startling proof of this is given in the newly discovered work of Hippolytus, ix. § 12, p. 460, ed. Duncker. He charges Callistus, Bishop of Rome, not only with ordaining men who had been married twice or thrice, and with treating a clergyman who had married after ordination as though he had not sinned, but with allowing women of rank, who were believers, to have a male concubine, slave or free, as they chose. Then, adds he, women called believers, began to secure themselves against having children by medicines procuring abortion, because, owing to their family connection and great property, they did not wish to have a child by a slave or a low freeman. This Callistus was bishop in A. D. 217-221.

to be united to his freedwoman by this tie than by that of a wife.

It has been maintained, we believe, that facility of divorce is necessary to prevent infractions of matrimonial rights, but under the empire, although neither law nor opinion set up any strong barriers against divorce, adultery was exceedingly frequent. This appears from the strong assertions of poets and historians, and it is confirmed by facts. The crime burst out like a plague in the very highest classes. The grand niece of the Emperor Augustus, Aquilia and Claudia Pulchra, members of distinguished families, Aemilia Lepida, wife of Drusus, who killed herself before trial, the sister of Caligula, his wife Livia Orestilla, Julia, daughter of Germanicus and niece of the Emperor Claudius,—these are examples from the history of the four first emperors of ladies tried and punished for this crime.* At the end of the second century an emperor of strictness and energy—Septimius Severus—endeavored to give effect to the laws against adultery, and Dio Cassius says, that, when he himself was consul, he found on looking over the register of cases that three thousand processes for adultery were instituted in this reign, but the war against manners was ineffectual, and the emperor, getting tired of his efforts on behalf of morality, stopped the prosecutions.†

The penalties for adultery‡ continued until the time of the Christian emperors, much the same as they had been constituted by the laws of Augustus. The principal penalties we have already mentioned as being relegation and a loss of property. The woman convicted of the crime lost half her dower, and a third of her goods; and from her paramour half his property was taken away. They were banished to different islands. Besides these leading penalties the woman lost her right of marrying again, although she might sink to the condition of a concubine. She could no longer wear the matron's stole nor appear as a witness in the courts. The

* See Rein's Criminalrecht, 850–856.

† Dio Cass, 66, § 16.

‡ It may need to be said that only a crime to which a married woman was a party, could be called *adulterium*. The Romans held that the *jus thori* pertained to the husband. He could not commit this crime against his wife.

man also lost the right of testimony, and, if a soldier, was shut out from the army. The Christian emperors increased the severity of punishment for this offense, following herein, it would seem, the example of some of their predecessors, as well as influenced by the spirit of Christian morality. Constantine the Great imposed death with confiscation of goods on the *adulter*. His sons punished the adulteress with burning and took away from her paramour the privilege of appeal, but this seems to have been only a case of extraordinary and temporary legislation. Under Valentinian the guilty woman was again sentenced to death. Justinian's legislation shut up the woman in a cloister, making it illegal for her husband to take her back within two years. If the parties were not reconciled at the end of this term the marriage was dissolved, and the woman's imprisonment in the cloister was perpetual. As for the offending man, he was visited with death, but not with confiscation of goods, if he had near relatives in the direct line.*

The legislation of Augustus in regard to divorce remained nearly unaltered until the times of Constantine. It was, however, a very feeble barrier against the disposition to break the marriage tie, and it read no moral lesson on the sanctity of that union. For, in the first place, it was a maxim of Roman law far down beyond the time when the emperors became Christian, that no obstacle ought to be put in the way of a dissolution of marriage caused by the free consent of the partners, liberty of marrying again being in this case equally unrestricted. The lawyer Paulus says, that it has been thought improper that marriages, whether already contracted or about to take place, should be secured by the force of penalty (*poenæ vinculo obstringi*), that is, that two parties ought not to be forced by fear of penalty, either to enter into a state of wedlock to which they were pledged, or to keep up such a state if they were agreed to the contrary. And it was laid down that marriage was so free, according to ancient opinion, that even agreements between the parties not to separate from one

* See Rein, u. s., 848-852, and Novell. 134, § 10, which renews Constantine's legislation.

another, could have no validity, (*pacta ne liceret divertere non valere*).* In the second place, the laws affected but a small part of the population of Rome. Slaves could contract no marriage. Concubinage became exceedingly common, it is probable, among the lower classes, and to this condition the law of divorce did not apply. The limited range of the law seems to be shown by the fact that for the legal formalities the presence of a freedman of the divorcing party was necessary. It is true that a freedman of a near relative was held to be essentially a freedman of the party giving the notice, but how many thousands of married people, or at least of Romans living together as man and wife there must have been, who could not provide a freedman for this formality. Did these classes furnish no cases of divorce, or were they overlooked by the law? We must conclude that they were never legally married, or that the law was intended to preserve a sort of decency of life in the upper classes, while the lower freemen were left to do as they pleased. Such was the freedom of divorce when it took place by the consent of both parties. It was equally free, a few cases only excepted,† where one of the parties terminated the union without the consent of the other, saving that here, if the woman had caused the divorce by her conduct, a large share of her dower was withheld from her, and if the man had caused it, he might be liable to pay over the whole of the dower, and that within a short term. The parties were subjected until the time of Justinian to a *judicium morum*, which might be instituted on a complaint of either consort. The fear, then, of losing a portion or the whole of the dower, and the dread of a loss of reputation, when the conduct of the parties in their married life should be investigated, seem to have been the only inducements to prevent one-sided divorce. But what if no misconduct could be alleged on the part of the man, what if he dismissed his wife to marry a richer woman, the law in this case had no restrain-

* Paulus in Dig. xlv., 1, 134; Cod. viii., 39, l. 2, de inutil. stip.

† These were adultery, where a man was obliged on penalty to dismiss his guilty wife; the case of a freedwoman married to her patron who could not separate from him although he might from her; the captivity or insanity or certain bodily defects of one of the parties.

ing power. And where the wife brought no dower, as might happen in the lower classes, there could be no operation of the law at all.

It will not be strange if examples of the infamous freedom of divorce continued to occur through this period, until the first Christian emperor ascended the throne. Caligula sent away his wife and married another, whom he took from her husband on the wedding day, then after two months banished her from the city and united himself to a third, whom he dismissed on account of barrenness. Claudius repudiated four wives, and the fifth by taking poison escaped a similar lot. Nero and Domitian supply us with instances of divorce. Elagabalus got rid of his first wife because she had a mole on her body, then married a vestal virgin—an unlawful thing—and then after sending away a third, fourth, and fifth, returned to the vestal. But the doings of the miserable Carinus (about 284 A. D.), who married and divorced nine wives,—*pulsis plerisque praequantibus*, as the historian Vopiscus writes,—are not easily matched, unless by the feats of those Roman ladies of whom Juvenal says, (vi. 229):

"Sic flunt octo mariti
Quinque per auctumnos;

or that other in Martial's epigram, (vi. 7):

"Aut minus, aut certe non plus tricesima lux est
Et nubit decimo jam Thelesina viro."

Martial atones for many bad things by the words which follow:

"Quae nubit toties, non nubit, adultera lege est."

But even Christian emperors practiced divorce, either on political grounds, as Honorius, or for private reasons, as Valentinian I. and Theodosius II., the latter because his sister and his wife were at variance.

With Constantine begins a strife between the stiffness of the principles of Roman law and the propensities of corrupt society on the one hand and the interests of religion and morality on the other. The vicissitudes of the contest show how hard it is to introduce legislation founded on higher principles into a demoralized society, half heathenish, and with unbroken precedents in favor of looseness in the marriage relations. Marriage

had been a mere civil contract: the half-measures, the indirect ways of legislation, the ease with which they were overturned, from this point of time onwards for more than two centuries, show that the world was still half or more than half pagan. Christianity was doing something on behalf of humanity, something on behalf of justice, something on behalf of the sanctity of marriage throughout society, but we believe also that it could not have given new life to Rome, that when it shattered and dissolved the empire, this was a beneficent work, necessary for the greater sway of Christian ideas in future ages. It was the stone that was cut out without hands, and it smote the image upon his feet of iron and clay and brake them to pieces.

Neither Constantine, nor any of his successors before Justinian, attempted to interfere with divorces by consent of the parties. His legislation went no farther than to fix the cases in which the parties could without fault separate from one another. There were three for the woman, namely, when the man was a homicide, a poisoner, or a violator of sepulchres; and three for the man, namely, when the woman was an adulteress, a poisoner, or a procuress. This enactment belongs to the year 331. In 337 the wife had permission to put away her husband for the fourth reason, that he, being in the army, had given her no news of himself for four years.

If either of the married partners separated from the other without the justification furnished by the above-mentioned crimes, they were visited with penalties of a severity unknown before in similar offenses to Roman law. The wife who forsook her husband lost her dower "to the very last mite," and was banished to an island. The husband who sent away his wife without cause was bound to restore her all her dower at once, and was forbidden to marry the second time. Still further, if he thus married, his repudiated wife "could invade his house," as the law expresses it, and acquire possession of the entire dower of her successor. Of Constantine's penalties for adultery we have already spoken.

We add, as showing the spirit of legislation under Constantine, that he struck a side blow at concubinage by granting legitimacy to children already born in that kind of union, whose parents should contract legitimate marriage, and also by for-

bidding fathers to give anything to such children or to their mothers in the way of donation or testament. But this last law was overturned by Valentian I. and was not restored afterwards in its full severity until the Emperor Leo, the philosopher (in Cent. 9), abolished concubinage in the East. Justinian extended the principle of legitimation introduced by Constantine to the children of concubinage in general. Such a tough life did this degraded caricature of marriage have, although abhorred by all the Christians in the world.

The divorce laws of Constantine were abolished by Julian (A. D. 363), who brought things back, as far as he could, into their old pagan channel. From that time for about sixty years there seems to have been no change in the law. Honorius, in A. D. 421, returned in a degree to the principles of Constantine's legislation, but united with them the old principle of Roman law, which Julian had recalled, of a one-sided separation for lighter faults with retention of more or less of the dower. Theodosius II. in 439 abrogated earlier ordinances,—probably those of Honorius,—and after ten years of experiment, in which divorces had alarmingly increased, gave out another law, which laid down the causes for which one party might lawfully separate from the other. The woman was authorized to do this if the man had been guilty of certain crimes, among which are murder, poisoning, treason, fraud, and various sorts of robbery, assaults or attempts on the life of his wife, intimacy with prostitutes, and adultery. The causes for which a man could, without penalty put away his wife were for the most part of the same description with those just mentioned. But peculiar to her are the offenses of passing the night out of his house, or of visiting the theatre, circus, or other public place against his will. Both the laws of Honorius and those of Theodosius had their penalties for unlawful divorce which we cannot stop to notice.

We go down to Justinian who, after tinkering on various occasions with this title of the laws, promulgated an important law in 536, and another in 541. Of the last of these alone will our limits allow us to speak. This statute abolished for the first time divorce *ex communi consensu*, with the single exception that the married pair might give each other leave to go into a

convent or take a vow of chastity. This was a most important step, and no Christian emperor had ventured to take it, although the contrary has, we believe, been asserted. As late as Anastasius, the second emperor of the East before Justinian, there seems to be no scruple about divorces by consent of the parties, and a woman so divorced is allowed to marry after one year.* This statute of Justinian again defined *the justifiable* causes of divorce, which were nearly the same as those that the law of Theodosius had laid down. In these cases the culpable party sustained a pecuniary loss by the separation, and might suffer also for his or her crime. Besides this kind of divorces another called divorce *bonâ gratiâ* was allowed in special cases due to no fault of either party. The cases were impotence, captivity, and the choice of a monastic life—not by both consorts, which was provided for in another chapter of the law, but by either the wife or the husband. Lastly, there might be divorces without good reasons (*citra omnem causam*), which were visited with special punishments, especially with pecuniary loss.

Some of the later laws prohibited remarriage to the party whose faults furnished ground for the divorce, or who dissolved the union without reason. The later legislation is also noticeable for another principle,—the prohibition of marriage to a culpable party for a certain period.

This imperfect sketch is sufficient, perhaps, to present to our readers the leading features of divorce legislation under the empire. As a summing up of what has been said we remark:

1. That divorce *ex communi consensu* kept its ground all the way down to Justinian, and was attended with liberty of remarriage.
2. That divorce on account of adultery affected the dower and other property, and that the punishment of adultery increased in severity under the Christian emperors.
3. That divorce for greater or less fault of one of the parties was visited on the faulty party in the shape of retention of dower from the woman in whole or in part, and of payment of

* This in fact appears from the law itself (Novel. 117, § 10), "Since many hitherto have dissolved marriage by agreement, we allow this to take place in no case hereafter," [except on account of chastity].—Comp. Cod. v. 17, l. 9.

the dower in whole or in part by the man. At length some restrictions were put on the remarriage of the culpable partner.

4. Much the same may be said of groundless divorce in its consequences to the party which initiated it.

5. The Roman law during the empire did not to any extent prohibit divorce, but only made its consequences unpleasant; nor did it, except in a few cases, prohibit remarriage.

6. We see then that the influence of Christian views, which were already matured and vigorous in its theory of marriage, produced but little influence in changing the traditional principles of Roman law on this important department of the marriage relations.

But what were these Christian views in regard to divorce, which for a time conflicted with the principles of Roman law, and at length gained a victory over them? To understand fully the state of Christian opinion in this respect we ought to trace the doctrine of the church on marriage in general, from its beginnings derived from the Gospel or some other source, until it grew into a vast body of canonical law. But we have no room for such an exposition. We can only mention the sources to which this doctrine is to be referred. Of these there were two, a new conviction of the sanctity and closeness of the marriage relation, and a feeling that marriage, though a good and lawful state, was not the best or highest form of life. The conviction was founded on Christ's teachings and other passages in the New Testament, and on the spirit of Christianity which harmonized entirely with express declarations. Marriage now was God's ordinance, and at length was grouped together with some other important religious transactions of life in a class not very logically coherent, to which the name of sacraments was attached. The beautiful analogy traced by the apostle between Christ and the church on the one hand and the husband and wife on the other helped to secure for marriage a place among the sacraments.

But there grew up also at an early age of the church an opinion that a single life,—a life of chastity as it was called, just as we call abstinence from spirituous drinks a life of temperance,—was best for the interests of the soul. This opinion was partly due to Gnostic or ascetic doctrines that crept in,

partly it was a reaction against the deplorable licentiousness of heathenism, and it found a degree of support in passages of scripture. Such were our Lord's words in Matthew xix. 12, several passages of Paul in I. Cor. vii., and the place in Revelations, xiv. 4, where "virgins," understood of man, was supposed to commend celibacy. But the Fathers, as a body, held marriage in honor, as an institution of God. A Tertullian, after he slipped into Montanism, almost deserted this position, when he inveighed against second marriage as a sin. A Jerome writing against Jovinian, who had asserted that virgins, widows and wives had equal merit, might say, "*Si bonum est mulierem non tangere, malum est ergo tangere. Si autem malum est et ignoscitur, ideo conceditur, ne malo quid deterius fiat.*" But his logic came back to him when he grew cool, and in general the doctrine that marriage was an evil was left for heretics animated by an evil spirit "forbidding to marry."

To these sources, in whole or in part, must be ascribed the encouragement given to vows of virginity, to professions of widowhood, and to a solitary or social life of abstinence from marriage. Hence too the discouragement, in the case of laymen, of a marriage subsequent to the first, towards which such dislike was sometimes felt that a father of the second century could call second marriages, "specious adultery," and fourth marriages, together with third in some cases, were prohibited by law in the Greek empire. Hence also the early ban put on second marriages of the clergy. Hence the long struggle against a married clergy which in the western church was so far successful at length as to separate a married man wishing to become a priest from his wife, to make marriages after ordination void and punishable with a loss of office, and to extend the prohibition of them to all but the lowest servants of the church.* Hence, finally, the hindrances to marriage from blood and affinity, which reached in their operation to a wide circle of relations.

The doctrine of the ancient church on divorce was tolerably

* Much as Jerome disparaged marriage, he freely admitted, as did most others, that any number of successive marriages was not unlawful. "*Non damno bigamos, imo nec trigamos et si diel potest octagamos.*" *Ad Pammach. apologet. c. Jovin.*

well established long before marriage came to be regarded as a sacrament in the more modern sense of that term. At the same time the sacramental character attached to marriage strengthened the view which scripture authorized of its fixed and indissoluble nature. Even death was held by some, although never by the prevalent opinion, to be no dissolution of the bond. The original source of the doctrine was of course the declarations in the gospel, which were honestly and laboriously interpreted with a pretty uniform result long before the doctrine of the sacraments was developed. This doctrine did not first teach the unlawfulness of dissolving the marriage tie, but took that view from the scriptures and from the firm prevalent opinion already spread through the church. Afterwards, however, the sacramental nature of marriage without doubt acted back to give more of rigor to marriage and to impede its dissolution. With this and before this the Christian spirit of forgiveness had an important influence on opinion in regard to divorce. The high sin of either party against the union might be repented of and God could forgive it. Why should not the parties be reconciled also? But for this it was necessary that they should remain unmarried. After forgiveness and restoration *ad integrum* were canonically lawful, there was naturally less need of relaxation in favor of a final separation with liberty of remarriage. These three then, Christ's law in the Gospel and as explained by Paul, the sacramental quality of marriage, the Christian duty of forgiveness, gave the shape to the doctrine of divorce in the ancient church. If the marriage had not been a Christian one, that is, had had no sacramental character, a complete divorce might take effect in the following cases, and in these only: in the *first* place an infidel converted to Christianity was to put away all his wives but the first. As however in this instance there was no true marriage according to Christian doctrine with any but the first wife, there was no real divorce in ceasing to have any relation to the others, who were merely concubines. *Secondly*, a converted infidel, who had put away his wife and married another, was required to take back again the first, even if she should have contracted a second marriage. Here again there was no true divorce, for the divorce and remarriage of both the parties

was regarded as unlawful. *Thirdly*, if an infidel became a convert to Christianity and his or her married partner was unwilling to keep up the marriage relation on any terms, or at least not without blaspheming God or leading the other into mortal sin, the Christian might be separated from the infidel so as to contract a new marriage.* This decision of the church was based on an interpretation of I. Cor. vii. 15, concerning which we refer our readers to what was said in the last number of the New Englander. And here only have we an instance of true divorce. All other cases, such as marriage to a Jew of a person already a Christian, marriage of a Catholic to a heretic, or schismatic, either rendered the marriage void *ab initio*—which is not divorce in the proper sense—or merely justified a separation *a mensa et thoro*, if even that were allowable.†

A very early and important passage on divorce is contained in the Shepherd of Hermas (ii. Mandat. 4, § 1). We will give it in English. "And I said to him, master, let me ask thee a few things. Say on, says he, and I said, if any one had a wife faithful in the Lord, and found her in adultery, would the man sin if he lived with her? And he said to me, as long as he is ignorant, the man is without crime, if he lives with her. But if the man had known that his wife had offended, and the woman had not repented, and if she remains in her fornication, and the man lives with her, he will be guilty of her sin and partaker of her adultery. And I said to him, what then if the

*The opinions of Innocent III. in the decretals of Gregory IX. §§ 7, 8, de divortio l. 19, may be consulted here in lieu of anything else.

† In the Greek church, marriage between the orthodox and heretics was forbidden and declared null, although in Russia since 1719 members of the established church may marry members of other confessions. In the western church marriage with infidels or Jews has long been considered invalid. But for Catholics and Protestants to intermarry is allowed, if they pledge themselves to educate the children in the Roman faith. Otherwise the priest may not celebrate the nuptials. But in modern times, even if such guarantees should not be given by the parties, the Catholic pastor may be present and record the marriage without blessing it; a singular compromise, as if the church were uncertain whether the transaction were concubinage or not. And in the Netherlands, since the papacy of Benedict XIV. (1740–1758), as well as in the western Prussian provinces since Pius VIII. (1829 onward), mixed marriages, celebrated not according to the form prescribed by the Council of Trent, but in one sanctioned by the law of the land, are regarded as real valid unions. (Walter, Kirchenr. § 300, § 318).

woman persist in her vice. And he said let the man put her away, and stay by himself, [*i. e.* remain unmarried.] But if he put away his wife and take another, he too commits adultery himself. And I said to him, what if a woman, when put away, repents and wishes to return to her husband, shall she not be taken back by her husband? And he said to me, verily, if her husband do not take her back, he sins, and allows himself to commit a great sin; he ought to take back the sinning woman who has repented; but ought not to do this often. For there is one repentance for the servants of God. On account of repentance therefore the man ought not to marry. This conduct is incumbent on both man and woman. Nor is there adultery only, said he, if one pollutes his own flesh, but also when any one does things like to the Gentiles he commits adultery. Hence, if one persists in such things also and repents not, withdraw from him and live not with him. Otherwise thou too art partaker of his sin. For this was the command given to you to remain by yourselves, whether man or woman, for in things of this sort there can be repentance.”*

In this passage it is distinctly asserted that a man who puts away an adulterous wife, and marries another woman, commits adultery; and another reason is given for his remaining unmarried—namely, that he may be in a condition to receive her back on her repentance. But such indulgence cannot extend beyond the first transgression. Here the foundation on which the first assertion is built is, no doubt, the words of our Lord, as limited by the Apostle in 1 Cor. vii., “let her remain unmarried, or be reconciled to her husband,” and Hermas con-

* In the Greek texts, as restored by Tischendorf, in Dressel's edition, and lately by Hilgenfeld, for “the sinning woman who has repented,” of the Latin text, appears “him who hath sinned and repented.” The words *there is one repentance*, etc., seem to mean that only once and not more than once after baptism, a sinner who has committed an act of open deliberate immorality, can be received back as a penitent into the church. To give a sinning wife a motive for repentance and not to drive her to despair—this is what is meant by “on account of repentance a man ought not to marry” another woman. The indulgence of Hermas in allowing that there could be any second “repentance,” was exceedingly distasteful to Tertullian, after he became a Montanist. Comp. his *de pudicitia*, § 10, § 20, where he has the words “scriptura Pastoris quæ sola mœchos amat,” and thinks that the author ought to have learned the opposite from the Apostles, referring to Hebrews vi. 4-6.

ceived that the reconciliation there referred to was to follow a separation on account of the adultery of the husband. He reasons fairly, as others have done then and since, that if this be a command for the wife, it is such also for the husband. Thus his injunctions are all scriptural, according to his understanding of Scripture. He may have been weak-minded, he may have misunderstood Scripture, as we think that he did, but he represents an opinion that must have been extensively held, and at length became the ruling one, and all this long before the doctrine of the sacramental character of marriage obtained currency.

In the next three centuries many other witnesses appear on the same side. Clement, of Alexandria, says, (Strom. ii., 25, § 144), that Scripture "regards marrying again to be adultery, if the other divorced partner is living;" and again, a little after (§ 145), "not only does he who puts away a woman cause her to commit adultery, but he who receives her also, as giving her opportunity to sin. For if he did not receive her, she would go back to her husband," where reconciliation is thought of as possible and desirable, whatever the woman had done to occasion the divorce. Origen seems to be of the same mind, where he says that some rulers of the church have permitted a woman to marry, while her husband is alive, contrary to what is written in 1 Cor. vii., 39, and Rom. vii., 3.* That Tertullian could be of another mind would be strange, when his opinion on second marriages in general is taken into account. In the fourth century, near the end, Augustin did more than any other man to establish the same opinion. He advocates it in several places. His treatise, *de conjugis adulterinis*, to which we referred in the last number of the New Englander, was written especially to show that 1 Cor. vii., 11, "let her remain unmarried, or be reconciled to her husband," can be understood only of a wife who has withdrawn from her husband on account of her unfaithfulness, and he reasons powerfully, if inconclusively. His friend Pollentius had maintained that in this passage she was to remain unmarried, '*quæ sine causa*

* Origen on Matthew xix., 8, in the ed. of Lommatsch, vol. 3, p. 320. For Tertullian see *De Monogam.* §§ 9, 10.

fornicationis discessit a viro, thus interpreting it correctly, as Chrysostom did, of separation not amounting to formal divorce for causes short of the husband's crime.* Augustin maintains, as he had done many years before in his exposition of Matthew, that they were commanded to remain unmarried, *quæ a viris suis ea causâ recesserint, quæ sola permissa est, id est, fornicationis*. Pollentius thought also, consistently with this his opinion, that marriage is dissolved by adultery just as by death, and absurdly supported his cause by an appeal to Rom. vii., 2, "if her husband be dead she is no adulteress, though she be married to another man," on the ground that the criminal husband was to be regarded as if he were dead, and that therefore it was lawful *tanquam post mortem, ita post fornicationem conjugis, alteri copulari*. In this work Augustin comes on ground where Hermas stood. Thus he says to his friend, "what seems hard to you, that one of the married pair should be reconciled to the other after adultery, will not be hard if faith is there. For why do we still regard as adulterers those whom we believe to have been washed by baptism or healed by repentance."

Jerome, a contemporary of Augustin, is also decided in his opinion on the same side, as may be seen in his commentary on Matt. xiv., 9.† A letter of his to a friend, Oceanus, is deserving of mention, as giving us the case of a divorce and remarriage of a Christian lady of high condition. Fabiola had a worthless, licentious husband. She had a right, says Jerome, to repudiate him, although not to marry again. The sexes ought to be equal in their rights. What is allowed to the man ought to be allowed to the wife. But Fabiola, young, rich, as yet not thoroughly Christian, thought, because her husband was rightfully put away, that she might marry another. She

* Chrysost. Hom. xiv., on 1 Cor. vii., where the causes of the separation which the distinguished interpreter conceives of are "continence, and other pretexts and pettinesses," or comparatively trifling reasons.

† Ubicumque est igitur fornicatio et fornicationis suspicio libere uxor dimittitur. Et quia poterat accidere ut aliquis calumniam faceret innocenti, et ob secundam copulam nuptiarum veteri crimen impingeret, sic priorem dimittere jubetur uxorem, ut secundam, prima vivente, non haberet. Here, it would seem, if the crime was manifest and confessed, his objections against a second marriage would be nugatory.

had not as yet known the "vigor of the Gospel," "*in quo nubendi universa causatio, viventibus viris, feminis amputatur*;" so while she avoided many wounds from the devil, she incautiously received one wound." The monk makes the best excuse for her that he can. "If she is blamed because when her husband was divorced she did not remain unmarried, I will readily admit her fault, while I admit her necessity." This lay in her youth, her position, her temptations. She married therefore, but after her second husband's death took such a view as Jerome and the times demanded, of her conduct. She openly professed repentance: *sic dolebat quasi adulterium commisisset*. She abounded in good works, and died, as Jerome thought, a most holy woman.*

From this time onward the rule became more and more established, that remarriage after separation was unlawful in the Christian Church, that only separations *a mensa et thoro* were possible. The proofs of this are abundant, but they are needless, as the fact of a prevailing, and at length a universal opinion in the direction named is unquestioned.† No doubt the development of the sacramental theory contributed to the consolidation of this opinion. "A true marriage," says Innocent III., "can exist between infidels (*a matrimonium verum*), but between the faithful marriage is both true and fixed (*verum et ratum*), because the sacrament of the faith which is once received is never lost." And yet the teachings of the New Testament, as they were understood by the early church, gave this shape to the sacrament of marriage, so that as far as divorce is concerned, nothing essentially new was deduced from the sacramental theory.

While in the Western Church marriage became rigidly indissoluble, and civil law was shaped in conformity with ecclesiastical judgments,‡ in the East the case was otherwise. Some

* Epist. 77 of the Venice ed. of 1766.

† Consult the decree of Gratian, *Caus. xxvii., Quæst. vii.*, a number of the Canons, Walter's *Kirchenrecht*, § 813, and the long note of Cotelierius, *Patr. Apostol.* 11, 88 (ed. Amstelod., 1724).

‡ "The stricter rule of divorce, on the ground of adultery alone, was first introduced into Italy [i. e. into state law] by Charlemagne and the Emperor Lothaire." Gans, *Erbrecht* iii., 180.

of the fathers looked with indulgence on the remarriage of the innocent party, and, on the other hand, the law of the Greek Church permitted separation only when the wife and not when the husband had been unfaithful. But the civil law did not conform itself to the law of the Church and of the New Testament, as understood by the Church, but in some respects to the laws of Rome under the emperors. For a time even the principle of divorce by consent of the parties, which Justinian had abandoned, was again introduced. Remarriage was allowed somewhat freely. And to this legislation the practice in the church was accommodated.*

Nor ought it to be supposed that in the Western Church opinion in regard to the lawfulness of remarriage after divorce ran altogether in one direction. The "leaders of the Church," to whom Origen refers in a passage we have cited, held that an innocent party might remarry when divorced on account of the adultery of a wife or husband. Lactantius seems to hold the same where he expresses the Christian doctrine thus, (Inst. vi., § 23), "that he is an adulterer who marries a woman put away by her husband, and he who, except for the crime of adultery, puts away his wife to marry another." So thought also the friend of Augustin, Pollentius, to whom we have adverted. The same thing is taught so far as the innocent husband is concerned by Ambrosiaster, as he is called, who is generally thought to be Hilary the Deacon. After citing 1 Cor. vii., 11, ending with, "and let not the husband put away the wife," he adds, "except for the cause of fornication must here be understood. And for this reason he does not subjoin concerning the man what he had said before concerning the woman, because for the man it is lawful to marry another woman after putting away a sinning wife; for the man is not so bound by the law as the woman is, since the man is the head of the woman." From this reason, to say nothing of the conclusion, most of the church writers would entirely dissent. Thus Lactantius (u. s.) blames the one-sided Roman view of adultery, according to which "*sola mulier adultera est, quæ habet alium, maritus autem, etiamsi plures habeat a crimine adul-*

* Walter, u. s., § 315.

terii solutus est." And Augustin held to the parity of the sexes in their marriage rights and obligations, saving that the sinning husband ought to be more heavily punished than the sinning woman.* To those who held the freer opinion that marriage was in one case dissolved, may be added the council of Vermerie of the year 752, who decide that in case a woman could be proved to have plotted her husband's death, he might put her away and, if he desired, might marry another. Here the crime must have been regarded as equivalent to adultery.† But none of these opinions carried any weight with them, the stream of doctrine ran quite the other way, and at length the council of Trent only confirmed and reasserted what had then been long admitted without dissent for ages, when it enacted the seventh canon on the sacrament of marriage, of which we gave the leading part in the last number of the New Englander.

A word or two ought to be added in regard to the attitude which the Church took towards the parties who had been separated from one another on account of crime. The marriage being dissolved only by death, the intention of the church was to excite repentance in the guilty partner, and after a probation to permit their reunion. The penance was a long one. In the time of Stephen V. (Cent. 9) the husband could decide whether he would receive back a guilty wife after she had undergone seven years of penance or be separated from her altogether. To become thus reconciled was taught to be the duty of a Christian, according to the words of Christ, "neither do I condemn thee, go and sin no more." During their separation the pair were to have no intercourse as man and wife with one another; and for the violation of this rule a severe penance was inflicted on the innocent party. When the marriage was terminated by death and the adulterous partner was the survivor, Canon law was not so strict as Roman law. The adulteress for instance could now marry her paramour unless she had plotted against the life of her husband, or had prom-

* De conjug. adult. i., 8, ii., 8.

† In the decree of Gratian, Caus. xxxi., Quæst. 1, c. 6.

ised marriage to the partner of her guilt during the life of her husband.*

We should now close our brief sketch of divorce, as it was looked at by the early and the mediaeval church, were it not necessary to speak for a moment of another kind of transactions which are sometimes called divorces, but are quite unlike those of which we have been treating. We refer to the separation of parties who have been living together in marriage which is not really such, and who therefore, when thus disjoined by the proper authority, may be free to marry again. Such cases our Lord did not have in his mind when he gave out his law of divorce. But under every civil law there must be such cases. Under the canon law of the mediaeval church there were many such cases. When they are brought before the court of the country or of the church it declares the marriage invalid; it pronounces a decree of nullity; it declares that the parties cannot lawfully live together hereafter, and possibly imposes penalties on them for so doing.

The canon law, which had marriage and divorce under its control, acted in regard to such cases as the Romans or any municipal law would. Its peculiarity was the number and complication of such cases, and the snares which it laid, so to speak, for married persons by its strict rules of prohibited degrees. This again led to dispensations and to a gainful traffic in sacred things.

The impediments to marriage which went beyond putting off its solemnization, or which without vitiating the contract did more than to render it improper for the priest to unite the parties in wedlock, were such as fraud, force or serious mistake as the procuring causes of the consent, impuberty, impotence, a previous marriage, the vow at ordination, or in entering a monastic order, difference of religion, and a certain closeness of relationship. The most of these we pass over in silence. By difference of religion is intended marriage of a believer with a Jew or an infidel, not marriage with a heretic or

* Comp. Decret. Gratian. Caus. xxxiii., Quaest. 2, c. 8, Caus. xxxi., Quaest. 1, several canons. Of course if the criminales were within certain degrees of relationship, there was another barrier in the way of their union. Caus. xxxiii., Quaest. 7, c. 19, 20.

schismatic baptized person, and the case where one of two Jewish or infidel married partners becomes a believer is subjected to other rules founded on 1 Cor. vii., 12-16. The impediments from nearness of relationship, making or capable of making marriage void, grew up by degrees into a most intricate and cumbrous system from comparatively small beginnings. First the degrees of consanguinity within which marriage was unlawful were greatly extended. Next, on the principle that husband and wife are one flesh, the blood relatives of each were counted as relatives of both, and from this source might arise impediments to a second marriage of either of them. And not only this, but it became unlawful for certain blood relatives of the two parties to marry with one another. The rites of baptism too and confirmation introduced a spiritual relationship, as in the case of a godmother and a godson or his father, which was an obstacle in the same direction. So also adoption might present a hindrance of a similar kind.

In regard to consanguinity the canonical law went no farther at first than the Roman, which prohibited marriage between the immediate descendants of the same ancestor, as a brother and sister, and between one immediate and one more remote descendant, as an aunt and a nephew or a great-uncle and a grandniece. In the reign of Theodosius the Great (A. D. 385), marriage between first cousins was forbidden. The church, starting from this point, gradually extended the prohibited circle until it included those who were within the seventh degree, that is, sixth cousins, according to a computation which counted the immediate descendants of a common ancestor the first degree, first cousins the second, and so on. This rule was authoritatively settled in the West in the eleventh century by Pope Alexander II. (A. D. 1065), although it had prevailed, more or less, long before. Being however not a rule of strict morality but of church practice, it could be dispensed with or suspended. Thus Gregory the Great (A. D. 601) writes to his missionary in England, Augustin, permitting members of the fourth and fifth generations to intermarry in that country, intending, as he says, that they should be, when more confirmed in the faith, bound by a stricter law. In this letter he makes the remark that Roman law allowed own cousins to marry, but

says, "*experimento didicimus ex tali conjugio sobolem non posse succrescere.*" But the rule of the seventh degree having been found inconvenient and not capable, *absque gravi dispendio*, of being observed, the sound sense of the great Pope, Innocent III., led him to bring about an alteration of the rule in A. D. 1215, at the fourth Lateran council. The new rule is this: *prohibitio copulæ conjugalis quantum consanguinitatis et affinitatis gradum non excedat*, which was so modified by Gregory IX. who had the decretals compiled, that a person in the fourth and one in the fifth, or third and fourth cousins, might be united in lawful marriage.* The same decree confined the ban of affinity to the fourth remove, which before had the same sweep with consanguinity to the seventh degree. In the Greek Church the blood relatives of the married pair were considered to have contracted affinity with one another, but not in the Latin, except that the children of a woman's second marriage were looked on as standing towards her first husband's relatives within the prohibited circle, but this impediment again was taken away by the legislation of Innocent III. There was again an impediment from illicit intercourse which was brought within the narrowest limits by the Council of Trent. Still another from the relation of the godparent was so far removed by the same council, that it effected only the godparents, the child and its parents, and the baptizer. And the same analogy applied to the parties at a confirmation. Finally betrothal involved a ban against marriage for each party with the relatives of the other, but the Council of Trent restricted its effects to the first degree.†

In all cases, where a prohibition of marriage rested on other than fixed moral grounds, the Pope, or others acting with derived authority, could dispense with the rules of the church, and this was done frequently, with or without reason. The Council of Trent makes the general order that dispensations are to be given beforehand either not at all or rarely, and, if at all,

* A reason alleged for this was that *quatuor sunt humores in corpore, qui constant ex quatuor elementis*. Decretal. Greg. iv., 14, cap. 8.

† Comp. Walter u. s. § 308-308, and Göschen in Herzog's Encycl. iii., p. 687 et seq. The leading canons may be found in the Decretals iv., 13 and 14, and in Sessio xxiv., cap. 2-4 of the Council of Trent.

for good cause and gratuitously. There are to be no dispensations between parties standing in the second degree, *nisi inter magnos principes et ob publicam causam*. Another declaration of the Council in regard to the extent of the dispensing power is worthy of notice here. "If any one shall affirm that only those degrees of consanguinity and affinity, which are expressed in Leviticus [xviii., 6, seq.] can prevent contracting marriage or separate it when contracted; or that the church cannot give a dispensation in regard to some of them, or enact that others besides shall not prevent and separate, let him be anathema." If the reader will consult the passage in Leviticus, he will find that all the cases there mentioned are beyond the precedents of dispensation and would be regarded as obstacles of an absolute and moral nature, except that of a brother's wife in v. 16. Is not this then a sort of ex post facto justification of the action in regard to the marriage of Henry VIII. with his deceased brother's wife?

When a marriage had been consummated with the proper formalities, and there appeared afterwards good reason for believing that it was an unlawful one, the case was brought before an ecclesiastical court. Where the impediments were of a public character, a public authority alone could institute a process of nullity, but where the impediments affected especially the private interests of one of the parties, the injured party could bring a complaint. If a decree of nullity was given by the judge, it had no effect on the condition of the children, nor yet on that of the parties up to the time of the sentence, if they had acted with good faith; and in any case the form of the marriage protected the children. The parties after the decree were permitted to contract marriage with other persons, but the validity of the first marriage was always an open question, and new evidence might at any time reverse the decree. In this case the second marriage would be a nullity and the first would recover its obligatory force, so that now two separations, it might be, would be demanded by canonical law. The separations by sentence of nullity were formerly called divorces as well as the separations *a menca et thoro* on account of adultery, but a modern distinction of some

Catholic writers between *annullatio* and *separatio* removes all ambiguity.*

We may sum up what has been said of the separation of married partners during the early and mediæval periods of the Christian Church in the following simple statements.

1. The prevailing and at length the unanimous opinion in the Church was that no crime of either of the consorts, being baptized persons, or Christians, justified the other in marrying again during the life of the offending party.

2. When an infidel deserted his or her Christian consort, the latter was allowed to proceed to a second marriage.

3. The development of the theory of the sacrament, as far as divorce was concerned, accepted conclusions already drawn from scripture.

4. As no crime entirely released the married pair from their relation to one another, and as forgiveness and reconciliation, being Christian duties, could now be exercised, consorts separated on account of adultery could come together again. For a time rigid penance kept the offender from the innocent party, and penance also was inflicted on the innocent party who strove to renew intercourse before the church was satisfied.

5. In many cases where marriage was prohibited by canonical law, a sentence of nullity left them free to unite themselves to other persons.

* Comp. especially Gœchen in Herzog, u. s., 697-700.

ARTICLE VI.—SIGNS IN DEAF MUTE EDUCATION.

The Education of Deaf Mutes; shall it be by Signs or Articulation? By GARDINER GREEN HUBBARD. Cambridge: A. Williams & Co. 1867.

Report on the Institutions for the Deaf and Dumb in Central and Western Europe, in the year 1844. By Rev. GEORGE E. DAY.

Mr. WELD's Report of his visit to Institutions for the Deaf and Dumb in Europe, 1844.

Report on European Institutions for the Instruction of the Deaf and Dumb. By HARVEY P. PEET, President of the New York Institution for the instruction of the Deaf and Dumb. 1851.

The Vowel Elements in Speech; a Phonological and Philological Essay, setting forth a new system of the vowel sounds, accordant with the mode of their formation by the organs. By SAMUEL PORTER, National Deaf Mute College, Washington, D. C. New York: B. Westermann & Co. 1867.

CHILDREN learn the language of their parents easily and spontaneously, not because they are children, though language is more easily acquired in childhood than at a later period, but chiefly because the meaning of words is revealed to them by circumstances. Thus, the mother says to an older child, "shut the door." The little one, with eyes and ears wide open, hears the direction and sees the act performed. So of learning a foreign language among a people who speak it.

When, however, the business of teaching, or rather of learning a language, is transferred from the family to the school, it is obvious that these great natural advantages for its acquisition must be in a measure lost. Comparatively few of the thou-

sand objects which fill a house, and daily come under the notice of the child, can be brought into the school-room, and if they were, they would be out of their relations to use.

Where, then, as in the case of those born deaf, the child must be removed from the family to the school, to learn language, the endeavor should be to find a method of instruction which will best supply these natural conditions; one which approaches nearest to home life, which can most successfully create or reproduce those circumstances on which the meaning of words depends.

Let us submit to this test, the various methods which at different times have been proposed or have been in use for imparting a knowledge of language to the deaf and dumb. These are, 1st. Articulation; 2d. Dactylology, or finger-spelling; 3d. Writing; 4th. Signs and descriptive action, in conjunction with writing and spelling.

We will take the deaf child to a school where he shall be taught articulation, and reading from the lips, where all signs, spelling, writing, and illustrative action, whether of the countenance or body, as means of instruction, are excluded. His powers of utterance, we will suppose, are first tried on the word *cat*. After days, it may be, of patient labor on the part of teacher and pupil, the task is accomplished. The word can be distinctly uttered, and can be read, also, from the lips, when pronounced by the teacher.

But in all this time, what has been done towards imparting to the child the meaning of this word? Nothing, absolutely nothing. If a *cat* had been brought into the school-room, if the picture of a cat had been shown, if a sign suggesting the object had been made, the name and the object might have been associated. But when all these means of indication are withheld, it is in the nature of things an impossibility that a meaning should be given to words so taught. They might be repeated till doomsday, and not the slightest hint of their purport would be suggested. And if no single word can have its meaning revealed by simply uttering it, much more hopeless would be the attempt to make manifest the meaning of whole sentences, by merely uttering the words which compose them. Apart from circumstances which, as we have seen,

are adequate of themselves to reveal the meaning, not only of single words, but of sentences, apart from the objects, or all semblance of them in pictures or descriptive signs, articulation, however perfect, can bring no intelligence into the mind.

The same remarks are applicable to dactylology and writing. By themselves they are incapable of giving any meaning to words. A look of the instructor, or attending circumstances, may give a clue to the meaning, but without some such aid, though all the words in the language should be spelled or written, and committed to memory, there would be no intelligence conveyed by them to the mind. They would be words without meaning.

We come now to the fourth method, viz. descriptive signs and illustrative action, in connection with spelling and writing. A class of twelve or fifteen children, all deaf, are assembled in the school-room. They know not the meaning of a word, nor even that words have a meaning. The teacher takes from his pocket a *ball*, and holding it up, writes the word—*ball*, on the large slate before them. He looks from the word to the object, gives a nod of assent, and thus they come to know that *ball* is the name of the round object with the use and nature of which they have long been acquainted. To commit this word to memory, it must be written by them many times, or spelled many times upon their fingers, or both. It is a great and difficult work, requiring it may be more than a day, to fix firmly in the memory the meaning and the written form of this first word. The second will be easier. Let the teacher seek for the name of one of the class. His handkerchief will show it. Instantly all are eagerly looking for their own names, producing their handkerchiefs. Their names are written and committed to memory. The teacher writes his own name, which they are made to understand by similar means. With these preparations, he takes the ball and throws it, and then writes, *Mr. ——— threw a ball*. He is asked what “a” means, and holds up one finger. The brighter portion of the class will conjecture at once, that the new word “threw,” means the act which they have just witnessed. And thus, these children gain as clear an idea of the meaning of the sentence, “*Mr. ——— threw a ball*,” as has the teacher him-

self. The language, too, with only this difference, that they have no conception of the sound of the words, means to them just what it means to persons who hear.

The scholars are next made actors in throwing the ball or other object, the name of which has been learned, and the more intelligent will write at once without assistance, *Master Smith threw a ball*, changing the name as often as the actor is changed, and changing the object whenever this is changed. Other verbs which can be illustrated in the school-room, are next introduced—such as drop, lift, bring, carry, eat, drink, go, come, sit, stand, walk, hop, laugh. But at length the actions which can be conveniently performed before the eyes of the pupils, will be exhausted. We wish to teach such sentences as “A boy climbed a tree.” Now the deaf and dumb, in talking with each other, represent a boy by putting the hand to the head, and taking hold of an imaginary hat, and then with the open hand, held horizontally, indicate the height of the wearer. A tree, they denote by holding the arm upright and waving it gently, the hand representing the tree top. Why should we worry ourselves in the vain endeavor to give an idea of such a sentence without signs, when it can be so easily and perfectly done by means of them? The tree waves here in the school-room, the boy advances and climbs it. The meaning could not be made more clear, if the class were taken into a forest, and a tree climbed in their presence. By signs, the act can be represented in a few seconds. To take the class to witness the actual climbing of a tree, might require half an hour.

Again, we write upon the slate the sentence, “A man shot a bear.” These children do not know the meaning of one of the words. We may show them a man, and then write the word. We may perhaps, by watching, see a man in the act of discharging a gun. But why wait for these contingencies? They all have probably seen a gun discharged. They have a sign in constant use for a man. A bear, most of them have seen, or his picture, and they denote him by his characteristic *lug*. We have then, only to make the sign for bear, locating him near or far, as we may choose, make the sign for man, and put him in an appropriate position, and all is plain. The gun is

brought down from the shoulder, the eye runs along the barrel, the trigger is pulled, and the bear falls dead upon the ground.

In order that we may have language, and intelligible language, there must be materials of which to make it. We may spell words, or utter words from the lips, yet unless there is some object or scene which these words are known to represent, we merely beat the air. No knowledge is conveyed, no real language is learned. But how are these materials of language to be brought into the school-room? All these children before us have seen enough and know enough of the affairs and ways of men, if it could only be brought before them, and *named*, to give them a wide circle of language. The ways of the family, the manifestations of a mother's love, the various processes in daily household labor,—the cooking, the washing, the ironing, the mending, the spinning, the ploughing, planting, sowing, mowing, the milking of cows, the making of butter and cheese, the feeding of chickens, calves, lambs, pigs, the driving of horses and oxen, the snowballing, sliding down hill, skating, fishing, bathing, cutting down trees, picking up chips, bringing in wood;—these and numberless other domestic scenes have all been narrowly observed or participated in by these silent boys and girls, but they do not know by what words to describe them. It will be of no service for us merely to utter or spell the appropriate words. The Lord brought the animals to Adam, before Adam named them. And we must follow this divine example. Ought not he, then, to be hailed by us as an invaluable helper, who could reproduce all these scenes in the school-room; who could present them with such vividness and fidelity, that the children should clap their hands with delight, and feel that their homes had been brought to them? But all this and more can be done by the use of signs, and as each object or scene is brought by their agency before the eyes of the class, the appropriate language can be given, given too with a distinctness which precludes the danger of mistake. There is but this one alternative. We must either bring the acts and objects which are to be named to the deaf child by signs, or we must take him to them, and in their presence while the events are occurring, impart to him the language which fitly describes them.

Signs are never directly taught. The deaf and dumb come gradually and spontaneously into the use of them, as children who hear and speak, do into the practice of speech. But let us seriously ask ourselves what would be the condition of the deaf and dumb, if this language of gesture did not exist, or were suffered to fall into disuse. If gathered into an institution, they still could have no intercourse with each other. Every day, for at least two-thirds of their waking hours, they must be doomed to silence. There would be no means by which their minds could be instructed or interested. Two or three years must thus be passed, or even more, if signs are forbidden to bear any part in their instruction. For a year or two, no attempt could be successfully made to impart religious knowledge. The very great value of signs as enabling the deaf child to express his thoughts and feelings, is worthy of special consideration. Some adventure in which he has been engaged may be burning like a fire in his bones. He has thoughts, wants, messages, which he would gladly make known. These he has only to express in signs, and his teacher can furnish him with the proper words for their communication in language.

The use of signs is in itself improving and elevating, especially so, when their grace and beauty are considered. It is impossible to handle such instruments without a reflex influence. All that has been claimed for the drama under the most favorable conditions, the effect on the imagination, the refinement of the taste, the development and elevation of the moral sentiments, may with greater reason be claimed for pantomime. By means of it, the simple narratives of the Old Testament, the story of Joseph, and Moses and Daniel, David's great fight with the Philistine, the sweet drama of Ruth, the royal perils of Esther, can be brought before the minds of the deaf and dumb with almost the freshness and power which a sight of the original scenes themselves would awaken. The infant Christ in the manger, the heavenly visitants to the shepherds, the wise child in the temple, the wonderful miracles, the wonderful words, and finally the crucifixion and resurrection of the Lord, can be made to pass before the eyes of these children of silence. As one of those compensations of Divine Providence which thoughtful men have so frequent

occasion to notice, it happens that the deaf and dumb, with no knowledge of written language, shut out, in their isolated state, from all knowledge of the existence of God even, can yet have imparted to them by means of the beautiful and expressive language of gesture, a knowledge of religious truth, more vivid and full than other children ordinarily attain.

But not only is the language of signs an instrument of culture, and a means of knowledge in itself, but the process of transferring signs into artificial language is in the highest degree improving and strengthening to all the powers of the mind. The subject or narrative given must be clearly understood, the incidents in their proper order and relations must be held in the mind, right words must be chosen, and arranged according to the idioms of written language. The mere uttering of words in the exact order in which they have been spoken, is a work for parrots, requiring little or no exercise of mind.

Because the opinion has been expressed by some metaphorical writers, that the deaf and dumb, accustomed from infancy to the use of signs, rarely attain to the habit of thinking in words, the conclusion is hastily drawn by Mr. Hubbard, that their knowledge of written language must necessarily be very imperfect. But may there not be a very good knowledge of a foreign tongue, while yet the mind does not use it in meditation? Mr. Hubbard, we presume, speaks more than one language, but does he not *think* in English. It is not the degree of acquaintance merely, but the degree of use, especially of recent use, which determines the fact of thinking in a language. If we admit that the deaf and dumb, while at school, do not get a sufficient acquaintance with language, or rather that they do not use it sufficiently to make it the instrument of their thoughts, it does not follow that such a result may not be reached subsequently, when they will be compelled by their circumstances to use language more and signs less. The two faculties employed in the acquisition of language, reception, and use, are quite distinct. From the nature of the case, and in spite of all that can be done, the former of these will be more exercised at school than the latter. That is, the pupil will receive and understand language better than he can use

it. But when he leaves the institution, his circumstances will be very nearly reversed. He will be compelled to employ language as well as to understand it, and a very marked improvement is noticed in the readiness and freedom with which pupils of ordinary intelligence use language in the first year or two after leaving school.

It is usually assumed that we, who hear, think in words, because in rapid thought, no trace of anything beyond or aside from words, is left in the mind. But is it certain that the mind does not know that a clock is ticking, because it does not consciously notice it? Let the ticking cease, and would not this be observed? Some apprentices to a jeweler discovered that their master would sleep soundly while the hammers were going, but would instantly wake if they ceased. If they wished to play, it was only necessary to detail one or two to keep up the music of the hammers, and they were as safe from detection as if their master had been locked up in the city prison. All which seems to require this paradoxical statement, while the master heard, he slept, when he could not hear, he waked.

Let the words horse, cow, mule, pass rapidly before the eyes, and we shall say, perhaps, that we saw nothing but the words; that there was no image, or shadow underneath. But if we pause a moment on each word, the form, or some characteristic feature of the object which the word represents, will come into the mind, and very nearly, if not quite displace the word itself. The deaf and dumb are children in mental development, not accustomed to watch the operations of their own minds. Their testimony, therefore, on so difficult a question as to what are with them the instruments of thought, would not be of great value.

But supposing that the deaf and dumb do always think in signs, and always will, this does not prove that they do not understand written language, or that they get their ideas into words by a slow and painful process. Even if we should admit that the intermediation of signs does retard somewhat the rapidity with which words are read and understood by the deaf and dumb, we think a very plausible argument might be framed, to show that this retardation would be an advantage, rather than a detriment. What is the great reason that words

make so little impression on us? Is it not because they pass so quickly through the mind? Let a text of the New Testament be translated from the original Greek, and though it be rendered in the very words of the Common Version, a power and fullness of meaning will be found in it, which have never been seen before, and simply because, in this process of translation, every word was necessarily dwelt upon until its real and full meaning was seen and felt. "We never can fully understand our own language," says Stuart Mill, "until we translate another language into it."

But again, it is considered a great advantage, in the study of words, to know their roots. The fullness and power of a word are greatly augmented, as all readily concede, by such a knowledge of its history and birth. It is not felt by learned men to be an evil, when they see a word, that their minds run back to its root. Now, the signs which the deaf and dumb associate with words are, for the most part, just such aids to knowledge and enjoyment, and even greater, than are the roots of words. Our conclusion then is, that so far as expressive signs intervene between words and thoughts, in the minds of the deaf and dumb, they are a benefit rather than an injury, giving language more life and power than it has to other persons.

We come now to another use of signs, viz., as a means of determining whether written or printed words are understood by the deaf and dumb. A passage has been committed to memory, it matters not now, whether by articulation, frequent spelling, or writing. Are the words thus learned comprehended? A most important inquiry. How shall we determine? We might require the pupil to express the ideas of the passage in other words of the same import. But his knowledge of words is too limited to enable him to do this. If he were a speaking and hearing child, we might assume, as is done in our common schools, that if he did not understand now, he would at some future period, and thus allow his memory to be loaded with words which give him no pleasure, because destitute of intelligence. Said a little girl to us the other day, "I don't understand my geography at all. It is all about the judicial and the executive. I don't understand a word of it." For ourselves, we think it a sad thing for any children to

be taught, or, rather, abused in this manner. In the case of those who hear, we may console ourselves with the thought that light will come by and by. But no such comforting reflection is possible in respect to the deaf and dumb. If they do not understand the words now, there is little reason to suppose that they ever will.

And here we cannot help remarking, that a mind which can commit to memory page after page of words, without knowing, or caring to know, their meaning, is but a slight remove from idiocy. But why should this folly ever be permitted in a child, especially in one who is deaf and dumb, when we have in our hands an easy and infallible means of determining whether the words taught are understood or not? If the deaf and dumb pupil can give the exact idea of the passage learned by signs, he of course understands it. On the one hand, we require him to translate signs into language, to improve his knowledge of language, or to show his facility in the use of it. On the other, we require him to translate language into signs, to assure us that he understands the language. What folly to reject or despise an instrument of such value, both as a means and test of knowledge!

The following incident shows how liable words are to be misconceived by those who are cut off from that knowledge which comes from circumstances and daily use. There is a story current that an old gentleman, quite zealous for orthodoxy, once visited the American Asylum, and to assure himself of the religious instruction of the pupils, wrote on one of the slates, "What is the chief end of man?" A bright boy, looked earnestly at the question for some time, and then, with the exultant rush of a discoverer, turned to his slate and wrote, "I am not sure, but I think it must be his *head*."

Looking now, for a moment, at practical results, the only decisive test after all of the value of methods of instruction, we ask, what is actually accomplished by the method of teaching the deaf and dumb now commonly practiced in this country, viz., by signs, in connection with dactylology and writing? What attainments do they make in language? The answer, if truly made, must be that there is a wide diversity in the results attained. Some succeed so well as to show in the use of lan-

guage no traces of their infirmity. Others exhibit many peculiarities and imperfections. These differences may be traced to two prominent causes, original difference in capacity, or insufficiency of the time they have been under instruction. The most remarkable results by any method—particularly is this true of articulation—have been attained where the whole time of an instructor has been given to one or two pupils for many successive years. Such a devotion to individual pupils is of course impracticable in a public institution. But there is need of reform in all our institutions in this respect. The classes, if not made very small, should at least be so graded that those of nearly equal capacity and attainments should be taught together. More teachers would be required, and the expense would be increased; but it is in vain to look for the highest results until this is made the invariable rule. The dull pupils will become discouraged or be driven to despair, by being required to do more than they can. The bright ones fall into impatience or laziness by having too little to do. Moderate capacities in the deaf child are no bar to the ultimate attainment of language. It is only necessary to take more time, to proceed more slowly and with more repetition. Some are doubtless discouraged and sink into careless inefficiency, who, if they had been led along more slowly might have made good scholars. As precisely the same period is allowed for the instruction of pupils of every grade, and as this period is not too long for the very brightest, it must needs be too short for the proper instruction of those who are dull in intellect. But with these exceptions and explanations, we are prepared to say that such a knowledge of language, and such power in the use of it, is acquired by the great body of the pupils in our institutions for the deaf and dumb, that they are thereby practically restored to society. They correspond with their friends. They read books and newspapers. They know what is passing in the world around them, and feel that they are a part of it and not excluded from it.

Such being the effect of education on the mind of a deaf child, it is well to consider how it is with him personally. How does he succeed in making his way among men? Can he make himself understood, and easily understood? Or is he

still avoided as one of another race, with whom hearing and speaking persons can have no communion and hold no intercourse? Is his knowledge of signs an advantage or a disadvantage to him? Is he, and must he be, an outcast and a wanderer, simply because he cannot utter words from his lips? Does he find men and women who have hearing and speech willing to converse with him by writing? These questions obviously cover the whole ground. The reply to them is easy. The great majority of our people, in the first place, have sufficient education to enable them to understand writing and to communicate with the deaf and dumb by that means.

2. Their interest in these children of misfortune is uniformly so great as to make them quite willing to submit to the extra labor and perplexity attending this mode of communication.
3. Signs are always a most attractive feature to all classes of people. They are delighted to see them, and especially pleased that they can understand them. In fine, the deaf-born, having received such an education as our institutions are able to give, are objects of favor and interest with all men. They fill, usefully and profitably, the various trades in which speaking people are employed. Not a pauper, a few years since, was to be found among the graduates of the American Asylum. And finally, what is more and better, they are made acquainted with the way of salvation through Jesus Christ, and are many of them bright examples of piety.

Before closing this Article, it might naturally be expected that we should make some more particular reference to articulation, as an accomplishment to be taught the deaf. We call it an accomplishment, for a means of instruction, except in a very limited degree, it is not. The excessive desire which some parents feel that their deaf-born children should be taught to speak, arises, we are persuaded, from a wish to forget or conceal from themselves the terrible fact that their children are deaf. But though, by the trickery of artificial speech, they may appear less deaf to them, they are none the less so to themselves. A silence, such as finds no image for comparison, reigns and must reign in their souls. The repugnance felt by some to writing and spelling, as a means of communicating with the deaf, is due in part to its strangeness, and may be

expected to pass away by use. An equal and even greater embarrassment is experienced, when, for the first time, we attempt to speak through an ear trumpet. We can think of nothing to say. We find it difficult to realize that we are talking to a person. But there should be some better reason for teaching articulation than that the parent may be aided in forgetting the terrible infirmity which has fallen upon his child, or that it is easier or more agreeable for the parent to hold intercourse with him by words than by spelling and writing. The only question that enlightened parental love should ask is, what will be most agreeable to my unfortunate child, what will be *best* for him?

Is then articulation agreeable to the deaf-born child? Is it a pleasure to him to exercise the vocal apparatus, so far as such exercise is practicable to one in his circumstances? No. The effort to speak is inexpressibly wearying and painful to him. Even those who had learned to speak before the loss of hearing, feel a great repugnance to using the voice as a means of communication. The reason is obvious. There is with them not only an entire absence of the pleasure which other children have in hearing the sound, and the pleasant modulations of their own voices, but there is a positive pain in these vocal utterances. "It hurts." In some of the German schools it is admitted that serious injury sometimes results. One young man of great promise and excellence died from hemorrhage brought on, as was confessed, by violent and unnatural straining of the lungs in the attempt to teach articulation. In all ordinary and natural use of the muscles, nature has provided a safeguard to prevent their being injured by excessive straining. We never lift or pull as much as we can, because it hurts so much that we are constrained to stop. Were it not for this warning we should, in moments of excitement, tear our muscles and tendons in sunder. In the use of the voice we have two safeguards: first, the ear, which notifies us at once of any unnatural strain, by the disagreeableness and strangeness of the tone; secondly, the pain in the vocal organs themselves. But where the hearing is lost, and the vocal organs have never been exercised, how shall the deaf person determine when he is injuring his voice and lungs by too vio-

lent or persistent efforts? The ear cannot tell him. The cries of pain that the organs give out, he is told must not be regarded, because they are the effects, not of over-exertion but of disuse. It may pain us greatly at first to move a stiff limb, but unless we bear the pain and continue to move it, we can never recover the use of it. So the deaf child is instructed in regard to the organs of his voice. This pain is owing to the disuse. By and by it will be less. With nothing, then, in nature to hold him back from over exertion, is it strange that great and fatal injuries sometimes result from these unnatural efforts?

A deaf and dumb gentleman writes to us that he became deaf from scarlet fever, at the age of five years; that on recovering from his illness he had lost all memory of sound, could not repeat even the names of his parents or sisters. "I was at once sent to school to be taught to spell, but the pronunciation of the words had no understanding. So I was let loose, like a young colt, to ramble over the hills, screaming and making all sorts of noises, to bring my vocal organs into action." The effect of articulation upon his vocal organs he thus describes. "*At the start I feel the voice come through my nose, and it comes out only very low. As I proceed, my nose is stopped up, and then I feel a tickling in my throat, and my eyes give vent to tears, and I am obliged to stop.*" I was for three years under the care of a professor of articulation, but could make no improvement in my voice." Dr. Kitto, who lost his hearing at twelve, says that he almost immediately found himself unwilling to talk, and it was only by stratagem that he was prevailed upon to do so.

What do learned physicians tell us is the origin of the clergyman's sore throat? Simply an unnatural and mechanical mode of speaking. They say, if the clergyman would throw away his manuscript and allow his thoughts to telegraph through the nerves to the vocal apparatus, there would result such a gentle and beautiful play of the vocal muscles, that none would be wearied or overstrained. Speech, in its effect upon the vocal organs of one born deaf, is very much like what a violent fit of coughing is to our throats. It rasps and tears. Articulation is distasteful to the deaf child, in the second place, because it takes so long a time to acquire it. "It

is the testimony of German teachers," says Prof. Park, of Andover, Mass., the most recent visitor of the German schools, "that pupils who are taught articulation only four or five years, will soon abandon it, but if they are taught seven or eight years they will continue to use this method of intercourse." No wonder if, like the children of Israel in the wilderness, they murmur and repine, and think they shall never come into Canaan. Indeed the comparison is more apt than we supposed when it first occurred to us. For the number who actually arrive at satisfactory results, are but the Calebs and Joshuas of the great multitudes who commenced the journey.

Articulation is distasteful to the deaf, thirdly, because they know that their voices are not agreeable. Sometimes they may exaggerate this, and sometimes it is impossible for them to do so. The filing of a saw, and the shriek of a steam whistle combined, could not produce a more disagreeable sound than that which is made in *some* of these artificial attempts at speech by the deaf and dumb. Knowing that their voices are so disagreeable, is it to be wondered at that they should be unwilling to carry on their intercourse with others by means of speech? What do we think of parents who are stupid or cruel enough to insist that their children, who have neither voice nor ear, shall sing before strangers? and what ought we to think of parents who would impose a still more disagreeable duty on their deaf-born children, by requiring them to speak in the presence of others?

But it may be said that the feelings of the child are of little consequence, provided we secure to him the highest good. What then are the advantages of articulation? Does it benefit the minds of those who practice it? Is it useful to them as a means of instruction? If all signs are excluded where articulation is taught, as it is claimed they are in the small school recently opened in Chelmsford, Mass., then we may say that however great the attainments of the deaf child may be in articulation, his mind will still be in darkness. If he is taught language by other practicable methods, he is a sufferer to just the extent that his time has been taken from these methods in his efforts to acquire articulate speech. If one-third of his time has been occupied in this way, then in a course of in-

struction running through six years, he has lost two entire years. But will not articulation enable the deaf to communicate with the hearing and speaking world, and thus be of incalculable benefit to him? Deaf children, taught by the methods pursued in our American schools, have three modes of intercourse with others, either of which they can use at pleasure; viz., writing, spelling, and descriptive signs, while the child who has been taught to articulate has but this one method: that is, it is laid down as a necessity that he must not practice other methods, for if he does he will lose this. Now we should not hesitate to challenge a comparison between the best scholars in the German schools and in our own, as to the ease and readiness with which they could receive and communicate ideas. It would be found that while our best pupils could receive ideas on all subjects to any extent by writing, and could communicate their own in the same way with no liability to mistake or misconception, the labor of conversing with the deaf by speech and reading of the lips, is so great and difficult and wearisome to all parties that, as a matter of fact, in general intercourse, none but the most necessary things are introduced into conversation. The conversations are made as brief as possible, and both parties are equally thankful when they are over. It will be found that this difficulty of intercourse by speech will increase in proportion as the deaf child is withdrawn from cultivated people, and thrown among tradesmen and mechanics. They will talk with him no more and no longer than absolute necessity requires. The results of the system will then be these. As articulation is an irksome and painful process when the pupils cease to be driven to it by their teachers, they gladly let it drop. It is so difficult for them to make themselves understood, and for them to understand others, that they become discouraged and cease to speak at all. Speaking is attended with such embarrassment and difficulty that there is a constant temptation to abridge and shorten as much as possible, until their speech becomes a mere skeleton of language, a sort of signs in words. Such a mode of speaking involves at length the loss of the structure of sentences, takes away all pleasure from reading or renders it impossible, and thus the process is one of constant deterioration.

With our best pupils, on the other hand, favorites wherever they go, writing, spelling, or making signs as the exigency may require, able to make themselves understood in any company by signs alone, winning regard and information from all with whom they come in contact, able to read books with increasing pleasure as years pass on, mingling with society with comparatively little sense of isolation, how wide the contrast!

We have confined the comparison hitherto to the best pupils of the two schools. But there is one painful fact which must not be omitted. Not more than one-fourth of those taught in the German schools attain such a knowledge of articulation as to be of practical benefit to them, while in our own schools every child not deficient in capacity is made acquainted with written language. "It is a very sad feature," says Professor Vaisse, "of the schools where what has been called the German system is more thoroughly carried on, that a very large proportion of their pupils are dismissed before completing their course of instruction, on the score of their being unable to speak, and consequently to be taught anything at all in such institutions."

Mr. Henry W. Syle, who has recently visited all the important British schools for the deaf and dumb, writes that not one in thirty of those born deaf receive any benefit from articulation, and that in a great majority of other cases, the attempts to teach it are failures. Mr. Syle is a nephew of the late lamented Henry Winter Davis, of Baltimore, and a most competent witness.

It is not difficult to explain the mistakes so often made by intelligent men in their examination of foreign schools. In the first place they go abroad with no knowledge of our own schools for the deaf and dumb, as it respects either their system of instruction or the results attained by it. Secondly, they suppose that articulation is a new thing, when there are at all times in our American schools persons wholly deaf, who can both speak and read from the lips. Thirdly, they are ignorant of the fact that it is only those, with rare exceptions, who lost their hearing after having learned to speak that are taught anywhere to articulate with success.

It would, doubtless, be of advantage to all children if they

could have instruction as to the manner of using the vocal organs in uttering the various sounds, both simple and compound, which enter into spoken language. As it is, the child's only endeavor is to imitate his parents. If the speech of the parents is defective, the child's will be so. But where the speech of the parent is perfect, or very nearly so, the speech of the child may be marred by great defects. These, in part, he may copy from others, but very much of the imperfection of speech is to be imputed to a natural indolence of the muscles of the voice. Certain sounds are more difficult to utter than others somewhat resembling them, and there will be a constant tendency to substitute the easy for the difficult.

The Yankee dialect so admirably exhibited by Professor Lowell, in the Biglow Papers, is not merely the imitation, by one generation, of the manner of speaking of its predecessor, but is a result of this indolent and shirking habit to which all the muscles of the body are more or less inclined. Thus, to say "hender" is much easier than to say "hinder," "wal" is easier than well, "ith" than with. That this mode of speaking is due very largely to this natural tendency to shirk labor in the vocal muscles, that is, to substitute that which is easy for that which is more difficult, was strikingly illustrated in an experiment which we lately tried. We requested a semi-mute to read to us Zekle's courtship from the Biglow Papers. He did not at once understand the meaning of the words under the new form of spelling, but it was a pleasure to see how much easier he found it to pronounce them after this manner than in the correct mode. Probably there is no nation on the face of the earth whose mode of uttering the words of their language is so defective as ours. Very grievous mistakes are not only made in the utterance of the vowel sounds, but the tongue and the lips seem often to refuse to perform their office in uttering the consonants.

By all means then let us have teachers of articulation, but let them begin with those who hear. Let the children in our schools be taught not to rant in declamation, but to utter correctly all the vowel sounds of the language. Let them learn to open their mouths, let them be made to understand by actual experiment that it is the immovable position of the upper

lip which causes for the most part the disagreeable habit of talking through the nose—let them avoid distressing precision of utterance on the one hand, and a shameful neglect of all care for distinctness and completeness on the other. Let words be made to come out from their mouths as coins newly dropped from the mint. When those to whom God has given all their senses, have learned to speak, then perhaps we may favor attempts to impart to the deaf also this great accomplishment.

ARTICLE VII.—THE "CATHOLIC WORLD" MORE CATHOLIC.

OUR readers may be presumed to remember, in the January number of our current volume, an Article contrasting certain inconsiderate statements concerning "the philosophy of conversion" to Romanism, which had just made their appearance in the "Catholic World." It will be remembered that the main drift of our criticism was to show how grossly and inexcusably the "Roman Philosopher," in his desire to make strong statements and to produce a striking effect, had misrepresented the belief and teaching of evangelical Protestants. The "Catholic World" for April contains a more judicious paper, from a more intelligent writer, not exactly replying to our censures, nor contradicting our positions, but rather inviting us to an amicable controversy on the points which distinguish the New England churches from the Church of Rome. Without accepting that invitation, in its whole extent, or committing ourselves to an interminable discussion of questions which have already been disputed for more than three hundred years, we propose to touch, not polemically—certainly not in any unkind feeling—upon some particulars in the courteous and well considered Article to which we have made reference.*

The new writer in the "Catholic World," instead of dealing with the "New Englander," chooses rather to deal with an individual contributor, whose name was printed on the cover of that number, in connection with our strictures on the Roman philosophy of conversion. We do not complain of his having done so; but this may be our excuse for saying that we too, instead of having to do, as before, with a writer whose person and name were entirely unknown to us, are dealing with one who, though anonymous in form, is not in fact anonymous to us. There are old memories—older than the day of his birth, and hallowed by death as well as by time—which make it easy

* "Catholic World," April, 1867, pp. 104-119.

for us to use all kindness and tenderness in commenting on what he has written.

We have no disposition to dwell upon the fact that the Article now before us, though put forth in the form of a review, makes no show of vindicating the Article which was the subject of our criticism in January. A word or two is said by the writer in compliment to his predecessor, whom he styles "our able correspondent;" and then he proposes to express his "own independent judgment as a reviewer" on some "important bearings" of the question between us and the able correspondent aforesaid. He will allow us, however, to suggest that he seems to err at the outset in one point a little personal to ourselves. He says that as the author of the essay which we criticised, "presented his view of what Protestantism is, reduced to its logical elements and constitutive principles," so we, in our criticism, "attempt to make a statement of [Roman] Catholic doctrine, as it appears to [our] mind, when reduced to its logical elements." We are not conscious of having made any such attempt; nor does a reperusal of what we wrote impress us with any evidence of such an attempt on our part. Instead of making our own statement of what conversion to Romanism is, or of what that is which the convert accepts in his conversion, we attempted to exhibit, in all honesty, the representations of the author whose performance we were considering. It was the writer in the "Catholic World," and not the writer in the "New Englander," who represented the Roman Church as pretending to "look with the eyes of God on the souls of men," and as demanding that the heart which God demands for himself shall be given to her. He it was who said, "the heart and will of her disciples have but one exercise, and that is submission." Not we, on our own authority, but he, from his own knowledge, said, "*Unconditionally, unquestioningly, unprotestingly*, they bow before her voice and echo its decrees." He it was who said that conversion to that organization is "the abnegation of all choice and self-affirmation, and the complete subjection of the heart and will to the obedience of faith" in "the Church." He it was who said, "What the Church teaches is from that hour the faith of that Christian heart. What the Church com-

mands is the law of that Christian will." Furthermore, the able correspondent himself did not profess to "present his view of what Protestantism is, *reduced* to its logical elements and constitutive principles." His statement about Protestantism, was not in the form of a *reductio ad absurdum*—not a deduction of principles regarded by him as logically involved in the system, though rejected by its adherents; it was, as we understand it, a statement of principles actually held and professed by Protestants, as the principles which distinguish them from the adherents of the Roman Church. Had we supposed that the two principles which he imputes to Protestantism as its foundation, were stated simply as the principles which the system yields in the last analysis, or as principles which the system arrives at in the progress of its development, or as principles which Protestants ought to hold, in order to be consistent, it would have been idle for us to prove, as we did prove, that those principles are in fact rejected by all evangelical Protestants, and any inference that he "either does not know what Protestantism is, or willfully misrepresents it"—if we had drawn such an inference—would have been preposterous. When a professed philosopher alleges as matter of fact that which is not fact, the reply that he either does not know the facts or misrepresents them, can hardly be called an inference; it is only the suggestion of a very obvious alternative. When the facts are notorious, and the philosopher's opportunities and means of knowing them are also notorious, the alternative may be an embarrassing one not only to the philosopher but to his intelligent and charitable readers. It is to be hoped that, under the guidance of the reviewer, the author of the essay on "the philosophy of conversion" will learn to be more considerate and exact in his statements.

We adopt, most heartily, the words with which the reviewer dismisses his correspondent and passes to the main purpose of the Article before us. "Those who love the truth can have no motive for misrepresenting the belief and opinions of any class of men. Sincere Catholics and sincere Protestants must alike desire that the principles and grounds of both Catholicity and Protestantism should be placed in the clearest light possible, and discussed upon their naked merits, with as little mix-

ture as may be of questions concerning the intellectual or moral qualifications of individuals." This is well said. Yet, we doubt not, the reviewer will agree with us when we add that sometimes the actual and legitimate effect of a system on the habits of the mind that comes under its power, may be important to a just estimate of its character. For that very reason, loose and careless statements by Protestants, of what Romanism is, or by Roman Catholics, of what principles Protestantism holds as fundamental, are the more to be condemned. For how can the actual and legitimate effect of a system be shown, unless the system itself, as a system of beliefs and opinions, is fairly represented?

We have intimated that not simply a reply to our criticism of the essay on conversion, but something quite different, is the main purpose of the reviewer in the Article now under consideration. He desires that "the principles and grounds" both of the system which he holds and of the system which we hold "should be placed in the clearest light possible, and discussed upon their naked merits," without the misleading effect of "minor questions and side issues." He speaks of controversy between the two systems as impending and inevitable, and indeed as already begun; but his desire is for an amicable controversy, in which earnestness on both sides shall not be inconsistent with courtesy or with the candor that can fairly appreciate the positions and arguments of an adversary. It would seem, therefore, that his proximate intention, in what we have now before us, is to promote good feeling, mutual intelligence, and a recognition of a common faith and of common interests, between the old New England churches and the Roman Catholics who have become by immigration, chiefly within the last thirty years, so considerable an element in the population of New England. Certainly this, when we consider the source from which it comes, is something new. Far be it from us to repel or discourage any such proposal, or to regard it as not made in good faith.

First, then, let us observe the reviewer's account of what the relations actually are between the Roman Catholic population and the Trinitarian Congregationalists in New England, and especially (for so he puts it) in Connecticut. Our readers shall

have his statement in his own words, with slight abridgment :

"The original and genuine religion of New England was the Calvinistic Congregationalism of the Puritans, which still survives, with more or less of modification among the Orthodox Congregationalists, and has its principal seat at New Haven. The temper and tone of mind prevailing among the clergy and members of this denomination place them at an extremely remote distance from the Catholic mind, and make any interchange of thought between the two very difficult." * * * "The hierarchical principle"—which distinguishes "the Protestant Episcopal denomination" from "other Protestant communions," and which is the starting point of discussion between Anglo-Catholics and Roman Catholics—"is in a great measure irrelevant to the question as it stands between us and the non-episcopal communions, whether these are what is called evangelical, or liberal, in their theology." * * * "The controversy as between us has to be commenced *de novo*, and to be carried on upon an entirely different basis. Circumstances over which neither of us have any control, make this controversy inevitable. We will confine ourselves, for the present, in order to simplify the question, to the relations existing between Catholics and Congregationalists in the State of Connecticut. We say then that these relations make a controversy between us inevitable, just as much as other circumstances and relations have made it inevitable between Anglicans and Catholics in England and the United States. The reason of this necessity is that we have so many things in common, and so many points of difference, that we cannot remain quiescent toward each other, except from isolation in distinct communities, or from mutual apathy to the interests of Christianity. Forty years ago, * * the question of Catholicity had but little living and present interest for a Connecticut theologian. It was a question of by-gone ages and distant countries." * * * "The Catholic religion was looked upon merely as the religion of a few poor immigrants, a bit of wreck from the institutions of the middle ages cast on the New England shore by the caprice of the waves. This habit of looking at the matter has remained to a great extent unchanged, on account of the almost complete social segregation of the rapidly increasing Catholic community. That it cannot remain unchanged, however, is evident to every one. There are now fifty priests, one hundred congregations, four religious orders, and a population of 75,000, belonging to the Catholic Church in Connecticut. Although, therefore, isolation has rendered the professors of the traditional religion of the State in a great measure indifferent to the religion of this new element in the population, thus far, it cannot continue." * * *

"The religious and moral doctrines and teachings of the pastors of one-fifth of the people of the State cannot be a matter of indifference to any one who takes an interest in the religious and moral welfare of his fellow-citizens. It follows then, necessarily, that the leading clergy and theologians of the Congregational body in Connecticut must engage with great application and industry in the study of the Catholic system of doctrine and polity, not in second-hand works, but at the original and authentic sources. They must pay attention, also, to the contemporary Catholic literature, both in the English and in foreign languages. Studying and thinking on these topics, they will necessarily write, speak, and converse upon them, and thus the same topics will engage the attention of all their brethren in the clerical profession, and of the intelligent laity. We on our part cannot be in

different to anything written or spoken by men of learning and high position on the great topics of religion. Consequently, we say, there must be controversy between us." pp. 104-106.

These statements indicate a more than ordinary intelligence and thoughtfulness, and are well fitted to conciliate the respectful attention of Protestant readers. Having thus transferred them to our own pages, we might let them pass without comment; but at some points their suggestiveness will justify a more deliberate consideration.

1. The "hierarchical principle" which the Anglicans and Romanists hold in common, brings those two parties into a pretty close proximity of religious thought. Discussion between those parties on the points which separate them from each other, begins and ends in a region quite foreign to our more Protestant habits of thinking. Therefore it is that writers of the Anglo-Catholic school are often of very little use to us as guides or helps in the refutation of Romanism. Questions about the validity of ordinations by English bishops and of sacraments administered by English priests—questions about the number of sacraments, whether they are seven or only two—questions about the rights and powers of national churches as relative to the church catholic—questions about the ecumenical character and authority of the Tridentine Council—are not within the range of the difference between the Church of Rome and the churches of New England. The difference between our Protestantism and the system which recognizes the chair of St. Peter as the center of Christian unity, is a difference about that far deeper and more vital question, "What must I do to be saved?" On that question, as we may have occasion to show more at length in the progress of these remarks, the theology of Rome and that of New England are so far asunder, that, as the reviewer tells us, "the interchange of thought between the two" is "very difficult."

2. We concur with the reviewer in his expectation that "the leading clergy and theologians of the Congregational body in Connecticut" (and of course in the United States generally), will give increased attention to the study of the Roman Catholic system. Indeed, they have already begun to do so—and that not *very* recently. From the time when Romanism began

to be known among us as a present reality instead of being known only in the remembrance and tradition of ancient conflicts and sufferings—as represented in Fox's Book of Martyrs, or in the New England Primer, with its rude pictorial illustration of "Mr. John Rogers, the first martyr in Queen Mary's reign," burning at the stake, while his wife and children are looking on—we have had the same sort of interest in knowing what it is, that we have had in knowing what Unitarianism or Universalism is, or what the Anglican Tractarianism is. Nor have we been altogether unmindful of the fact that even at Rome the nineteenth century is not the sixteenth; that the Romanism of to-day, especially in the United States, is not in all respects identical with that which Philip and the Duke of Alba attempted to impose upon the Netherlands; and that, therefore, if we would know what the Roman Catholic thinking of Europe and America is to-day, we must become acquainted with it as it utters itself to-day in the living languages of Protestant nations, as well as of nations that acknowledge the claims of the Pope. Doubtless the Congregational pastors, and those of other Protestant churches, ought to be better informed than they are concerning the Roman Catholic system; and those who are entrusted with the theological education of candidates for the ministry, might well do more than they are doing to make their pupils accurately acquainted, not only with what Romanism has been, but also with what it is. But we assure the reviewer that, in the theological seminaries and elsewhere, the questions between his system and ours are receiving more and more attention, and are getting to be pretty fairly understood.

3. "The almost complete social segregation" of the Roman Catholics in New England, has been caused largely by influences which can hardly be permanent under our civil and social institutions. Religious antipathies in this country are by no means what they are in Ireland. So long as the Roman Catholic population shall continue to be Irish rather than American—foreigners in heart though naturalized in law—regarding themselves as citizens of an imaginary Irish republic about to be set up in "the old country," making our country the base of operations in the prosecution of their national hostilities

against Great Britain, and, by means of the political power with which their oaths of naturalization invest them, moving with steady pressure to involve their adopted country in a war which they can convert into a crusade for the chimera of Irish independence—they will continue to be inflamed with traditional resentments and hatreds, and it will be easy to keep up their "social segregation." But there will surely be a change in this respect. After a while the descendants of the Irish emigration will be not Irish but American ; and like the descendants of the Hollanders in New York, of the French in South Carolina, of the Palatine Germans along the Mohawk, of the Gaelic Highlanders in North Carolina and Georgia, of the Scotch-Irish in western Pennsylvania, and of the English in every State and Territory, they will recognize this as their native and only country. Their birth and education as citizens of free and self-governed States, their patriotic sympathies, their participation in our national memories and hopes, their pride in the great names of our history (and why not in the Pilgrim Fathers, as well as in the heroes of the revolution?) will identify them with our nationality. Ireland will be to them nothing more than what the kingdom of the Netherlands is to the De Witts, the Vermilyes, the Van Rensselaers, the Van Burens, and all our citizens with Batavian names—or what old England is to us and to our friend the reviewer. Then the "social segregation" of the Roman Catholics will be little more than that of the Protestant Episcopalians. It will be quite impossible for their clergy to guard them against the currents of thought and the surges of disputation sweeping around them. Who shall hinder them from reading, as other people read, the newspapers, the magazines, and all the current popular literature? Their clergy, severed from all domestic relations, may still be a segregated class—in society but not of it ; and "sisters of mercy," in somber uniform, may still pace the streets on charitable errands, and return to their convent doors, without knowing any more about the questions that happen to be agitated in the outside world, than the outside world knows about life in the nunnery ; but the Roman Catholic population as a whole will share in the common life and thinking of the American people. Some of them, if the dogma

of transubstantiation is debated, or the theory of justification before God, or the alleged efficacy of priestly absolution, will not only read what is published on one side, but will also know something of what is maintained on the other side—something of the faith in which neighbors of theirs are living whose lives are indisputably holy—something of what the worship is which such neighbors offer to God—something of what the gospel is as preached from Protestant pulpits. In that new condition of affairs, fresh controversy between Romanism and Evangelical Protestantism will follow of course, and the arguments on each side will find some readers and some thoughtful attention on the other side. Doubtless the reviewer is even now expecting that if the discussion to which he invites us shall proceed, some lay readers of the "Catholic World" will read also what we may say in the "New Englander."

Assuming, now, that there is to be a new discussion of the main differences between the Roman Church and the churches of New England, we proceed to the reviewer's representation of what the discussion, or (as he calls it) controversy, ought to be in its aim and spirit on both sides. Having disavowed all "desire for a *polemical* controversy;" and having affirmed that he has no wish "to see the Catholic and Protestant pulpits waging a theological artillery duel against each other, or a violent strife for mastery, with all the bitter hostile feelings which it engenders, inaugurated between the Catholic and Protestant portions of the population;" he tells us that the purpose of the Article before us is to bring forward certain considerations tending in an entirely opposite direction. He desires "to forestall controversy of the sort alluded to, and to point out what [he conceives] to be the true spirit and manner in which both sides should approach the subject of the differences which unhappily divide us." With such words before us it would be ungenerous on our part to distrust his profession, or not to recognize his good intention. He shall show in his own way what sort of a discussion he proposes:

"There are two ways in which we may carry on controversy. One way is, for each side to place its own exclusive truth and right in the strongest light, to affirm its doctrines in its own peculiar phraseology in the most positive and dogmatic manner, and to take a position as far remote from that of the other side,

and as unintelligible to its opponents as possible; moreover, to take the worst and most unfavorable view possible of the doctrines and positions of the other side, and to impute to them all the most extreme consequences of their principles which seem to ourselves to follow logically from them.

"Another way, is to conduct controversy, not from the two opposite extremes of doctrine, where the difference is widest and most palpable, but from those middle terms in which both parties agree, and in relation to which they are intelligible to each other. From these middle terms we may proceed to the extremes, and thus endeavor to settle the points in which we differ, by the aid of those in which we agree. The points of difference also, may be perhaps reduced by mutual explanations, and a substantial agreement be proved to exist in some doctrines where there is an apparent contradiction in the terms used to express them." p. 106.

There is more of the same sort further on. We transcribe it here for the sake of showing what seems to be the truly catholic spirit of the writer—catholic in our sense of the word, a sense which differs from that of Romanism and Anglicanism on the one hand, and from that of Indifferentism on the other. In a tone very unlike that of the writer on the "Philosophy of Conversion," he says,

"We have no just reason for regarding the original colonists [of Connecticut] as formal heretics or schismatics, and even less reason for including the subsequent generations in that category. All who have lived and died in that faith which worketh by charity we acknowledge as the children of God, and our brethren in Jesus Christ. Those now living who have this *fides formata*, are spiritually united to the Holy Catholic Church, the communion of saints." p. 111.

Without undertaking to define exactly the import of the qualifying word *formal* in the phrase "formal heretics or schismatics," we may say that we understand the writer as intending to admit, explicitly, the essentially Christian character of the New England fathers, and of all who in succeeding generations have been followers of their faith. Whatever may have been the faults of those good men—from whom his lineage is derived as well as ours—he does not regard them as having denied the faith, or as having separated themselves from spiritual communion with that holy and universal church of Christ, which is one in all lands and through all the ages. Not denying that some traits of heresy and of schism may be justly imputed to them, he would have us understand that he regards those traits as accidental rather than essential to their character. We make this paraphrase or explanation, not for the sake

of forcing upon his words the best construction which they can be made to bear, but only for the sake of fixing attention upon what is to us his obvious meaning. If we have misunderstood him, he will explain himself, no doubt, more accurately. Meanwhile he has more to say with the same intention :

"We repeat, therefore, once more, that the proper basis on which we may confer together concerning the faith, is to be found in those doctrines in which we agree, and not in those in which we differ. We may not make a positive judgment in regard to the interior and subjective relation of individuals toward God or the true Church of God. We leave that to him who is the only judge of hearts and consciences. We are sure of this, however, that we are bound to cultivate the spirit of Christian charity toward those who profess allegiance to our common Lord, to the utmost possible extent. This charity forbids us to make an arrogant and harsh judgment that they are *en masse*, and by the simple fact of their outward profession, aliens from the household of faith, or that any particular individual is so, unless he makes it plainly manifest in his conduct."

On our part, we heartily accept and reciprocate these kind words and charitable professions. As our thoughts run back along the course of the reviewer's personal history to the days when his tottering baby steps were sometimes upheld by the hand that is now writing these lines—as we think of the family in which he was born, of the prayers that were breathed over his cradle, of his bright childhood, of the changes that have passed over him—as we think of what his saintly mother and his great-hearted father hoped when they said to each other and to God, "What manner of child shall this be?" and compare their hopes with what his actual career has been—it is a sad feeling that comes over us. We are quite sure that he has fallen into lamentable errors—that his capacities of affection and his intellectual gifts have never had their best and highest development—that he has strangely misunderstood the gospel of Christ, and in his personal reception of it has overlaid it with traditions and dogmas at war with its divine simplicity—that his career, from the day when he became an Episcopalian to this day, has been, with all its logical consistency, and all its ascetic enthusiasm, one great, mistake; but far be it from us, very far, to utter any censorious judgment on his internal character, or his spiritual relation to the communion of the saints. "To his own master he standeth or falleth," and why may we not add, "Yea, he shall be holden up, for God is able

to make him stand." So of others, whose intellectual and æsthetic idiosyncracies have led them in the same path with him, and of many more whose training from infancy has taught them to abhor the name of Protestant—far be it from us to pronounce any rash or unkind judgment upon them. Let us not dare to say that any individual man who believes what Fenelon believed, and worships in the forms in which Fenelon sought access to the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, is fatally wrong, unless, in a life of selfishness and unbelief, he makes it plain that his heart is not right in the sight of God.

Our reviewer goes still farther by way of clearing the field for the amicable controversy which he proposes. He lays down a quite respectable platform on which, he thinks, Roman Catholics and Protestants can stand together, and can in some sort work together for common interests :

"We are agreed on both sides that we are responsible to God for our belief, and bound, as teachers and theologians, to study conscientiously the truths of the divine revelation. We have also a common interest in endeavoring to come to an agreement, so far as this is necessary in order to establish unity of faith and of ecclesiastical fellowship." * * * "We shall agree that it is our common interest to defend the authenticity and inspiration of all those books of Holy Scripture which we revere in common as canonical, and the historic truth of the Mosaic and Evangelical records against infidel rationalism. Also, to solve the difficulties raised by modern science in relation to the harmony between rational and revealed truth. Also, to preserve the faith of the people in the Trinity, the Incarnation, and other doctrines which we hold in common, and which are strongly attacked by many popular preachers and writers in New England. Also, to counteract the tendency to indifferentism and apathy in regard to religion which is so common. Also, to take all possible means to bring the mass of the people under the influence of the spiritual and moral truths of the gospel. Also, to protect the Christian ordinance of marriage from being to a great extent subverted by the practice of divorce. Also, to suppress intemperance, licentiousness, and immoralities destructive of the well-being of society. Also, to protect the religious liberties and rights of all religious societies, and the property which is devoted to religious, charitable, and scientific purposes. Also, to do all in our power to blend the various elements of the population into one homogeneous body, and to educate them in an enlightened and devoted attachment to the political principles of the founders of the State." pp. 111, 112.

In another place, he says,

"In point of fact, these terms of agreement are numerous, and include the most fundamental articles of the Catholic faith. The Trinity, the Incarnation, the redemption, original sin, the regenerating, sanctifying grace of the Holy Spirit, the resurrection and eternal life; the necessity of repentance for sin, and of good

works, the canonicity of the principal books of the Old Testament, and of all those of the New Testament, their divine inspiration, the obligation of believing all the truths revealed by God, even if they are super-intelligible mysteries, on the motive of the divine veracity; these are all doctrines and principles in which there is a substantial agreement." pp. 106, 107.

Where, then, is the disagreement? Our friend attempts no formal answer to this question. In the Article before us, he hardly swerves from the one aim of making the disagreement as little as possible. Yet he cannot refrain from touching two points on which the parties differ; though he endeavors to show that even on those points the difference is by no means so great as it seems to be. Those two points are, in fact, the same with those to which the former writer in the *Catholic world* directed our attention when he told us that "Protestantism, so far as it is a system, is based upon two principles, from which have been developed all its influence and power, and to which may be traced the numerous and immeasurable evils whereof, for many ages, it has been the fruitful source." "*New England*," Jan., 1867, p. 120. Roman Catholics differ from Congregationalists in regard to the way in which a sinner is justified before God, and in regard to the authority of the church, as a visible and organized corporation, to determine what shall be received as the word of God.

Much of what the reviewer says on the second of these two points, seems like an endeavor to obviate and explain away some of the imprudent expressions in the essay on the philosophy of conversion. Having distinguished between different sorts of conversion, and having shown, in his own way (very unlike that of the former writer), that the conversion of a truly Christian Protestant to Romanism, though called by the same name, is not at all the same interior or subjective change with the conversion of an irreligious man to a penitent and believing life, he finds occasion to show what is, and what is not the authority claimed by the Roman Catholic Church, and conceded to it by its faithful members. We do not propose to discuss that subject with him just now; but, before we pass to the other topic, we pause to ascertain, if we can, from his statements, what the doctrine is which he proposes to assert and establish in the desired discussion. We are

not sure that we understand all his attempted distinctions and explanations.

He tells us that the subjective change which takes place in a devout Protestant when converted to the Roman Catholic Church, "is not a transfer of mental allegiance from the word of God to the arbitrary, irresponsible dictation of a hierarchy." This sounds plausibly; it is a denial of something; but let us ascertain, if we can, *what* is denied. In the next sentence we are told that the change "is simply an increased intelligence of the actual contents of the word of God, and of the nature of the medium through which the knowledge of that word is transmitted." According to this writer then (and here surely we cannot misunderstand him) there is in such a conversion no "transfer of mental allegiance from the word of God" to anything else. The supposed convert, after his conversion, just as before, recognizes no authority in religion superior to *the word of God*. But what is the meaning of that phrase, "the word of God?" The reviewer knows what that phrase means as commonly used by Protestants; and that to them that phrase is a synonym for "the inspired Scriptures." We cannot think that, writing for Protestant readers, he intended to use a phrase which they would understand in one way while he might construe it in another way. Did he mean then to have us believe that in the supposed conversion there is no "transfer of mental allegiance" from the inspired Scriptures to anything else? Did he mean to say that the change in question is "simply an increased intelligence of the actual contents of the *inspired Scriptures*, and of the nature of the medium through which the knowledge of *the Scriptures* is transmitted?" Our impression is that he uses the phrase (certainly without any intentional equivocation) in the broader sense which has become more familiar to him. We therefore understand him as saying that, in the supposed conversion, there is no transfer of mental allegiance from the word of God; that the devout Protestant and the devout Romanist both honor the word of God as the supreme authority in religion; but that the convert, while a Protestant, had only an imperfect intelligence of what the word of God is, erroneously assuming it to be nothing else than the inspired Scriptures, till, in his con-

version to Romanism, he learned to recognize the traditions and dogmas of the Roman Catholic Church as being also, and no less than the Bible itself, the word of God. Evidently we may save much ink and paper, and avoid the waste of some valuable time, by postponing the discussion, so far as we are concerned, hoping that the reviewer will kindly explain his statement.

We hope he will also take the trouble to show us, a little more clearly, whether, after all, he means to deny that in the supposed conversion there is a "transfer of mental allegiance," if not from the word of God, at least from something, to the "dictation of a hierarchy;" or whether he does not himself regard and describe the conversion as consisting essentially in the fact that the convert yields his mental allegiance thenceforward to the dictation of the hierarchy which has its center at Rome, and to which every true convert, from the time of his conversion, is related through a confessor or spiritual director. As we scan the phraseology of his denial, we observe the apparently superfluous words "arbitrary and irresponsible;" and we cannot but ask whether these two words were put in to bear the stress of the denial. If he really means to deny nothing more than that the dictation of the hierarchy is "arbitrary and irresponsible," we need not stop at present to maintain what he denies.

On another page he repeats that denial, setting it forth with amplification :

"The notion of Catholics being subject to an arbitrary authority of the hierarchy or the pope to impose whatever articles or belief they may choose, is a pure misapprehension. The church is a witness to the doctrines and facts once for all revealed at her original foundation. These doctrines and facts are on record. The testimony of the church in regard to them has been publicly given, and she cannot retract her testimony without manifestly falsifying her claim to be an infallible witness. As a judge of controversies, she can only judge of controversies relating to these very facts and doctrines. These judgments, once given, are irrevocable. They have been already pronounced respecting all the great facts and doctrines of Christianity, and are on record. One who submits to these judgments knows to what he is submitting. The synopsis of all Catholic doctrine is given to him in the decrees of the Council of Trent. Since that Council there has been but one definition of faith made, and that was the definition of a doctrine already universally believed before it was defined. The notion that a Catholic is subject to capricious, arbitrary, and unlimited decrees binding his faith is altogether chimerical. There is no room for further definitions except

in regard to certain theological questions relating to doctrines already defined, and the practice of the church has proved how slow she is to limit the liberty of opinion in the schools by a final decision of questions of this kind. The argument from the tyrannical nature of church authority is therefore a mere begging of the question in dispute between Catholics and Protestants. If the church, as Catholics define the church, be not infallible, her judicial decisions of doctrine are tyrannical. If she is infallible, they are not, and do not enslave either faith or reason. It is no tyranny over faith to make known with unerring certainty what God has revealed, or what is a deduction from what he has revealed. It is no tyranny over reason to furnish it with certain universal principles and indisputable data from which to make its deductions. The only real question, therefore, respects the infallibility of the church." pp. 110, 111.

Just now, as we have said, we are not arguing against the reviewer's doctrine of church authority, but only endeavoring to ascertain, clearly and exactly, what his doctrine on that subject is, as he understands it, and as he expects to assert and prove it. With this view, and for the sake of obtaining any further explanations which he may choose to offer, we subjoin to the passage just quoted a few notes and queries.

1. We do not know what occasion our friend has to take so much pains in refutation of "the notion of Catholics being subject to an *arbitrary* authority of the hierarchy or the Pope to impose whatever articles or belief they may choose," or "to capricious, arbitrary, and unlimited decrees." Certainly we have committed ourselves to no such position.

2. Certain limitations of the power which the Roman Catholic Church is supposed to have over its members and suggested by the reviewer. (1.) The Church is a witness only to certain doctrines and facts which were revealed long ago, which are on record, and in regard to which her testimony has already been given. (2.) The Church having once testified on a given point, "cannot retract her testimony," nor contradict it, "without manifestly falsifying her claim to be an infallible witness." (3.) "As a judge of controversies she can only judge of controversies relating to those very facts and doctrines" on which her testimony has already been given. (4.) In the decrees of the Council of Trent, and of preceding councils, the Church acting as judge of controversies has given judgment "respecting all the great facts and doctrines of Christianity," and has summed up "all Catholic doctrine" into one synopsis. (5.) The decrees of the Council of Trent

are so near to being a finality that the power of the church to make new definitions that shall be "of faith," is very much limited, only one such definition, and that "the definition of a doctrine already universally believed before it was defined," having been made later than those decrees, and there being "no room for further definitions except in regard to certain theological questions already defined." If we misunderstand the reviewer in regard to these limitations or supposed limitations of church authority, we cannot doubt that he will correct our error.

3. Some readers will naturally inquire what the church is, for which this infallibility is claimed, and which is always to overrule the private judgment of the supposed convert? The reviewer tells them "that the bishop who occupies the See of Peter, together with his colleagues, constitutes the *ecclesia docens*, the teaching church." But that bishop is a great way off, and his colleagues (or brother bishops), without whom he is not the *ecclesia docens*, are dispersed over the whole earth. What then, or who, is the *ecclesia docens* to the individual inquirer at Chicago or at San Francisco? Assuming that in some way he has ascertained to his own satisfaction that Pope Pius IX. is at present "the bishop who occupies the See of Peter," how is he to come into communication with that far-away bishop and his colleagues? "The infallible church," says the reviewer, "has proclaimed her doctrine in the decrees of the Council of Trent." But how can the individual inquirer avoid the necessity of putting his own private judgment to the task of interpreting and understanding those decrees? Can he have any satisfactory or sure communication with the infallibility of the church, otherwise than through the mediation of the individual priest to whom he commits the guidance of his soul? Is not that individual priest, for all practical purposes, the *ecclesia docens* to that individual disciple?

If we know ourselves, it is in no caviling temper that we call for a clearing of the question before the beginning of any argument on this topic. Is church authority, as Roman Catholics understand it, really hedged about with the limitations suggested by our friend the reviewer? Outside of those limi-

tations is there an inviolable liberty of inquiry and of private judgment? Is it admitted distinctly that the infallibility of the church exhausted itself, or at least almost exhausted itself, in the decrees of the Council of Trent, so that if we accept those decrees we encounter only a slight hazard of being required to accept anything not yet decided? Is the body of Roman Catholic doctrine now so completed and rounded, that no considerable addition to it is to be expected in all coming time? Who is to judge whether, in any instance hereafter, the region sacred to freedom of inquiry and opinion is invaded? For example, it has been decided of late, by "the bishop who occupies the See of Peter, together with his colleagues," that Mary, the mother of Jesus, was conceived without sin, that she might be the sinless mother of a sinless child; but, we believe, the infallibility of the church has not yet decided that the mother of Mary was, nor that she was not conceived without sin. There is room then, as yet, for a devout Roman Catholic to entertain the pious opinion that the mother of the blessed virgin, as well as the blessed virgin herself, came into being by an immaculate conception. That opinion, as yet, is within the region where every man may think and judge for himself without impiety, if only he is guided by the Scriptures, the Council of Trent, and sound reason. But if the immaculate conception of St. Anne should begin to commend itself to the faithful as a pious opinion sustained by probable evidence, is there anything to restrain the *ecclesia docens* from pronouncing an infallible judgment upon it? In the nature of the case, must not the infallibility of the church, wherever lodged, be as boundless as the range of human thought, and as enduring as time? Remember we are not arguing against the principle of church authority. We are only inquiring what the principle is, and what is the bearing of it on the individual disciple. Nor are we declaiming against any alleged tyranny of the Pope or of the Roman Church. If the decisions of ecclesiastical authority are infallibly true, the thought of any tyranny in them is absurd. What we ask is that before the question of church authority shall begin to be argued, it may be disentangled, and a clear

statement made of the position which our friends of the "Catholic World" undertake to maintain.

Turning now from the question of church authority, we meet the other cardinal difference between the two systems. Everybody knows that from the day when Luther nailed his theses to the door of the church in Wittenburg, and even from the earlier day when Luther's own soul, after long groping in darkness, found the peace and freedom which the gospel offers, the doctrine concerning the justification of a sinner before God has been, more than any other doctrine, the point at which the Roman Catholic system of religion and the Protestant system separate. The difference between the two systems at this point may be overlooked, may be misunderstood, may be so represented as to seem quite unimportant; but it is like the difference between two diverging lines at the point of their intersection. The angle measures just as many degrees in the moment of divergence as at the remotest circumference. Doubtless a believer in Christ, the Lamb of God, may be justified, and may be sanctified and saved, without being able to define the doctrine of justification correctly, and without being at all versed in the theology of the subject,—just as a drowning man may grasp a rope and be drawn to the shore without understanding the scientific principles involved in the operation. Doubtless the soul, guided by the prevenient grace of God, may find in either system of doctrine (as a magnet finds iron among sand) those objective truths, so simple and so grand, which are the power of God to salvation. Yet, even in those whom God thus regenerates by the truth, the two divergent theories of Christianity, with their contrasted methods of preaching and pastoral teaching, produce two different types of Christian experience and character.

The reviewer touches the doctrine of justification in two separate portions of the Article before us; and in both places he endeavors to show that our doctrine and the doctrine prevalent among Protestants in our age, is an approximation to the Roman Catholic doctrine on the same subject. We will not reply to him without first laying his statements fairly before our readers :

"The New Haven school has brought the Calvinistic doctrines, in those respects in which it has modified them, into a nearer approximation to the Catholic doctrines than they were before. In regard to the cardinal point of justification, the difference is really less than it would appear. Although, in the New Haven theology, faith is made to include what Catholics call the theological virtue of hope, yet it includes also that which we call faith, and which the Council of Trent defines to be the 'root of all justification;' that is a firm, explicit belief in those revealed truths which are necessary *ex necessitate medi*, and a belief at least implicit in all other revealed truths. As [the writer in the 'New Englander'] says, it is held that faith, in order to justify, must be accompanied by charity, or the love of God. It is our opinion, therefore, that the New Haven divines really hold that it is *fides formata*, or faith informed and vivified by love, which justifies, and that this doctrine is practically preached by the Congregational clergy generally. This is identically the Catholic doctrine. In this case and in others, the saying of the learned Dollinger is verified, that 'Protestants and Catholics have theologically come nearer to each other.'" p. 107.

Already it begins to be evident (and it will soon be much more evident) that the word "justification" and the word "faith" are used by the reviewer in a sense quite different from that which they bear in the Protestant doctrine of justification by faith alone. He himself implies this in his attempts to show that our doctrine, though we put it in words which he repudiates, is essentially the same with that which he, as a Roman Catholic, holds and teaches. We withhold our comments that he may explain himself more at large:

"In regard to justification, the first writer [in the 'Catholic World'] asserts that, according to the Protestant doctrine, every man who believes he is saved by Christ, is by that sole belief united to the invisible church, which his opponent also vehemently denies. It is the original, genuine Lutheran doctrine, *Sola fides formaliter justificat*. Faith alone formally justifies, which is in question. We do not think [the writer in the 'New Englander'] either understands or believes this doctrine. The New England theology has from the beginning a character of its own, in which the subjective change called regeneration, a change of heart, or conversion, consisting in an inward supernatural transformation of the soul through the grace of the Holy Spirit, has been made very prominent. The Catholic formula, *Fides, una cum aliis requisitis, dispositivè justificat*,—Faith, together with other requisites, dispositively justifies, expresses better the spirit of this theology than the Lutheran formula. That the merits of Christ are the meritorious cause of justification is agreed upon by all parties. The exact sense of the Lutheran formula is difficult of apprehension and of expression in clear terms. As we understand it, it imports that the justification of the sinner, which is, in this system, a mere forensic justification, and is from eternity objectively perfect, is subjectively applied by an act of the mind firmly believing on Christ as the substitute and ransom of the particular person making this act. In the strict Calvinistic system, the doctrine that Christ redeemed only the elect is distinctly made the basis of the doctrine of justification by faith alone. Saving faith, therefore, implies that Christ died for him in particular, and that consequently he

is entitled to the favor of God and eternal life, irrespective of his personal acts, although he cannot receive this favor or be prepared for the happiness of heaven without the gift of a grace which gradually sanctifies him. Fletcher of Madely, the great theologian of the Methodists, wrote most ably against this Solifidian system. It has also been strongly combated within the past few months by Dr. Young, of Edinburgh. It is our opinion that this doctrine tends to reduce religion to pure individualism, and thus to obliterate both dogma and church. It concentrates the method of salvation into a mental or spiritual act by which Christ is apprehended in the relation of Saviour. This act is supposed to be excited by a supernatural inspiration of the Holy Spirit; but as there is no test by which the reality of the inspiration can be certainly verified, it reduces personal religion to a subjective sentiment. A subjective personal trust in and affection to Jesus Christ becomes, therefore, the principal mark of a Christian and of a member of the true church. All who have this ought, therefore, to fraternize and commune together." p. 116.

Such is the reviewer's account of the Protestant doctrine concerning justification, and of the progress which modern Protestants, and especially those of the New England school, are supposed to have made, in that particular, toward the theological system rejected by the reformers. While we acknowledge the courtesy with which he expresses himself, and his sincerity in professing to believe, not only with the learned Döllinger, that Roman Catholics and Protestants "have theologically come nearer to each other," but also that the "Catholic World" and the "New Englander" are theologically near enough to each other to join hands in an endeavor for a better understanding, in order to a closer approximation, we cannot admit that he has succeeded in representing with perfect accuracy either our views of justification by faith, or the views generally accepted among evangelical Protestants. We mark some of the points in which, as it seems to us, he has missed his aim.

1. He fails to vindicate the statement made by his collaborator, which was, that to "the church founded by our Lord," the church invisible, "every man who believes he is saved by Christ is by that sole belief united, whatever else his creed and religious observance may be." Is this a fair way of stating the doctrine of justification by faith alone, as that doctrine is held by evangelical Protestants? We do not intend just here to show what the Protestant doctrine is, and how it differs from that set forth by the Council of Trent; but we submit

that the ultra-Calvinistic doctrine of atonement provided only for the elect, with the corollary that therefore justification by faith implies a belief on the part of the person justified that he is one of the elect, ought not to be represented as identical with the doctrine held by evangelical Protestants. Everybody knows that according to the doctrine which evangelical Protestants everywhere hold and teach, a man may believe with the utmost assurance that he was from eternity divinely elected to salvation and is therefore saved by Christ, and not be justified before God.

2. The reviewer very justly says that, in the New England theology, "the subjective change called regeneration, a change of heart, or conversion, has been made very prominent." But surely the New England theology, whatever mistakes one writer or another may have made, has never fallen into the error of teaching that a sinner, instead of being justified by faith alone, is justified by regeneration, or by "an inward, supernatural transformation of the soul through the grace of the Holy Spirit." Into whatever inaccuracies of phraseology any of our writers may have been betrayed, our theology has always distinguished between justification and sanctification—the one "an *act* of God's free grace," the other "a *work* of God's free grace"—the one a divine absolution or acquittal, the other a divine renovation—the one an instantaneous change in the sinner's relations to the condemning law and holy government of God, the other a progressive change in the soul's affections and habits.

3. We are not aware—and in our judgment the reviewer exhibits no evidence tending to prove—that in defining or explaining the faith by which a sinner is justified, "the New Haven school" has modified at all the doctrine commonly accepted in New England and represented (for example) in President Edwards's "Discourse on justification by faith alone." If, in the New Haven theology, the faith that justifies "is made to include what Catholics call the theological virtue of hope," or in other words is the act of the sinner laying hold on the hope set before him and entrusting his soul to the Redeemer of sinners, the same may be affirmed of all evangelical theology. To say that the faith which justifies *includes* such

trust in Christ, is not so much our habit as to say that it *is* trust, trust as distinguished from the merely intellectual belief of a proposition, personal trust in a personal Saviour. We love to say, "God gave his only begotten Son that whosoever believeth *in* (*is*) him should not perish." "He that believeth *on* (*is*) the Son hath everlasting life." Yet the "New Englander" did not say, in its article on the "Roman Philosopher," exactly what the reviewer understands it to have said. The proposition which we quoted from the Westminster Confession, "Faith receiving and resting upon Christ and his righteousness is the alone instrument of justification, yet it is not alone in the person justified, but is ever accompanied with all other saving graces, and is no dead faith, but worketh by love,"—is not quite identical with the reviewer's interpretation of it in these words, "It is held that faith, *in order to justify*, must be accompanied by charity, or the love of God." That phrase, "*in order to justify*," betrays, to our thought, the unconscious influence of the Roman Catholic theory on the mind of the reviewer. Justification is by faith, not *because* the faith which justifies is accompanied by charity, nor *because* it is accompanied by all other saving graces, but simply because it is that mental act which embraces the justification so freely provided and offered in the infinite benignity of God.

Sola fides formaliter justificat. This, says the reviewer, is the Lutheran formula, and he translates it, too literally for the intelligence of any reader who needs a translation, "Faith alone formally justifies." Over against this he sets what he calls "the Catholic formula," *Fides, una cum aliis requisitis, dispositive justificat*; and that he translates, with the same literality, "Faith, together with other requisites, dispositively justifies." As we understand those technical words of scholastic logic, "*formaliter*" and "*dispositive*," the first formula may be paraphrased, "Faith alone is the instrument or means of justification;" and the second, "Faith, conjoined with other requisites, is a preparation for justification." With these two conflicting dogmas before us as a text, we will now attempt, for the consideration of the reviewer as well for the benefit of less learned readers, an exposition of what we understand to be the actual and irreconcilable difference between the

doctrine of justification by faith alone as held by evangelical Protestants, and the Roman Catholic doctrine of justification as defined by the Council of Trent.

Perhaps there is no better way of showing what the evangelical doctrine is, than by recollecting how it entered into the religious experience of Luther. His experience was by no means exceptional in this respect among his contemporaries. It is constantly paralleled in later times, whenever men who think that they must do something to make themselves better, or that, at least, they must in some way become better, before they trust in Christ, are brought out of that bondage into the liberty of the sons of God. The Reformation, as we call it, grew out of the old question for which every theory of religion must offer a solution—the question of the jailor at Philippi, "What must I do to be saved?"—the question which old prophets met and answered, "Wherewith shall I appear before the Lord?"—the question which burthened the soul in lands and ages that knew not Moses, "How should man be just with God?"—the question which will utter itself in one form or another wherever the soul awakes to the consciousness of sin.

This question, long working in the depths of Luther's great and earnest soul, crowding itself into his thoughts, especially at every alarm that roused his conscience, became more urgent when the sudden death of a fellow student and dear friend opened before his eyes, as it were, the gates of the infinite unseen. This question haunted him in his studies, overshadowed his worldly hopes, filled him with anxious longings, and, at last, in a moment when he felt himself "encompassed with the anguish and terrors of death," it swept away all the plan which he had marked out for himself in life. It was this question, for which he had not yet found the true and simple answer—it was the fever of his soul hungering after the assurance of peace with God—that took him from the university which he was beginning to adorn with the splendor of his intellectual powers, into a convent. The same fever burned within him there;—the penances and various discipline of his monastic life could not give him the peace he longed for. Some glimpses he caught of Christ as the Saviour of all men,

and especially of them who believe. Some guidance he had from souls that could say, "Behold the Lamb of God," but still his question was, How dare I believe in the favor of God, so long as my heart is not changed? By this inward discipline God was preparing him to grasp the truth in its simplicity, and to learn what faith is, and how the just shall live by faith. It was a painful process, but the Holy Spirit was his teacher. His convent life, with its ascetic rigors, and his continued mental suffering, might have been fatal to him, had he not found at last the peace of God that passeth all understanding. And how did that peace come to him? He was lying in his cell, oppressed with sickness, with the sense of sin, and with the fear of death. An aged monk, whose heart was full of simple faith (for such monks there were before the Council of Trent, and such we trust there are to-day in places where Protestant antipathy would not expect to find them), came into that cell and spoke to him some words of fraternal kindness, common-place, perhaps, but true. Luther opened his heart to the old man and told his fears and troubles. The old monk was not learned, he had no skill in casuistry and no familiarity with the hair-splitting logic of the schoolmen; he had little knowledge even of the Scriptures, but he knew the Apostles' creed, the traditional formula in which so many generations of believers had professed faith in Christ. To that simple "form of saving words" he recalled the mind of the sufferer, and especially to the words, "I believe in the forgiveness of sins." With those words came a ray of comfort. Why not? "*I believe*," said Luther to himself, "I believe in the remission of sins." Whose sins? "You must believe," said the old man, "not only that David's sins and Peter's are forgiven—the devils also believe all that. God would have us believe that *our* sins are forgiven." Thus Luther grasped the simple gospel of God's free forgiveness. He trusted in a forgiving God. What else could he do in order to be forgiven? We give the story as it is commonly reported and believed among Protestants. If the reviewer or anybody else should say that it is all a myth,—no matter. Take it for myth, or take it for veritable history, it answers as an illustration. The question of its historic accuracy would be a side issue.

This, then, is what we mean when we speak of justification by faith alone. We say to the soul burthened by sin, God is in Christ, reconciling the world to himself—he is in Christ reconciling *thee* to himself; believest thou this? We say to that soul, It is a faithful saying, and worthy of all acceptance, that Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners—it is a faithful saying and worthy of *thine* acceptance, that Christ Jesus came into the world to save *thee*; dost thou accept the faithful saying? The gospel which we hold is, "Let us come boldly to the throne of grace, that we may take hold of mercy (λάβωμεν ἔλεον) and find grace to help in time of need." The mercy which God offers us is simply gratuitous. Justification, or the readjustment of our violated relation to the law and government of God, has been provided for us, and is ours, not if we will earn it—not if we will do something towards making ourselves worthy of it—but simply if we will take it. The act of taking it—the trusting in it—the committing of the soul's welfare to it—is faith; and thus it is that justification is by faith. The believing soul is of course, in one degree or another, penitent,—for there can be no acceptance of pardon when there is no sense and acknowledgment of guilt, but it is the faith alone and not the penitence that justifies. The believing sinner is of course a converted sinner,—for when he accepts the offered reconciliation, he is in the act of turning to God; but it is the faith alone, and not the conversion, that justifies. The believing soul, in that very act of trust, is already beginning to love God; the faith is "accompanied by charity" and by "all other saving graces;" it proves its genuineness by its continued effects on the heart and in the life; but it justifies simply as faith and not by virtue of its accompaniments or of its consequences. The faith itself is not without its moral quality; but it justifies the sinner simply because it is the acceptance of a freely offered justification, and not because it is itself right and well-deserving. All this is summed up in the phrase, *Fides sola, non solitaria*. Sinners are justified only by faith; but the faith which justifies is not alone in the person justified.

If, now, we introduce into this simple conception of a free justification divinely prepared for every man who will accept

it as the method of his personal reconciliation to God, metaphysical speculations concerning God's purpose of election, or if we mix it up with the narrow and anti-evangelical dogma of a limited atonement, we make an unnecessary as well as unprofitable complication of the whole matter. The fatalistic view of God's eternal purpose has no more connection, logically, with justification by faith than with justification by works. Assume the doctrine of predestination, or the doctrine of election, in whatever form of necessitarian philosophy; and how can one doctrine of justification be deduced from it rather than another? If justification is by faith, and if, at the same time, only the elect can be justified, does it follow that only the elect can believe? Just so, if justification is by works, and if only the elect can be justified, it follows that only the elect can perform the works by which they are to be justified. Superadd to the doctrine of election in whatever version of it, the doctrine that the atonement is only for the elect, and the question whether justification is by faith alone or by works, remains just as it was. What has the breadth or narrowness of the atonement to do with the method of justification? Indeed, so far is the doctrine of a limited atonement from being either auxiliary to or dependent upon the doctrine of justification by faith, that it even embarrasses the preaching of that gospel which offers a free justification to be accepted by faith or rejected by unbelief. The faith that justifies is not the unwarranted belief that I am one of the elect for whom alone there is forgiveness; it is rather the simple belief that there is pardon and help for all men, and therefore for me.

Our friend, the reviewer, seems not to distinguish accurately between justification and the consciousness of justification—or between the ground and method of justification as a divine act on the one hand, and the evidence on the other hand that this or that individual has believed to the saving of the soul. Justification, in the Protestant sense, is an act of God, pardoning the sinner and accepting him as righteous on the ground of Christ's mediation and atonement accepted by the believing soul. If I, as a sinner under condemnation, frankly commit myself to the mercy and power of a redeeming God, thus

fleeing for refuge to lay hold on the hope set before me, I am justified, God has received me as a forgiven child. If I am justified, I am in Christ and have begun to become a new creature. My justification being God's act and not mine, is an object not of direct consciousness but of faith in God who justifieth. That faith is indeed "the alone instrument of justification;" yet, if it is genuine, it is not alone in the process of my salvation. If it is genuine, it is accompanied by other saving though not justifying graces; and so its genuineness is attested to my consciousness and to the charitable judgment of other men. The publican, who could only say, "God be merciful to me a sinner," was "justified" in the sight of God rather than the Pharisee—justified not by his good works but by faith alone. Yet that justification was far from implying that when he went down to his house, the faith which had said "God be merciful," might fail to give evidence of its own genuineness and of the relation which it had established between his soul and the God of grace. We may use the story of the publican in the temple to illustrate Paul's doctrine of justification by faith without works; but if, in our thoughts, we follow that publican to his home and through the duties and changes of his subsequent life, the sequel to the story will illustrate the teaching of James. The works of that believing sinner, from the hour of his justification, are the effect and not the cause nor the instrument of his reconciliation to God, and he is justified by them only so far as they justify his faith by demonstrating its integrity and its vital efficacy.

How then does the Roman Catholic doctrine of justification by works (or by faith and works) differ from the Protestant doctrine of justification by faith alone, as now held by evangelical divines of the New England school? The reviewer seems to think that the difference is not wide and may be diminished by explanation and a more accurate use of terms. We think, on the contrary, that explanation will expose the difference without removing it. Nevertheless we say, let us have the explanation with all explicitness and candor, and see what will come of it. For our part we will frankly state the difference as we understand it; and, if we err in our representation, let the reviewer help us with his better knowledge of

what Romanism is, as administered in these times and in this country.

I. The difference between the two systems, on the subject in question, begins with a difference in regard to the idea of justification. Evangelical Protestants recognize a distinction between justification and sanctification. Roman Catholics disregard that distinction. Our doctrine uses the former word in a judicial or forensic sense, as signifying simply the complete forgiveness of a sinner, the removal or reversal of the sentence which the violated law of God records against him, the investing him, as it were, with a righteousness which is not his own, but which is as complete as if he had never sinned. This view of justification, as identical with "the forgiveness of sins" in the Apostles' creed, is essential to the Protestant doctrine. But in the Roman Catholic doctrine, the idea of justification is carefully blended with the idea of sanctification. In that theory there is no divine act which justifies the sinner, and, by the remission of forfeitures and penalties, puts him in the same relation to the divine government as if he had not sinned; but instead of all that there is a divine process of justification making the sinner personally righteous.

II. This divergence of the two systems becomes more conspicuous when we observe their different modes of conceiving and representing the subjective condition on which justification depends. In the Protestant doctrine that condition is simply and specifically faith, or trust in God's readiness to forgive sinners and save them from their sins—simply faith or the soul's recognition and grasp of the revealed fact that God is in Christ reconciling the world to himself, not imputing to men their trespasses. In the Roman Catholic doctrine the subjective condition—or rather the preparation for justification—is "faith with other requisites," which other requisites may be described as a good and virtuous state of mind generally.

III. But what is faith as related to justification? Here the two systems are still divergent from each other. When Protestants affirm that the actual and consummated pardon of an individual soul, as distinguished from the pardon provided for all and offered indiscriminately, is consequent upon faith, they use the word to signify a specific act of faith, the act in which

the soul accepts God's mercy. But in the Roman Catholic doctrine, faith is a belief of revealed propositions—an intellectual recognition of truth—in a word, orthodoxy rather than a personal trust in a personal Saviour. Thus the reviewer says, "That which we call faith, and which the Council of Trent defines to be the 'root of all justification,' is "a firm, explicit belief in those revealed truths which are necessary *ex necessitate medii*, and a belief at least implicit in all other revealed truths." p. 107. Should it be said that this is only a difference in the use of terms, we answer, that it is not such a difference as can be removed by mutual explanation merely. It is a difference about the meaning of the Scriptures in the answer which they give to a sinner who asks, "What must I do to be saved?"

IV. Of course the difference between the two systems becomes more conspicuous when we inquire what the connection is between faith and justification. Protestantism makes faith the instrument merely of justification, having its efficacy only in that it is receptive of God's mercy and of the offered reconciliation—as when a drowning man grasps the friendly rope that draws him to the land. Romanism, on the other hand, resolves the justifying quality of faith into the moral excellence belonging to it or accompanying it; so that, in that theory, faith does not justify simply as faith, but only as "*fides formata*, or faith informed and vivified by love"—faith "accompanied by charity or the love of God."

V. On the question, "How am I to know that I am justified?" the two systems are hardly less at variance. Without inquiring, at present, what Luther taught, or Calvin, on this point, or what strength of expression has been used in the heats of controversy and the fervors of enthusiasm, we may best contribute our quota to the mutual explanation proposed by the reviewer, if we simply state our own view, which we assume to be the view now commonly accepted among Protestants generally, and among orthodox Congregationalists in particular. We might content ourselves with a reference to what is said about the "assurance of grace and salvation" by the authors of the Westminster Confession (ch. xviii), for we believe that the considerate and discriminating statements of

that chapter would be not less satisfactory to Methodist Arminians than to Presbyterian Calvinists. But for the sake of freshness in the representation of a living belief, we will state our view, freely though not carelessly, in our own way.

1. There is an element of assurance in the very idea of that faith which is "the alone instrument of justification." Protestantism says, with the Apostle Paul, "Being justified by faith, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ; by whom also we have access into this grace wherein we stand; and [by whom] we rejoice in hope of the glory of God." It says, "God commendeth his love toward us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us: much more then, being now justified by his blood, we shall be saved from wrath through him; for if, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son, much more, being reconciled, we shall be saved by his life." In proportion to the simplicity of faith—fixing the soul's attention upon the object of faith, God's redeeming love and power—there is assurance in it. The believer, intent on the object rather than the act of faith, can say, "I know in whom [ō] I have believed, and am persuaded that he is able to keep that which I have committed unto him against that day."

2. A justifying faith then, being simply the free acceptance of an offered justification, or the soul's reliance on the Saviour, is, in its own nature, and in proportion to its vividness, an assurance of forgiveness. But when the believer's attention is fixed on his own act of faith instead of resting simply on the object of faith, his thoughts have passed into another field of thought; for to believe in Christ is one thing, and to believe that I believe in him is quite another thing. In that new field of thought, the question is not, "Do I know in whom I have believed?" but, rather, "Do I know that I have believed in him,"—not, "Is he able to keep that which I have committed unto him?" but, rather, "Have I committed it unto him?" We do not imply that this introverted action of the mind is not sometimes a duty, but we do say that the attitude of the mind looking into itself and analyzing its own consciousness, is very unlike the attitude of the mind looking to Christ and simply believing on him. A simple-minded Christian who

never read Edwards on the Affections, and who has never learned to distinguish between the objective and the subjective, may sometimes enjoy an assurance of personal justification which a little more knowledge of how deceitful the heart is would seriously impair.

3. Yet it does by no means follow that the simple-minded believer is mistaken in his assurance. The faith which justifies may and should attest the justification, not merely by the direct consciousness of believing, but, also, by the consciousness of effects which follow in the interior life. Thought, sensibility, and will are changed; the entire character is created anew, in consequence of that change in the relation of the soul to God. Faith, embracing the gospel, puts its offer of mercy, its promises of grace for help in time of need, to the test of experiment. In the first act of faith there is the beginning of Christian experience. Believing in Christ is really in some sort hoping in Christ, and such "hope maketh not ashamed because the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost which is given unto us." God's gracious work of sanctification begins with his gracious act of justification; and that work, in its progress, manifests itself in the principles and habits, in the aspirations and affections, in the illumination and intuitions, and even in the conflicts of the new life. The Scriptures abound in references to this testimony of God within us. "We have received not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit which is of God, that we may know the things that are freely given to us of God." "Hereby know we that we dwell in him and he in us, because he hath given us of His Spirit." "Ye have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear; but ye have received the spirit of adoption, whereby we cry Abba, Father. The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit that we are the children of God." "We trusted in Christ in whom ye also trusted, after ye heard the word of truth, the gospel of your salvation: in whom also, after ye believed, ye were sealed with that Holy Spirit of promise which is the earnest of our inheritance until the redemption of the purchased possession."

Our Protestantism holds that this is what every believer should attain to—the *sana mens in corpore sano* being pre-

supposed. Some consciousness of reconciliation to God is implied in the consciousness of believing, for the believing is the soul's acceptance of an offered reconciliation. But our consciousness in such a matter is not infallible, for the heart is deceitful and may have trusted in itself, or in some dream, instead of trusting simply in the gospel. It may be obscured by some false notions that becloud the mind. It may be imperfect and uncertain through the feebleness of the soul's grasp in taking hold of the gospel. The direct testimony of consciousness—the witness of our spirit that we are children of God—needs to be confirmed by another witness. That other witness is God himself, giving us grace to help in time of need, performing within us the work of our salvation from sin by the promised Holy Spirit, shedding abroad His love in our hearts, and teaching us to love the brethren, or, in other words, to love our neighbor as ourselves. Thus the Spirit itself beareth witness with our Spirit. Thus the believer, being confirmed in Christ, is anointed with an unction from the Holy One, is sealed as an accepted servant of God, and receives the earnest of the Spirit as the first installment of the boundless inheritance secured to him.

If now the reviewer thinks he can show that all this is pretty nearly the same thing with the gospel according to the Council of Trent, we hope he will try. For our part we are quite willing to learn what Romanism is in this respect. How is it that, under the system of justification by one's own meritorious works, a sinner can attain to a comfortable assurance of his own justification? If the righteousness which God has provided for me is not enough, but must be supplemented by some righteousness of my own, how can I ever know that I am justified? If the Tridentine theory of Christianity is the true theory, how can it be said to believers, "Ye have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear, but ye have received the spirit of adoption, whereby we cry Abba, Father?" If the reviewer shall see fit to pursue the discussion which he has opened, we trust he will take pains to show that the system which makes justification by works one of its cardinal doctrines, is not characterized necessarily, nor, in fact, by the spirit of fear rather than of hope and joy, and that the "good works" which it demands

and inspires are not like the tasks performed by a slave, but are the free obedience of filial love.

The notion of a sacramental justification, which is commonly regarded as an essential element in the Roman Catholic theory, has no place in the reviewer's representation of the subject, and therefore we have not introduced that topic into the remarks which we have offered concerning the difference between his doctrine and our own. Yet on that topic much explanation will be necessary, before those who intelligently hold the Protestant doctrine can be brought to believe that it does not diverge very widely from Romanism. In the decrees of the Council of Trent, it is declared that the "instrumental cause" of justification is "the sacrament of baptism which is the sacrament of faith." The distinction, at this point, between the two systems, is not easily explained away. According to the Council of Trent, faith is only part of the preparation for justification. According to Protestant orthodoxy, faith is the soul's reception of justification. The instrument of justification, says Rome, is baptism. "Faith," responds the Reformed theology, "is the alone instrument of justification." "For those who fall into sins after baptism," says the Council of Trent, "Christ has instituted the sacrament of penance." The doctrine of justification by baptism is not complete without a doctrine of relief from recontracted guilt by "sacramental confession" and "sacerdotal absolution," and then follows a necessity of "satisfaction by fastings, alms, prayers, and other pious exercises of the spiritual life." We offer no argument here against the Roman Catholic institution of the confessional, nor against the doctrines on which it rests. We only wait for explanations which may show that in this respect the Roman Catholic theory of the way to be saved has been misunderstood by Protestants.

If we are not mistaken, our readers have already observed that we are not writing polemically, with victory for our aim. We meet the reviewer, according to his invitation, amicably, and with a view to ascertain whether any conciliation is possible between Roman Catholics and evangelical Congregationalists. Therefore we will frankly say, not fearing any advantage which he, as a disputant, may gain by the concession, that,

as a matter of history, Protestantism has not constantly and universally maintained its own distinctive doctrine of justification by faith alone, with due clearness of intelligence, nor proclaimed it with due persistency. It was the mission of the great Reformers to recover and republish the original "good news" [εὐαγγέλιον] in its simplicity, "to wit, that God is in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them." But it must be confessed that Protestantism, as actually held, has often been something else than simply evangelical, something quite unlike the simplicity of the "good news" originally proclaimed by the Apostles and recovered and republished by the Reformers. Some, instead of holding clearly that faith justifies simply by consenting to the offered reconciliation, have seemed rather to hold that faith justifies because it is repentance or because it is to be productive of good works; and thus they have turned the attention away from faith as mere confidence in a redeeming God to the moral quality of the faith as related to an antecedent repentance and to consequent newness of heart and life. In proportion as any have fallen into this way of thinking, they have gone back toward the Roman doctrine that justification is by faith and works, or rather that faith is the root of all justification, inasmuch as it is the root of all good works. Others, insisting (as they ought to insist) on the necessity of a divine regeneration, have unintentionally and needlessly obscured the simplicity of the objective gospel, and have fixed the attention of awakened souls on the process of that subjective change by which, if any man be in Christ, he becomes a new creature, rather than on Christ himself inviting men to be at peace with God, and offering himself to them as an all-sufficient Saviour. Such a way of thinking tends to substitute for justification by works, not justification by faith alone, but a blind notion of something like a justification by Christian experience. In like manner some may have so confounded the doctrine of election, mixing it up with the theory of a limited atonement, and of a salvation possible only to the elect, that those whom they taught were put upon seeking to be justified by the discovery of their election rather than upon trusting in Christ and consenting to be saved by him. The

Protestant doctrine, in its simplicity, holds up to faith the objective Christ—a Christ who loved us and gave himself for us—a Christ whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood—a Christ whom in his sinlessness God hath made a sin-offering for us. At the same time our Protestant doctrine represents the subjective Christ as essential to the process of salvation—a Christ who is not merely standing at the door and knocking, but to whom the door has been opened and who has entered in—a Christ in us, the hope of glory—a Christ formed in us and living in us. The faith that justifies is faith in the objective Christ alone; it looks to Christ not as already formed in us, but only as he is evidently set forth before us, the propitiation for our sins. If we confound this distinction between the objective redemption and the subjective, or between Christ who died for us and Christ who liveth in us, we confound the whole doctrine of justification. But whatever confusion there may be in the statements of speculative theologians, and whatever may be the perplexity of burthened souls groping their way without adequate guidance to the knowledge of Christ, the heart of Protestantism ever holds fast the gospel of a free salvation offered to all who need it and realized by all who freely accept it. In times of spiritual declension, speculative theologians and perfunctory makers of sermons may elaborate one doctrine of justification or another, which has more law in it than gospel, more work than faith, more logic than life, more dogma or tradition than Scripture. But the religious awakenings and revivings of Protestant church history are associated—as in the times of Edwards on this side of the Atlantic, and of Whitefield and Wesley on the other—with a renewed assertion of this old gospel, so characteristic alike of Paul and of Luther. Prayer and praise in Protestant churches are full of this gospel just in proportion as they have glow and joy in them. Protestant hymns, and most conspicuously the hymns of invitation and of Christian experience, are full of it. The reviewer cannot have forgotten, and cannot remember without sensibility, some of the strains with which his childhood was familiar :

"Come, ye weary, heavy-laden,
 Lost and ruined by the fall;
 If you tarry till you're better,
 You will never come at all:
 Not the righteous—sinners Jesus came to call.

"Let not conscience make you linger,
 Nor of fitness fondly dream;
 All the fitness he requireth,
 Is to feel your need of him."

* * * * *

"Venture on him, venture wholly,
 Let no other trust intrude,
 None but Jesus can do helpless sinners good."

Nor are the hymns which he remembers as thus inspired by the *fides qua creditur Christus*—the identical faith of which it is said, *Fides sola formaliter justificat*—a mere tradition from old times. The most popular of the few new hymns which have come into universal use among British and American Protestants, since the day when he ceased to worship with them, is little else than Luther's experience, and his *articulus stantis vel cadentis ecclesiæ* breathed into song.

"Just as I am,—without one plea,
 But that thy blood was shed for me,
 And that thou bid'st me come to thee,—
 O Lamb of God, I come!

"Just as I am,—and waiting not
 To rid my soul of one dark blot,
 To thee whose blood can cleanse each spot,
 O Lamb of God, I come!"

* * * * *

"Just as I am—thou wilt receive;
 Wilt welcome, pardon, cleanse, relieve;—
 Because thy promise I believe,
 O Lamb of God, I come!

"Just as I am—thy love unknown
 Has broken every barrier down;—
 Now to be thine, yea thine alone,
 O Lamb of God, I come."

Does the heart of Roman Catholic devotion cling with such a faith to such a Saviour? Does Roman teaching—do the

Paulist fathers lead the awakened sinner up to the cross of Christ with such a confidence in his willingness and power to save? The reviewer can speak that which he knows, and testify that which he has seen. He knows more than we can pretend to know about the actual character of religious experience and feeling, as well as of religious opinion, among Roman Catholics in our day and in our country. He can tell, better than we can, whether there is any possibility of new relations between devout and liberal men in the great communion to which he belongs, and other devout and liberal men whose hope of salvation stands or falls with the doctrine of justification by faith alone. Some Protestant hymns—as, for example, Watts's "Come, Holy Spirit, Heavenly Dove," and, if our memory serves us, Wesley's "Jesus, lover of my Soul"—are sometimes found in Roman Catholic manuals of private devotion, just as hymns from the "Roman Breviary" are freely incorporated into Protestant manuals without asking whether they were composed before or since the Council of Trent. Is it possible for Roman Catholics and Protestants anywhere—and more particularly in the reviewer's native Connecticut, of which he speaks with filial love—to come together in one assembly for the one purpose of singing with blended voices some of the hymns which are approved on both sides as expressive of truly Christian thought and feeling? Would it be possible, in such an assembly, to sing, "Come, ye weary," or that more exquisite song of faith in Christ, "Just as I am?" We ask these questions not to entangle the reviewer, but only as desiring information which he can give.

There is one thing more to be said before we take our leave of the subject for the present. After all, what is there of doctrine that can be profitably discussed between us and the writers in the *Catholic World*? For them the doctrines which divide them from us are already defined immutably by the infallibility of the Council of Trent. In the decrees of that Council, "the synopsis of all Catholic doctrine," in other words, the synopsis of all Christian doctrine, is propounded to their belief by an authority which they cannot conscientiously question. To them there is no possibility of correcting or otherwise improving any proposition in that synopsis;—they

would charge themselves with impiety if they found their minds infested with a doubt of the infallibility on which they rest. Certainly no question between Rome and the Reformation is an open question to them. How then, can we and they enter into any discussion of such questions with the mutual profession of a willingness to be convinced by argument and of a desire to ascertain the truth? Such is the inequality between the parties that there can be no intelligent expectation of mutual helpfulness. In one view we have a great advantage over them. We profess to be learners, but it is impossible for them to learn anything on the subjects which are proposed for discussion. We do not recognize Luther, or Zwingli, or Calvin, nor all of them together, as having dominion over our faith. We are under no obligation to hold or defend their statements of doctrine any farther than those statements may be shown to be in conformity with the Scriptures. If our learned friends of the "Catholic World," any or all of them, even without converting us to the entire creed of Pope Pius IV., can give us any light, or can help us to any modification of our present views, on the doctrines proposed for discussion, we shall be greatly obliged to them. But it will not be possible for us to be the means or instrument of any such benefit to them; for, unless they first cease to be "good Catholics," they cannot give up or modify one jot or tittle of whatever the Council of Trent, three hundred years ago, decreed for them to believe and defend. In another view of the case, they have a great advantage over us. We have nothing but the Scriptures to back us in the conflict. They have an infallible church behind them. If we go into the proposed discussion, the questions which we must argue with them are, fundamentally, questions about the interpretation and exposition of the Scriptures, and we must search the Scriptures in the use of our own faculties, under our personal and direct responsibility to God, and with prayer for the enlightening and guiding influence of the Holy Spirit. But it is not so with them. On all the points of controversy between Rome and Protestantism, they hold that the meaning of the Scriptures is already definitely fixed; and the only question which they have to consider is not how to interpret holy Scripture, but how to

interpret the decrees of the Council of Trent. Why then should their time and thought, or ours, be expended in a discussion so unprofitable? After all, must not the questions between Romanism and Anglicanism be first disposed of? Does not the question whether the Council of Trent was infallible (including all the subordinate questions which that includes or into which it may be resolved) come first in order? What other question is there which can be fairly debated between us and them, except as preliminary or subsidiary to that main question? Let us then say, plainly, that we have no intention of entering into any discussion, however amicable, with the "*Catholic World*," concerning the *proof* of the great doctrines which we hold as evangelical Protestants. The mere repetition of old arguments on one side and the other is a work in which we do not propose to exercise our faculties at present. Yet, as the readers of this Article have seen, we are quite willing to do what we can towards a better understanding of each other's actual belief. We will do what we can towards helping intelligent and candid Roman Catholics to understand what we, on the authority of the Scriptures, believe concerning Christ and the way to be saved. We will endeavor to ascertain any misunderstanding of our views on their part, and to remove their misunderstanding by patient and charitable explanation. So, on the other hand, we hope to learn from them, not what we think (for in that field of inquiry we are more at home than they are), but what they think. In whatever particulars we misunderstand their faith and doctrine, let our misunderstanding be corrected. In this way something may be gained on both sides. Roman Catholics may learn to think more favorably of their Protestant neighbors, and may be more ready to coöperate with them in the interest of good morals and the public welfare; and earnestly religious Protestants, on the other hand, may learn some valuable lessons of respect and charity for those whose birth and education, or whose idiosyncrasies have made them the devoted subjects of Rome, but who are, nevertheless, endeavoring to be loyal to their country and to liberty.

ARTICLE VIII.—THE ARIAN CONTROVERSY.

THE doctrine of the Trinity is fundamental in the Christian system, and is most firmly established in the Christian faith; yet it is nowhere explicitly taught in the New Testament, though it involves the profoundest mystery of Revelation. Briefly stated it is: "There are three persons in the Godhead; the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost; and these three are one God, the same in substance and equal in power and glory." "The same in substance" and yet "three persons;" "three persons" and yet "one God;"—statements which stagger the intellect and can be exactly received only by a humble faith, and yet for fifteen hundred years that doctrine in its baldest statement has been the pillar and the glory of the Christian Church.

It is our object to consider the Arian Controversy which distracted the Roman Empire as well as the entire Church for more than fifty years, and in the heats of which the doctrine of the Trinity crystallized into its present form—a form which will probably remain unchanged and unexplained as long as the visible Church seeks to state its faith, and will only pass away in the day when all creeds and symbols shall die; for we shall see Him as He is.

Our Saviour did not state a formal doctrinal system, so far as we can judge from the narratives we have of his life. He simply lived a life and cast it into the center of the world's heart, and passed away. But that life began so mysteriously, was so simple and yet so full of startling and profound facts, ended in a removal so suggestive, and was followed by a spiritual influence so marvelous, that thousands of souls were, by its power, born again and became consciously accepted sons of God, even as he had promised. Tracing their new communion with God to their fellowship with Christ, in their practical faith and belief they worshiped Him as God. Not only the apostles and evangelists, the companions of our Lord, but the great body of the Church in the first two centuries, held the

Son in equal honor with the Father. In Clement of Rome, and Polycarp, and Ignatius, and Justin Martyr, and Irenæus, and Tertullian, we find the faith of the Catholic Church on this point, not expressed fully and consistently in the technical terms of the later controversy, yet hearty and unmistakable.

The young Church had on its shoulders the tremendous missionary work of evangelizing the world. With glowing piety they preached a risen Lord; they had not time or heart yet to stop and analyze their faith. Yet as they did the will of their Lord, a faith more perfect than any creed lived in their souls and awaited only opportunity to take on a full and exact statement. Time passed on. The age of Apologies began to pass away, for the Church had gained its position in the world. Gradually arose the spirit of speculation within the Church. Weak men and wicked men rose up and misstated the Christian consciousness, and good men and strong men too missed the full meaning of that wonderful life and death of Christ. But in every time of need sprang up a champion, and the age of Polemics came. By contentions and councils and persecutions the Church has to make its creed.

The first topic which presented itself for discussion was this: What is the relation of Christ to God? First in natural order it was, for Christ was the grand, central figure in the new dispensation; first in importance also, for on the dignity and nature of Christ rest the faith and the hope of the gospel. The Arian Controversy may be called the third stage in this discussion, so that to understand it we must first briefly characterize the two preceding stages out of which it naturally proceeded.

Passing over the Gnostic emanation theories as too remote from the Christian stand-point, we come first to the Patripassian and Sabellian heresies, akin to Gnosticism perhaps, in that human speculation rather than the Bible was the source from which they sprang, and also in that Christ was held to be by the one and by the other merely an emanation from, or a manifestation of, God. Both the Patripassians and Sabellians denied the hypostatic or personal distinction in the Divine essence, offering to the Church one God and one person, variously appearing, but still one person. The Church whose

heart dwelt on the facts of Christ's life, rejected with prompt severity this partial solution of so vital a question. The advocates of this doctrine were deposed from office and excommunicated from the Church. The two synods at Antioch in their action represent the feeling of the Catholic Church.

The second stage in this discussion is marked by the doctrine of Origen. This great and good man was a life-long opponent of the Patripassians. He perceived how destructive and false it is to deny the personal distinctions in the Godhead, but following his speculation, rather than the Bible account of Christ, he made a second grade of divinity and to this referred the nature of Christ. The Father was *ἰεθερς*, but Christ was merely *θεος*, thus laying such stress on the distinction in persons as to jeopard, if not sacrifice, the unity of essence. Origen meant only to confound the Patripassians, but he confounded instead the whole Church, for from his teachings, selected and perverted, sprang the parties that fought the truth throughout this Arian controversy. He taught—First: The distinct essence of the Son. Secondly: This distinct essence is generated from the Father. Thirdly: This generation of the Son is timeless. But, Fourthly: The generation of the Son is dependent on the will of the Father. Thus Origen taught. He died, but his teachings lived on, and more than a century afterward reappeared with a vigor which attests the living power of this adamantine theologian.

About the year 320 A. D., Arius, a presbyter of Alexandria, made prominent the doctrine ever since known as Arianism, which was the immediate cause of the controversy we are to consider. The doctrines peculiar to this man may be briefly stated. They were—First: The Son was created from nothing by the will of God. Secondly: *ἦν ἔτεσ ὁυκ ἦν*,—the Son had a beginning of existence. Thus the Son was made to be a mere creature. It would be difficult to conceive how a man could arrive at such a doctrine, if we could not notice the process of his ideas, their origin, and the peculiar method of his mind. He was educated at Antioch, and there imbibed the hostility of the Eastern Church to the Sabellian identification of the essence of the Son and Father. Passing to Alexandria he met the teachings of Origen. First, the distinct essence of

the Son. With this his own views coincided. Secondly, this distinct essence is generated from the Father. But, he reasoned, if the product is a distinct essence, the process is not generation, but merely creation, for generation imparts the same substance or essence, but the essence being distinct the process is mere creation and Christ is only a creature. Of course a creature must have been created in time, which denies Origen's third tenet, viz: The eternal existence of the Son. And of course, also, he accepted Origen's fourth statement, viz: The Son exists by the will of the Father, and not from a necessity in the divine nature. It is probable that Origen held in his heart the catholic faith, but he mingled incongruous elements in his statement of it. It remained for this narrow, sharp Arius to strip that statement of the glorious idea most precious to Origen, viz: The eternal generation of the Son, and to prostitute its whole spirit. But Arius strove also to defend his doctrine from the Bible, and referred to Acts, 2d chapter, 36th verse, and Hebrews, 3d chapter, 2d verse, where the verb *ποιέω*, signifying "to make," is used with reference to Christ; and to Colossians, 1st chapter, 15th verse, where Christ is styled the first-born of every creature. Both in his interpretation of Origen's statements and in his Biblical exegesis, we mark the same mind. Narrow, intense, unspiritual, he lost the real, central idea of the great Alexandrian, and he could pass by the sublime facts of Christ's life, the grand import of Revelation, and fix his doctrine on stray words mechanically interpreted.

Such a doctrine was of course opposed immediately and decidedly by the Christian consciousness. Arius was deposed by his bishop, Alexander, who maintained in fundamental opposition to the Arian idea, the unity of the Divine essence. Thenceforward the orthodox party took its name from that leading tenet, and was called the Homoousion party.

But let us at once lose sight of Alexander, the bishop, who appeared to act, and fix our attention on his archdeacon Athanasius, who was really the soul of the Homoousion movement. By one of those peculiar Providences, so remarkable that they seem to indicate the direct interposition of God in certain extremities, and of such a sort as was the meeting of the

Monitor and Merrimac in Hampton Roads, Athanasius was on the spot and grappled at once with Arius and his heresy, and he never let go his hold till not only Arius had long been dead, but Arianism was put down and the Homoousion idea reigned in both the Eastern and Western Church.

But, to return, Arius had not a very large party holding exactly to his doctrine, but he appealed to the bishops of the Eastern Church, for with them he held one fundamental point in common, viz. the distinct essence or nature of the Son. The Eastern Church, in opposing the Patripassians and Sabellians, had, as we have seen, learned to fear the Sabellian idea of unity of essence, and when they heard Arius cry, "I am condemned by the Homoousion party because I hold to the distinct essence of the Son," though they would not have sanctioned the degrading conclusions he drew as to Christ, remonstrated with Athanasius and his party for their severity. Thus we have the strange spectacle of two parties acting together, because in non-essentials they were alike, and two parties opposed, who, at heart, were one.

The Emperor Constantine deprecated greatly the contention and disorder into which the Church now fell, and having failed in his diplomatic idea of forming a compromise between the two parties, on the entirely foreign doctrine of Divine Providence, summoned a general council to meet at Nicæa, in Bithynia, in 325 A. D. The three parties in this council were,

1. The Arians, led by Arius himself, with only a few followers.

2. The Eastern bishops, who disliked the Homoousion idea so much that they sympathized rather with Arius than Athanasius. They held to a distinct essence in the Son, but said that it was *like* the essence of the Father, and so were called the Homoiousion or Semi-Arian party; and,

3. The Homoousion or Athanasian party, holding to unity of essence as opposed to both Arians and Semi-Arians. The Semi-Arians, led off by proposing a creed which should leave unsettled the question in dispute, but Biblical and sufficient in their view to meet the practical wants of the Church. This by no means satisfied the Athanasian party, who demanded a condemnation of Arius and his views, and the adoption of the

Homoousion idea. The Eastern bishops of course opposed this, and, in union with the Arians, would have succeeded had not a new element interposed. The Emperor Constantine declared in favor of the Homoousion idea, asserting the consubstantiality of the Son, and by his influence led to the adoption of the historic Nicene creed.

It often pleases God, when the world is ready for some new idea, to embody it in some man, who ever after appears at once as the leader and as the instrument of that idea. So in Columbus appeared the man who found a new world, partly because a new world must be found, and partly because he must find it. So Luther contains the Reformation, so to speak. Doubtless it must have come, but did not his wonderful character make it come then and grandly as it did? So, perhaps, history will tell us, has Abraham Lincoln come to stand forever for the triumph of republican institutions. So, already, history has declared Athanasius the prophet and the champion of the consubstantiality of the Son. Such men are always led by a spiritual, almost a prophetic, impulse. They derive their inspiration from fundamental practical truths, and behold, as if already accomplished, the victory of the idea they espouse. Such men never give up; shall they be false to the vision from God!

We find then that Athanasius insisted upon the equal Deity of Christ not from speculation, nor from any narrow interpretation of individual words of Scripture, nor merely from any repressive fear of the evil which the contrary doctrine might lead to, but from that glorious view of the truth in Christ Jesus which he derived from the spirit and scope of the whole Bible, and which impelled him to die, if need be, rather than cease to fight for it. If our fellowship with Christ be not communion with God, then we have no mediator; if Christ be not God we have no sufficient redemption. The essence of Christianity was, in the mind of Athanasius, contained in the Deity of Christ. If he or the Church yielded this point, the citadel was lost, and with a resolute pertinacity simply sublime he held his position. Beginning with the conviction of Christ's Deity he determined that now it should be settled forever in the Church that as God the Father is God, so

Jesus Christ the Son is God. His keen mind saw that if Origen's view of distinct essence obtained, then the offensive doctrines of Arius must practically follow. Christ could be produced then only by creation, and of course must have had a beginning, and so farewell forever to the "Eternal Son." He asserted, therefore, the doctrine of sameness of essence and insisted that the *ὁμοούσιον* be inserted in the creed of the Church. This point, as we have seen, he carried by the aid of Constantine's influence, and then naturally and completely and terribly he tore up root and branch the whole Arian doctrine. Less terrible to Arius must have been the added anathema of the Church. The Son being of the same substance with the Father, the idea of the creation of a Son out of nothing must be abandoned, for all analogies of creation are transcended here. Then followed, as a matter of course, the mysterious idea of internal generation or generation from the essence (*γεννησας ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας*) as indicating the relation of Christ to God. Styled "the Son" in the New Testament, as his most excellent and essential title, the early Church ever dwelt fondly on this relationship, and Origen had lovingly and strenuously advocated it. It was the Bible idea, and the Church idea, and received now its place in the creed of the Church. Two points being thus made, viz. the "sameness of substance," and "essential generation," it appeared that the Arian motto *ἦν ὅτε οὐκ ἦν*, "there was when he was not," was simply absurd. Could God be eternally the Father, had the Son ever not existed? This generation being a communication of the Divine essence it could never have begun or else God must have changed essentially, and this could not be conceived. This relationship of internal generation must also, then, be an eternal one. And, finally, the Arian idea that the Son depended for existence upon the will of God, was part and parcel of the doctrine that He was created by God, but now having been declared to be the eternal Son from the very essence of the Father, the relation was seen to be a necessary one, acquiesced in, delighted in by the Father, yet still depending in no way for existence on His will.

So splendidly the truth triumphed in this council at Nicæa. Nor let it mar our satisfaction that the Church was not yet

ready in its thought and experience to adopt it heartily. Let us be sure that Athanasius did not much care that it was the royal influence and not hearty conviction that led the Church to adopt the Nicæan creed. He was assured that the truth had been uttered, and he knew that it would reign in the heart of the Church in God's good time, and he lived to see the Eastern and Western Church adopt freely the symbol which so many years before he had wrought for them out of his own heart. As in ancient warfare the soldier would cast his weapon far over into the ranks of the enemy, and then fight his way up to it, so Athanasius gave the world his ultimatum in the creed he put forward at Nicæa, and he never turned back till fifty years afterward through persecution, and abuse, and toil, he had made a way for the whole Church to the faith in the Triune God.

ARTICLE IX.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

TRENCH'S STUDIES IN THE GOSPELS.*—This volume answers to its title. It is not a commentary unfolding either the whole or any definite portion of the Gospels, but is made up of a succession of "Studies," or of investigations into the meaning and reflections upon the teachings of difficult or important sections and passages selected from all parts of the Gospel history. The passages discussed are sixteen in number, commencing with the one which contains the story of the Temptation of Christ, and passing on in the order of time to the closing one, which has reference to the interview between our Lord and the two disciples on the way to Emmaus. Each of these passages is entered into fully and minutely, but, of course, in great measure without relation to the others which precede or follow, and the book becomes in this way a collection of fragments, which need to be gathered up into a larger plan, in order to have entire completeness, or to be in the highest degree valuable to the ordinary student. Indeed the author intimates that he entertained the purpose of preparing such a larger work at the beginning, but was compelled to abandon it and limit himself to the perfecting, as far as he might, of these smaller parts. The reputation of the author is so widely extended, and his former books on the Miracles and the Parables have been so long known, and so greatly prized by preachers and students in this country, that high expectations must naturally be raised at the announcement of any new volume from his pen. From our examination of the one before us, however, we cannot but fear that these expectations will be somewhat disappointed. Many of the characteristics of the author's style and thought will be found in its pages; but there seems to be a want of that thoroughness which exhausts the subjects, and of that richness and suggestiveness which make a work of this kind truly excellent. The reader will hardly find himself aided very greatly in his insight into the

* *Studies in the Gospels.* By RICHARD CHEREVIX TRENCH, D. D., Archbishop of Dublin. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1867. 8vo., pp. 326.

deeper meaning of the Scriptures, or largely increased in his knowledge as he follows the Archbishop—and yet he will discover, here and there, traces of the same things which have distinguished the earlier and more useful works to which we have referred,—enough, perchance, to make him glad to renew his acquaintance with the author.

TRENCH'S HULSEAN LECTURES.*—These lectures were delivered in 1845 and 1846 by the present Archbishop of Dublin when rector of Itchenstoke. They are now reprinted in a neat and portable form by Mr. Widdleton. The topics themselves are of special interest, and they are treated in a clear and solid way by the well known author, and not without a certain gentle earnestness which makes his works in general both instructive and interesting.

AMERICAN EDITION OF SMITH'S DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE.†—Smith's Dictionary is the best work of the kind in the English language. It represents well the Biblical learning and scholarship of England. In scientific precision and compression, it is inferior to Winer's *Real-Worderbuch*; and many of its Articles are defective. But the American edition, which Messrs. Hurd & Houghton are issuing in numbers, is a great improvement upon its English predecessor. The American editors are eminently qualified for the task they have undertaken. We feel sure that the highest attainable accuracy will be secured for the work, under their vigilant supervision. The corrections which they introduce are very numerous and are often important. The additional Articles contributed by them or by their co-laborers bring the Dictionary up to the state of knowledge at the present moment; and much of the new matter is of special importance to the American student. Few persons are aware of the amount of toil required in the preparation of this edition of the Dictionary. In typography the work appears to be *a fac simile* of the English edition.

* *The Fitness of Holy Scripture for Unfolding the Spiritual Life of Men.* Christ, the desire of all Nations, or, the Unconscious Prophecies of Heathendom. Being the Hulsean Lectures. By RICHARD CHERNIVIX TRENCH. New York: W. J. Widdleton. 1866.

† *American Edition of Dr. William Smith's Edition of the Bible.* Revised and edited by Professor H. B. HACKETT, D. D., with the coöperation of Mr. EZRA ABBOY, A. M., Assistant Librarian of Harvard University. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 1867.

McCLINTOCK AND STRONG'S CYCLOPÆDIA OF BIBLICAL, THEOLOGICAL, AND ECCLESIASTICAL LITERATURE.*—The plan of this Dictionary, as the title indicates, is very comprehensive, covering the whole field of theological knowledge. It is impossible that a critical reader should fail to mark in such a work the omission of some topics which he would expect to find. Inaccuracies will unavoidably creep in, let the editorial labor be never so diligent. These, however, are not likely to be of serious consequence to the majority of persons who have occasion to consult such a work, although perfect correctness should, of course, be carefully sought. The eminent qualifications of Doctors McClintock and Strong for the preparation of a work of this kind are well known. They have made use of the best sources of knowledge in the various languages; and their original contributions, although not concealing their own theological predilections, will be characterized, it can scarcely be doubted, by a spirit of candor and fairness. Their Dictionary deserves liberal patronage from all denominations of Christians.

MANUAL OF BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION.†—In the present state of biblical science we need nothing more than a severe, relentless *method* in the treatment of all subjects connected with it; not only in order to attain sure results in the particular department in hand, but also to accustom students to such a mode of treatment. In reviewing the attempts that are made from time to time to contribute to this science, we are bound to inquire first of all how they satisfy this demand. We welcome any new effort to bring about more correct views of the Bible, of its relations to our faith, and of the proper method of studying it, but we doubt if the above mentioned work can be considered, in these important points, any great advance upon Ernesti. Certainly in orderly arrangement and conciseness it is inferior. This would, however, be unimportant if the author himself had arrived at a clear and consistent view of the subject, and placed it before the student in such a way as to impart the same to him. Such is not the case. He professes himself of the grammatico-historical school, but has

* *Cyclopædia of Biblical, Theological, and Ecclesiastical Literature.* Prepared by Rev. JOHN McCLINTOCK, D. D., and JAMES STRONG, S. T. D. Vol. I.—A, B. New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers. 1867. pp. 947.

† *Manual of Biblical Interpretation.* By JOSEPH MUENSCHER, D. D. Gambier, Ohio. Printed for the Author. 1865.

not reached a clear mastery of the method of that school, and the results to which it leads. The consequence is a collection of canons, which are not classified or arranged at all, and which are in some respects contradictory. We notice a corresponding uncertainty in his own exegesis, both in the examples contained in the "Manual," and in his Commentary to the Book of Proverbs. (See the treatment of 1 Kings ii., on pp. iii. and iv. of the Introduction.) He quotes, in his chapter on "Rationalism," the canon "*Interpret the Bible as you would any other book*" (p. 50), to condemn it as a doctrine of that school. The chapter is very vague, and it is impossible to find out who are meant by Rationalists, as he does not approach to a definition. We doubt if there are not classes of persons, who, from *their* stand-point, would regard some portions of the work before us as rationalistic, and feel that the author had robbed them of much of the "richness" of the word of God. We shall do better therefore to dismiss these invidious party-names and judge principles and opinions on their merits. We turn now to page 85, and find that the author lays it down as a "general preliminary principle, that *the Bible should be interpreted as other books are interpreted*. The same laws which are considered legitimate and proper in regard to the explanation of other books are applicable to the Bible." He proceeds, however, to qualify this, to the effect, that the Bible is the inspired record of a supernatural revelation, and is therefore, in so far, not to be treated like other books. This qualification constitutes the difference between his canon and the one which he quotes from the Rationalists. We have then a distinction established between sacred and profane Hermeneutics. The Revelation of God is written with words, in a book, according to the rules of human language, yet its meaning is not to be elucidated by the same rules, by which we get at the meaning of other things of the same nature. The reason is because the Inspiration of the Bible is a "dogmatic law of interpretation,"—"an axiom in the science of Biblical Hermeneutics." Whence this axiom, however?—an axiom which our opponents deny, and which assumes the solution of the problem proposed? Do we get it from tradition? The author's views of tradition are too sound for us to expect an affirmative. From the authority of the Church? Neither will he probably affirm this. He would argue, we presume, with us, that it rests upon the claims and character of the book itself—and these we can only become acquainted with, through studying the book—*i. e.*, bringing our

science of interpretation to bear upon it. To assume, as our author does, from the outset, the inspiration of the Bible, is to make a postulate of that which is a result, and perhaps the last and highest result, of our science. It is not strange that such an inversion of the terms of the problem introduces confusion into the entire treatment of it. That classification of the branches of the science, which experience has shown to be necessary, in this, as in all other departments of learning, is here utterly neglected. The book claims to be a manual, and may, therefore, properly contain all that is necessary for an untrained student, but even on that account, it is more necessary that it should not become a mere jumble of unclassified rules, relating to the entire field of biblical science. Hermeneutics are one thing, Exegesis is another (the author himself distinguishes between them), and Biblical Theology is another. The rules for the right interpretation of written documents are the same for all cases. When ideas are expressed in words, and written in a book, the human mind has only one process for reaching them, whether their ultimate origin is divine or human. So too in Exegesis. The Exegete must scrutinize the passage, the verse, or even word which lies before him, for itself—not, indeed, in order to “put upon it such a construction as he thinks it will bear,” as our author (p. 206) says the Rationalists do—but in order to find out, in all sincerity, what that passage means to assert. If you must leave one portion of Scripture to compare others, it is evident that these others will require the comparison of still others, and those of others yet, and so on without end. We must go patiently through each by itself. The labor of comparing, systematizing, and reconciling, so far as may be, the result of all this, belongs to a third and especial stage of the work of biblical interpretation, and here it is that the inspiration of the authors first finds place to give authority to that which we have found in their works. Nothing is more dangerous than to begin by comparing, with a set purpose to reconcile, at all hazards; and between those who do this in the spirit of unenlightened harmonizers, and those who do it to inject their philosophical or theological theories into the text, there is really little to choose. We have preferred to call attention to those points which seem to us all-important for the interests of biblical science among us, rather than to pass over with general commendation those portions of the book which deserve it. We thank the author for the emphasis with which he maintains the position that Scripture is the

ultimate appeal from all creeds and dogmas. He cuts off uncompromisingly the time-honored overgrowth of allegorical, tropical, and other kindred interpretations. He calls theologians and clergymen to a more thorough study of the Scriptures, and exhorts them to make it the basis of all their instruction. He gives just weight to the principle that the student should be in harmony with the thought and feeling of the writer, so as to be capable of understanding his state of mind and intention. He establishes the claim that "a writer's language should be interpreted in conformity with his known character, previous history, habits of thought, opinions, religion, situation, and circumstances; and no principle foreign to the views of the writer should be allowed to exert an influence on the interpretation of his writing, whether philosophical or theological." (p. 233). All these are grand principles, which we are glad to see so positively affirmed, and which may be laid to heart by our students of theology with great advantage.

SADLER ON THE INCARNATION.*—This handsome volume treats of the great and central truth of the Christian system. It is written with earnestness and ability, and we sympathize most cordially with the aims of the author. In the discussion and defense of this theme he treats very fully not only of the attacks of avowed Rationalists, but also of the interpretations of such men as Jowett, Stanley, the author of *Ecce Homo*, and others of the so-called Broad Church party. In his notices of these writers he does not mean to be unfair in his judgment of their opinions. He desires to do entire justice to their honesty and to the value of the truths which they utter; still he somehow fails to put himself upon the same starting-point of inquiry as that from which they set off. We feel that he and they do not study the Scriptures after the same method, or interpret their contents by the same maxims; in short that he fails to do justice to them when he might and ought to, when he would, in fact, were it not that his conceptions of the Scriptures and of the proper method of studying their contents are strikingly unlike theirs. His own method is formal and dogmatic, theirs is historical and tentative. His spirit and genius connect him with an age that is past. They represent one that is pre-

* *Emmanuel: or, The Incarnation of the Son of God, the foundation of Immutible Truth.* By the Rev. M. J. SADLER, M. A., Prebendary of Wells, and Vicar of St. Paul's, Bedford. London: Bell & Daldy. 1867.

sent. While, then, we find in this work much important truth forcibly asserted and ably defended, we also miss in it much that, if present, would make it successfully supply the defects, and correct the errors of the very interesting but faulty school of writers whom it has chiefly in view.

CHADBOURNE'S NATURAL THEOLOGY.*—This work has some advantages over many others upon the same subject. The first is a more comprehensive selection of topics. The author is sufficiently well versed in the sciences of nature to speak with accuracy and authority upon each of them, and to draw his illustrations from all with equal freedom and success. The second is his knowledge of those views of Physics and Natural History which are usually urged in opposition to Christian Theism. He is also earnest and sincere in his treatment of the subject, and the views which he expresses are generally correct and well grounded. He is often very earnest and animated in his style, and rises towards an imaginative eloquence. For all these reasons the book is fitted to be popular and useful for general reading and as a text book. We cannot, however, assign to it any of the higher qualities of thought or diction which we desire to find in a work on this most important subject. It is, however, so difficult to find a book that contains so much matter on so great a variety of topics, that we have no reason to reject this as unworthy the attention of the public, but ought rather to accept it with thankfulness till a better treatise shall appear, written from the stand-point of modern science.

GARBETT ON INSPIRATION.†—This volume is an elaborate and apparently a candid attempt to vindicate a special theory of the Inspiration of the Scriptures. There is no want of ability on the part of the author, and his argument is elaborately constructed with the design to leave no difficulty unexplained or objection unnoticed. The great defect of the author, however, seems to be that he does not for a moment put himself in the place of the person who feels

* *Lectures on Natural Theology; or, Nature and the Bible from the same Author.* Delivered before the Lowell Institute, Boston. By P. A. CHADBOURNE, A. M., M. D., Professor of Natural History in Williams College, &c., &c. New York: G. P. Putnam & Son. 1867.

† *God's Word Written.* The Doctrine of the Inspiration of Holy Scripture explained and enforced. By the Rev. EDWARD GARBETT, M. A. Published by the American Tract Society, Boston.

the difficulties which he seeks to set aside. He does not read the Scriptures with a true historical spirit. He has not learned for a moment to appreciate their actual historic character. Hence his arguments, though satisfactory to those who have never felt any difficulties, do not in the least affect those who experience them. We welcome this book as an able representation of a certain theory of Inspiration; but we doubt the propriety of publishing a work of theological science under the auspices of the American Tract Society.

SCOTT'S "CHRIST OF THE APOSTLES CREED."*—This volume consists of a series of sermons on the principal points suggested by the Apostles Creed, with especial reference to the anti-Christian theories of the present day. The author writes with some vigor, but with great diffuseness, with much earnestness, and no little egotism, with some subtlety of analysis, but with little appreciation of the real difficulties that occasion modern unbelief. He has read extensively upon the themes of which he treats, but his critical power is not very conspicuous. While we do not doubt that these sermons were very useful to the audience which heard them, it does not seem to us that there was any very imperative reason which required that they should be published.

TAFEL ON SWEDENBORG.†—The editor of this volume has performed an excellent service, and one that will be gratefully appreciated. He has endeavored to exhibit his great master and oracle as a Philosopher and Man of Science. So much has been said upon this subject by different writers who were not of his faith, and such extravagant claims have been asserted for him, that it has become not only a great convenience, but almost a necessity to be able to determine the justice of these representations, without wading through the cumbrous volumes in which his wisdom lies concealed. Dr. Tafel has performed his task in a very acceptable and satisfactory way. The work is divided into two parts—the subjects of which are indicated in the title. The first part—Emmanuel Swedenborg the Philosopher—is made up chiefly of the

* *The Christ of the Apostles Creed. The Voice of the Church against Arianism, Strauss, and Renan, with an Appendix.* By the Rev. W. A. Scott, D. D. New York: Anson D. J. Randolph. 1867.

† *Emmanuel Swedenborg, as a Philosopher and Man of Science.* By RUDOLPH TAFEL, Ph. D. Chicago: E. B. Myers & Chandler. 1867.

testimonies of distinguished men of all classes and schools in respect to his philosophic genius. The second is a condensed statement of his scientific doctrines—under the following heads: Swedenborg's Theories of Form; Physiological Theories; Chemical Theories; Magnetic Theories; Astronomical Theories. This book will be welcome in all literary and scientific circles as a real addition to our stock of useful manuals.

DR GUTHRIE'S "OUT OF HARNESS."*—Anything from the pen of the eloquent Dr. Guthrie is certain to find readers. This volume of sketches was prepared by him when he was disabled from preaching; and was published in the Sunday Magazine, of which he is the editor. The sketches are all glowingly written, and very attractive of their kind. The religious and moral lessons are eloquently enforced.

MACMILLAN'S BIBLE TEACHINGS IN NATURE.†—This volume is written in a style of gorgeous description which is in itself not displeasing, though somewhat over-wrought. The religious lessons, which are derived from the teachings of nature, are all impressively enforced. Those of our readers who are fond of this kind of reading will find in this volume much to interest and edify them. Though the author gives abundant play to a somewhat luxuriant style, yet he is a well-instructed and devout man, and rarely oversteps the limits of good taste. The titles of the chapters will give some idea of the contents of the volume. Pleiades and Orion—Ice-Morsels—Grass—The Trees of the Lord—Corn—Blasting and Mildew—The Leaf—The Teaching of the Earth—The Vine and its Branches—Fading Leaves—The Root out of a Dry Ground—Agate Windows—Stones with Fair Colors—Foundations of Sapphires—No More Sun—The Law of Circularity, or Retrogression an Essential Element of Progress.

HOMILETICS AND PASTORAL THEOLOGY.‡—The science of Homiletics does not pretend to furnish the preacher with *thoughts*; but

* *Out of Harness; Sketches, Narrative and Descriptive.* By THOMAS GUTHRIE, D. D., editor of the "Sunday Magazine." New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1867.

† *Bible Teachings in Nature.* By the Rev. HUGH MACMILLAN. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1867.

‡ *Homiletics and Pastoral Theology.* By WILLIAM G. T. SHEDD, D. D., Baldwin Professor in Union Theological Seminary, New York City. New York: Charles Scribner & Co., 654 Broadway. 1867.

it aids his power of invention, teaches him the true method of thinking, and promotes the right arrangement, "lucidus ordo" of the discourse. It enables him to use his materials to the best advantage. A mind that will be killed by the study of the true principles of writing and speaking, cannot be a very strong one. It may be, indeed, that at first, in the application of the laws of rhetoric to sermonizing, and in the careful methodizing of thought, there will result some little loss of natural freedom, and there will perhaps appear something of the sense of art, but these objections will soon be obviated when a man relying supremely on higher help is sincerely resolved by every means, by the faithful cultivation of every talent, to make himself an effective preacher. He is bound to do this, if he consecrates himself to this work. This need of the thorough training of the mind for the purpose of effective preaching, Dr. Shedd sets forth in a convincing manner; he evidently has no sympathy with those loose notions now so prevalent, that while a man, in order to be successful in everything else that is difficult or worthy of attainment, must bend all his energies to it, and make thorough preparation, yet in preaching, the greatest and highest work of the human mind, very little study and preparation are required—or, that by some magical influence, a man is made all at once into an eloquent and persuasive preacher.

In treating of Homiletics, Dr. Shedd first discusses the relation of Sacred Eloquence to Biblical Exegesis, showing how vital are the connections of preaching with the truth itself which forms its subject-matter—that the true work of the preacher is to be the interpreter of the written Word. He is not to create truth, or to draw truth out from his own mind, but is simply to apprehend the truth revealed, and to be a pure medium of its communication to others. "The talent, then, which comprehends the revelation of the Eternal Mind, is not creative but exegetical. The etymology of the term exegesis implies a leading forth (*ἐξηγῆσαι*) into the light of a clear perception, of an idea that is shut up in human language. It supposes words,—words that are filled with thoughts that require to be conducted from behind the veil which covers them. Exegesis, therefore, implies a *written* word. It supposes a *written* revelation." p. 5. By this effort to comprehend and interpret the written word of God, the preacher acquires a freedom, freshness, and force that are utterly beyond his reach without it,

and that far exceed the powers of secular eloquence. Hence comes true *originality* in preaching.

"For, to recur to our definition of originality, the human intellect is stirred into profound and genial action, only as it receives an impression from something greater and grander than itself. If it adopts the egotism of Fichte, for example, and attempts to create from within itself, its action must be spasmodic and barren. To employ the often repeated comparison of Bacon, it is not the spider but the bee that is the truly original insect. Only as the sermonizer and the orator, by a critical analysis of the Biblical words, and their connections, saturates his mind with the Biblical elements (*σφοδρία*), and feeds upon revelation as the insect feeds upon foliage until every cell and tissue is colored with its food, will he discourse with freedom, suggestiveness, and energy." p. 14.

"Now, such an exegesis as this,—an exegesis of the Scriptures that is the result of 'finished' study, and that fills the soul with the very thoughts and spiritual energy of the holy men of old who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost,—is a well-spring of originality. The influence of it is strikingly illustrated by a comparison of the English pulpit of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, with that of the eighteenth. The minds of Hooker and Howe, of Taylor and South, of Barrow and Bates, were thoroughly imbued with the substance and spirit of the written revelation. It was an age of belief, of profound religious convictions, of linguistic, reverent, and contemplative study of the word of God. Secular literature itself was tinctured and tinged with the supernaturalism of the Bible. The plays of Shakespeare, the licentious plays of the old English stage, are full of the awful working of conscience. If men sinned they suffered for it; if they committed adultery they were burned in hell-fire therefor. This was the ethics, and this was the drama, of a period for which God was a living person, the Bible an inspired book, and the future life a solemn reality. The strong sense and healthy genius of England had not yet sophisticated itself into the denial of God's holiness, and God's revelation, and the authority of the human conscience. Men had not learned, as they have since, to rush into sin, and then adjust their creed to their passions. Look, now, into the sermonizing and eloquence of these English divines, and feel the freshness and freedom that stamp them instantaneously as original minds. They differ much in style. Some exhibit an involved and careless construction; others a pellucid and rhythmical flow; and one of

them, according to De Quincey, is the only rhetorician to whom, in company with Sir Thomas Brown (himself a reverent and biblical mind), 'it has been granted to open the trumpet-stop on the great organ of passion.' But all alike are profound religious thinkers, and all alike are suggestive and original discourses."

This intimate study of the Bible, this single and sincere aim to interpret its deep and life-giving truths, not only inspires original thinking and eloquence, but imparts also to preaching its real *authority*. Without this, it is human and weak; with this, it is armed with a divine power. It has a commanding tone. The preacher says with St. Paul, "I am not ashamed of the gospel of Christ; for it is the power of God."

"And certainly the age requires in its religious heralds and teachers that other characteristic of authority. If a man speaks at all, he must speak in the oracles of God; he must speak oracularly and positively. For the intellectual world is now an arena of contending ideas and systems. Think you that all the dogmatism of the time is within the precincts of theology and the Church? Think you that scepticism stands meek and hesitating, like the ass that Sterne describes, who seemed to invite abuse, and to say to every passer by, 'Don't kick me, but if you will you may?' No! all ideas, the false as well as the true, all systems, the heretical as well as the orthodox, are positive and assertory. It is no time, therefore, for Christianity,—the only system that has a right to say to the world, 'Thou shalt,' and 'Thou shalt not;' the only system that has a right to utter its high and authoritative, 'He that believeth shall be saved, and he that believeth not shall be damned,'—it is no time for that absolute and ultimate religion, in and by which this miserable and ruined race must live or bear no life, to be deprecatory, and 'borrow leave to be.'" p. 33.

This first chapter is the most characteristic and important one, for it strikes the key-note of the book. It is marked with the qualities of the author's forcible and pregnant style, enriched by great and varied learning, and illumined with the light of a vigorous and chastened imagination. The other chapters, equally suggestive, treat of familiar homiletical properties of style, maxims for sermonizing, different species of sermons, the plan of a sermon, extemporaneous preaching. A shorter treatise upon Pastoral Theology concludes this valuable volume, which is not only useful to the minister and theological student, but to every intelligent

Christian laborer in the same great field, as presenting the philosophy of preaching, or of bringing truth to bear upon the human mind with the greatest power and effect. The writer's method of treating this grave and difficult theme is not technical, nor is the work one which may be regarded as exhaustive of the subject when looked upon in a more purely practical light—as a systematic text-book or depository of the rules and principles of Homiletics—but rather as the well-weighed thoughts of a profound and earnest mind upon one of the greatest of all themes—the preaching of the gospel to sinful men that they may obtain eternal life.

HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL.

فروده's NINTH AND TENTH VOLUMES.*—These are the latest volumes of the series. In force of style, in dramatic skill of arrangement and presentation, in graphic portraiture of scenes and characters, they are equaled by few, and excelled, perhaps, by no histories in the English tongue. Macaulay is more oratorical and uniformly brilliant than Froude; but for this very reason the latter is more readable. The subject—the early years of Elizabeth's reign—involving the history of Mary, Queen of Scots, together with many other stirring passages in the great drama of European politics when Protestantism and Catholicism were in the midst of their terrible struggle, is a most attractive theme. Froude is fairer than in his previous volumes. The follies and sins of Elizabeth are laid bare without reserve, and without the sophistical apologies which were thrown over the crimes of her father. The character of the Scottish Queen is finely comprehended, and the successive steps in her career are vividly delineated. Murray and Knox are Froude's favorite Scotchmen. Among the counselors of Elizabeth, the genius of Burghley shines preëminent. Elizabeth, notwithstanding the tremendous difficulties surrounding her position, was guilty of a thousand follies from the ruinous consequences of which nothing but the unsurpassed patience and sagacity of her statesmen rescued her. Her conduct, for example, towards Scotland and the parties into which that country was divided, was systematically insincere. "She

* *History of England from the Fall of Wolsey to the Death of Elizabeth.* By JAMES ANTHONY FROUDE, M. A., late Fellow of Exeter College. Reign of Elizabeth, Volume III. New York: Charles Scribner and Company. 1867.

persisted," says the historian, "in her peculiar policy of breaking every promise by which she had bound herself." She was in fact a flagrant liar, and did not scruple, when she thought it politic, to swear to her falsehoods. Froude exhibits here, as in his former volumes, a vehement—we had almost said, childish—hostility to "dogmas in religion." He is fond of sneering at "theology," which he considers the grand source of evil among men. His declamation on these topics is too common-place and shallow to require formal refutation. "In the eyes of theologians," he says, "or in the eyes of historians who take their inspiration from theological systems, the saint changes into the devil and the devil into the saint, as the point of view is shifted from one creed to another." (Vol. ix., p. 587). But the great statesmen of England, in the age which Froude is describing, might in most cases be called theologians. Lord Bacon was a theologian. These petty flings are scarcely worthy of a place in a great historical work. In various places, Froude discovers a want of faith in the doctrines of the Christian system. He appears, however, to understand the need and the value of the Puritan movement. "It would have fared ill with England had there been no hotter blood there than filtered in the sluggish veins of the officials of the establishment." (Vol. x., p. 114). "But for the statesmen to whom they"—i. e., men like Whitgift—"refused to listen, and the Puritans whom they endeavored to destroy, the old religion would have come back on the country like a returning tide." (Vol. x., p. 117). What, we may stop to ask, would these indispensable Puritans have done, if they had been possessed of no more theology than Froude lays claim to, and had regarded religious doctrine with the same sort of contempt? Now and then, in the course of these volumes, we meet with a poor remark on other subjects. Thus (Vol. ix., p. 447) we read:—"Hard language about men whose work for good or ill has been long past should have no place in history. It is enough to relate what they did with such allowance as the circumstances and passions of the time can suggest." On the contrary, we hold that the historian should be fully alive to nobleness and meanness, to virtue and to vice, in the characters that pass before him in review; and that a capacity to enter with moral warmth into the transactions of by-gone days, and to utter righteous judgments, is an excellent quality in a historian. The moral earnestness of Dr. Arnold of Rugby made his review of the various characters of Roman history impressive

in this respect. It is to be regretted that along with the signal merits of Froude's work, there are not profounder and broader religious views underlying it.

GAYARRE'S PHILIP II. OF SPAIN.*—This is not a regular narrative of the events of Philip's reign, "but in a certain way a philosophical retrospect of what was most memorable in Spain during that period, as it was shaped by the controlling mind at the head of affairs." It is "an historical essay in its exhibition of results, while it really conveys to the reader the most noticeable facts upon which the various conclusions are established." It begins with a description of Philip's death from an agonizing and loathsome disease. The leading events of his reign are introduced in the course of the book, but the king is himself always the central figure. This volume is obviously founded on much historical study. It is in a high degree entertaining. The vigorous, imaginative style of the author not unfrequently runs into an excess of strength. Thus, of the massacre of St. Bartholomew, and of Philip's responsibility for it, we read:—"To him belongs the original idea, and he cannot justly be deprived of a copyright so authentically, and in due form registered in the records, and under the great seal of hell." (p. 41). "What of Scotland? * * Were not adultery and murder seated on her throne whilst round it the weird sisters, with their choppy fingers on their lips, led their hideous dance." (p. 86). This is certainly *strong* writing. The historical statements are not uniformly sustained by evidence. What proof is there that Queen Elizabeth had "paramours?" (p. 7). Notwithstanding these blemishes, Mr. Gayarré has given us a lively and instructive book, and if he occasionally soars too high, he never plods.

THE JESUITS IN NORTH AMERICA IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.†—Mr. Parkman's new volume—the second of the series—is not only a highly interesting narrative, but it is likewise a substantial contribution to our knowledge both of the Indian tribes,

* *Philip II. of Spain.* By CHARLES GAYARRE, Author of the History of Louisiana, &c. With an Introductory Letter by George Bancroft. New York: W. J. Widdleton. 1865.

† *The Jesuits in North America in the Sixteenth Century.* By FRANCIS PARKMAN, Author of "Pioneers of France in the New World." Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1867.

and of the self-devoted missionaries of the Roman Catholic Church, who labored for their conversion. The full contemporaneous reports of the Jesuit Fathers are the principal authority; but besides his diligent study of these invaluable documents, Mr. Parkman has extended his researches wherever there was light to be obtained upon his subject. He also possesses the advantage of a personal acquaintance with Indian life and Indian customs, as they exist at present among the remnants of the aboriginal inhabitants of America. To these most important qualifications for his task, he joins a simple, forcible, pleasing style of composition, and uncommon skill in the grouping of the incidents which he has to relate. The introductory chapter treats of the two great divisions of savage tribes, the Algonquins and the Iroquois, which were spread over "the vast tract of wilderness from the Mississippi to the Atlantic, and from the Carolinas to Hudson's Bay." Their mode of life, their homes, fortifications, method of treating diseases, their political and social organization, are concisely described. In regard to their religion, as on various other points, many popular notions respecting them are shown to be erroneous. "The primitive Indian," writes Mr. Parkman, "was as savage in his religion as in his life. He was divided between fetish worship and that next degree of religious development which consists in the worship of deities embodied in the human form. His conception of their attributes was such as might have been expected. His gods were no whit better than himself. Even when he borrows from Christianity the idea of a Supreme and Universal Spirit, his tendency is to reduce him to a local habitation and a bodily shape; and this tendency disappears only in tribes that have been long in contact with civilized white men. The primitive Indian, yielding his untutored homage to one All-pervading and Omnipotent Spirit, is a dream of poets, rhetoricians, and sentimentalists."

Mr. Parkman begins his narrative with a description of Quebec as it was in 1634, and of Father Le Jeune, and the incipient mission which the order of Jesus had planted on this spot, in the midst of the wilderness. This chapter is followed by an account of the origin and character of the Jesuit Society, together with a more particular account of Le Jeune, his education, his consecration to the missionary service, and the hardships which he suffered in the winter among the Indian hunters whom he joined for the purpose of acquiring their language, and laboring for their conversion. The establishment of the Huron mission, and the

adventures of the heroic Briebeuf and his companions, the settlement of a colony at Montreal, the wars between the Hurons and their implacable foes, the Iroquois, by whom they were at length exterminated, the wonderful sufferings, and still more wonderful fortitude of Isaac Jogues, Briebeuf, and other Jesuit martyrs, are among the leading topics of the subsequent chapters. The volume abounds in suggestive facts, which are not less adapted to interest the philosophical student of human nature and history than to entertain the general reader. In perusing it, we have seldom met with a remark to which we have been inclined to take exception. After an excellent description (pp. 319, 320) of the effects of religious effort among the Indians, the author says: "As for the religion which the Jesuits taught them, however Protestants may carp at it, it was the only form of Christianity likely to take root in their crude and barbarous nature." But were not the Protestant missions among the savages of North America, on the whole, as successful as those of the Jesuits? The remark, quoted above, is not sustained by evidence.

LIFE OF CARL RITTER.*—Mr. Gage's well known translations of Ritter's "Lectures on Comparative Geography," and his "Geographical Studies" have already associated him in the minds of American scholars with the name of the great philosopher and geographer, whose biography he gives to the world in the present volume. His position as a friend and pupil of Ritter, and his residence in Germany have given him unusual facilities for collecting the materials for his work, which has evidently been a labor of appreciative love. We have a full and interesting account of the early life of Ritter—his training in the institution at Schnepfenthal under the generous and enthusiastic Salzmann, who, however, failed to *recognize the possibilities of his pupil—his experiences* as an "educator" in the Hollweg family at Frankfort, whose two sons were under his exclusive direction for many years, and whose future career amply repaid his faithful and judicious care—and the very gradual, almost unconscious, development of his mind in the direction of the science of Physical Geography, to which his subsequent life was devoted, a science which owes its creation, in-

* *The Life of Carl Ritter*, late Professor of Geography in the University of Berlin. By W. L. GAGE, Editor of Ritter's *Sinaitic Peninsula and Palestine*, and Translator of his *Lectures on Comparative Geography*. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1867. 12mo. pp. 242.

deed, to his minute and exhaustive investigation of details, and his broad and philosophical generalizations. We could wish that the latter half of his long life of eighty years had been less hastily passed over—the period in which, as devoted to his special work as professor and author, he exercised so great an influence on the German mind, and did so much to win the admiring gratitude of all lovers of true science. During these years he unfolded in his lectures at the University of Berlin, and in his published works his method of treating Geographical studies, elevating what had before been a mere mass of dry, uninteresting details into a science, whose unity and comprehensiveness embraced not only all the physical facts of the globe on which we live, but showed their subordination to the moral and spiritual development of man, and their true significance as an unfolding of the Divine thought. He thus gave not only form and beauty to the class of geographical facts, but by his central idea of the working of a living God in all the conditions of historical development he spiritualized and ennobled the whole physical structure of the universe. His voluminous writings—too voluminous and full of details to attract the ordinary student even of physical science—remain a lasting monument to his thoroughness of investigation and his scientific method, but he exerted, perhaps, a greater influence on the world by the direct impression of his ideas and intellectual character on the large number of young men who filled his lecture room for successive years. His influence as a Christian scholar has impressed itself indelibly on the German mind and, indeed, upon the whole world of scholars; and we rejoice in everything which, like the present volume, helps us to a clearer idea of his inner life, and his life work.

PUBLICATIONS OF THE NARRAGANSETT CLUB. VOL. II.*—The Narragansett Club is a society for the publishing of books and documents pertaining to the history of Rhode Island. In respect to spelling and typography, their publications are a *fac simile* of the quaint originals. The second volume of the series is chiefly made up of "Master John Cotton's answer to Master Roger Williams." This old tract closes the controversy between Cotton and Williams, and is highly important for the light which it throws on the cause of the banishment of Williams from Massachusetts. It is edited

* *Publications of the Narragansett Club.* (New Series.) Volume II. Providence, R. I. MDCCCLXVII.

by Rev. J. L. Diman, Professor of History in Brown University; and the value of it is greatly enhanced by his instructive preface, and by the judicious and learned notes which accompany the text. Professor Diman expresses the decided opinion that among the grounds of the exile of Williams, his doctrine respecting the legitimate province of the civil magistrate was entirely subordinate, and that "his rigid principle of separation was what made him suspected and disliked." This peculiarity, along with his denial of the validity of the king's patent, whereby the colony held its lands, and the zealous, not to say disorderly, method of asserting his notions on these topics, were the real causes of his banishment. His principle in regard to the restricted function of the State was then quite in the background, and was not brought forward prominently until a later day. Professor Diman's observations on this subject deserve the attention of all who are interested in New England history. They are founded on a careful examination of the sources of knowledge on the subject, by one who is evidently accustomed to weigh historical evidence in a dispassionate and discriminating spirit.

The present volume contains, in addition to Cotton's pamphlet, a reprint of the "Queries of Highest Consideration," addressed by Roger Williams to Presbyterians and Independents in England, in relation to Church Polity and kindred matters. It is a curious and interesting monument of the author's character, as well as a summary of his tenets. The editor, Mr. R. A. Guild, the esteemed Librarian of Brown University, having ascertained that a copy of this old tract is in the British Museum, caused it to be transcribed, and now puts it forth with such explanatory remarks as render its contents and its design intelligible to readers of the present day. Mr. Guild deserves congratulation for the enterprise he has shown in this matter, as well as for the manner in which he has performed his task of editing this exhumed treatise.

BELLES LETTRES.

TEGNER'S FRITHIOF'S SAGA.*—Some eighteen years ago this strange and wild poem came to our notice, in an English translation printed at Stockholm. It was like the opening of a new

* *Frithiof's Saga*. From the Swedish of Esaias Tegner, Bishop of Wexiä. By the Rev. WILLIAM LEWREY BLACKLEY, M. A. First American Edition. Edited by Bayard Taylor. New York: Leypoldt & Holt. 1867.

world, the world of imagination created by the wild Northmen, on the stormy coasts of Scandinavia, in the solitary wildness of its fir-clad mountains, or abroad upon the tempestuous waves of the Northern seas. Mingled with impressions of these scenes were the tender emotions of faithful love triumphing over every obstacle, and unextinguished by long delay or scenes of bloody strife. The poem revealed to us the simplicity and nobleness of the hearts of the Scandinavians, who have always been too much overlooked by the more cultivated and wealthier races at the south. We rejoice that this beautiful poem is brought within the reach of the American people. We do not doubt that it will be received with favor, and that its wild melody and its tender pathos will win for it the response of many hearts.

MR. SCHUYLER'S TRANSLATION FROM THE RUSSIAN.*—A novel from the Russian is a novelty indeed. In fact this is the first instance, we believe, in which an English translation has been made from any entire work of fiction in that language. The novelty of the attempt to render Russian fiction into English would of itself excite the curiosity—even if nothing were anticipated except a certain insight into the workings of the Russian mind, and a transcript from Russian life. We opened this volume moved by this vague curiosity, and scarcely expecting to find anything in the plot or the characters which would interest, much less excite. We confess to have been surprised to find ourselves at once seized upon by both characters and plot, and carried forward to the end at a single sitting. The story has all the interest of a superior modern novel, added to the peculiar zest which is imparted from its pictures of Russian domestic and social life. Some of the characters described could only have existed in Russia. Some of the scenes described could have occurred in no other country. In painting these characters, and describing these scenes, the writer has showed no little skill and sensibility. A special interest arises also from the circumstance that his tale represents Russia in its state of transition from the old to the new, in respect to institutions and principles. Some of the best drawn characters are the new men, the men formed by the new modes of thought and feeling that have come in from France and Germany. For all these rea-

* *Fathers and Sons*. A Novel by Ivan Sergheievitch Turgenev. Translated from the Russian. With the approval of the Author. By EUGENE SCHUYLER. Ph. D. New York: Leypoldt & Holt. 1867.

sons the book has an uncommon interest. The translation is in general remarkably well executed. The diction is simple, flowing, and thoroughly English. We can recall no translation of a German novel which is so successfully done, and the difficulties encountered and overcome by Mr. Schuyler, we are assured, were formidable in no slight degree.

HELENA'S HOUSEHOLD.*—A good historical novel is very difficult to write, but none the less desirable or valuable for that reason. To write a good historical novel of ancient life, and make the impression clear and vivid of the men and manners of other times is still more difficult. This anonymous tale gives Roman life just at the time when Christianity was introduced to the Eternal City. As a tale it is well wrought and successfully sustained, and as an instructive picture of the manners, the government, the social and domestic life, the morals, the religion, and the situation of the times, it has very great merit. We wish for it a very general circulation.

HOMESPUN.†—This is a work of real genius, a prose poem, written by a man with a clear head and a warm heart, who can both feel and describe the excellence and dignity there is in the "plain living and high thinking," that once characterized country life in New England, and that are not yet wholly outworn or outgrown. Mr. Lackland ought at once to receive a farm of the best quality in the quietest of New England villages, as the appropriate reward of his attempt to appreciate justly, and to describe worthily what has been depreciated and dishonored so often and by so many. We cannot convey to our readers any just impression of the many graphic sketches, all taken from life, of the most characteristic personages, events, and scenes with which New England formerly abounded. They are worthy of Crabbe in careful minuteness and honest truth, while for humor and pathos they surpass him. Let all our readers who have ever known New England country life buy and read this book, and they will not deem our praise excessive.

* *Helena's Household*; a Tale of Rome in the First Century. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1867.

† *Homespun*; or, *Five and Twenty Years Ago*. By THOMAS LACKLAND. New York: Hard & Houghton. 1867.

MISCELLANEOUS.

THE DUKE OF ARGYLL ON THE REIGN OF LAW.*—This interesting and timely volume has already reached a fifth edition in Great Britain in the course of a few months, but is yet little known in this country. The subject of which it treats is fundamental to all philosophy both of nature and religion, and is therefore at all times of the utmost importance. In these times it is the subject of all others which deserves to be carefully considered and profoundly studied—for the questions concerning it agitate the minds of all men of scientific thought. Is law supreme in nature and over spirit, or does law itself indicate and pay homage to a lawgiver? Is law blind with an undiscerning force, or is law in all its forms of action illumined and directed by a discerning and rational mind? Is law ever suspended, or set aside, or overborne, or must we believe that its reign is universal, despotic, and uncontrolled? Does science rightly assume that law is invariable by an axiom which she intuitively discerns, and which she cannot and does not need to prove, or must science seek a reason for this assumption in those other axioms which subordinate law itself to intelligent will? Questions like these force themselves upon the attention of every scientific man who has the most superficial conception of the relations of science itself to the other forms of knowledge, or to his faith, or to his no faith. They are no longer the peculiar themes of the schools of metaphysics, but have forced the most "positive" and material of philosophies to become intensely metaphysical, even in spite of their own disclaimers, and against their most inveterate prejudices. Theology cannot avoid them, nor ignore them, nor despise them, nor contend against them. Theology must keep herself abreast with the thinking of the times. She must ask herself whether true science is Theistic or Atheistic, and if she discerns that the science of the day is Antitheistic she must show, in a scientific spirit and by scientific methods, that it is so far unscientific.

The "Reign of Law" is designed by the author to meet the demands which we have described, and to answer all these questions in a scientific spirit. Though the views expressed, and the arguments employed, are all in favor of faith and Christian theol-

* *The Reign of Law.* By the DUKE OF ARGYLL. Fifth Edition. Alexander Strahan, London. 1887. George Routledge & Sons, 416 Broome Street, New York, Agents for the United States.

ogy, yet no one can complain of any unduly biasing tendency, or a sermonizing tone. The discussions are cool, rigid, and impartial. Not even the most arrogant and exclusive positivists can complain; none of them have complained of any unfairness in the representations of their views by the distinguished author. The clearness of the author is admirable. His method is lucid. His language is perfectly transparent. His illustrations are all well-chosen. We dare not say that on every point he has removed all difficulty, or answered every inquiry, but we can say that no volume has been published upon this subject in the English language, for a score of years, which can be read with more pleasure and profit than this. We trust that the fact that it has not been reprinted will not hinder its general circulation in our country.

JOUBERT'S SELECT THOUGHTS.*—This little volume is worth its weight in gold. It has astonished us not a little for the point and brilliancy, the elevation, and the piety of the brief sayings which it records. We have been, if possible, still more astonished that a man like Joubert could have lived in the stormy periods of the Revolution and the Empire, and have kept his faith and his temper, his wit and his eloquence, during those dreary and corrupting years. We have abundant reason to thank Mr. Calvert for the pains he has taken with this volume.

MISS COBBE'S WORK AND PLAY.†—Miss Cobbe always writes earnestly, even when she writes bad theology. We cannot help liking her spirit and admiring her intellect, even when we disagree with her opinions. This volume consists of miscellaneous Articles, all of which, except one, have been previously published in the English and American journals. The topics are very various, as will be inferred from the titles, viz.: Public Morality and its Teachers—The Indigent Class—The Brahmo Samaj—The Fallacies of Memory—The Fenian Idea—A Day at Adelsberg—A Lady's Adventure in the Great Pyramid—The Diablerets—The State Vault of Christ Church—The Shadow of Death—Alured—The Spectral Rout—The Humor of Various Nations—The Fenians of Ballybog-mucky.

* *Joubert. Some of the "Thoughts" of Joseph Joubert.* Translated by GEORGE H. CALVERT. Preceded by a notice of Joubert by the Translator. Boston: William V. Spencer. 1867.

† *Hours of Work and Play.* By FRANCES POWER COBBE. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1867.

ESSAYS, REPRINTED FROM "THE NATION."*—We are glad to avail ourselves of the occasion offered by these sensible and agreeable essays, which are selected from the columns of "The Nation," to express the satisfaction which all educated men must feel in the establishment of a weekly journal so able, and, at the same time, so moderate and high-toned as "the Nation" has thus far proved itself to be. The combination of literary and political discussions of so uncommon excellence, free from vulgarity and flippancy, may almost be said to mark an epoch in American journalism. The only qualification to be made in this commendation relates to the reviews which bear on the great subjects of Natural Religion. These appear to have fallen into the hands of some disciple of Comte, who questions the validity of the argument from final causes. A journal like "the Nation" should keep clear of little philosophical coteries, especially when they dispute the verdicts of the general reason of mankind.

GOULD'S GOOD ENGLISH.†—Here we have another book designed to remind us of the mistakes we are liable to fall into in using our mother-tongue. Such Mentors have been rather numerous of late, and if the present generation grows up to talk English badly, it will not be for lack of warnings to the contrary. On the whole, we can commend Mr. Gould's work. The greater part of his teachings are sound and useful. He is disposed, it is true, like all his craft, to exaggerate somewhat the importance of his office, and the heinousness of slight offenses against the rules of established usage. But there is little harm in that. Books of this class are a subordinate part of the apparatus for maintaining unity and uniformity of speech in a cultivated community, and if they did not overstate their own claims and merits, they might fail to win even as much attention as is fairly due them. The tendencies in language to change and corruption may be indefinitely checked, but cannot be wholly put down; the purists themselves, when they have done their best, must philosophically assent to what they are powerless to prevent, consoling themselves by remembering that, after all, the whole history of human speech has been a succession of inaccuracies committed, of swervings from established usage.

* *Critical and Social Essays*. Reprinted from the New York Nation. New York: Leypoldt & Holt. 1867.

† *Good English; or, Popular Errors in Language*. By EDWARD S. GOULD. New York: W. J. Widdleton. 1867. 12mo. pp. v., 328.

while yet no language of a people that thought well and nobly has failed to grow all the time more worthy; and that our English, which we so value and praise, is the one among all modern tongues which has undergone the most sweeping disintegration and replacement, grammatical and lexical. To think clearly and write unaffectedly is what we have to aim at most earnestly; if we do that our language will take care of itself.

Mr. Gould's style is quite lively, sometimes even too lively; it often verges on the strained or the flippant. Now and then his learning is a little at fault, as when he rails at the word *stand-point* through two or three pages, evidently without a suspicion that it is simply an out-and-out transfer from the German. We do not regard it as a necessary or a desirable addition to our stores of English expression, but we should not care to oppose it so desperately as does our author. Still less can we sympathize with his virulent anti-Websterism. The vehemence with which he assails the orthographic innovations of our late respected townsman is so excessive as to wear a shade of the ludicrous in its aspect. It smacks of the real orthographic purist, to whom an established mode of spelling is an integral and sacred part of language. But, in our view, language is something uttered by the voice and addressed to the ear; a mode of writing is quite another thing, being solely a means of making spoken language apprehensible by the eye, instead of the ear alone; and it is valuable in proportion as it simply and conveniently performs this duty—and practical convenience, certainly, is not a virtue which can be claimed as distinguishing our present orthography. We ourselves are conscious of a feeling of gratitude to Webster for his practical denial of the inviolability of the written word—a feeling quite independent of the value of the special reforms proposed by him.

The lecture on clerical elocution, with which Mr. Gould has helped to fill out his volume, would have pleased us better if it had been less exclusively addressed to, and adapted to the needs of, clergymen of the Episcopalian denomination. It gives a sectarian aspect to a work in other respects addressed to the whole public of educated men.

STUART'S EDITION OF CÆSAR'S COMMENTARIES.*—This is a very inviting little volume for the school-boy who is about to read

* *Cassii Julii Cæsaris Commentarii de Bello Gallico.* With explanatory notes, by GEORGE STUART, A. M., Professor of the Latin Language in the Central High School of Philadelphia.

his first Latin author. It is printed on large, clear type, on good paper, is neatly bound, and is furnished with about seventy pages of condensed notes and a map of Gaul. We are not prepared to pass an absolute judgment on the correctness and value of the notes, for such a judgment should not be declared without a more minute examination of the whole than we have had time to make. But it is noticeable that they give the needed information without waste of words, and that there is, as there should be, a multitude of references to the grammars, which indicate that the object in studying Cæsar is rather to learn Latin than to read the book.

It is an interesting fact that the great Cæsar should have secured for himself a greater number of readers than any other Latin author, by having written the best book to use in beginning to learn that language. For aside from the interest which the narrative is adapted to awaken, and the great historical value of the narrative itself, the Commentaries are distinguished for the simplicity and perspicuity of their style, while the purity of Latin entitles them to a place by the side of the works of Cicero.

PROFESSOR HOPPIN'S TRAVELS IN ENGLAND.*—Professor Hoppin has had excellent opportunities for seeing England. He did not hurry from point to point, like most of the eager sight-seers who visit foreign parts, but lingered in interesting places long enough to become familiar with their characteristic features and associations. His love of natural scenery led him to seek out those portions of England which in this respect are most attractive, and his powers of felicitous description enable him to depict them with remarkable fidelity. The account which he gives of the different cathedrals of England is marked by a discriminating, yet appreciative taste. The anecdotes of his intercourse with the English people, of his interviews with distinguished persons, and of the impression made on him by the noted preachers whom he heard, are among the most entertaining passages of the volume. There breathes everywhere in its pages the spirit of a cultivated observer, catholic but penetrating in his judgments, modest in the expression of his opinions, and seeking material for admiration rather than for fault-finding. The cordial reception this unpretending volume is receiving is creditable to the public taste.

* *Old England; its Scenery, Art, and People.* By JAMES M. HOPPIN, Professor in Yale College. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 1867.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

The Year of Prayer: being Family Prayers for the Christian Year, suited to the services and commemorations of the Church. By Henry Alford, D. D., Dean of Canterbury. pp. xxxi., 283. London and New York: Alexander Strahan.

The Foundations of our Faith: Ten Papers read before a mixed audience of men. By Professors Anserien, Gess, and others. pp. 279. London and New York: Alexander Strahan.

Three Phases of Christian Love. By Lady Herbert. pp. viii., 315. New York: Lawrence Kehoe.

Manual of the Lives of the Popes, from St. Peter to Pius IX. By John Charles Earle, B. A. pp. x., 332.

The Progress of Doctrine in the New Testament. In eight lectures on the Bampton Foundation. By Thomas D. Bernard. From the Second London Edition, with improvements. 12mo. pp. 258. Boston: Gould & Lincoln.

First Historical Transformations of Christianity. From the French of Athanasie Coquerel the Younger. By E. P. Evans, Ph. D., Professor of Modern Languages and Literature in the University of Michigan. Boston: W. V. Spencer. 1867. 12mo. pp. 264.

The Redeemer: a Sketch of the History of Redemption. By Edmond de Pressensé. Translated from the Second Edition by Rev. J. H. Meyers, D. D. American Tract Society, Boston. 12mo. pp. 412.

When were our Gospels Written? an argument by Constantine Tischendorf. With a narrative of the Discovery of the Sinaitic Manuscript. 18mo. pp. 132. American Tract Society, New York.

The Word. The House of Israel. By the author of "Wide, Wide World." New York: R. Carter & Brothers. 1867. 12mo. pp. 501.

Classic Baptism. An inquiry into the meaning of the word *Baptizo*, as determined by the usage of Classical Greek Writers. By James W. Dale, Pastor of the Media Presbyterian Church, Delaware County, Penn. Boston: Draper & Halliday. 1867. 8vo. pp. 354. Price \$3.50.

The Church Hymn Book. Edited by William Salter, of Burlington, Iowa. 12mo. pp. 284.

Yesterday, To-day, and For Ever. A Poem, in Twelve Books. By Edward Henry Bickersteth, M. A., Incumbent of Christ Church, Hampstead, and Chaplain to the Bishop of Ripon. New York: R. Carter & Brothers. 1867. 12mo. pp. 427.

Remarkable Characters and Places of the Holy Land: comprising an account of Patriarchs, Judges, Prophets, Apostles, Women, Warriors, Poets, and Kings. With descriptions of ancient cities and venerated shrines. By Charles W. Elliott, author of the "New England History," etc., etc. With articles from Theodore D. Woolsey, LL. D.; Right Rev. Thomas Clark, D. D.; Rev. Joseph Cummings, D. D.; Rev. Charles A. Stoddard; Rev. S. F. Smith, D. D.; Rev. William Adams, D. D.; Rev. Henry Ward Beecher. Illustrated with steel engravings. Hartford, Connecticut: J. B. Burr & Co. 1867. Large 8vo. pp. 640.

Bogatky's Golden Treasury. R. Carter & Brothers. 1867. 24mo. pp. 384.

Our Father's Business. By Thomas Guthrie, D. D. 12mo. pp. 278.

Liber Librorum; its Structure, Limitations, and Purpose. A friendly communication to a reluctant sceptic. New York: C. Scribner & Co. 16mo. pp. 232.

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The Twelve Decisive Battles of the War; or History of the Eastern and Western Campaigns in relation to the actions that decided their issue. By William Swinton, author of "Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac." New York: Dick & Fitzgerald. pp. 520.

The Popham Colony. A Discussion of its Historical Claims. With a bibliography of the subject. Boston: Wiggin & Hunt. 8vo. pp. 72.

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Literary Life of J. K. Paulding. Compiled by his son, W. J. Paulding. 8vo. pp. 397. New York: O. Scribner & Co.

Joseph Reed: a Historical Essay. By George Bancroft. New York: W. J. Widdleton. 1867. pp. 64.

Correspondence and Remarks upon Bancroft's History of the Northern Campaign of 1777, and the character of Major-General Philip Schuyler. By George L. Schuyler. New York: David G. Francis, 506 Broadway. 1867.

A Criticism on Mr. William B. Reed's Aspersions of the Character of Dr. B. Rush, with an incidental consideration of Gen. Joseph Reed's Character. By a member of the Philadelphia Bar (J. C. Johnson). Philadelphia: Collins. 8vo. pp. 61.

The English Exile; or, William Tyndale at Home and Abroad. By Mrs. S. T. Martyn. American Tract Society, New York. 12mo. pp. 237.

Instant Glory, with a short biographical notice of the late Mrs. Winslow. By Octavius Winslow, D. D. 32mo. pp. 125

BELLES LETTRES.

The Prose Tales of Edgar Allan Poe. 2 vols. pp. vi., 483; vi., 498. New York: W. J. Widdleton.

The Poetical Works of Henry Wadsworth Longfellow. pp. viii, 363. [Diamond Edition]. Boston: Ticknor & Fields.

May Day, and other Pieces. By Ralph Waldo Emerson. pp. iv., 205. Boston: Ticknor & Fields.

Rural Studies, with Hints for Country Places. By the Author of "My Farm of Edgewood." pp. iv., 295. New York: Charles Scribner & Co.

Miss Ravenel's Conversion from Secession to Loyalty. By J. W. DeForest. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1867. 12mo. pp. 521.

The Man with the Broken Ear. From the French of Edmond About. By Henry Holt. New York: Leypoldt & Holt. 1867. Square 16mo. pp. 254.

Dickens' Works. Nicholas Nickleby and Martin Chuzzlewit. Diamond Edition. Boston: Ticknor & Fields.

Donald Fraser. By the Author of "Bertie Lee." New York: R. Carter & Brothers. 1867. 16mo. pp. 224.

TRAVELS.

A Journey to Ashango-Land; and Further Penetration into Equatorial Africa. By Paul B. Du Chaillu. 8vo. pp. xxiv., 501. New York: D. Appleton & Co.

Appleton's Hand-Book of Northern Travel.—The Northern Tour; being a Guide through New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, Maine, New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana,

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MISCELLANEOUS.

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T H E

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ARTICLE I.—THE DARWINIAN THEORY OF THE
ORIGIN OF SPECIES.

THE whole range of natural science presents no more interesting question than that of the origin of the various forms of life which have flourished in different regions and at different periods. The generally received opinion is; that each species of organism is the result of a special exertion of creative power. The opposition to this view presents itself in the theories of Spontaneous Generation and Transmutation of Species. Of these theories, the former teaches that exceedingly simple organic forms are produced from dead matter by virtue of certain laws or forces inherent in matter. The latter theory teaches that by natural processes of variation one specific type may give rise to another, and thus the great variety of organized existences may have been derived from one or few original forms. The latter theory alone comes strictly within the province of this Article, as Darwin and some of the ablest of his followers unhesitatingly reject the doctrine of spontaneous generation; yet the two views are so naturally associated as constituting together a complete naturalistic theory of the ori-

gin of life, and are thus in common adopted or rejected by so large a number of thinkers, that a discussion of the one question cannot be considered complete without some allusion to the other. Especially is this the case in view of Professor H. J. Clark's recent attempt to deduce the transmutation of species as a corollary of spontaneous generation, considering the latter view as proved by the experiments of Professor Wyman. The result of these experiments is regarded by their distinguished author as only equivocal. And, when we consider how contrary to universal experience is the alleged fact, how in all the history of biological science numberless supposed instances of spontaneous generation have disappeared one by one before more accurate investigation, how numerous and important are the grounds of uncertainty in regard to the experiments in question, we cannot accept a doctrine resting on so shadowy a foundation. But, even admitting spontaneous generation, transmutation by no means follows as a logical inference. The two theories naturally suggest each other, but such suggestion is very far from scientific proof. Clark's argument for transmutation involves, then, the twofold fallacy of an illogical conclusion from a false premise.

As the question of permanence or mutability is involved in the very definition of a species, it will be proper here to consider some of the definitions which have been given. The orthodox view is embodied in the words of Linnæus: "*Species tot sunt, quot diversas formas ab initio produxit Infinitum Ens; quæ formæ, secundum generationis inditas leges, produxere plures, at sibi semper similes.*"* A species has been defined as a group of individuals descended from a common pair. In order to avoid a disputed question, this definition may be modified as follows: a group of individuals presenting no structural or physiological differences incompatible with possible community of descent. The metaphysical idea which underlies this physical conception is expressed by Professor Dana as "a specific amount or condition of concentered force defined in the act or law of creation."† This definition prac-

* Phil. Bot., 99, 157.

† "Thoughts on Species." Am. Jour. Sci., [2], Vol. xxiv., p. 304.

tically coincides with the preceding, for Dana finds in the phenomena of hybridism the criterion of specific identity or diversity.* Radically in opposition to these views, the Transmutationists maintain that a species is but a convenient category under which to group all individuals presenting a certain degree of similarity in structure and physiological relations. On this view species differ from varieties on the one hand, and from genera on the other, only in degree. Varieties are, according to Darwin, "incipient species," and may become true species—that is, may by further variation develop a character so different from that of the parent species as to be worthy of a separate name and place in our systematic arrangements. In like manner species may be developed into genera, genera into families, &c. The position of Agassiz on this question is peculiar. In common with the Transmutationists, he denies that species have any other objective reality than groups of higher degree. In common with the orthodox party, he maintains the permanence of specific types.

The doctrine of the transmutation of species has been brought forward at various times by various authors. Its most prominent advocates before the time of Darwin had been Lamarck and the anonymous author of the "Vestiges of Creation." While these and other authors have agreed on the general principle of the origin of species by descent with modification, they have assigned different causes for the extreme variation required by this theory. Lamarck "attributed something to the direct action of the physical conditions of life, something to the crossing of already existing forms, and much to use and disuse, that is, to the effects of habit. He likewise believed in a law of progressive development."† The author of the "Vestiges" founded on embryological facts and fictions an hypothesis still more fanciful. But these and all other forms of the development theory, except that proposed by Darwin, have been thoroughly exploded, and are of interest now only as a part of the history of science. But the question has been

* "Thoughts on Species." *Am. Jour. Sci.*, [2], Vol. xxiv., p. 309.

† Darwin on "Origin of Species," p. xiv. (References to this work are in all cases to the fourth English edition).

placed in an entirely different light by the publication of Mr. Darwin's work "On the Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life." No book that has appeared during the present century, has aroused more of earnest discussion, or done more to stimulate scientific investigation. Whether its views prove true or false, the originality of the whole conception, the immense learning which is brought to bear upon the argument, the boldness with which every difficulty is encountered, the mingled candor and ingenuity with which objections are answered, will make this work the crowning glory of one already eminent in scientific investigation.

A brief analysis of the Darwinian theory should here be given. The effects of variation under domestication are first discussed, showing what effects man has produced by means of selective breeding, that selection being in some cases methodical, in others unconscious. It is then shown that variation occurs to some extent under nature, though its causes and laws are little understood, and that all variations tend more or less strongly to be inherited. From the high geometrical ratio in which all organic beings tend to increase, it follows that many more individuals are produced than can possibly survive. Hence every individual is exposed to what Darwin very fitly styles the "struggle for life"—a struggle which, consciously or unconsciously, is going on continually with rivals, enemies, and the forces of inorganic nature. If, then, any variation gives to the individual any advantage in the struggle for life, as, for instance, by enabling him more readily to secure his proper food, or to escape his natural enemies, that individual would be more likely to survive than his less fortunately constituted brethren. He would thus be naturally selected to propagate his kind; and, in the ordinary course of inheritance, his peculiarities would tend to be transmitted to his descendants. Successive variations in any desirable direction would thus be accumulated. As the same species might be exposed to different conditions in different portions of its range, this process of variation and natural selection might take various directions, producing divergence of character. As the improved forms would come into competition with the parent forms, the result

would generally be the extinction of the latter. Thus individual variations might give rise to well-marked varieties, and varieties might be further differentiated into species. How far the theory may be carried Darwin is a little uncertain. Positive that each of the great branches of the organic kingdoms is composed of the modified descendants of a common ancestor, he believes "that animals have descended from at most only four or five progenitors, and plants from an equal or lesser number." * But he is inclined to go further, and it does not seem to him incredible "that from some such low and intermediate form [as the spores of algæ], both animals and plants may have been developed; and, if we admit this, we must admit that all the organic beings which have ever lived on this earth may have descended from some one primordial form." †

It is much to be regretted that the discussion of this question has often assumed a character rather theological than scientific. The pulpit and the religious press have generally been far more ready to denounce the Darwinian theory as materialistic and atheistic, than to consider the scientific evidences on which it rests. Although no one who has at heart the highest welfare of humanity can speak otherwise than with respect of any honest effort to support the cause of Christianity, we must protest against the course which theological writers on Darwinism have usually taken. Science must be free to investigate any subject in nature, and to form any theory which the facts may warrant. It is the spirit of the Inquisition which seeks to terrify the student of science by the cry of heresy. The age has passed when such attempts could be successful. Alas, that such attempts should still be made! The course of these theologians is as prejudicial to the interests of religion, as it is contrary to the spirit of science. It is no service to a good cause to teach men that the truth of Christianity is dependent on the decision of a still doubtful question in science. The whole history of philosophy,—the shameful retreat of the church from point to point, after each vain endeavor to check the progress of science,—the noble minds who after each scientific discovery have been led to reject the faith which its recognized expounders had

* "Origin of Species," p. 570.

† Ibid., p. 571.

founded on scientific error—driven into infidelity, not by the supposed infidel tendencies of science, but by the folly of Christian teachers—ought long ago to have taught the lesson which the church seems still so slow to learn. For the sake of religion as well as science, let scientific questions be discussed and settled on purely scientific grounds. Theology may then use the results of scientific research, to illustrate and enforce the truths of religion.

The great strength of the Darwinian theory, as of any theory of development, lies in its coincidence with the general spirit and tendency of science. It is the aim of science to narrow the domain of the supernatural, by bringing all phenomena within the scope of natural laws and secondary causes. The savage sees a special miracle in every unusual phenomenon—the earthquake, the volcanic eruption, the eclipses. The man of science discusses the laws of volcanic phenomena, and calculates the periodicity of eclipses. Things which seem most irregular and capricious—the course of the winds, the arrangement of foliage, the forms of continents, the position of mountains, plains, lakes, and deserts—are seen to be determined by laws as changeless as those which fix the orbits of the planets. This tendency of science is sometimes condemned as atheistical, but it is perfectly consistent with the purest theism. For God works in nature no less than in the supernatural. The difference which we recognize between the two, is merely subjective. Any effect of divine power which can be embraced in the formulas of science, we call natural; those which cannot be thus formulated, we call supernatural or miraculous. As every chain of secondary causes must have a beginning in the fiat of the First Cause, there must be a limit at which the natural passes into the supernatural. At this point science must terminate. But this limit is to be determined by scientific investigation, not prescribed by philosophic dogmatism. Science has repeatedly passed the supposed boundaries of possible discovery. Whether, in any particular direction, the real limit of scientific progress is already reached, or infinitely remote, no one can a priori determine. But the latter must always be assumed till the former is proved. Thus, in the case before us, it may be that we shall be compelled to admit half a million

distinct miracles to account for the phenomena of organic nature, but it is clearly the duty of science to seek for some other explanation.

This tendency of science is well illustrated in the almost universal acceptance of the nebular theory, with which the Darwinian hypothesis has many points of analogy. The history of the former controversy furnishes a sort of judicial precedent to aid our decision in the latter. We must notice, however, one point in which the analogy between the two theories strikingly fails. If the nebular theory is true for a single system or for a single orb, it is equally true for the whole universe. The extension of its application involves no new difficulties. Darwinism, on the contrary, is beset at each step with continually accumulating difficulty. That Darwin has assigned a sufficient cause for the production of varieties, will hardly be doubted. Whether he can account in the same way for the origin of species, is a debatable question. And, as we apply the theory to the production successively of genera, families, orders, classes, sub-kingdoms, and kingdoms, the difficulties under which it labors are enormously increased.

Before passing from these general views to a more special examination of the evidence, it is necessary to settle precisely what must be proved in order to entitle the hypothesis in question to our acceptance. It is often said that the burden of proof must devolve upon the new theory, and many people seem to imagine that a new theory requires for its support a kind and degree of evidence entirely different from that which would suffice in the case of an old theory. This spirit of conservatism, while it is exceedingly useful in practical matters, should have little weight in purely theoretical investigations. The truth of a doctrine depends not on its age: novelty is no synonym for error, or even for improbability. It is commonly said that it will be time to believe in Darwinism when we see an ape turning into a man; and even so able a thinker as Agassiz has condescended to argue in a manner somewhat similar. But historical proof is not to be required in hypothetical reasoning. The questions by which an hypothesis is to be tried, are these:—Is the cause assigned for the phenomena a *vera causa*? Is it competent to produce in kind and degree

the effects required? Can the phenomena be accounted for as well by any other hypothesis?

That the principle of Natural Selection really exists in nature, and has been largely efficient in the production of varieties and geographical races, none can doubt. The third question is as easily answered as the first. The only alternative is the admission of half a million of miracles, and in science the supernatural is to be admitted only when all naturalistic hypotheses fail. The theory, then, must stand or fall in accordance with the answer which may be given to the second question. Is natural selection competent to produce in kind and degree the actual phenomena of organic existence? If the facts are precisely and only such as this principle would account for, we must fully adopt the theory. If some phenomena exist which the principle does not perfectly account for, or some phenomena are unknown which according to the theory we should expect to find, we must receive it with doubt and suspicion. If we find any class of phenomena positively contrary to the theory, the theory must be rejected.

How, then, do the results which would follow from the principle of natural selection, correspond with the actual phenomena of organic life? If species had been derived in the way Darwin supposes, we should expect to find life commencing with simple forms, and gradually advancing to the most complex in organization and the highest in rank. Paleontology presents just such a progress from Eozoon to man. Yet we should suppose that this progress would not be in a linear series, but in divergent lines, involving sometimes partial retrogradation. The facts agree also with this conclusion. We should suppose that many early forms would have been comprehensive types, combining more or less the characters of groups subsequently to be differentiated. Trilobites, ganoids, sigillarids, labyrinthodonts, and cycads are but a few of the many examples which might be adduced. We should suppose that, if in any geological period a peculiar type of organisms became from any cause localized in any region, the fauna of the same region in the succeeding period would exhibit somewhat of the same type. Australian marsupials and South American edentates are marked cases in confirmation of this conclusion. In groups of organisms, more or less nearly related, we might expect often

to find homology of structure preserved in organs appropriated to very different uses. Comparative anatomy abounds in examples of this law. We might expect that species would in many cases exhibit useless rudiments of organs which in some related species had been well developed and useful. This also is confirmed by fact. We might conjecture that the embryonic or larval forms of species would often exhibit resemblances to lower or more ancient forms. The coincidences of this sort between embryological development, geological succession, and systematic rank are numerous and striking. As the processes of variation and extinction by which species and more comprehensive groups are supposed to be produced are very gradual, it would necessarily follow that the boundaries of such groups would often be exceedingly indefinite. Very significant in this connection are the not infrequent cases in which equally competent authorities hold opposite views in regard to the value of supposed species, or the naturalness of groups of higher grade. These are a few examples of the alleged coincidences between the theoretical results of natural selection and the actual phenomena of organic nature.

The main position of the Darwinians, in its most general statement, is, that the morphological, teleological, chronological, and geographical relations of all organic beings are precisely what might have resulted from such a course of variation as is supposed.

It is to be remarked, however, that these relations are also precisely what might have resulted from special creation. Admitting for the present that nothing in organic nature is inconsistent with the hypothesis of development, it is certain that there is nothing inconsistent with the hypothesis of direct creation by a wise and benevolent Deity;—a Deity working out designs infinite and perfect through the medium of finite and imperfect matter; securing by wondrous adaptations the greatest good of the greatest number, though at cost of what may seem partial evil;—a God in whose image man was made, and with whose thoughts human-like in their very infinity man can hold communion;—animated by an infinite love of beauty and of unity in variety (a love whose finite counterpart in man

makes the poet and the philosopher), and inscribing everywhere in nature the story of his superhuman and yet human thought and love;—the God of the moral as well as of the natural world, looking forward and upward ever in the history of creation through the material to the spiritual,—through the mineral, the plant, and the animal to the being in whom his own nature might be embodied; and, through all its wondrous changes, inorganic and organic, preparing earth to be the school in which his children should be trained for heaven. This would seem sufficiently obvious; yet, as the fact has been sometimes overlooked, and sometimes expressly denied by the Darwinians, it may be worth while to consider it more at length.

That the teleological relations of organisms—their adaptations, often wondrously complex, to each other and to the inorganic conditions of life—are consistent with the hypothesis of independent creation, it would seem madness to deny. Yet the Darwinians have in some cases ventured to do this. Mr. A. R. Wallace presented to the British Association, in 1866, a statement of some observations on Lepidoptera. “The *Heliconidæ*, a group of butterflies with a powerful odor, such as to cause birds to avoid eating them, were simulated by the females of another group, which had no smell, and might otherwise fall ready victims to birds. By their great resemblance to the obnoxious butterflies, the scentless females were enabled to escape pursuit and deposit their eggs. Mr. Wallace conceived that this case was a crucial test of the truth of the Darwinian doctrine. Professor Huxley cautioned Mr. Wallace against considering this as a decisive case. It was explained quite as completely by the teleological doctrine of the late Dr. Paley. Mr. Herbert Spencer thought he could show that the case described by Mr. Wallace could not be satisfactorily explained by Dr. Paley’s teaching. He understood Mr. Wallace that the imitation was not complete, and varied in different individuals. This incompleteness was not to be explained, were we to assume that the one butterfly was made in imitation of the other by the Creator; but it was readily accounted for by the law of evolution.”* This argument certainly requires no

* “Ann. Sci. Dis.,” 1866–7, p. 310.

refutation. It is an instructive example of the absurdity into which a fantastic and speculative mind may fall. Even Darwin seems inclined to consider the alleged imperfection or unfitness of certain adjustments and contrivances in nature as incompatible with direct creation.* It may well be questioned whether, with our imperfect knowledge (and no one has had occasion to affirm the imperfection of human knowledge more constantly than Darwin himself), we have any right to affirm that anything in nature is imperfect. It may be a truer, as well as a more cheerful faith, which would acknowledge

"All discord harmony not understood,
All partial evil universal good."

But, admitting that the supposed imperfections are real, it would be a legitimate argumentum ad hominem, since Darwin avows himself a theist, to inquire whether he supposes the Deity to have been ignorant of the consequences of the laws which he established, or not to be responsible for the indirect results of his action. In one instance Darwin's zeal for his theory seems to have led him into something like a blunder. He attempts to explain that arrangement of the organs which requires our food to pass over the orifice of the trachea, on the supposition of descent from some form of vertebrate whose respiration was aquatic, and which might therefore indulge its appetite without constant peril of strangulation.† The fact that all fishes, save the *Lepidosiren* and one or two other anomalous forms, have the ductus pneumaticus on the dorsal side of the œsophagus, would seem rather opposed to this ingenious explanation. The cases which Darwin has adduced of animals whose habits apparently do not correspond with their structure, seem at least equivocal in their bearings on the question. They certainly do not indicate that structure is as plastic as the transmutation theory supposes.

It may well be questioned, whether, in his efforts to show that no teleological explanations can account for the geographical distribution of various forms, Darwin has not underrated

* "*Origin of Species*," pp. 242, 290, 557.

† *Ibid.*, p. 222.

the important considerations of climate and physical conditions of life. But, for our present purpose, it is sufficient to remark that creative intelligence could and would adapt the different organisms of a fauna and flora to each other, as well as to the inorganic conditions of life. And, perhaps, on the supposition of independent creation, we can discern in the Creator's design of exhibiting organic types under all possible variety, a reason for the great differences in the fauna and flora of regions essentially alike in physical conditions. No more marked examples of this sort can be found than the mammalian faunas of South America and Australia. But the peculiarly microsthenic character of these groups renders such isolation a necessary condition of their existence. Higher and more vigorous forms seem readily to supplant the indigenous Edentates and Marsupials. Darwin lays great stress on the presence of bats in islands where no other indigenous mammalia are found. This fact has a bearing on the Darwinian theory only on the supposition that these bats are, as Darwin claims, of peculiar species. On this point the following remark of Lyell is especially interesting, since the great geologist supposes himself to be defending the theory of his friend:—"As to peculiar species, and even genera, of bats in islands, we are perhaps too little acquainted at present with all the species and genera of the neighboring continents to be able to affirm, with any degree of confidence, that the forms supposed to be peculiar do not exist elsewhere,—those of the Canaries in Africa, for example. But what is still more important, we must bear in mind how many species and genera of post-pliocene mammalia have everywhere become extinct by causes independent of man. It is always possible, therefore, that some types of Cheiroptera, originally derived from the main land, have survived in islands, although they have gradually died out on the continents from whence they came; so that it would be rash to infer that there has been time for the creation, whether by variation or other agency, of new species or genera in the islands in question."*

In geological succession, as in geographical distribution, Darwin underrates the effect of physical conditions. He tells

* "Antiq. of Man," p. 447.

us "that if under a nearly similar climate the eocene inhabitants of the world could be put into competition with our existing inhabitants, the former would be beaten and exterminated, as would a secondary fauna by an eocene, and a palæozoic fauna by a secondary fauna." * That would doubtless be true, if the ideal climate of the experiment were the climate of the world to-day. Otherwise nothing could be more false. What chance would mammalia and birds have of surviving in the carbon-loaded atmosphere of the periods preceding the carboniferous? This great law of the "Relation of the history of life to the physical history of the globe," † so completely ignored by Darwin, renders geological succession intelligible on the theory of independent creations.

Nor can we regard the facts of morphology and embryology,—the unity in variety pervading nature,—identity of structure joined with diversity of use, and vice versa,—even the existence of rudimentary organs—as meaningless on the hypothesis of special creation. Not idle words are those which Agassiz and other philosophical naturalists have written of the plan of creation. Meet it seems that everywhere in nature—in the least things, as in the greatest—unity of plan should proclaim the unity of the Creator, and boundless diversity in execution declare the infinity of his provident skill. There are mysteries in nature; but if there were no mysteries—if finite man had completely grasped the plan of an infinite God in creation,—it would be more than mystery. There is a purpose in these mysteries. If the plan of creation looked "ever towards man and a spiritual end," ‡ then the mysteries of nature may have been in part designed for man's mental training. In seeking to resolve these nebulæ, his vision was to be made telescopic. To some this notion may seem puerile, but not to those who realize the dignity of man's place in creation.

It is not surprising that Darwin's theory should seem to explain some things which on the orthodox theory are mysterious. Scarcely any theory could be proposed which would not afford

* "Origin of Species," p. 402.

† Dana's "Manual of Geology," p. 600.

‡ Ibid., p. 602.

a plausible explanation of something. Yet many of the facts which Darwin declares inexplicable save on his theory, are equally explicable on the common view. This has been shown to be the case in regard to the general laws of morphology and teleology, geographical distribution, and geological succession.

It may be well to examine one or two more of the special facts in regard to which the same unfounded claim is made.

"Wide-ranging, much diffused, and common species vary most;"* but the obvious reasons which are given for this fact, are entirely independent of any theory on the origin of species. It is universally admitted that varieties are produced by means of secondary causes. Again, "Species of the larger genera in each country vary more frequently than the species of the smaller genera."† But the reason assigned for this fact is equally independent of the theory of transmutation: "For the mere fact of many species of the same genus inhabiting any country, shows that there is something in the organic or inorganic conditions of that country favorable to the genus; and, consequently, we might have expected to have found in the larger genera, or those including many species, a large proportional number of dominant species."‡ And it has been previously shown that dominant species generally vary most.§ With what propriety, then, can it be immediately affirmed that, "if we look at each species as a special act of creation, there is no apparent reason why more varieties should occur in a group having many species, than in one having few?"|

"Species very closely allied to other species apparently have restricted ranges."¶ This would seem very reasonable on the theory of direct creation, for the slight differences between nearly allied species would adapt them to regions in which the conditions of life were but slightly different, and an area of no very great extent might thus furnish in its different parts a home for several such species. Yet Darwin remarks on this and similar facts that "these analogies are utterly inexplicable if each species has been independently created."**

Another alleged fact of which Darwin "can see no explana-

* Darwin's "Origin of Species," p. 61.

† Ibid., p. 63.

‡ Ibid., p. 63.

§ Ibid., p. 62.

| Ibid., p. 64.

¶ Ibid., p. 68.

** Ibid., p. 68.

tion" "on the view that each species has been independently created,"* is that "a part developed in any species in an extraordinary degree or manner, in comparison with the same part in allied species, tends to be highly variable."† According to that author's statement, there seems to be room for doubt whether this is true as a general law; but, admitting that it is true, we can see no special difficulty in the case. These extraordinary developments may be almost monstrous developments of parts possessing slight physiological importance, such as often constitute secondary sexual characters. In this case their slight physiological importance is a sufficient reason why they should have been left variable. In cases where the parts thus extraordinarily developed are of high physiological importance, there is evidently an adaptation to extraordinary and exceptional conditions of life; and, as such conditions are not likely to be very constant, a considerable degree of variability would seem very desirable for the species.

The last of these points which we shall notice, though others might be discussed if space would permit, or if the subject demanded further illustration, is, that "specific characters are more variable than generic."‡ The teleological explanation usually given is, that generic characters relate to things of greater physiological importance than specific. Darwin maintains that this explanation is sometimes inapplicable; and cites the case of the color of flowers, which is sometimes a generic character, and sometimes only specific. It might be answered that we are not sufficiently acquainted with the complex relations of organisms to each other, and to the physical conditions of life, to determine a priori what peculiarities are of vital importance to the individual, and hence to the species.§ But the very fact that a character is generic proves its high importance, and this on the theory of transmutation as well as on that of independent creation. For natural selection could not establish a character, and maintain it nearly constant through the countless generations during which generic forms survive, unless that character was itself of vital im-

* Darwin's "Origin of Species," p. 179.

† Ibid., p. 177.

‡ Ibid., p. 182.

§ Ibid., p. 96.

portance, or by unknown laws correlated with other characters of vital importance; and, for our present purpose, these two cases may be considered as identical.

From the facts and arguments thus far considered, it would appear that the phenomena of organic nature are equally well accounted for on the theories of transmutation and special creation; but that, in the absence of other evidence, the theory of transmutation should be preferred, as being naturalistic, while the other is supernaturalistic. There are, however, important facts in nature which, it is claimed, are contrary to the Darwinian theory. It remains for us, then, to examine the objections to Darwinism.

The most obvious objection is that which is drawn from the general permanence of known species within the period of human history. Varieties have indeed sprung up under domestication, but in these cases the animals or plants have been placed under conditions very different from those which exist in nature, and the breeds or races thus produced seem gradually to lose their peculiarities when removed from artificial conditions. Among wild species variations occur; but these seem oscillatory, rather than progressive, and introduce no change in the specific type. The descriptions of our best known species given by the most ancient naturalists are as applicable now as then. The figures of animals which have come down to us among the fragments of ancient art, are sufficiently accurate representations of the species with which we are most familiar to-day. And the strength of this argument is greatly increased by the fact that some of our present species can be traced back geologically to a period long preceding the commencement of recorded history. In the coral reefs of Florida, Agassiz has shown that the same species living now were living, at the lowest possible estimate, more than 70,000 years ago.* The deposits of the Champlain epoch carry back the present molluscan fauna of the northeastern coast of America, almost without change, to an antiquity which it is difficult even approximately to estimate in years. We have ourselves had the op-

* "Methods of Study in Nat. Hist.," p. 190.

portunity of examining with considerable care a very good collection of these fossils from the Leda clays and Saxicava sands of several localities in Maine and British America. Even man himself may trace back his history to the period of *Elephas primogenius* and *Rhinoceros tichorhinus*, and find in the skulls of Engis and the Neanderthal evidence of the existence of races not essentially different from those which still survive.* Such facts as these constitute an argument of some force against the theory, but are by no means conclusive. The period of recorded history is too short to be appreciable in the progress of organized nature. And the mere fact of certain species remaining essentially permanent for immense periods proves nothing decisively, for the Darwinian theory involves no rapid or constant change in specific types. On the contrary, Darwin expressly says that "natural selection always acts very slowly, generally at only long intervals of time, and generally on only a very few of the inhabitants of the same region at the same time."† Again, "The periods during which species have been undergoing modification, though very long as measured by years, have probably been short in comparison with the periods during which these same species remained without undergoing any change."‡

Another objection is closely connected with the one already considered. If species had arisen by variation, ought we not to find an indefinite number of gradational forms between them? There are indeed some cases in which the boundaries of species are doubtful; there are some forms whose specific character is admitted and denied by perhaps equally competent authority. But, setting aside those species which have been described from an inadequate number of specimens, or by incompetent or careless writers, the limits of the vast majority of species are exceedingly well defined. Each species is surrounded by a chasm, not always wide, but no less impassable, bridged by no gradational forms. And there are broader gaps separating genera, families, and groups of higher degree. The

* Huxley's "Evidence Man's Place in Nat.," c. 3. Lyell, "Antiq. of Man," c. 5.

† Darwin, "Origin of Species," p. 122.

‡ Ibid., p. 359.

answer of the Darwinians is, that, as the forms developed by natural selection come into competition with the less improved, the latter must inevitably become extinct. Hence we might expect that the transition from one existing form to another would be oftener by a saltus than by imperceptible gradations.

But this extinction of less favored forms is not precisely simultaneous with the development of improved forms, and is a gradual process which may be in progress during long periods. Hence it would appear that in the older groups the extinction should have been more complete, so that species, genera, and other divisions recognized in systems of classification would be bounded by broad lines of demarcation. On the other hand, it would seem that groups more recently introduced ought to present more difficulty to the systematist, the gradational forms connecting species, genera, &c., not having all become extinct. We have not been able to make a thorough comparison in this respect, and can present no positive conclusions. Yet it is our impression that the result of such a comparison would be unfavorable to the Darwinian theory, the groups more recently introduced generally admitting of more exact definition and classification than those which have come down from more ancient time. A few examples may be given. In the vegetable kingdom, "as a general rule, the varying species are relatively most numerous in those classes, orders, and genera which are the simplest in structure;"* yet the endogens and angiospermous exogens are of far more recent introduction than the more lowly organized thallogens and acrogens. Among animals, fresh-water mollusks have been noticed as a remarkably variable group; yet all the principal genera—*Melania*, *Paludina*, *Limnæa*, *Physa*, *Planorbis*, *Unio*, *Cyclas*, *Cyrena*—appeared in the Jurassic, while the large majority of present genera of marine gasteropods and lamellibranchiates are unknown till the tertiary.† No class has been more perplexing to systematists than that of worms, yet there were worms in the Potsdam. Maioid crabs are a remarkably con-

* Hooker's "Introductory Essay to Flora of Tasmania." *Am. Journal of Science*, [2], xxix. 6.

† Woodward's "Manual of Mollusca."

stant group, yet they were unknown even in the tertiary.* Among insects, the hymenoptera are far more constant than the orthoptera and neuroptera; yet the former are unknown till the Jurassic, while the latter are at least as old as the Carboniferous.

The classification of cold-blooded vertebrates is much more difficult than that of the warm-blooded, yet the former are far more ancient. The only two classes of vertebrates which are not separated by a very broad line of demarcation, are fishes and reptiles, the dispute on the affinities of *Lepidosiren* being scarcely ended; yet these two classes have come down respectively from the Silurian and Devonian. Especially striking in this view is the chasm between man and the apes, since the quadrumana date only from the tertiary, and man seems to have been the last work of creation. Here, if anywhere, we should expect to find a series of closely gradational forms. But this comparison, though made with all possible care and thoroughness, would yield but uncertain results; for, where gradational forms appear between different groups, it would often be impossible to determine whether they are remnants of preëxistent forms, or results of incipient processes of variation. And it is doubtless a general truth that low forms are more variable than those highly organized—a law which is sufficiently explicable independently of any theory in regard to their origin.

Geology blends these two objections into one, and gives to them a vastly increased force. "Rarity, as geology tells us, is the precursor to extinction." So says Darwin.† This is true to a certain extent in regard to more comprehensive groups, but not in regard to species. On the contrary, species generally disappear suddenly. The individuals of each species are as common in the uppermost bed in which they occur, as in the lowest, or any intermediate bed.‡ This distinction is noticed by Prof. Dana. The extermination of species he attributes to local catastrophes, such as oscillations of level, "while the extinction of tribes or higher groups may have

* Dana's "Manual of Geology," p. 514.

† Darwin's "Origin of Species," p. 123.

‡ Agassiz's "Contrib. Nat. Hist. U. S." Vol. III., p. 91.

been a consequence of secular changes in the condition of the climate, atmosphere, or water."* But species are not only undiminished in numbers as we approach the boundary of their geological range. They are unchanged in character. And when, in the superjacent stratum, we meet with a new species, the transition is not by imperceptible gradations, but by a saltus.

Moreover, not only species, but whole groups have suddenly appeared : e. g. Teleosteans in the Cretaceous. In like manner three great sub-kingdoms seem to have flashed into existence in the lower silurian, no animals save Protozoa having been known before. Besides the partial extinctions which mark every transition from one stratum to another, there are two points in geological history at which the extinction appears to have been universal. The Mesozoic and the Cenozoic age commence each with a fauna composed entirely of new species and largely of new genera.

Such facts as these seem almost fatal to the theory of transmutation, but Darwin's answer is far more satisfactory than would seem possible. He justly affirms the geological record to be far less perfect than geologists have usually claimed, though perhaps he somewhat exaggerates its imperfection. Fossiliferous deposits of considerable thickness can be formed only where the sea-bottom is subsiding at a rate nearly equal to that of the deposition of sediment. This has been by no means the constant condition of our continental areas. For oscillations of level have been continual; and, on the whole, the continental areas have been elevated by the subsidence of the oceanic basins. Strata, which have emerged from the water at any time, would have been subjected to immense degradation; while below a moderate depth no fossiliferous strata of any consequence could form. Probably in those localities where the series of fossiliferous strata is most complete, less than half of the time past has left any legible records in the rocks. These gaps in the record in different localities can be partly filled up by mutual intercalation, but for this purpose how small a portion of the earth's crust has been with any degree of thoroughness ex-

* Dana's "Manual of Geology," p. 601.

plored! and how much must ever remain inaccessible! Not only have there been vast periods in which no rocks now accessible were formed; many of the strata which exist, are ill adapted for the preservation of fossils, and consequently are almost barren. Of all the myriads of living creatures that have constituted earth's teeming population in the successive geological periods, what an infinitesimal remnant has been preserved! No wonder that we cannot discern the former continuity of the chain of organic life, when so many of its links have rusted away, and so many others are concealed beneath ocean waves or mountain masses. As to how far this reasoning removes the objections which we have cited, different minds will form different opinions. A theory which is forced thus to slink into the darkest corners of uncertainty, must be regarded with considerable suspicion. Yet these objections are not conclusive; and opposed to them is the great *a priori* plausibility of a naturalistic theory in distinction from a supernaturalistic. Were there no other objections than these, the theory of Darwin would seem entitled to a somewhat hesitating provisional adoption. The nebular theory might still be received, though all the nebulae were resolved into stars.

But, though the non-existence of gradational forms between existing or extinct species constitutes no conclusive argument against the theory of transmutation, the case would be quite different if types should be found exhibiting plans of structure radically distinct, so that gradational forms between them would be impossible or inconceivable.

Theoretically, natural selection might make any amount of change in degree. Nascent organs might be developed to any extent. Organs now largely developed might be reduced to rudiments; but no new plan of structure could be established. Strict relations of homology would bind together all organisms, however changed in external form or teleological adaptations. On the contrary, we find in the animal kingdom (disregarding for the present the Protozoa) four distinct plans of structure. The lowest of these, the Radiate, is hypotypic; its characteristic feature, the radiating arrangement of homologous parts around a vertical axis belonging more properly to the vegetable than to the animal type. The Molluscan

is the simplest of typical animal plans, being simply a visceral sack, without radiation or articulation. The Articulates and Vertebrates, in the repetition of homologous elements along a longitudinal axis, exhibit more clearly the antero-posterior polarity which is the essential feature of the normal animal type. But in the Articulates these homologous elements are normally a series of rings, enclosing in a single cavity the viscera and nervous system, the latter being on the ventral side of the alimentary canal. In the Vertebrates each of the homologous elements consists of a double arch, the upper or dorsal inclosing the nervous system, while the lower or ventral incloses the viscera. These different types are entirely distinct from each other in their general structure and in the single elements of which they are composed. The spheromere of the Radiate, the sack of the Mollusk, the arthromere of the Articulate, and the vertebra of the Vertebrate can have with each other no homology. All homologies are limited by the boundaries of these sub-kingdoms. And these groups are as radically distinct in embryological development as in the structure of the adult. We must, then, conclude that a direct genetic connection between any two of these groups is impossible.

But some would seek to trace such a connection between the Protozoa and each of these four sub-kingdoms respectively. The Protozoa may be considered as "systemless,"* and in the lowest of them scarcely any specialization of parts is manifest. It might be argued that in these every part is virtually homologous with every other, so that the process of specialization might take a direction towards either of the systems of structure indifferently. The question would then arise, "how could the first steps in advancement or in the differentiation and specialization of parts have been taken?"

Darwin modestly declines to answer, declaring that, "as we have no facts to guide us, all speculation on the subject is useless." He consoles us, however, by the precious information that Mr. Herbert Spencer would probably offer the following lucid and satisfactory explanation:—"Homologous units of any order become differentiated in proportion as their relations to

* Dana's "Manual of Geology," p. 748.

incident forces become different.”* Some minds may be so obtuse as not to comprehend the application of this splendid dictum, or so skeptical as to see in Darwin’s confession of inability to answer the question a radical and conclusive objection to his theory.†

But, passing this question, and admitting that in some way a transition might be effected from systemless Protozoa to low forms of Radiates, Mollusks, and Articulates, we have still the world-wide chasm between the Protozoan and the Fish to be bridged simply by imagination or by faith. Some naturalists have discovered in the Protozoa resemblances to the three lower specialized types, and have classified them accordingly as Actinozooids, Malacozooids, and Entomozooids;‡ but no one has discovered in any of the Protozoa any approximation to the vertebrate type. This gap is rendered yet more vast by the consideration that the earliest known fishes are not hypotypic, but even hypertypic, exhibiting some characters of higher classes. These first ganoids and selachians bear a testimony in favor of special creation, which, in the present state of science, no facts contradict, and no argument can set aside.

And it is not merely one isolated instance of special creation which is thus established. The admission of a plurality of distinct creations, to which we are thus forced, breaks down that universal analogy on which, more than on any matters of fact, the Darwinian theory depends. In the claim that all life, or even all animal life, is one by lineal descent from a common ancestor, there is much philosophic plausibility; but, if a plurality of original forms must be admitted, it makes little difference how many of them are supposed.

Natural selection can originate no new function. Admitting that variation may advance a function already existing to

* Darwin’s “Origin of Species,” p. 145.

† One of Lyell’s two great objections to the theory of Lamarck was, “that he had failed to adduce a single instance of the initiation of a new organ in any species of animal or plant;” the other being the sterility of hybrids. “Antiquities of Man,” p. 392. It would have been interesting if Lyell had informed us why the same arguments are not equally good against the Darwinian as against the Lamarckian theory.

‡ Dana’s “Manual of Geology,” p. 748.

any degree whatever, or localize in some special organ a function previously exerted by the whole organism indifferently, or obliterate by disuse a function no longer useful, yet the origination of a new function can only be ascribed to direct creation.

If, then, all animals are descended from a common ancestor, no function can exist which did not exist in the simple forms with which life is supposed to have commenced. But is this true? In the complex chemistry by which food is elaborated into all the varied structures which compose a highly organized animal body,—in the production of the secretions, venomous or otherwise, which are peculiar to certain species or groups,—in the electricity of certain fishes, and the phosphorescence of certain insects,—in the subtle mysteries of viviparous reproduction,—in the mammalian habit of nourishing their young,—in special sensation executed by organs of such complication as the eye and ear in the higher animals or in man,—is there no function which is not possessed by beings whose bodies are but sarcode, whose blood is scarcely more than seawater, whose eggs form no germinal vesicle, and whose highest manifestation of life consists in enveloping in their gelatinous mass some smaller infusoria with which chance may bring them into contact?

But, passing this question, it is to be noticed that the same principle must hold good in regard to mental faculties. Not that thought is merely a function of the bodily organism. No notion could be more false or more pernicious. We are taught that in another state of existence the human mind, though disembodied, is to exercise its faculties in greater perfection than at present. Some philosophers have even conjectured with some degree of plausibility that for brutes, also, there may be some sort of an immortality. Yet it is no less true that in this state of existence mental action, whether in brute or man, is conditioned on physical organization. The mind of Newton would have manifested nothing above idiocy, had his nervous system been constituted in a manner slightly different.

Considering mental action as thus conditioned on physical organization, it appears that variation and natural selection can develop to any extent a faculty which already exists, but

can originate no new faculty. Hence, if all animals have been developed from some simple form, even man can have no faculties which did not exist in that original simple form. In the mental qualities which make the glory of the poet, the philosopher, or the saint, we see only the further development of those powers which exist, in a somewhat rudimentary condition, not merely in gorilla and chimpanzee, but in *Amœba* and *Eozoon*. Probably this doctrine will find few adherents, but it seems a legitimate corollary of the Darwinian theory.

But the theory is as incompetent to explain the instincts of brutes as the higher intelligence of man. It is often difficult to draw the line between instinct and true intelligence, since the two are so frequently blended. Some of the higher animals exhibit marks of reason, while man acts sometimes from instinct. A creature is said to be guided by instinct when it performs any act, whether simple or complex, independently of experience or instruction, and without understanding the purpose which that act is to serve. It is evident that a new instinct is in the strictest sense a new faculty. One instinct cannot be developed into another. The intelligence which in the child builds a cob-house, may, in the man, build a cathedral. But the instinct which in the wasp makes cells of paper, is entirely distinct from that which in the bee makes cells of wax. Hence, natural selection can never account for the origination of a new instinct. Darwin's chapter on instinct is wonderful for its ingenuity, but it is far from being satisfactory. To show that several species have instincts somewhat similar, is a very different thing from showing that any one of these instincts might be derived by inheritance from a species which had no such instinct. In the consideration of exceedingly complex instincts, such as are exhibited by the hive-bee and by slave-making ants, and the comparison of the somewhat similar instincts existing in allied species, there is danger of being led by an appearance of gradation to overlook those cases in which gradation is impossible. In this view, the most simple instincts are the most difficult of explanation on the Darwinian theory. Darwin has attempted to show that the instinct which makes the rude wax-cells of the humble-bee, might be developed into the instinct which forms the perfect cells of the

hive-bee.* The real difficulty in the case would have been more nearly met, if he had told us how the humble-bee inherited its coarse and clumsy instinct from an insect which made no wax-cells at all. One or two examples of simple instincts will further illustrate the point. How could natural selection teach an insect to provide for the larvæ of whose existence it could have no knowledge, by laying its eggs in the midst of food suited for its larvæ, though entirely different from that used by the perfect insect? How could natural selection teach the mammalian infant the use of the maternal mammæ? How could natural selection originate the sexual instinct, when the primal monad had become so far differentiated as to give rise to animals with separated sexes?

Darwin lays great stress on the fact that instincts vary somewhat, especially under domestication. On the theory of independent creation, this would be but one of the many illustrations of variability within limits—a universal law in organic and in inorganic nature.†

The psychological argument is somewhat uncertain, since we can have no accurate knowledge of the mental conditions of brutes, or of the relation between mental action and nervous organization even in man; yet it cannot be doubted that the considerations above presented afford a very strong presumption against the Darwinian theory.

The most decisive argument against the doctrine of Transmutation, is that which is drawn from the phenomena of Hybridism. It appears to be a general law that, within the same species, a union between individuals, as diverse as possible, is most favorable to fertility. Darwin is inclined to believe that even self-impregnating hermaphrodites require at least an occasional cross to keep up the vigor of the species. It is "the almost universal belief of breeders, that with animals and plants a cross between different varieties, or between individuals of the same variety, but of another strain, gives vigor and fertility to the offspring; and, on the other hand, that close interbreeding diminishes vigor and fertility."‡ In plants, pre-

* Darwin's "Origin of Species," p. 269.

† Dana's "Thoughts on Species."

‡ Darwin's "Origin of Species," p. 109.

potency seems to furnish a readily applicable criterion of the relative vigor and fertility of various crosses. That pollen of different varieties is prepotent over that of the same variety, is well shown by an experiment performed by Darwin.* Out of two hundred and thirty-three seedling cabbages, from plants of different varieties growing near each other, one hundred and fifty-five were mongrelized, and even some of the remainder were not perfectly true to their kind. It is claimed that in some exceptional cases varieties are infertile when crossed, but certainly the general tendency is towards increased fertility. The general law is, without doubt, correctly stated by Huxley as follows: "The members of a species which are most unlike have the greatest tendency to pair, and are the most fertile."† When different species are crossed, the result is directly the contrary. In most cases the result is no issue whatever. And in all cases the hybrid offspring are incapable of permanent fertilization inter se. The Darwinians deny that this sterility is quite universal; and, in default of any accepted criterion of specific identity or diversity, there is no means of proving that it is so. Nor is that a matter of any great importance. That there is a general tendency towards a sterility more or less nearly complete, none can deny or question. Here, then, we have the law that divergence of character, within the limits of a specific type, tends to increase fertility, but beyond this limit tends as surely to diminish fertility or to produce absolute sterility.

In the face of these facts, is it not absurd to claim that varieties and species differ only in degree? Are we not forced to the conclusion that there is between them a radical difference in nature and in origin?

The facts of geographical distribution have somewhat of a bearing on our subject, though yielding no positive conclusions on either side. The very wide and interrupted range of many genera is a serious objection to the Darwinian theory. On the theory of special creation, the existence of closely allied or representative species in regions widely distant and separated

* Darwin's "Origin of Species," p. 112.

† "Address before Brit. Ass." Ann. Sci. Dis., 1866-7, p. 310.

by impassable barriers, presents no difficulty, as they seem manifestly designed to fill quite similar places in the polity of these different regions. But the attempt to account for their existence and distribution by descent from a common ancestor and migration from a common center, is beset with apparently insuperable difficulties. Darwin's great resource is the supposition of a universal glacial period. It may be questioned whether the facts thus far observed prove anything more than local glacial periods, which may or may not have been contemporaneous. But admitting such a glacial period as Darwin supposes, the case is hardly improved. The idea of tropical species surviving a reduction of climate which enabled temperate species to migrate across the equator,* is by no means easy to be received. Dr. Hooker seeks to remove the difficulty by the following hypothesis:—"It remains, then, to examine whether the relations of land and sea may not have been such as that a certain meridian may have retained a tropical temperature near the equator, and thus have preserved the tropical forms. Such conditions might perhaps be attained by supposing two large masses of land at either pole, which should contract and join towards the equator, forming one meridional continent, while one equatorial mass of land should be placed at the opposite meridian. If the former continent were traversed by a meridional chain of mountains, and so disposed that the polar oceanic currents should sweep towards the equator for many degrees along both its shores, its equatorial climate would be throughout far more temperate than that of the opposite equatorial mass of land, whose climate would be tropical, insular, and humid."† No point in the whole discussion is more noticeable than the more than glacial coolness with which certain writers elevate or submerge continents in any part of the globe and at any time that may be convenient for their theories. As a sufficient refutation of all such hypotheses, stands the grand geological fact that "the continents and oceans had their general outline or form defined in earliest time."‡ Our present continents have not been sub-

* Darwin's "Origin of Species," p. 449.

† "Flora of Tasmania." *Am. Journ. Sci.*, [2], xxix. 24.

‡ Dana's "Manual of Geology," p. 782.

merged beneath oceanic depths, nor have continental lands existed in place of our present oceans, since the beginning of the Silurian. Another example of this passion for the creation of imaginary continents will be noticed presently.

We have already referred to the argument in favor of the Darwinian theory drawn from the succession of similar forms in the same area. The theory meets a corresponding difficulty in the fact that sometimes the fauna or flora of one region at one geological period finds its nearest allies in a subsequent period in some distant region. Such a case is found in the marked analogy between the miocene flora of Central Europe and the existing flora of Eastern America. But the continent-builders are ready for the emergency. Professors Unger and Heer conjure up from the ocean "*die versunkene Insel Atlantis*," by way of which the European flora might have emigrated to America. Fitting is the name which their island bears, redolent with the dreamy odors of an age when fancy was blossoming in luxuriance, and the seed of science had scarcely begun to germinate.

This examination of the Darwinian theory, though too long for the patience of the reader, has been too brief to develop fully the important points of the argument. We have seen that the theory accounts for many of the phenomena of organic nature, and that it has in its favor the antecedent probability which belongs to a naturalistic theory in distinction from a supernaturalistic. On the other hand, we have seen that it encounters many difficulties, that there are many phenomena which it is not competent satisfactorily to explain, and that two important facts—the limitation of homologies and the sterility of hybrids—are directly contrary to it.

In accordance with the rules laid down at the commencement of this discussion, it must therefore be rejected as inconsistent with the present teachings of science. What new facts further investigation may bring to light, or what new relations old facts may be made to assume, time alone can show. Yet it does not seem likely that the aspect of the question will be materially changed. What new theories further thought may devise, none can foretell; yet it would be difficult to con-

ceive of a theory of development which should combine more elements of strength than that which we have considered. The objections to the Darwinian theory are objections to the theory of development in general. The only alternative is the doctrine of special creation. We may expect, then, that after all possible modifications of the transmutation theory have been tested, the philosophic world will acknowledge the prophetic wisdom of Prof. Dana's "Thoughts on Species"—that clearest and fullest statement of the great law of permanence of specific type tempered by variability within limits—the law which, changeless as the great Lawgiver, extends through all time and all space, binding in the unity of plan all nature, inorganic and organic.

The rejection of the doctrines of spontaneous generation and transmutation of species will thus bring us to a purely supernaturalistic theory of organic nature. Life is not a property or a modification of matter. It is a direct creation by Omnipotence. Here, then, will be found one of those limits of scientific discovery, which, as we have seen, must bound our progress in every direction, though we cannot even conjecture their situation till we have actually reached, and vainly endeavored to pass them. For the origin of life in its myriad forms no secondary cause can be assigned. Its effects may be discerned in their correlation with the laws of matter, but the creative act which originated it must remain an inscrutable mystery. Matter in every form may pass under the microscope or into the crucible, but the principle of life will forever elude our observation. We can seize it with no forceps, we can view it with no lenses, we can dissect it with no needle-points, we can analyze it with no re-agents. It is above and beyond matter—the pure, ethereal inspiration of that Spirit which of old "moved upon the face of the waters." Life, whether vegetating in the protophyte or culminating in the power and glory of human thought, is a sacred thing—the grandest sacrament of nature's universal worship; and Science, in the presence of its solemn mysteries, will stand with bowed head and moveless wings like the cherubim above the ark of God.

Such will probably be the result of the controversy on the most important question now agitating the scientific world. Yet we have used the future tense designedly, for we believe the time has not yet come when the question can be authoritatively and finally decided. On a subject so complex, and so imperfectly studied in many of its bearings, we must be content to hold and teach provisionally those views which seem to us the nearest approximation to the truth, ready to abandon to-morrow every article of the creed we advocate to-day, leaving perhaps to future generations to confirm or to contradict our teachings, and cheerfully accepting as our mission the task of opening, through the gloom of uncertainty, or it may be through the deeper darkness of error, a path for our successors to the perfect truth.

We have examined the question not as theologians, but as students of science; yet it would seem scarcely fitting to leave the subject without some-reference to its theological bearings. To what extent is the almost universal abhorrence felt by evangelical theologians for the Darwinian theory, a reasonable feeling?

The adoption of a naturalistic theory of organic nature would materially weaken one of the arguments of natural theology. Eternal existence in some form has been almost universally admitted, the only alternative—the notion of an uncaused beginning—being absurd. Hence the older atheists maintained the eternity of the present cosmos. The rise and progress of geological science necessitated a modification of this view. The only atheistic theory which can now be plausibly maintained is that matter and its laws are eternal, and that each successive condition of the universe, or of any of its parts, is but a natural development of the condition immediately preceding. This of course involves the doctrines of spontaneous generation and transmutation of species. Deny these or either of these, and the atheist is driven to the absurdity of supposing an uncaused beginning. The orthodox theory in science writes the name of God on every organic structure so plainly that even the fool can scarcely fail to read it. We should be unwilling to have that inscription erased. Yet it should be remarked that the effect of the Darwinian theory would be

merely negative. It would somewhat obscure nature's record of the existence of God, but it would write no word of contradiction. The theory is perfectly consistent with theism; the worst that can be said of it, in this connection, is that it is perfectly consistent with atheism also. The argument for the existence of God from design in nature, as well as that drawn from man's moral consciousness, would of course remain intact. The Christian Darwinian would say the question is not *whether*, but *how* God made animals and plants.

But to many minds there appears to be a positive contradiction between Darwinism and Revelation. With that propriety can man be said to have been created in the image of God, if he is only a more highly developed protozoan? With what propriety indeed can he be said to have been created at all, if he is the natural offspring of some other creature? The Christian Darwinian might answer that it is not necessary to consider the human soul as a development; that the theory relates only to man's physical nature, which allies him with the lower animals; and that the godlike soul was supernaturally created, when a body worthy to be its home had been naturally developed. The acceptance of the Darwinian theory would of course necessitate the adoption of a modified view of inspiration, or of a loosely allegorical mode of interpretation, at least as regards the early portion of Genesis. A change so radical, suddenly, effected would affect the church with a painful feeling of general insecurity. A change of base in the midst of the conflict is always hazardous, though sometimes necessary. Yet we are far from believing that any permanently disastrous consequences would ensue.

And, while science holds in abeyance her final decision of the question, let the Church lift herself above the notion that the Christian faith is dependent on the issue. Christianity is founded in the necessity of man's moral nature, and its strongest evidences are above the reach of scientific questioning. Let the lesson of the past be heeded. As one theory after another, supposed to be inseparably connected with Christianity, has been swept away, Christianity has but risen from the shock stronger and purer. We may wait, then, without fear the issue of the scientific controversies of to-day. The foundations

of our faith will remain unshaken in the future as in the past, whether the sun revolves around the earth, or the earth around the sun,—whether the universe was created by flats, or moulded by the gradual operation of secondary causes,—whether the duration of man's existence be six thousand, or sixty thousand years,—whether all nations were “made of one blood” in a literal, or only in a spiritual or metaphorical sense,—whether “God formed man of the dust of the ground” immediately, or through a process of secondary causation.

ARTICLE II.—CONFESSIONS OF A HIGH-CHURCHMAN.

Bryan Maurice, or The Seeker. By Rev. WALTER MITCHELL.
Philadelphia: Lippincott. 12mo.

THIS is a volume of Episcopalian polemics under the form of a novel. It makes "the epic plunge" at once *in medias res*, with a discussion on the Pentateuch, and winds up with a wedding, and red fire, and "the solemn cares of a Missionary Bishopric," with a handsome Gothic church and parsonage for the back scene. The story is entirely subordinate to the theological intent of the author, and serves mainly as a setting for his brilliants of controversial divinity; so that the book takes place in literature with a class of school-books once in vogue, such as "Conversations on Chemistry between a Mother and three Daughters," or "Uncle Peter's Talks upon English Grammar with his Little Friends," in which it was conceived that the driest studies might be capable of a certain dramatic fascination; or rather with that large and still growing class of popular discussions, the latest representative of which we see advertised under the title "Dialogues on Ritualism between a Layman and his Rector," and the advantage of which is that therein the ill-favored opponent of the writer's pet doctrines can be made, in spite of himself, to defend sentiments which he would abhor, with weak arguments which he would despise, and then be overwhelmed with sudden and quick-witted rejoinders which the author had dreamed of for a week, wishing that some one would only say such foolish things, that he might seize his chance to make such bright replies. This sort of controversy is conceived to have many of the advantages of actual tug-of-war, with none of its perils. The intellectual satisfaction of it to the writer, if not quite like

"the joy which warriors feel
In foemen worthy of their steel,"

may at least be likened to the martial glory of a sham-fight at a militia training; or to the excitement of the combat in a Punch-and-Judy show, when the left-hand puppet is so horribly banged with that terrible club by the right-hand puppet;

or to the fierce joys of the gaming-table, as realized by the Marchioness in "The Old Curiosity Shop," when she played at cribbage over her orange-peel-and-water in the solitude of Sampson Brasse's back-kitchen, and kept tally for the right hand against the left.

Of course, then, it would not be fair to criticise "Bryan Maurice" as a novel. Not but that there are points of interest about it in this aspect. We regard the adventure which is the hinge of the story as one of the boldest strokes of the pen in recent fiction. The two lovers go down on the same plank in the wreck of the Arctic, paddle off in different directions under water, and come up, one in Nantucket and one in Halifax, never to hear of each other again until they are both whistled up by the call-boy in time for the wedding-scene in the last act. There is nothing quite equal to this, we think, either in Scott or in Bulwer.

And yet it would be equally unreasonable to criticise the book as an argument. There *is* a serious, though unsuccessful, purpose of argument in it; a number of the old stock defenses of the high-church faction in the Episcopal Church are neatly stated, and several fair hits, together with some foul ones, are made at his antagonists; but, as a general thing, the writer "fights as one that beateth the air," when he strikes out against the communion of Christian believers outside of his sect, in consequence of his ignorance of their relative position and views.

But "Bryan Maurice" has, nevertheless, a certain ponderable and measurable value, of a sort which its author, perhaps, did not think of in the first rapture of publication. It is worth something as *Confessions*. For the book is, plainly enough, autobiographical. The scenes of it, described with pre-Raphaelite minuteness, when not openly named, are recognized, and meant to be recognized, as the places of the writer's residence; and at Boston and Cambridge, at Norowam, which is Stamford, and at the Cranmer Divinity School, Broadwater, which is the Berkeley Divinity School, Middletown, Connecticut, the writer takes the portraits of various acquaintances in public and in private stations, which he designates by the most transparent pseudonyms, and hangs out along his pages for the

public entertainment. His style of art is literal rather than imaginative, and his pictures often depend for recognition, rather on strongly marked peculiarities in the cut of the whiskers, or the curl of the hair, or on the names or official titles written up under them, than on any lively delineation of character. But the most marked trait of his style is the constancy with which his portraits are flattered up towards his highest ideal of manly and womanly beauty just in proportion as the sitter coincides with him in his theological position. For this, as well as for some other reasons, we are inclined to class his efforts at character-painting among his acquaintances in successive dwelling-places, with the works, not so much of the painters and sculptors, as of those humbler "artists," whose studios trundle upon wheels from village to village as the exigencies of business demand. Good likenesses are promised, and satisfaction guaranteed, only to those who come within the narrow range and focus of his camera. If none but Episcopalians of the right grade are portrayed to the last hair with a noble distinctness,—if Congregationalists are blurred into phantoms, and Unitarians distorted into monsters, is it *his* fault, quotha, that they would stay in their absurd positions, instead of coming up upon his platform and inserting their heads between the prongs of his standard of orthodoxy?

It is an incidental disadvantage of the author's free-and-easy method of dealing with the persons of his various acquaintances, that it necessarily brings his own personality strongly into view. If a late student at Cambridge College and Middletown Theological School, and convert from Unitarianism to the Episcopal Church, leads his hero in the character of a Unitarian "seeker" of the Episcopal ministry, through his own old haunts and experiences, with free comments on his old instructors and neighbors from the author's point of view, it is all very well to call him "Bryan Maurice," or Childe Harold, if he choose, but it will be impossible thereby to avert the universal inference that the book is an *Apologia pro Vita Sua*, and that the paragon with the romantic name and history is a more or less idealized "portrait of the author."

It is this consideration to which Mr. Mitchell owes his title to the honor of a special Article in the *New Englander*. We

would not unduly disparage the value of his opinions and arguments. But his *testimony* concerning himself, the representative of a class, especially when it is given unconsciously, and most of all when it inclines against the witness and his sect or set, is of more importance still. Let us glance, then, at the story of Bryan Maurice.

He is introduced as a recent graduate of Harvard College, a Unitarian, twenty-three years old, making the grand tour. On the way to Rome he falls in with Gardiner, an Episcopalian minister of magnificent personal appearance, with "white and very handsome hands," and "high and ample forehead," and to him he opens some of his skeptical difficulties. At Rome, he is present at the death-bed of a college classmate, when Gardiner administers the Lord's Supper. Maurice looks on, never before having seen this ordinance, as much interested as an intelligent Pagan might have been in the absolute novelty of it. He discovers, to his amazement, the indications of there having been an ancient Christian church in Rome, and is becoming interested in Gardiner's explanations of the facts in a "Protestant Episcopalian" sense, when he is drawn insidiously into an ambuscade, through a mysterious letter, by that dreadful, though somewhat familiar character, the "Jesuit in disguise." Snatched by Gardiner from this Scylla, he steers easily clear of the Charybdis of the American chapel, where he finds incompatible contradictions in the preaching, on successive Sundays, of Christian ministers of different denominations. Just at this juncture he meets, under interesting circumstances, with an altogether bewitching little Quakeress turned Episcopalian, from Philadelphia, who goes through and through his affections by the insidious but irresistible process of asking his advice and guidance, at their first meeting, on a question of duty concerning her baptism. He goes to church with her at the English chapel, where he is deeply impressed (of all things in the world!) with the solemnity of the *Commination Service!* and when, after church, in answer to his declaration, "but I am not an Episcopalian," she looks up with her lovely eyes, and says, "You will be; nothing else will satisfy you; *something tells me that you will*"—the reader with half an eye, discerns that it is all up with poor Maurice, and that

"fate and metaphysical aid" will do the business for him by the time he gets to the last chapter. On the homeward trip, he has the charming creature for a fellow-passenger aboard the "Mystic" (Arctic), and when the unhappy steamer is about going down after a collision, she has a fresh presentiment, and assures him that "*something tells her*" that he will come out right after all.

When the hero finds himself ashore, safe and thankful, he goes with earnest and serious purposes to Cambridge Divinity School, to prepare for the Unitarian ministry. He finds the institution swamped with skepticism and utter infidelity; and all his classmates (excepting one, who ultimately turns Episcopalian) are men without faith, earnestness, or common honesty, and some of them without decent morality. Nevertheless, his hopes of a Church of the Future, and the wily managing of politic old foxes of the Unitarian clergy, keep him for the present, and he goes to Norowam, filled with nameless longings for valid ordination, and yet resolved to take charge of the Universalist Church in that village. Here he becomes a fellow boarder at the hotel with the young Episcopalian minister, Rev. Alfred Winthrop, and the Rev. Augustine Ralston, pastor of the Congregational Church. The former was

"Evidently young, quite young. His hair, quite long and with something of a wave, was very fine and silken, and brushed back from his brow. It fell round the smooth oval of a face whose perfect features, in their almost womanish perfection, had a marked likeness to that beautiful ideal which the Italian painters have chosen for St. John the Divine. 'He sung church-music with a voice evidently of high culture and great natural sweetness.'"

The representative Congregationalist, however unable to stand in comparison with this Adonis, is nevertheless remarkable among Mr. Maurice's non-Episcopalian acquaintances for possessing some redeeming qualities. He was "a keen, wary, yet genial man, very fond of art, with an uncultivated indiscriminate fondness,"—"well, but diffusely read,—extraordinarily independent in his views, and loving to air them in controversy;"—yet "not quarrelsome, far from it;—gentlemanly, kindly, and thoroughly even-tempered." *Per contra*, he had those dark, insidious traits, that insincerity of opinion, and that feline craftiness with a selfish view to personal or sectarian

aggrandizement, which seem to Mr. Mitchell's generous observation to be the characteristic traits of the ministers of Christ in Congregational churches. He had "grown up in a school which regards all opinions rather as the foils with which you show your skill in fence, than as the sword with which one fights for life and death." "He was an honest and Christian man in his way, but had been educated into a morality in religious politics not unworthy of Liguori. It is the result of that utter absorption of religion into a pure technicality and formalism, which is the proper sequence of an attempt at a bodiless spirituality. This is the cardinal mischief of New England Puritanism."

Under the winning influence of the saintly example of Winthrop, who is a model of religious devotedness to his work, and under the influence of a large number of fascinating and delightful girls, who are represented as holding the key to good society in Norowam, and as using it with a single view to the interests of the Episcopal denomination, and who have a singular habit of "reading his very soul" by moonlight, and saying to him in portentous tones, "*Something tells me*, Mr. Maurice, that you will yet kneel at that altar"—it is no wonder that the young man at last succumbs to the force of circumstances. Gardiner comes in opportunely at the last of these oracular utterances, clinches his resolutions with a few common-place arguments, a hundred times refuted, and the upshot of the story is that Maurice is off for Broadwater in a twinkling, to get his theology rectified and his ordination "validated." Once more he has a turn of hesitation, but at the opportune moment another lovely woman appears upon the scene, exclaiming, "O, Mr. Maurice, do! I am sure you ought. I *know* you will never feel contented till you do;"—this last argument settles him, and "he takes the morning train for Broadwater." The pretty Quakeress miraculously reappears to him, at the chancel of a love of a stone church in Philadelphia, all stone, outside and in, and they are married and live in a love of a parsonage built for Maurice by one of those very Norowam girls who used to assure him that "something told them" he would preach in a gown and bands before he died. And as for the only decent man among his Cambridge theo-

logical classmates, he comes out at the same result by way of the Roman Catholic church, and goes slap into a first-class city parish, with a first-rate chance for "the solemn cares—the dread responsibilities of a Missionary Bishopric." With which climax the book concludes.

We need not speak particularly of the subordinate characters; they may be briefly described as follows:—

Sundry Episcopalian ministers, all of the very finest personal appearance, sweet voices, superior intellectual and spiritual qualities, and costumes regardless of expense.

Several Episcopalian laymen, also of noble appearance and superior virtue.

Chorus of Episcopalian young ladies, all of remarkable personal beauty, the very highest fashion, and the sweetest piety, devoted to good works, Easter lilies, and altar-cloths, and to young non-Episcopalian ministers in an interesting state of mind.

Certain ministers of other denominations, all of them self-seekers, without religious sincerity or earnestness, nor any personal beauty, nor voices, nor fine clothes, worth mentioning.

A number of young ladies, not Episcopalian, commonly not of good social position nor good looks, and with serious blemishes of character.

"Citizens generally," male and female, outside of the Episcopal church, mostly illiterate, and of the grade of "trades-people."

Jesuits (in disguise).

To come to the main points of instruction in Mr. Mitchell's express or implied confessions, we note:

I. How ignorant a Boston-bred and Harvard-graduated man may be probably supposed to be, of everything outside of the Unitarian sect in Massachusetts.

Mr. Mitchell, who is an accepted contributor to the *Atlantic*, and by no means to be reckoned an uncultivated man, represents his double, an accomplished young gentleman, with a taste for biblical study, at the mature age of twenty-three, finishing his education by foreign travel. In the midst of

Italy he does not know a word of Italian—a point which is confirmed by the fact that the book rarely ventures a quotation in a foreign tongue without coming to grief with it. He is absolutely ignorant of English politics and theology, and when “the talk is of Newman, and Gladstone, and Mr. Ward, and the Bishop of Exeter, and the Gorham case,” it is “pure Sanscrit to the young New Englander.” He has never seen the administration of the Lord’s Supper; submits without a murmur to be referred to the “original Latin” of the New Testament; discovers, after protracted study, that the New Testament consists of books of different dates, and after a long period of exegetical research at Cambridge, comes, much to his surprise, upon the recondite fact that our Lord’s ascension did not occur immediately upon his resurrection, but forty days afterwards. He hears the Magnificat chanted, and on inquiring the source of so fine a lyric, he is quite amazed and incredulous at being told that it is in the gospel according to Luke. He is driven to his wits’ end in conversation, in consequence of not knowing the meaning of the word “catholic.” No wonder, then, that knowing so little about what concerns his own religion, he should suffer even to the end from the most amazing ignorance about other people’s. Having attended high mass at St. Peter’s on Christmas day, he thinks “the elevation of the Host was very fine, but what meaning is there in it all? What is the Host? I’m sure I don’t know.” He doesn’t know what is the ecclesiastical meaning of “confirmation.” He is told, as a piece of rare and exquisite erudition, that the Athanasian creed is not the authentic work of Athanasius. Of course he and the Rev. Mr. Mitchell both believe the raw-head-and-bloody-bones representation of Calvinism, and suppose that Christian congregations are taught by Evangelical preachers, that Christ did not die for infants or the non-elect, and that one “will be converted, if he is to be, when his time comes, and won’t be before that for all his trying; and that until that, he can’t make things worse or better.”

Is it possible—Mr. Mitchell assures us that it is, and he ought to know—that Unitarian young gentlemen, of the first families in Massachusetts, are tumbled out from the nest of

their *Dura Mater* at Cambridge, in such a painfully callow and unfledged condition? Are they really undefended, except as they carry about upon their heads the broken egg-shell of early prejudice against orthodoxy as something vulgar, from the attacks of the first "Jesuit in disguise," who quotes at them the New Testament from "the original Latin," or the first Episcopalian who "startles" them with his notions of English church history? And are they wont to be dumb-founded, in foreign society, at the commonest words and allusions in English literature and politics? Can it be that local antipathy to the unabridged and illustrated edition of Webster's Dictionary has led to such results? These are questions for Mr. Mitchell to settle with his old instructors and college friends; and we acknowledge that, between the two parties, there is a very considerable presumption in favor of the college. But if we are driven to accept his representations as against himself, it does much to clear up the story of Bryan Maurice's conversion to high churchism, and sheds light upon the second point of his confessions, to wit:

II. Into what narrowness of feeling it is possible for a somewhat intelligent and Christian gentleman to be trained, in the High-Church faction of the Episcopal denomination.

The real argument of "Bryan Maurice," and we do not doubt the sincerity with which it is offered, is, that holiness of life, intelligent faith, pastoral fidelity and self-denial, devout and imposing worship, gentlemanly culture and female loveliness, are found in the Episcopal Church, and therefore stand in some relation of necessary sequence with Apostolical succession. The critical point of Maurice's conversion is, when, being called to the remorseful bedside of a bad man, he finds that his Unitarianism gives him nothing to say which can relieve the conscience and save the sinner. His Episcopalian friend is called in, and delivers to the wretched man the gospel—with a stiff churchiness of manner, but the same good news, nevertheless, of an almighty Saviour, which comforts the souls of true believers in every land and age,—and on the Saviour thus set forth the sick man trusts, to the saving of his soul. Maurice is touched and impressed, as well he may be; and at once, with an induction worthy of Mrs. Nickleby's

best moods, he infers that it "must be something in the leather,"—that it was the "authority" of a "valid ordination" with which the thing was done, which made the main difference between himself and his neighbor. And at this day, preaching the gospel with great sincerity and fidelity, and with good success, we have no doubt that he really believes in his heart that he owes that success to the "authority" of his "valid ordination," and that he is honoring the divinely appointed means of the world's salvation, when he trains himself, and tries to train others, into the belief that that vast body of prayerful and self-denying ministers of Jesus Christ, which lies outside of his pin-fold, are mere talkers of unfruitful talk, mere "technicalists and formalists," and that the true followers of the Saviour are pretty much all Protestant Episcopalians.

It requires an effort to adjust the vision of ordinary readers to a focus at which they can fairly see the microscopic narrowness of mind and feeling implied in the Mitchell-Maurice position. Stating it, we fear lest we shall seem to be caricaturing it, or lest it shall be inferred to be not the actual position of the author's mind, but the position of attack upon others into which he rushes, for a moment, in the heat of controversy. But simply and soberly, it is this: that the usage of worship and the church organization of a portion of the population of the southern part of one of the islands off the coast of Western Europe, has a divine and exclusive claim to be accepted and followed by the entire population of America! The Act of Parliament, commonly known as the "Book of Common Prayer," is a divine "pattern given in the mount," and so far as any act of worship deviates from this, it loses in beauty, and majesty, and spirituality. The rites of the Roman Church he finds to be "tedious" and "ludicrous;" and in the simplicity of outward form with which the overwhelming majority of his fellow-Christians in America earnestly worship God, he can see nothing but absurdities on which he may practice his cleverish little sarcasms. Even the ritual variations and "beautiful garments" with which some of his brethren pardonably seek to diversify the endless repetition of their "Dearly-beloved-brethren," are repudiated by him, and noth-

ing is truly impressive but a pied gown, black and white, and the Dearly-beloved-brethren *straight*, three times a day. All immigrants to this country, whatever their national and ecclesiastical antecedents, become *de jure* members of the Protestant Episcopal Church, and are bound by its laws and ritual. The Moravian must abandon the exquisite litanies of his fathers, and the German must forsake the hymns of Luther and of Gerhardt, that they may learn the provincial ways of another European tribe, and recite the Dearly-beloved-brethren, and sing the exhilarating psalms of Nahum Tate, or must suffer the pains and penalties of schism.

This hair's-breadth narrowness on ritual questions is commensurate with the writer's breadth of view on questions of theology and practical religion. He sincerely believes that true theology on the Trinity, on the origin of evil, and on the relation of predestination to responsibility is found alone in what he, in common with the infinitesimal sect of a sect, believes to be the doctrine of the Anglican church. So, also, he thinks that Christian self-sacrifice and beneficence are a peculiarity of episcopally-ordained ministers. Witness the following:

"There had been more or less of epidemic disease hanging about Norowam. A drought in summer had been followed by warm, sultry days, and then by a sudden chill with sea fogs and the raw easterly airs. Maurice noticed that Winthrop's handsome face looked very grave as he came to his meals, that he ate them hurriedly and was soon off.

"Maurice hesitated to ask the cause, but another of the hotel boarders called out across the table at dinner, 'Many sick in the parish, Mr. Winthrop?' 'Several very sick,' was the answer. 'Keeps you pretty busy, eh?' The young clergyman nodded assent. 'What is the matter?' asked Maurice, in a lower tone. 'Oh, this horrible dysentery. It is the most treacherous thing we have, worse than typhoid, I think—except scarlet fever among the children, there is nothing I dread so much.'"

"'Well, but *do you have to go where it is?*' said Maurice.

"'Go! why to be sure. I was not speaking of myself, when I said I dreaded it,—in fact, I haven't thought of that—it is in the parish that I dread it.'"

"'Why,' said the other, who had put the first question, 'won't dysentery kill you parsons as quick as it will the rest of us?'

"The young man smiled slightly, and then said, 'The killing is not in the account. We have something else to think of. I have not found ever in my short experience that men live longest who are most afraid of dying. When I first began to go about among the sick, one of the Doctors told me not to suppose that anything could kill me—and then half the danger was over. So I have just acted on that principle ever since—that is, not to worry about myself at all, which comes to the same end.'

"*Maurice looked at him with admiration.*" pp. 207, 208.

We also admire; but are at a loss at which to wonder most,—whether at the acquaintance with Christian ministers which persuades our author that it is a rare and distinguishing virtue among them not to shirk duty in a dysentery season; or at the narrowness of view which convinces him that this most moderate allowance of official virtue is an Episcopalian quality, which a Presbyterian can scarcely attain unto, and which a Unitarian (to use his own words) “feels to be far beyond his own mark.” For our part, we can conceive of a minister who would run away from his duty in an epidemic as something to be despised and kicked out of the profession; but it would hardly occur to us, from the ministers we have happened to know, to signalize one’s attendance on dysentery patients as anything exceptionally heroic, or even “beyond the mark” of an average Unitarian.

One cannot refrain from remarking how far more contracted and illiberal are the habits of thinking of a High-Churchman in Mr. Mitchell’s position, than those of an intelligent Roman Catholic. Those who have read the Article in the *Catholic World*, which was reviewed in the last Number of the *New Englander*, will have marked how much better it is, in point of courtesy, of candid effort to appreciate an antagonist’s position, of Christian love and respect towards fellow-disciples of Christ, from whom he is sundered, than it would have been possible for the author to write when he was still lingering, in mid-progress, among the Anglicans. The Romanist makes no claim to Catholicity which he does not back up with earnest effort, on a scale commensurate with his claims, to subdue the entire world, Christian and Pagan, to the papal obedience. He does not attempt to enforce the provincial traditions of a petty region like southeastern Britain, upon the adoption of all mankind; but accepts the only principle on which his idea of an external catholicity could possibly be realized—the principle of “*E pluribus unum*.” Holding fast by certain great fixtures in discipline and worship—the authority of popes and councils, and the forms of celebrating the mass, other things are subject to necessary change to adapt them to varying times and peoples; and the traditions of diocesan sovereignty, which have long been extinguished in the Episcopal Church by the

exorbitant authority of Parliament or triennial synod, still linger in the Papal Church, giving vitality in all its parts, and reminding one of the lost independency of churches in the primitive age. A Roman Catholic missionary in Connecticut may, *permissu superioris*, draw upon all the resources of Protestant hymnology, old and new, and bid his proselytes worship God in the wonted strains of Watts, and Wesley, and Toplady, and Bonar, and Ray Palmer; he may put on his black coat, and talk to them from his improvised pulpit with as close and familiar appeal as Finney or Beecher. But his next-of-kin has one unvarying song for Morning Prayer, for Evening Prayer, for Sundays, for week-days, for fasts, for feasts, the same excerpt from John Calvin, (of whom he hates the very name), the "Dearly beloved brethren, the Scripture moveth us," with its long sequel; and cannot travel into the unevangelized regions of puritanism without a band-box, a basket of prayer-books, and a clerk to start the responses. He is doomed by the inexorable necessity of his position to stand upon trifles, and to look on his own things and not on the things of others. We are bound to make due allowance for this, in observing the little arrogances and misconceptions and misrepresentations of gentlemen in that position, and not to conclude too hastily that they proceed from any inward deficiency of good manners or good feeling.

It is worth while to make a brief excursus here on the practical question, How shall we deal with well-intending gentlemen who are betrayed into incivilities to their neighbors by the necessity of their sacerdotal position? The best answer may perhaps be found in the experience of the Rev. Augustine Ralston, as we have learned it from himself.

The Rev. Walter Mitchell gives his conception of what would have been a first encounter between the Rev. Mr. Ralston and the Episcopalian minister of Norowam, as follows:

"Provoking as he [Ralston] could be, when you came to know him it was impossible to quarrel with him. He was provoking, however. He took advantage of a silence at the dinner-table to address Winthrop so pointedly as to draw the attention of all upon him. 'Brother Winthrop, when shall we have the pleasure of an exchange?'

"'Thank you, Mr. Ralston, I shall be engaged till after Christmas, and then I shall probably leave.'

"Ralston hit his lip and resumed. * * * * 'Come, now, that is mere fencing with the question. Would you exchange with me if you had the power?'"

"'No, I would not,' said Winthrop, tired of this badgering, 'or with any other who tried to tease me into it.'"

"'Oh! that is not the reason. I am not pressing you to do the thing, only to say why you are unwilling. Now, be frank; say it is because you do not hold my orders to be valid.'"

"'Very well, Mr. Ralston, you knew that perfectly well; you knew, before you asked me, that no Episcopal clergyman in this Diocese would exchange with you, or consider you to be a lawful minister. * * * * 'I do not consider you, in any sense, a validly ordained minister, and, unless you are in a different position from most Congregationalists, you are a teacher of heresy.'"

Of course, in the discussion that follows, the unhappy Congregationalist is showed to have pulled down overwhelming arguments and repartees upon his head. Being curious to know what sort of a picture might be made of the affair, if the lion should turn painter, we asked Mr. Ralston, the other day, what sort of talks he used to have with his Episcopalian neighbor at Norowam, and received an answer which, being translated into the romantic style of Mr. Mitchell's novel, would run somewhat as follows:

The youthful but heroic Ralston came back from the exploration of his new field, wearied, yet not discouraged. But so great a draft upon his exquisitely tender sympathies had quite exhausted him, and as he sank into his study chair, his classic head—with its Hyperion curls still surmounted by a delicate Panama hat, like the gold-foil glory which constitutes the coiffure of a pre-Raphaelite saint—dropped upon his marble hand in an attitude of graceful but unaffected languor.

Augustine had not rested long, when a tap was heard at his door and a card was laid on his table, inscribed in minute black-letter characters, thus:—

† The Reverend Alfred Winthrop.

The Rector of the Episcopal Church (which was one of several sectarian organizations that had grown up about the old parish church of the town) soon followed his card, on a visit of courtesy to the new comer. He was evidently a gentleman. This was obvious not only from his clothes, and from the way in which his hair was cut, but from that partial paralysis of the facial muscles which is cultivated by the first families of Boston under the title of "the Beacon street air." And yet, with all this, there was a certain professional style pricking out at all points. As to his costume, he had the appearance of having put himself into the hands of a "clerical tailor" of extreme views; and in accordance with the theory of the great Teufelsdröckh, the consciousness of peculiar clothes, both on week days and on Sundays, had done more than the doctrine of Apostolic succession to ingrain into his mind the pleasing conviction that he stood above the general mass of men and ministers in a position of authority. It was an amusing

study to Mr. Ralston to observe the struggle which was always going on in his visitor's mind, between the natural modesty and courtesy of a well-bred gentleman, and the professional habit of feeling and acting with an air of superiority and condescension. Ralston was quite too good-natured to disturb for a moment the harmless little pompousness of this assumption on the part of his new friend; but when he observed how embarrassed the latter was in the continual collision between his personal respectfulness and almost timid deference, and his professional loftiness, it seemed a mere act of humanity to relieve him.

Accordingly, when the Reverend Mr. Winthrop, after a long and lively conversation, buttoned the perpendicular row of buttons to his chin and stood gazing for a moment upon his clerical hat, as if momentarily expecting it to bifurcate into a mitre, Ralston responded cordially to his "Good evening," and added an expression of pleasure at the new acquaintance,—“although,” said he, “I feel bound to say, at the outset, that these social relations must not be understood as implying any mutual relations whatever of an official character.”

“O, certainly,” quickly replied the other, “we can’t, of course, you know ————”

“Of course we cannot, Mr. Winthrop,” said Ralston, kindly, but sternly; “it is out of the question for me to recognize the validity of your ordination.”

“Why, but Mr. Ralston, you do not understand, perhaps, that I am the rector of St. Bardolph’s church, and have had the imposition of hands from Bishop Gardiner.”

“My dear sir, I do not question for a moment the impositions you have undergone. But a very little attention to the Greek Testament will show you that the essence of ordination is not in the *χειροθεσία*, or laying on of hands, but in the *χειροτονία*, or holding up of hands of the assembly of believers in the election of the elder or bishop, which ever he may be called. I do not doubt, at all, that you have been attentive enough to the forms and accidents of ordination; what you lack is the very substance of the thing. These impositions that you speak of are all well enough as between yourself and Bishop Gardiner, and the separatists who consort with him; but it is plainly impossible that they should fulfill the requirements of the Scriptures, or confer upon you any standing in the Church Catholic.”

“However,” continued Ralston, as he saw a look of dejection creep over Winthrop’s feminine features, and a rosy flush suffusing his fine complexion, up to the very roots of his silken and wavy hair, “you must not feel entirely cast down. We are not disposed to insist unreasonably upon points like this, when we see a man really trying to be useful, as I hear from all quarters that you are”—here Winthrop bowed with an evident expression of relief—“but you will acknowledge, yourself, that we could not entirely overlook defects and irregularities such as I have pointed out to you.”

Notwithstanding the benignant look that beamed, as he spoke, from Ralston’s face, Winthrop shrunk timidly toward the threshold, and all that was heard in reply before he

———“plunged all noiseless into the dark night,”

was, “Well, I’m sure ———— I never thought ———— but I don’t see ———— Good night.”

As Ralston turned to his self-denying labors, a faint smile might have been seen to steal over his noble but melancholy features.

Nothing could have been happier than the effect of this timely explanation; for Winthrop, who had never before been able to keep up any sort of terms of amity with his clerical neighbors, found himself thenceforth relieved, in Ralston's society, from his most besetting embarrassments, and cultivated a friendship for him which was cordially reciprocated. (*From "Augustine Ralston; or The Hero of the Faith," an unwritten novel.*)

III. It will do us all good to learn from these Confessions of Mr. Mitchell, how it is possible for a man to be led into a narrow schismatic position, in relation to the Catholic Church, the Communion of Saints, by truly generous considerations. It may seem paradoxical, and yet we believe that Mr. Mitchell might justly claim, if he knew the real history of his own mind, that he was drawn towards that noisy little secession from the general communion of believers which now holds his allegiance, by a true love for the whole body of Christ's disciples, and a hatred of divisions. There is really touching evidence of the working of this influence in the warm-hearted, though impractical eloquence with which Bishop Cleveland Coxe, on a "Christian Union" platform, urges upon brethren of other bodies of clergy the acceptance of a free grant of apostolic succession, as the one hope of a reunited Christendom, and the one deliverance from that frightful bugbear, the Pope. It is the mark of a true Christian heart, to be disgusted with the "Evangelical" cant which vindicates the scandal and nuisance of our modern schisms as being ordered by an all-wise providence, and as contributing to the total effectiveness of Christianity. We cannot, therefore, but respect the motives which hurry some impatient souls to seek a solution of this trouble in High-Churchism—that is, in declaring that their sect is the church, and in intense, conscientious making-believe that there are no Christians (except "after a sort") outside. The noblest example of this method of restoring church-unity is that of the little handful of Samaritans who to this day live in the city of Sychar and kill their yearly passover on Gerizim. That little remnant, of forty families, hold that "in this mountain men ought to worship," and that all outside of their fellowship are "strangers to the covenants of promise," and when taunted with their feeble numbers, declare with confidence that some-

where beyond the Sabbatical river, which flows impassably for six days in the week, and runs dry only on the seventh, are hosts and nations of good Samaritans, who are hindered by nothing but a rigid Sabbatarianism from marching forth to manifest their fellowship with their feeble brethren. In like manner our little knot of High-Churchmen having solved the difficulty of the division of the church by declaring their fragment to be the church, are accustomed to keep up each others' spirits by promising one another that some time or other, when the Sabbatical river of Greek and Armenian exclusiveness shall be dried up on a week-day, we shall see what we shall see. "*Expectant dum defruit amnis.*"

We have a very considerable measure of respect for the exclusiveness of the High-Churchman. It is no very long time since we have ourselves argued that making a truce and opening diplomatic relations with seceders was no way to national unity; and we have no disposition to flinch from the parity of reasoning which concludes that the unity of the Church of Christ is not to be gained by the organizing of its factions into several confederated and mutually militant parties, picketed against each other from village to village through the land, but "recognizing" each other, and having certain diplomatic relations, as of pulpit exchange, and so forth. This is the ideal church unity to which the Tract Society bears its cautious witness, and after which the heterogeneous leaders of Mr. Kimball's "Christian Union Society" led one another such a pretty chase some two years ago, and came out nowhere. We believe that a generation is growing up which will see the folly of all such Eirenica as these, and which will candidly acknowledge, to the honor of the little squad of High-Church Episcopalians, that, in their ridiculous way, they did nevertheless bear unconscious witness, in a perverse age, to the principle and duty of Christian Union, and by the obstinacy of their schismatic practices did testify against schism tolerated and approved. And we tender them a certain amount of qualified sympathy, in view of the aggravating behavior of the recusant Thrall, Cotton Smith, and Tyng, Jr., whose notorious latitude of exchange with Presbyterian and Congregational neighbors no

Episcopal or Canonical authority has thus far been able to restrain.

It is superfluous to point out how absurd a contrivance for healing the wounds of Christendom is the Mitchell prescription of a little more apostolic succession. Mr. Bryan Maurice sneers at the American chapel at Rome as a "funny compound. One week it was Presbyterian, the next New School Taylorite, the third Dutch Reformed;"—the hymn that is sung "says that 'The voice of Free Grace cries Escape to the mountain,' and then the Doctor prayed that the elect might be speedily brought to a sense of the truth; and then Mr. Adams told us that we had only to *will* to be converted, by calculating the advantages of the step, and we should be converted." His biographer will not pretend that the theological variations here caricatured are wider in range than those which prevail among the ministers of Episcopal Churches, all the way around from Pusey to Samuel Clark the Arian, by way of Thomas Scott and Frederick Robertson. The absurdity which his sarcasm cuts upon so keenly is that of seeing Christians of these various opinions coming together in a foreign land for common worship, with no more of a basis of union than their mutual love, and common trust for salvation upon the same almighty Saviour. If only the flux of valid orders had been thrown in, and the incantation of the Dearly-beloved-brethren pronounced, how sweetly they might have flowed together! Not all the family feuds and bitternesses and back-bitings that have vexed "The Protestant-Episcopal-Church-in-the-United-States-of-America," could make it less than heavenly in its unity, if only this healing branch of priestly pedigree could be introduced. Only accept this boon, which comes begging to be taken,—so we have been assured many a time, not only from Episcopalian, but from Episcopal lips—and you come right in at once, New School or Old, Calvinist or Arminian, and no questions asked, and the Church is one again. Their principle of Christian union is derived, evidently enough, from misapprehension of a patristic maxim, which they inversely read "*in necessariis, libertas; in non-necessariis, unitas;*" and where the *caritas* comes in, it is not always easy to discover.

We cheerfully concede to this High-Church party the advan-

tage incident to conscientious narrowness of position, in giving energy to proselyting operations. It was the remark of the great Henri IV., that so long as the Huguenot conceded the salvability of the Catholic, while the Catholic refused to concede the salvability of the Huguenot, nothing could be expected of the controversy but that the Huguenot should go to the wall. We must make up our minds to yield this advantage to our High-Church Episcopalian friends, just as they, in turn, will have to give it up when their approaching contest with the Romanist comes on. But so long as they continue to hold it, it gives a certain air of dignity and religious duty to the electioneering and wheedling, as well as to the argument and authority, by which sea and land are compassed to get a man out of one Christian sect and into another. We can have a genuine respect for the home propagandism of our Episcopal brother, who rejoices over every new proselyte brought over from a godly Methodist or Presbyterian family as over a brand snatched from the burning, when if our Congregational or Presbyterian brother should be caught mousing about in the same way, we should be very much ashamed of him. This conviction of an exclusive divine privilege conferred upon the ecclesiastical corporation, is a very good and energizing thing for the sect, but a very, very bad and demoralizing thing for the members of it. And yet it is the only thing which can give respectability or substantial vigor to that pushing and elbowing effort for self-advancement which characterizes the dissenting sects in England, and the Episcopal denomination in this country. "There is something peculiar about your American Episcopalians"—this was a remark which we once heard from an accomplished lady, a devout member of the English Established Church—"they seem so very much like our English dissenters."

In conclusion, we gladly take the opportunity to testify that it would be altogether unjust to judge Mr. Mitchell by his book. From the admiring descriptions of his favorite heroes, it is much to be feared that his readers will conceive of him as a sentimental goose, taking vast pride in his "white and very handsome hands," his "silken and wavy hair," and his "feminine beauty" of face; choosing his religion mainly for archi-

lectual considerations, and under the guidance of delightful girls, whose "Oh, do, Mr. Mitchell; something tells me that you will," it is impossible to resist. On the contrary, he is a very diligent and faithful Christian pastor, eminently useful and practical, a thoughtful student of the Scriptures, and as liberal in his views and dealings as is compatible with his unfortunate position. In literary merit this book is far inferior to other efforts of his pen, in prose and verse; so that we are disposed to accept the apology, if it should be offered, that the author has purposely written it *down*, both in style and argument, to the taste and capacity of the class of young people whom he considers most hopeful subjects of his zeal. We strongly recommend it to Episcopalian ministers, for lending to susceptible young persons in their neighbors' congregations, of inferior intelligence, but ardent longings after the first society.

ARTICLE III.—OBSERVATIONS ON THE MODERN GREEKS.

IN estimating the present condition of the Greeks as a nation, there are several things which must not be left out of view, if we would do them justice. These things are not excuses for their faults or failures, but conditions of their national life—independent, in part, of their character—which have affected their progress.

One of these is the state from which they came into existence as a nation, taken together with the shortness of the time that they have had since that event for development. Under the Turkish rule the Greeks were in a state of degrading slavery. It was a slavery worse in many respects than most cases, because the people of quick intellect and progressive spirit served the one of dull mind and stationary habit—the Christian served the Mahometan. Their restlessness under the yoke increased the severity of their masters, just as to-day the Greeks of Asia Minor are better off than the Cretans have been at any time during fifty years. They had no schools but such as they could themselves maintain; no proper means of communication from town to town; no secure possession of the profits of their labor. Then came the war of independence, lasting from 1821 to 1829, which completely desolated their country. When they came out of this, they had to start from the very beginning to build up civilization. In Athens, for example, in 1830, there was but one building fit to be inhabited. It is not quite forty years since they began at this point, and forty years in the Levant is not what it is in Chicago.

Another thing to be considered is the small scale of the materials and means which they have had for their progress. The whole population is now a little over one million, having come up quite gradually to that point. Their territory is about nineteen thousand square miles, but less than half of it is cultivable, and of that part only about one-third is in private

hands. Improvident management during the ages of slavery has left the hills bare of vegetation, and, as a natural consequence, the low land suffers from want of water and from floods. While much of the soil is as thin and stony as any in New England, neither climate nor race fit the inhabitants to deal with it as the men of New England have with their rough inheritance. There is under cultivation a little more than an acre of land to every one of the population. In New England, in 1860, the average was a little over four acres to every one of the population. With poor tools and so poor a soil, not much can be expected from agriculture in Greece. The *metayer* system of rents also increases the distaste of the people for an agricultural life.

Another thing to be considered is the anomalous political condition of the state since it gained independent existence. It has been during these thirty-seven years under a protectorate. The three powers, England, France, and Russia, which gave it independence, bound themselves to secure that independence; and the two former keep each a vessel of war always stationed in the harbor of Athens. This protectorate may have been of advantage to the infant state at first, but it has come to be felt as a burden, and on one occasion, at least—in 1854, when the Greeks made a movement to use the opportunity of the Crimean war to attack their old enemy,—Turkey,—it prevented their action by force. It has given the people a king of foreign birth and race, and in choosing him there has been no thought of special adaptation in character or tastes to the country and people. This has been an underlying cause, tending to excite dissatisfaction at any time. The present king was entirely ignorant of the Greek language and history when he came to the country. Then, too, the artificial limits imposed upon the new state at its creation, excluding Thessaly, Epirus, the Ionian Islands, and Crete, have continually caused disappointment and irritation, and kept the people restless from the wish for more and better territory. The recent cession of the Ionian Islands, by England, has been welcomed by the people of the rest of the kingdom, but even the fervor of Greek patriotism and love of liberty could not raise the islanders themselves above a sort of mercenary regret at the change

from gainful dependence upon England to union with the fortunes of poor, though independent, Greece.

Now making due allowance for these hindrances to progress, let us look for a moment at the actual progress of the country during these thirty-seven years. They have established and kept working a reasonably stable government, with no more revolutions than other and older nations of Continental Europe have had during the same period. They have organized and carried on a system of education, modeled upon that of Germany, which, though it has the usual fault of such systems, a neglect of the lower departments in comparison with the higher, yet does good service and is full of promise for the future. They have built some three hundred miles of road—an amount which appears less insignificant when we consider that the nature of the country makes elaborate engineering, like that of the Alpine passes, necessary almost everywhere. The tonnage of the commercial marine has quadrupled since 1833, and the custom-house receipts have doubled in the last ten years. The population has increased from some six hundred thousand in 1833, to over one million; and Athens, to say nothing of Patras, Syra, Tripolitza, and Kalamáta, has grown from a heap of ruins to a well-lighted, well-built (in the better half of it), and orderly city of fifty thousand inhabitants.

So much, at least, may be said for the actual progress of the Greeks since they became a nation. But these statistics give a somewhat more favorable impression than will be derived from a general view of the present state of society. It has been said that the people were obliged to build up civilization almost from the very beginning. There are still to be found in their social state traces of the barbarism from which they have so recently emerged. To most of these, indeed, it would not be difficult to find parallels in the social history of England within the last hundred years. They offend the more in Greece because they appear side by side with a civilization in other things as advanced as England has now attained, and, we may add, with the ruined remains of a civilization which, in its own sphere, no country of modern Europe has surpassed.

One such trace of barbarism is the existence of brigandage, so often urged as the standing disgrace of the Greek govern-

ment. It cannot be denied that brigandage exists, and has existed at intervals ever since the nation began to govern itself. A year ago last August, a prominent politician, who had been minister of finance the previous winter, was seized by brigands at his country-house in the Peloponnesus, kept wandering among the hills for thirty-six days, and released on paying a ransom of \$10,000. It seems probable that the tendency of the Greeks to this kind of life grew naturally out of the character of their warfare in the revolution of 1821-9. Unable to keep large armies in the fields, they occupied the mountains and passes with irregular, unorganized bands, which harassed and eluded the Turks just as the Cretan insurgents are doing now. These wandering warriors are the heroes of the people's songs and stories still, and their name (*καλαϊάρα*, from *καλλάξ* ?) is assumed by the brigands continually. The mountainous nature of the country and consequent want of good roads has made it difficult for the government to put them down with regular troops, and left the scattered peasantry to be terrified into concealing their movements and supplying them with food. Northern Greece especially has been at their mercy, because they could defy pursuit by crossing the frontier into Turkey, where, it is said, the wish of the authorities to injure Greece in any way, secures them impunity. After each revolution or interregnum through which the country has passed, there has sprung up a crop of these outlaws, men who have committed some crime in the time of disorder and thus found themselves forced into hostility against society and law to escape punishment. It is difficult to say exactly whose fault it is that this brigandage is not put down. Whose fault is it when a government is weak, in any country? At times it has been put down and kept down, until some general disturbance of society loosened the rule of order again. That the people, as a whole, are capable of self-restraint and respect for law, the bloodless revolution of 1843 satisfactorily showed. It may be true that some political leaders have been weak and wicked enough to use brigands to control votes by intimidation, but something like this has been known to occur once or twice in other countries. As the period of conflict with barbarism recedes into the past, as the system of roads is extend-

ed, as the nation becomes habituated to government by a royal family of its own religion, or civilized up to the point of obeying a ruler chosen from among its own sons, this blot upon its character will disappear entirely, as it is disappearing in Italy.

Akin to this is another trace of barbarism, or of semi-barbarous civilization,—the need of guarding the public executioner from the violence of the people. The writer of this Article saw in an old fort on a little island in the harbor of Nauplia, one of the two men who do this public service for the whole kingdom. They are themselves criminals, who saved their heads by undertaking this unpopular duty, and they live always under military guard. Executions are not by hanging, but by beheading with the sword. The passions of individuals are so unrestrained, their minds so little disciplined by the idea of public duty, so little used to distinguishing between the act of the individual and that of the official, that the life of the executioner would not be safe among them. The treatment of criminals in prisons, too, is a disgrace to the country. The want of occupation and of provision for comfort or cleanliness shows the need of such a work as John Howard did for the rest of Europe in the last century. Some among the Greeks themselves see the evil, but do no more than lament that the government is prevented by its poverty from remedying it. It is significant that while Athens has a university building on a greater scale and better adapted to its purpose than most of our colleges have, a number of fine school buildings, and several museums and hospitals, built by government or by private means, the whole kingdom is in want of a good prison, properly built for the purpose.

The position of woman betrays the recent influence of Turkey and the nearness of oriental customs. Marriages are arranged, not by the parties themselves, but by their parents or friends, and often while those most concerned are in their cradles. A lady told me that she had received several offers for one of her sons, but none for the other. It is said that the experiment was tried some years ago, of letting the young people manage the matter themselves, but the first results were so unsatisfactory that the old system was speedily restored. In

other respects the condition of woman is much the same as in other countries of Continental Europe, except for slight, scarcely perceptible indications that it has been different. Hence the peculiar importance in Greece of the education of women. Most of the older women, whose early life was passed under the Turkish rule, are quite uneducated. There is no more hopeful sign for the future than the continued increase of facilities for the education of girls and young women.

There is a sort of roughness about the society and life of the Greeks like that of the surface of their country, from which, as an obstacle to free communication, it may in part result. Except in Athens and the chief sea-port towns, there are no hotels; a traveler must lodge in a khan, or be quartered on some family by the authorities. The domestic ways, in regard to washing, beds, and other household arrangements, are generally, away from a few principal towns (and in them among the common people), of a very primitive character recalling often certain Homeric descriptions to the mind. The implements of agriculture, too, belong to the same distant age, such as ploughshares of wood, with or without a little iron point. The impossibility of using waggons over most of the country puts heavy loads on the backs of men and donkeys. Manufactures are in a very backward condition, and most of the exports are fruits of the earth which require little preparation to fit them for the market.

When we turn from the social condition to the character of the people, we find much to regret, and less evidence of progress than in external matters. We need to bear in mind that we are looking at a people which lives under much the same physical conditions with those of Italy and Spain, in which, therefore, we should not seek the peculiar virtues of more northern latitudes,—under an ecclesiastical influence hardly differing from that of the church of Rome, where, therefore, we should not look for the virtues of Protestantism,—and on the confines of civilization and barbarism, over which the wave of history has once passed in its westward course. The vices of the nation which are most prominent are such as result from the thousand years of subjection and slavery through which it has passed. Concealment and deceit, the natural

weapons of the weak against the strong, have become the habit of the Greek mind. The ancient Greeks may not have had the opposite virtue in the days of their freedom, but, if they had, it has perished with them. Nothing discourages so much as this him who sincerely wishes well to the modern Greek nation; scarcely anything is so serious a hindrance to their real progress. It appears both in word and in deed; they lack truthfulness, and they lack honesty. In neither church nor family is example or teaching given on this point on the side of good morals. These are painful things to say, but they must in truth be said. No greater benefit could be done this people than to convince those in it who are teaching the young of the prime importance of teaching them the lesson of truth. The state of the national finances is an apt illustration. It is believed that the revenue, in every year of fair crops, exceeds the expenses of the government, yet the actual receipts and the published statement have always, with the exception of one or possibly two years, shown a deficit. The interest on the loan made in England, in the time of ardent Philhellenism, has not been paid for many years, and the arguments by which the people justify this, only make the matter worse. At the present day a nation must be solvent to command the respect of the world, and Italy shows that she knows it by her efforts to attain that position. If Greece would take rank among the nations, let her by public honesty and economy right herself financially and begin to pay the interest of her debts.

The ages of subjection and the short period of independent existence, given and secured by a protectorate, have not educated the nation into a habit of self-reliance. In their discussions and anticipations about Crete and the extension of their territory northwards, it is striking how much they feel their own weakness and rely upon the hope of the intervention of the western powers. In private life, too, the same thing appears, an oriental want of energy and self-helpfulness, but not to so great a degree, and in a far less degree than in their more oriental neighbors, particularly in all matters of trade. In these, they are the Yankees of the Levant. The high character and success of the Greek houses in leading commer-

cial cities, everywhere outside of Greece itself, are too well known to need proof here. It need hardly be said either, that in speaking of untruthfulness and dishonesty as national faults, it is not meant that there is no person in the kingdom whose word may not be fully trusted. There are many whose word and credit are above suspicion.

With all this want of self-reliance, they have a boastfulness and extravagance in language quite equal to any American newspaper. To read an editorial in the "ΕΣΠΕΡΙΔΑΣ" or "ΑΛΦΕΙΑ," one would think it was only necessary for the Greeks to rouse themselves, to remember their glorious ancestry and history, in order to sweep the Turks from the face of the earth. This sort of talk alternates with expectations of intervention by other nations in their behalf, but no one is troubled by the inconsistency.

But such boastfulness is only a false manifestation of one of the great virtues of the Greeks. It often springs from vanity in individuals, but the same persons may be modest about themselves who are very boastful about their nation. Their patriotism, though it appears so much in this questionable form, is a strong deep-seated feeling, and has borne bitter fruits. The many public institutions which Athens owes to the liberality of Greeks grown wealthy in other countries, and the large contributions from the same sources in such crises as the present Cretan revolution, are substantial proof of this. This patriotism has indeed sometimes given way before bribery and factious ambition, yet it is the one strong and universal virtue of the Greek character.

Their enthusiasm for education is another point in their favor. Though, perhaps, as already hinted, the zeal for education has been somewhat extreme, and other needs of society have been neglected for its sake, yet in time this diffusion of knowledge will lead to the supplying of these deficiencies, and the error is on the right side. We need not inquire too closely into the motive which prompts the desire for education in individuals. Even if it is often the gain in social position and opportunities of advancement, it is better that men should be moved by these hopes to seek education than that they should remain in barbarian indifference to it. And it is evi-

dence of life and health in the social system that men have reason to hope they may rise by this means above the level at which they start. The quality of the education given may be open to criticism, but hardly when one considers the circumstances, and compares it with that in older countries rather than with an ideal standard. If we think how Greece is separated from the rest of Europe, and by what it is surrounded, such a university and such gymnasia as it has must excite our admiration and wonder.

The passionate love of freedom, which the history of the ancient Greeks identified with their name, appears also in their modern descendants. It was in old times often perverted into mere license and the tyranny of a mob, and to-day it tends in the same direction. The fullest personal freedom of religion, and of opinion, and of speech is not yet secured or understood. It would hardly be safe to oppose or discourage the Cretan revolution in any part of Greece, and neither Protestantism nor Freemasonry can be publicly advocated without danger from the law or the mob. Yet their desperate struggles against the Turkish dominion, and their attachment to the constitution which declares all citizens equal before the law, attest their love for political and civil liberty. It is only reasonable to expect that education and experience in self-government will teach them the lessons of practical freedom which other nations have been none too quick in learning. The danger to freedom is rather from the weakness of the government than from its strength.

These forty years of enlarged activity and increased intercourse with Europe have not left the character of the Greeks unchanged. Old people complain of the neglect of old customs, and the introduction of new ones from abroad. They tell the traveler that he must go to the inland country villages to see Greek life in its genuine form and the Greek church in its proper position and purity. They lament that the ancient usages of the Church are dying out in the larger cities, and that it is losing its control over the morals of the people. The popular feeling with regard to the use of Sunday has changed. When it was necessary to fit up a building for King Otho's residence, the workmen refused to work on Sunday, though

greatly pressed for want of time. But since then the presence of the foreigners, they say, has spread among the people the continental idea of the day. Many of the young men who go from home to study in Europe, return without any religious faith. Indeed the educated people generally are lifted above the superstitions of the Church, and, seeing nothing else in it to hold their faith and reverence, value it only for its influence upon the uneducated and as a bond of national union.

There is nothing in Greece that has so much genuine nationality and antiquity about it as the Greek Church. The government is wholly modern, the society and literature have a French tone, the system of education is after a German model, the language itself is a mosaic of foreign idioms, and of classical forms revived from so remote antiquity that they seem foreign. But the Church has borrowed nothing from Western Europe, and prides itself on having undergone no improvement since the first ages of Christianity. Calling itself simply "the Orthodox Church," claiming to preserve uncorrupted the doctrines and usages of Apostolic days, untouched by the Reformation which left its mark on all the rest of Christendom, having a "Christian year" and a ritual peculiar to itself,—to all these claims upon our interest it adds yet another, that it has been the ark of Greek nationality and the preserver of the Greek language and literature.

This nationality of the Greek Church appears to be its one eminent merit. The Greeks themselves ascribe the preservation of their national existence to their church more than to any other agency. Its organization and its services have never been wholly interrupted. It has kept the people distinct from their Mahometan and Roman Catholic neighbors. It has preserved in its ritual their ancient language, in its New Testament and Byzantine forms. Its clergy have been the most active promoters of education, when the Turkish rule threw the whole burden of it upon the enslaved people. It has been a centre of national feeling in the absence of a government, and has given the sanction of religion to their struggles for freedom.

It is, perhaps, in consequence of this antiquity and nationality, together with a want of enlightenment, that the Greek Church is so intolerant. It looks down upon all other forms of

Christianity as merely so many subdivisions of schism, and cannot easily come to regard them as having equal rights with itself. To it, the Church of Rome with its centuries of history and tradition is no more than one of a number of heretical sects. So identified is it with the Greek nation, that any attack upon it, even anything tending to draw away a single member from it, is regarded as an injury to the nation itself. This is the main obstacle to missionary work in Greece. Any citizen may change his religion, but if it can be proved that he did so under any influence from a foreigner resident in Greece, both parties are liable to punishment, and any religious organization including foreigners and Greeks as members, is a violation of the law. Thus religious liberty exists; that is, members of any religious body may live unmolested in the country; but proselytism is forbidden, and the question between our missionaries and the courts has been generally what constitutes proselytism. For a Greek to leave the church, is almost to become a traitor to his country. An American, resident for a short time in Greece, saw in a theological journal a representation of Protestantism, by a theological teacher in the University, which seemed grossly unfair. He offered a criticism of it to the same journal, and it was published, with the addition, undesired by him, of his name and nationality. This called out two public denunciations of him as residing in Greece for the purpose of making proselytes.

All this shows a want of enlightenment on the part of both clergy and people. But the ignorance of the clergy has more serious consequences, too obvious to need to be stated here. For the work which they actually do, no education beyond the power to read and learn by heart the ritual, is needed. Nor is it strange that educated young men very rarely enter clerical life, while the position of the parish priest is so low, the pay, made up of what fees the people can give for special services, so small, and the opportunities of advance to high station so rare. Some of the highest dignitaries are men of little or no education. There is a fine school in the outskirts of Athens for young men intending to become priests, but the majority of its pupils go into secular life after leaving it, where their education finds a better market. Without a general education

of the priesthood superior to that of the common people, it is difficult to see how the Greek Church can reform itself from within.

But of some reformation there appears to be great need. At present the Church seems to be full of formality and superstition. The doctrine of baptismal regeneration, the rite of baptism with its useless ceremonies, the practice of admitting infants to the communion, the kisses and prayers given to pictures of saints, the practical divorce of morality and religion (every baptized person being a Christian, and everybody being baptized), the use of masses for the dead, the worship of the Virgin, the doctrine of transubstantiation, the virtue imputed to the outward acts of fasting and partaking of the communion,—such things as these indicate a mournful departure from the truth and spirituality of the Gospel. It is interesting to know and appreciate these facts in view of the tendency manifested by a small party here and in England to fraternize with the Greek Church,—a tendency which the Greeks have heard about, and which has confirmed them in their confidence of superiority. They make a boast of it as a sign of a desire of the wanderers to return to the true orthodox Church. The Episcopal Church in this country has gone farther on the way back to the middle ages than most of us think, if it can cordially fraternize with the Greek Church as it is. There are some good things to be said, however, of the Greek Church; that it does not prohibit or discourage the use of the Bible by the people, that its services, though recited or chanted at such a rate of speed as to be almost unintelligible, are still in a language understood and in a form obtainable by all, that it does not actually avow the policy of keeping the people in ignorance in order to control them, but rather encourages education except by its example. On these things, and on the desire of the people for education, must rest any hope of the reformation of this Church from within. But if the latter outruns the former, as it is now doing, if the people make progress in enlightenment while the Church remains unchanged, and the study of the Bible is neglected, the result can hardly fail to be that the educated classes will become infidel, and the ignorant superstitious, even more than now.

There are two different systems of missionary work among the members of such a church as this. One is to endeavor to promote reform within the existing organization, discouraging every attempt to form a new church, and dissuading individuals who may be awakened to new life from leaving the old Church. This is the policy of the "Anglo-Continental Society" of the English Church, on whose list of patrons are the names of half-a-dozen bishops of the American Episcopal Church. The other missionary system is to promote the study of the Bible, in the expectation that the conscience of the converts will under that influence alone revolt against the errors of the corrupt church, and so they will be constrained to leave it. This latter policy is that of the missionaries of the "American and Foreign Christian Union" at Athens; the former has, we believe, no active representative in Greece. It is much to be desired that an earnest effort should be made to give the principle of the Anglo-Continental Society a thorough trial in Greece. For if it should succeed, it would accomplish the great object of missions at less cost in the excitement of sinful passions and the wounding of feelings; if it should fail (as seems more probable), its failure would define the position of the Greek Church, and concentrate missionary effort on the other plan. The only other hope for Christianity in Greece is in the formation of a pure Protestant Church under the constitutional guarantee of religious liberty. As the law is now, such a Church, consisting, pastor and people, of Greek citizens only, may be formed, and may claim the protection of the government against violence. It would meet with fierce opposition at first, and its members would have to make great sacrifices. But the right is clear and could be maintained. Let such a Church, by the blessing of God, have wise management and pure character, and it would soon make for itself a hearing, and command respect. The intolerance of the Greeks is of the kind that would give way before enlightenment, and there could be no better enlightenment than the sight of such a church. It would in course of time work reform in the Greek Church by the influence of its example. The Greeks themselves see and confess in private their need of reform, and now and then a bold priest advocates it publicly. But they must do the work themselves. The best

way to bring them to it is to build up such a church as we have described.

On the whole, the tendency of things in Greece is toward improvement in education, in civilization, and in government. We hope that when the Gospel they have buried out of sight is brought back to them, even from the distant West, the improvement will begin in the Church also.

NOTE.—It seems worth while to add a few particulars about the University of Athens (τὸ ἑθνικὸν πανεπιστήμιον). It was organized soon after King Otho's coming to Greece, by some German scholars who came with him, and, as has been said above, strictly on the plan of the German Universities. Like them, it has a rector (in Greek, *πρύτανης*) appointed yearly from among the professors. Like them, it has four faculties, of law, medicine, theology, and philosophy, containing ordinary and extraordinary professors (*καθημερὶ καὶ ἑκτακτοὶ καθηγηταί*), and *privat-docenten* (*ὑπογῆγοι*). Like them, it gives instruction almost entirely by lectures, and confers degrees on condition of a certain term of residence, and after examinations. The lectures are free and open to all, and are attended by many who do not enroll themselves as students. Many, probably most, of the professors have been educated in Germany or France, and present the fruits of European science in their instructions.

The University occupies one large building, erected by subscription, and well arranged for its purpose. It contains a lecture-room for each faculty, an anatomical theatre, a laboratory, and a large hall for public occasions. There is deposited in it also the national library, the property of the government, which is said to number over 80,000 volumes, and a smaller one, containing some 5,000 or 6,000 volumes, belonging to the University, and for the use of the instructors only. The nucleus of this latter was the private library of Thiersch.

A newspaper just received from Athens contains some statistics about the University, from which the following facts are derived. The whole number of students enrolled as candidates for degrees from Sept. 1, 1837, to Sept. 1, 1866, was 4,347, classified as follows:—in the theological faculty, 198; in the law faculty, 1747; in the medical faculty, 1986; in the philo-

sophical, 182; and in the school of pharmacy, 244. Those who obtained the degree of doctor during this time were 1014, with about the same proportion in the several faculties, except that there were only five in the theological school, and 158 in the school of pharmacy. Of instructors of all grades, there have been 8 in theology, 20 in law, 28 in medicine, 36 in philosophy. During the year 1865-6 there were 1182 students enrolled, more than in any year before, of whom more than half, 678, were in the law faculty.

The expenses of the University for that year are given as about \$10,000, of which a little more than half was to make up the salaries of the professors for two months when the government was unable to pay them. The receipts from all sources are stated to have been a little over \$29,000, and a large part of the surplus was invested in shares of the National Bank.

The lectures are all in Greek, and show in an extreme degree the tendency to conform the modern language as far as possible to the model of the ancient. The degree of this tendency is the test of a man's scholarship and style, in the view of most of the modern Athenians. Many people attend the lectures for the mere pleasure of hearing their language skillfully and elegantly wielded, or even to improve their own style of expression by hearing from the professors a sort of Greek which they never hear in common life.

ARTICLE IV.—NEW PHASES OF THE SCHOOL QUESTION
IN CONNECTICUT.

Circular respecting the Abolition of the Normal School at New Britain, issued by the State Board of Education in Connecticut, September 12, 1867. 8vo. 4 pp.

The Daily Public School in the United States. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1866.

A Shorter Catechism on Consolidation. 1866. 8vo. 4 pp.

IN respect of education, as well as of politics and religion, Connecticut is a sort of battle-ground between the friends of progress and the advocates of reaction. In almost all questions of public policy two parties appear, nearly equally balanced, and both of them eager to maintain the ascendancy. First one succeeds, then the other; and thus the "Land of Steady Habits" is in danger of being known as the Land of Unsteady Habits, so hard is it to foretell what course will be pursued in any matter which depends upon the action of the people.

We can cite some recent illustrations of this changeable policy. For example, the same legislature which bestowed, last summer, upon the Insane Asylum for the Poor a second appropriation fifty per cent. more than the directors asked for, declined giving aid to a Reformatory for girls, caused the Normal School to be abolished, and were only led to make a decent appropriation for the salary of the State Superintendent of Schools, by the personal representations of the Governor and the Lieutenant-Governor. A Republican citizen of New Haven, who desires to be known as an educator by profession, sat by the side of one of the leading Democrats of the Assembly, while he was attacking the established system of public instruction, giving countenance to his effrontery, and poison to his arrows. Just as the Board of Education of the State had

accomplished the reforms in the Normal School, which the action of previous Assemblies had demanded, they received a warning for their fidelity and implied censure, in place of gratitude, for their unpaid and unselfish devotion to the interests of the State. From the days when Henry Barnard began to labor for the improvement of Common Schools until now, the legislation of the State has exhibited this same "jerky" character. His reward was that of Aristides the Just, banishment from the state, because of "the exercise of powers" which Themistocles said were "dangerous in a Democracy." In like manner his successors in office have every one of them been assailed with virulence, commonly by those who should have been their friends; and the power to bring about good results has been seriously hampered by narrow minded opponents of taxation, by interested advocates of private schools, by disappointed candidates for official place, and by misinformed believers in an erroneous and injurious political philosophy.

In regard to these various classes of opponents we shall presently speak; but, first, we desire to call attention to the fact that while Connecticut goes stumbling along, the system of Public Instruction, of which she is a principal author, and of which her history is a principal record, does not halt. It is established in New York, Ohio, Michigan, California, and in all the other great republics of the west, where the Sons of Connecticut have chosen their homes. It is imitated in the Dominion of Canada. Its principal characteristics are exhibited to the scholars of Europe in the most influential Review of the continent, as worthy of general approbation and adoption. A Royal Commissioner from Great Britain, after a careful study of our methods and results, officially reports that by reason of the American system of public instruction, we "are certainly the most generally educated and intelligent people on the earth."

There is a second preliminary point on which we propose to dwell still more at length. People at a distance are much more puzzled than are we at home by the apparent inconsistencies of Connecticut legislation, and by the uncertain fluctuations in public opinion. To us, many facts are known respecting the movement of the population which are not revealed by

a scrutiny of the census, or by the hasty observations of travelers. We are well aware of the changes which are in progress in this once homogeneous and well educated commonwealth. We know what distinctions are introduced into society by the accumulation of enormous fortunes, by intimate and incessant intercourse with the great metropolis, and by the rapid immigration of foreigners who have been bred under despotic institutions, and are ignorant of the dangers which beset a republican government. We see how rapidly our population is turning from agricultural to mechanical pursuits, and how the thriving and noisy smart factory villages, filled up with new comers, both foreign and domestic, are supplanting in influence, at least at the polls, the shaded town streets, inhabited by substantial and conservative residents, and the still more quiet "rural districts" where the remnant of farmers yet cultivate the soil. We are well enough aware that large numbers of young men, who would have been among us the efficient promoters of all good interests, are laying the foundations of new cities and states on the slopes of the Pacific, and in the fertile valleys of the Mississippi basin. We understand, moreover, that in these days of change and fermentation, established principles and usages are liable to be attacked, the right will for a time be overwhelmed by the wrong, and progress will seem to be backward. But we do not despair of the Republic. We welcome controversy, discussion, inquiry, agitation, not for their own sakes, but for the elimination of errors, and for the confirmation of the truth.

Facts so obvious to us, as those just recorded, show themselves but imperfectly, in the bare outlines of statistical tables, yet even here they may be discovered. From the official data of 1860, it appears that during the ten years previous, Connecticut ceased to be a "migrative" state, and became a "receiving" state; that is to say, the number of inhabitants who came into her borders from other states exceeded the number of those who removed away. Among these new comers were large numbers of foreigners, most of whom were Irish. It is a fact not generally known, but undisputed we believe, that the three southern states of New England, and the city of New York are a sort of Irishman's Paradise. It is

here, at least, that "the Exodus" of that people terminates. Hence, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New York have each of them among their inhabitants *over twelve per cent.*, or about one eighth Irish. No other states are favored to a like extent with the Milesian suffrage. While this is so, these same New England states are giving in exchange for this foreign element their own brightest young men, the flower of the land, so that thirty per cent. of the natives of Massachusetts, thirty-three per cent. of the natives of Connecticut, and thirty-nine per cent. of the natives of Rhode Island are found to be permanently resident beyond the states of their nativity. Now, when this double process is at work, when the American element is thus drawn off, and the Irish element is thus infused, it is not to be wondered at that the traditional institutions, habits, usages, and opinions of New England are modified and perhaps corrupted. Connecticut in one respect suffers more than Rhode Island or Massachusetts. The cities of Providence and Boston exert upon the states of which they are the capitals an educational influence which Connecticut does not gain from its double-headed organization. Hartford and New Haven, important and rival centres of wealth, traffic, enterprise and culture, are not accustomed to act in unison for the advancement of public measures, and thus there is a want of concentration in the efforts of good citizens to promote the general prosperity. It is consequently harder to ward off evil influences, and encourage good undertakings than in those states where most of the leading newspapers, the houses of legislature, the state offices, the higher courts, and the chief seats of learning are clustered in the vicinity of a single capital.

Neither the citizens of Connecticut nor their friends in other states have, therefore, any reason to be surprised that the principles of Public Education are sometimes called in question in the very community which has been conspicuous as an originator and defender of the New England ideas. Since the earliest colonial days we have had no foundations to lay. We have been called upon to accept, advance, modify, and adapt the inheritance of the past. Other parts of the country have have been forced to determine what plan they would adopt, and have gone through a series of radical and fundamental

discussions, after which they felt "settled." On the other hand, our controversies have been so far in advance of these radical investigations, and have been so much taken up with secondary questions, that many of our most intelligent citizens show themselves ignorant of the underlying principles.

What now is the aspect of the School Question in Connecticut? Disturbed, controversial, pugnacious, is our reply. The questions which are agitated, the men who are discussing them, the vigor which is manifested, the measures which are proposed, are unmistakable signs of an educational movement throughout the state, originating with no individual, instigated by neither political party, and occasioned by no single transaction, and likely, for these very reasons, to be prolonged, thorough, and fruitful either of good or evil to every town and village, to every boy and girl within the limits of the state.

But the aspect of the School Question in Connecticut is also hopeful, in our opinion eminently hopeful. In spite of what the *Evening Post* of New York has said, and the "dismal" picture which the *Massachusetts Teacher* has discovered in the recent report of the Board of Education, and the Jeremiads which are played on a harp of a thousand strings, we believe that the signs of the times indicate an early, comprehensive, and satisfactory advancement of the established system of public instruction. That our readers may understand the reasons for our cheerfulness, in the present hour of momentary discomfitures, let them view with care the situation.

On the one hand, the State Normal School, while under the care of an accomplished and highly successful instructor, has been abruptly suspended, the teachers dismissed, and the scholars scattered, in accordance with the directions of the Legislature. This is the most disheartening circumstance, though it is capable of explanations, which at another time we may perhaps reveal. In addition to this hostile procedure in the General Assembly of the State, there have been some vigorous local manifestations of dislike to a good school system. For example, last year, in New Haven, seven of the nine members of the City Board of Education recommended the abolition of the High School, an institution which, in

Hartford, every one approves; while in Hartford, a noisy town meeting refused to unite the various school districts on a plan which, in New Haven, receives the general, if not the unanimous, approval of the people. Such local disputes in their general influence may counterbalance each other, but they are significant indications of public opinion, and sometimes of bitter hostility to the school system. When a meeting, called for deliberation, like that which was held in Hartford in August, 1866, refuses to listen to the most gifted orator of the city, and drowns his voice with cries of "order," we are safe in concluding that there is some acrimony of feeling. So much for the opposition.

Now let us look at the other side. We have gained within a little more than two years, a Board of Education instituted by the Legislature, and composed of four able men beside the Governor and Lieutenant-Governor. Under their direction, a Secretary, well known through New England for his zeal in public education, is at work all over the state, correcting evils, pointing out right measures, awakening public attention, and diffusing right principles.

Again, the Teachers' Institutes, which for want of a suitable pecuniary allowance, have been for years no ornament to the system, are now, by a change of the law, liberally provided for, so that the gatherings held last spring in Norwich, Danbury, and Waterbury, awakened in behalf of these instrumentalities a zeal before unknown.

Thirdly, the tax required by the State from every town for school purposes, has been increased one third, the benefit of which will be gained during the coming year; and what is more gratifying still, the amount raised in the year 1865 (the last year of which we have a financial report) by voluntary taxation in the several towns and districts, reached the sum of \$292,347, a gain of \$70,000 in a single year, and a gain of \$170,000 within ten years. In other words, two and a half times as much was raised for schools by taxation in 1865 as was raised in 1856.

Fourthly, the school law has been so modified as to facilitate the abolition of small school districts, or rather the union of all the districts of a given town, so that the intelligence and

wealth of the central portions of the town may extend their enlightening influence into every nook and corner of the state. This law, it is true, is not compulsory, but permissive. Its main features are intended to meet the difficulties which now exist in towns where there are out-lying, deserted, or impoverished districts, too poor or too forlorn to maintain good schools.

Fifthly, there is unusual attention paid to educational matters in the newspapers of the state. The apathy of our people, which is one of the chief dangers of republican society, has been disturbed. The enthusiasm of friends and the bitterness of opponents are combining to secure one excellent result—the scrutiny of the system in its methods and results. From this arousal of the community we expect the best results. The recent attempt in New Haven to incite the Irish against the Americans and to exhibit at the polls the power of a Roman Catholic party excited by the priests, while it involves temporary evil, may bring permanent good, if it tends to make American citizens, irrespective of political party, watchful of the ballot-box and watchful likewise of the interests of Public Schools.

We, therefore, conclude that while the abandonment of the Normal School of the State and the occasional attacks on local institutions are evidences of hostility to the Public School system, the establishment of a State Board of Education to control our schools, the provision of a competent salary for a competent Secretary, the improvement of the Teachers' Institutes, the passage of the law for consolidating school districts, the voluntary increase of taxation for school purposes, and the general willingness of the newspapers and of the people to discuss the system of public instruction, are signs of progress and of hope.

We now proceed to analyze as well as we are able some objections to the received system of public instruction which are current in Connecticut. An extended acquaintance with individuals in different parts of the State, a prolonged official correspondence, an attendance on many public meetings called for the purpose of discussion, and a careful perusal of hundreds

of cuttings recently clipped from the different newspapers, afford us the information on which our generalizations will be based.

Some of these arguments will appear to the educators of Massachusetts, and perhaps of other parts of the country, as decidedly mediaeval. We regret, for the credit of the State, to present this diagnosis; but as our object is the improvement of the patient, we can see no gain by concealment of the symptoms. For convenience, we shall group the objections under five heads, which seem to us sufficiently comprehensive, namely: the Theological, the Financial, the Historical, the Aristocratic, and the Philosophical. Generally, though not always, our opponents are likewise of five classes—grumbling tax-payers, needy gentle-folks, disappointed place-men, ecclesiastical bigots, and selfish teachers of private schools. Whenever we meet a man who does not believe in any moral or religious ideas, who is close and parsimonious in his expenditure of money, who is tied up in the fetters of any phase of religious formalism, or who cares much more for his great-grandfather than he does for posterity, we expect to find an opponent of public instruction; and so, when we meet a frank, open-hearted lover of mankind, who desires the prosperity of the community better than selfish gains, who trusts the people and believes that they can be trained, under American institutions, for the high functions of local self-government, then we expect to find an intelligent advocate of the Common Schools. Where we see the teacher of a private school, whose returns are less than they might be, busying himself to attack the High School, the Grammar School, and the Normal School, not in an open but in a covert way, we cannot but raise the question, why this great uneasiness? and so, when we find school officers displaced from office attacking the very system of which they have been, and still desire to be, the chosen managers, we cannot but ask them, why are you among the Philistines? But the truth is neither to be defended nor embarrassed by personal arguments and insinuations. Our School system, like all republican institutions, and like the Christian faith, commends itself to approbation on its own merits alone, and not because of the endorsement of any advo-

cate, however eminent, and not because of the attacks of any opponent, however selfish. It deserves support because of its inherent fitness for the wants of our day and generation.

Let us, therefore, irrespective of personal considerations, proceed with our analysis. The position which is held by the advocates of our common schools, and which is attacked by our opponents, may be stated in the briefest form as follows: The education of the people is essential to the safety of the republic and the progress of civilization; and this can only be secured by Public Schools, not designed for any class in society, but FOR ALL; the schools which are good enough for those who know what good schools are, being none too good for the most ignorant and lowly.

The Theological objection to this idea is this: In schools which ALL attend, religion cannot be taught, without awakening denominational and ecclesiastical censure; but religious doctrines and worship should be inculcated in every school; *ergo*, denominational or church schools would be much better for the community than common schools. This is the argument—"the Parish School *versus* the Public School." This plausible syllogism is wholly satisfactory to the Roman Catholic Church, and is regarded with favor by many Episcopalians, Old School Presbyterians, and other Christians of "High-Church" proclivities. We hear it brought forward continually on the corners of the street, and it is occasionally uttered in the pulpit.

Its influence was powerfully felt in New Haven at the school election of September 16, 1867, when an avowedly Roman Catholic ticket was elected by a majority of seventy votes. The day before the balloting two of the Roman Catholic pastors of the city exhorted their parishioners to show their strength against "the Yankees," and in the third of the churches, the pastor being absent, the Catholic ticket was distributed through the children of the Sunday school. One of the priests is reported to have said that he had been trying for years to secure public money for his parish school, and now was the time to demand it. This is the ultra, possibly the ultra-mon-tane, advocacy of the Parish School. What would be the effect of carrying out to its logical conclusion an argument

like this? Does any one suppose that the community will consent to be divided into simply *two* religious bodies—the Romanist and the Protestant? Not by any means. The Episcopalians would at once demand separate schools for their children. So would the Jews. So would the Disbelievers. So would the Spiritualists. So, in five, would all the religious bodies. It is easy to conceive what would be the character of such schools, free from inspection, managed without responsibility to the public, liable to the most bigoted influences, and rife in sectarian gall. But we need not merely theorize, for this plan of public education has been tried in England, and has failed to educate the people. It satisfies nobody. The admissions of her own writers might be quoted to show that England is getting behind the continental states, and behind our own country, in some important respects, simply for want of better systems of popular education. Hence, the British government is causing the theory and methods of public instruction to be studied by good observers in the most enlightened nations, and we do not hazard much in predicting, as an imminent result, that the days of the Parish Schools, as distinct from the Public Schools, are already numbered in that land. More than this, without fear of contradiction, we assert that the people have never been in any land, by the parish school, as generally well educated as they are here under our American popular system.

The real fallacy of this theological argument seems to us to be in the assertion or the enthymeme that because the young must be instructed in religion, the day school is the place where this teaching should be given. We heartily believe in the religious training of the young, but we do *not* believe that teachers chosen because they understand the arithmetical rule-of-three, are, of course, the best persons to expound the mystery of the Trinity. In our view, tuition in spelling, reading, geography, grammar, figures, and the other rudimentary arts, is no more a religious exercise than playing ball. We hold that the tenets of Christian faith and worship should be taught under the direction of Christian pastors in a totally different manner and at a totally different time from that which is employed in imparting this so-called "secular" knowledge.

Where the catechism is taught by a perfunctory teacher, and where a prayer is made, or a chapter in the Bible is read as a perfunctory task (as it may be in any school by a bigot or an unbeliever employed as a teacher), Religion herself is dishonored. It would be better by far, in our opinion, that positive religious instruction should be given by competent and, if necessary, by salaried teachers, employed by the various churches, in their sacred places, than that religious people should content themselves with the erroneous and dangerous notion that our present Sunday schools, and the brief religious opening of the day schools, furnish adequate training in the knowledge of Christianity.

On the other hand, any good school (our best Public Schools, for example), are, of necessity, schools of positive morality, though not of Christian faith. The virtue of Truth is taught, and not only so, but the scholar is trained to habits of Truth, when a teacher insists upon the exact use of language and on accurate recitations. Self-control is taught in the school where good order is preserved. Fidelity to engagements is taught by a strict requirement of regular and punctual attendance. Obedience to lawful authority is enforced by the required submission to the rules of school. So of other moral duties. Better is it, in our opinion, to encourage these virtues in the public school, and to impart religious doctrines under the guidance of the ministers of religion. In short, as the church is not the place to study arithmetic, so the Public School is not the place to provide religious training.

The Financial objection to common schools is the second point to which we call attention. This is the case of "the Private Purse *versus* the Public School." "They cost too much," is the complaint. When this remark is made by elderly people living on a fixed income inadequate to their support, and seriously diminished by the tax-collector's bills, we can listen to it with deference; but when it comes from men of wealth, who clutch, with the miser's hand, every dollar they own, we grow restless and impatient. "No taxation for the benefit of other peoples' children," is the cry with which they rally all the crusty old bachelors, all the fast young men, all the mean and illiberal citizens. They do not often

complain that the Public School is too costly for the work it performs. Commonly it is admitted that so many children could not be so well educated in private schools at so small a cost. The current argument is this—"You have no right to tax me for my neighbor's benefit." The answer is obvious—the community has a right to tax every citizen for the good of all. I may never ride, or even walk, in certain streets; but it is right to tax me for laying them out, for repairing them, for paving, draining, or lighting them. I may own no house; but it is right that I should pay for the maintenance of the night-watch and the fire department. I may have no suit at court, but it is for my interest that justice be administered. So of the school. If it benefits the community it benefits me, and I am rightly taxed for it. The establishment of any other principle would lead to the dissolution of society.

That Public Schools, well ordered and administered, are a positive financial benefit to the communities in which they are located, admits of ready proof. The argument has been so often presented that we will not repeat it here. But the objector says—Shall every project, then, for the benefit of the community be maintained at the public expense? We answer, no. Every such measure is to be judged on its own merits, and the public support bestowed on those projects only which cannot be secured without public aid. The education of the people, as the experience of all nations shows, can only be secured by public aid, and on this account the Public Schools are essential.

The Historical argument next deserves our attention, for although it is commonly employed by ignorant men only, yet occasionally it appears in the writings of those who ought to know better. For example, this remark is made by a correspondent of one of the New Haven dailies, whose love of military symbolism finds expression in the General's star, (*), which he affixes to an anonymous communication: "Our schools, supported by the school fund and by taxation, were **DESIGNED ORIGINALLY** for the children of parents who could not educate them at their own expense." This phrase alone might be considered as an accidental or trivial inaccuracy. But the same idea crops out repeatedly in an Article of two

columns. He complains of "new measures" introduced "on the deceptive plan that the schools for the poor should be made as good as the schools for the rich." He scoffs at the "magnificent communism of Massachusetts innovators," and at the "clap-trap of declamation" of a Connecticut writer, who speaks of the rich and poor sitting side by side in the public schools. It was not so, he implies, in the days of our forefathers.

A similar statement was recently made by the official guardians of the public instruction in one of our large towns. Our schools, they say, were "originally designed for the poor." Many people actually believe that the idea of a school, common to all, irrespective of social station, originated with Horace Mann, or if not with him, then with some one of those horrid "Prooshans" whom he visited in Europe. Horace Mann has many claims to honor, but none so great as this. At most, he was only the restorer, not the founder, of the American school system. "Did I know," said a distinguished citizen of Connecticut, nearly seventy-five years ago, "the name of the legislator who first conceived and suggested the idea [of common schools] I should pay to his memory the highest tribute of reverence and regard. I should for him have a much higher veneration and respect than I do for Lycurgus and Solon, the celebrated legislators of Sparta and Athens. I should revere him as the greatest benefactor of the human race." Probably, says a historian of acknowledged authority, "the honor of devising the scheme of popular education, which has prevailed in New England, belongs exclusively to no individual, but to Theophilus Eaton and John Davenport, more than to any others in New Haven, should be ascribed this honor." What, then, was their idea of public instruction? Take New Haven colony, for example. The system may be easily ascertained by a perusal of the Colonial Records now within the reach of all. It was simply this: "All the children must be taught. The public must see to this. The community must establish a school, engage a school master, superintend the instruction. A Grammar school or Latin school must supplement the elementary class, so that boys may be fitted for the university.' There was no select academy or institute for the children of Eaton

and Davenport, Goodyear and Gregson, and another for those of humble life, but there was one school for all, a Common school. It is true that this school was not a free school, in our acceptation of the phrase. Those paid tuition who were able; and only those who could not pay received gratuitous instruction. But the school was for everybody's children; no matter whether they could pay or not, it was open to them all, like the air they breathed, and like the common which they trod. It is therefore sheer ignorance of our local history to claim that it is a modern notion to propose "instruction for all" in the public school system. The feature of all others which distinguishes the American educational establishment is this democratic principle. It is the gift of New England to the pedagogics of the world. Public schools for different classes are known elsewhere. Public schools for the poor have long been maintained by the Roman church, and various Protestant communions. But Common Schools, schools common to all, are the characteristic of the Christian democracy established in New England in the middle of the seventeenth century. It may be that our forefathers planted better than they knew; that they thought simply of their own wants; that they were not expecting to introduce a system for the continent. But the germ still grows; its branches cover the land; its offshoots will be transplanted to every people of the civilized world.

We would not be considered as laying undue stress on the value of past institutions. Antiquity alone is no argument. But when our opponents charge us with innovations, it is well for our friends to look up the record. Fortunately in this case experience confirms the positions of antiquity.

The Aristocratic objection to public schools, is of all others to us the most obnoxious. The point of this argument, as we understand it, is this. It is dangerous to the refinement and morality of well-bred children, to sit side by side with barefooted clod-hoppers. The poor are, of necessity, so demoralizing that children who can wear broadcloth and silk must avoid the calico and satinet as they would the leprosy and plague.

Such doctrines as these are not stated in just these words;

but stripped of their euphemisms this is their import. People at the West will be astonished to learn that any man of any creed, or of any party, should hold such opinions. A school officer from beyond the Mississippi recently expressed to us in the strongest terms his opinion of the mode in which such opinions would be received in those new commonwealths.

As we are not among the believers in Cologne-water churches, or in Cologne-water schools, it has astonished us beyond measure, to learn that one who has been a prominent member of the Republican party appeared before the Joint Standing Committee on Education in the General Assembly, as an open advocate of social "caste." "It will not do" (he is reported to have said) "to have the children of parents who cannot pay for their education associate with the children of those who can. Not that the line of virtue and vice is always coincident with the line of wealth and poverty, but it is so generally the case as to constitute the rule."

Let our readers mark these words. Have we a Bourbon or a Stuart among us? or is this the daring utterance of Hammond, or Davis, or some other fire-eater of the South opposed to Northern institutions?

Fortunately, when this plea for class distinctions was uttered in the crowded committee room at Hartford, a distinguished scholar, an officer of Yale College, was present, who could say, "I have had four boys at one time in a public school of New Haven, and I have never known them to be there exposed to any vicious or contaminating influence."

We are not opponents of private schools. We presume that in all time to come, however good the public schools may be, private schools will be required. We have no objections to the attempt to secure for the favored few a culture of a higher order than can be provided for the multitude. It does no harm to the post-office for rich men to use the telegraph. The police do not suffer by the employment of private watchmen. But we shall oppose the expenditure of public money for any other object than the good of all; we shall protest against the attempt to establish or recognize in this country any permanent class of "poor;" and we shall fight to the

best of our ability against "the Pauper theory" of Public Education.

Dr. Holmes has somewhere humorously delineated the virtues of "the Brahmin Caste" in New England. There is an inherited aristocratic sentiment, which often manifests itself in the older historic families of New England. So long as it is seen in an idolatrous reverence for traditional blue-china, or in a superstitious avoidance of certain articles of diet, we laugh at it; so long as it appears in a conservative desire to perpetuate the refinements and manners, the intelligence and good breeding of "old-school" gentlemen and "old school" ladies, we admire and uphold it; but when it appears in a horror of popular advancement in intelligence and comfort, or in a ridiculous shrinking from intercourse with families whose grandfathers are by chance forgotten, we despise and abhor it. We have no sympathy with the arguments of "the Brahmin caste, *versus* the Public Schools."

The only remaining arguments which we shall notice are those, which, out of compliment to the authors, and for want of a better term, we call Philosophical; but be it understood that they are the results of "Philosophy, *falsely so called*." They are the utterances of men who think it is sagacious and profound to combat all accepted and established usages in society,—who extol the past as the golden age, who join with Carlyle in his dread of "Shooting Niagara;" who sniff and jeer at every noble sentiment of Christian brotherhood, or republican public spirit. Their ideas of social science may be crude, prejudiced, and superficial, but they are also positive, dogmatic, and unreasonable. Their leading principle seems to be opposition to every good principle. If religion is advocated we hear them sneer at priest-ridden congregations. If the national existence is at stake, they are the extravagant and untimely advocates of state rights. If the government is forced to raise funds on credit, they believe in nothing but very hard cash, and are intensely interested in the history of the copper cent. If the growth of the town is under consideration, they don't want to see any more people in it, it is too large already!

Their opposition to public instruction is equally profound, and is based upon the tenet stated in one of their recent utter-

ances, that "the State cannot keep school." There are many variations of this cry adapted to different occasions; for example: "We have too much eddication now," is one; the High school is "a fungus," is another; the Latin class is "a trap to catch unsuspecting juveniles," is a third; Normal Schools are "Augean stables," is another. These philosophers were represented in the last Assembly by an eloquent disciple and advocate, into whom it would seem that the brave spirit of Peter the Hermit, or Sancho Panza, or some other valiant crusader had entered, and who thus exclaimed, on "philosophical" not on shallow "parsimonious" grounds, against the increase of pay to the Secretary of the State Board of Education: "It is *monstrous* to give a mere clerk \$3,000 and his expenses, when the Chief Justice of the state receives but \$2,000. If he is to advocate the State Normal School, I would not give him a cent. I am told that he is a sort of preacher of the principles of the Normal School. I am told he advocates the introduction of the Prussian system of education [once more, those 'horrid Prooshans!'] which looks to the establishment of a great National Seminary at an expense of twenty millions, and that these first steps are only the beginning of a plan looking to that system. Mr. Speaker, I move the postponement of the whole matter."*

We will not detain our readers with any attempt to answer such flings as these. The fundamental error on which they are based is the only point deserving respectful attention. Stated without exaggeration, it is this. "The state 'botches' all that it undertakes, it mismanages so badly that we should strip it as far as possible of all powers. Parents alone should be responsible for the education of the young, and the state should only see to the training in elementary knowledge of those abandoned children whose parents give them over to ignorance and vice."

This is sometimes fitly called the Pauper theory of public education. It places the common school on the basis of the alms-house, so that every honest and deserving poor man will avoid it as he would the lazaretto. Necessity alone is the usher to its halls.

* See report in the Hartford Times, July 24th, 1867.

Now we have but little fear that any such views as these will be prevalent among the American people to such an extent as to modify our laws and institutions,—but they do furnish arguments which to weak-minded friends of public instruction seem weighty.

The answer is this : Imperfect as are our modes of civil government, they are the only means of securing some of our best social institutions. Roads, parks, municipal improvements, the post office, the courts of justice, the militia, may not be perfect. A battalion of school boys may march better than the organized troops of the state. What then? Shall we have no public works, no state improvements, no progress in civilization and state-craft, because all political machinery is defective? By no means. The community is bound to provide public schools for the same reason that it provides the other institutions we have named,—because in no other way can the benefits desired be secured so generally, so cheaply, and so satisfactorily.

As for the fear that parents are led to give up their own care of the young by the creation of such public schools as those of New England, it is a pure invention of the enemy, a groundless apprehension, a calumny just as applicable to private as to public schools. The employment of any teacher may be called a shifting of parental responsibility; but tell us which is the most dangerous shift to entrust a child to a public school for five hours a day, or to a boarding school for twenty-four?

One thing is certain, if the Public School in America is abandoned to the so-called poor it will soon be abandoned by them. The only safe theory for our government is to recognize no permanent class of poor or rich, no line of aristocratic distinction, no barrier of caste, but to provide for the benefit of all. "This is a government of the People, by the People, for the People." It is the masses, the multitude, who are neither very rich nor very poor, who are neither high bred nor degraded, for whom all our institutions are contrived. We have no fear that these mock philosophers, these educational "owls," will make any progress with their theories of government.

We have thus enumerated the various arguments which are presented by the advocates of the Parish School, the Private

Purse, Inaccurate Tradition, the Brahmin Caste, and the Philosophy of the Owls in opposition to the Public School. The knowing reader has probably discovered that they are not imaginary objections, but are the actual statements which have been seriously made, within a short time past, in the State of Connecticut, by intelligent and influential men. We have recounted them that our friends elsewhere, liable to hear like discussions, may know the light in which we regard them.

The opposition to the Common School system of Connecticut has shown itself in four phases, or rather, there have been four points of attack; first, the New Haven High School; second, the law providing for uniting small school districts into one town district; third, the appointment of that so-called "Massachusetts Innovator," Mr. Northrop, to the superintendence of schools in the State; and fourth, the Normal School at New Britain. In all the first three points, the Public School party have been heartily sustained. The High School has been continued, the consolidation law has been passed, and the appointment of Mr. Northrop, a Connecticut man by birth and education, has been confirmed by legislative action. The remaining point has been lost, for the moment at least, in consequence of the open desertion, and the still more dangerous whispers of professed friends of the institution, rather than the criticism of opponents. We may at some future time show our readers by what influences this Teacher's Seminary was brought into disrepute; and how it happened that an institution which had enjoyed for sixteen years the guidance of so many excellent men as Principals and as Trustees, was finally stranded. For the present we forbear, and content ourselves with expressing the hope, that the suspension of the school will lead to reorganization at an early day on a wise and enduring basis. The arguments in favor of such a course are enumerated in the circular referred to at the beginning of our remarks, which bears the signature of Governor English and his coadjutors in the Board of Education. We presume that in the next Assembly this subject will receive the attention it deserves, and our friends should see to it that the cause is not lost by default, or by the petty prolongation of personal difficulties.

With two or three further remarks we shall conclude our observations.

In the first place, we urge upon the friends of public education to stand firm for the right. It may be well for them to combine in local or state organizations for the promotion of public schools, in order that by the publishing of documents, the delivery of addresses, and the holding of public conferences, the true theory may be presented to the voters of every town, and village, and district. We can trust the people; if they understand the question; see to it that they are enlightened.

Secondly. The interests of public education should be kept free from ordinary political partisanship. The system is ruined if either Democrats or Republicans assume its direction, or enrol themselves to assault it. It is noteworthy that among the opponents of the Normal School were leading Republicans, and that among its defenders were many prominent Democrats. The remarks of our present chief magistrate, Governor English, in laying the corner stone of the hospital at Middletown, and in presiding at the anniversary in New Britain, showed a sympathy with popular education and a desire for the maintenance of the Common School System which will always be remembered to his honor, especially among those who may have differed from him on other political issues. A similar tribute is due to the present Lieutenant-Governor, Hon. E. H. Hyde. Years ago, in like manner, another Democratic magistrate, Governor Seymour, planted himself firmly as a friend of Common Schools, and of the Normal School, and the services he rendered are still gratefully borne in mind. The *Hartford Times* has been one of the strongest advocates of district consolidation. We call attention to these facts, because most of our readers are of the Republican party, and we desire to have them know that there are efficient allies to be found in educational contests among men of all shades of political belief. Certainly questions so vital to the public welfare ought not to be confounded with the struggles of national political parties.

Finally; it is very important that the people of Connecticut should sustain the present State Board of Education. In addition to the two chief magistrates it consists of four wise and cautious advocates of public instruction, all of them liber-

ally educated gentlemen, two of them at least experienced teachers, all of them accustomed to public life. They understand the state, and are interested in its welfare, and their guidance may be safely followed. Their selections of teachers for the Normal School, and their various suggestions for the improvement of the schools at large, deserve the scrutiny and the approbation of every citizen.

We are in the midst of grave discussions. If we are wise and temperate, watchful and persistent, the victory will be ours, and we shall soon see the Land of Steady Habits restored to its former educational renown.

ARTICLE V.—PRESIDENT WOOLSEY'S ADDRESS AT
THE FUNERAL OF PRESIDENT DAY, COMMEMO-
RATIVE OF HIS LIFE AND SERVICES.

I SUPPOSE that if the nearly 2500 graduates of Yale College who were educated here under President Day were asked who was the best man they knew, they would, with a very general agreement, assign him that high place. I can scarcely doubt that his family friends and other acquaintance would speak the same word. I certainly share in the opinion. And the character ascribed to him by so many would be not that of a blameless man merely, but of a man perfect and upright according to the standard of Scripture—a perfect man in Christ Jesus. This maturity of Christian virtue in him had a peculiarly peaceful cast. All was tranquil in his soul, and to the inward state the peace of his outer life corresponded. It was, therefore, in keeping, as peace beautified his life, that the evening of his long day should be calm repose, and his last end like the sinking of a cloudless sun.

I feel it to be a great honor to me, and it is an equal pleasure, to be permitted to pay my tribute of love and duty to such a man. It is, in some respects, also an easy task. A man who stands up to utter words in honor of the dead ought, as I think, to speak the simple truth, to conceal no glaring fault, to be kind and charitable indeed, yet at the same time to be just. Otherwise he must feel that the verdict of his own conscience and of men is giving him the lie; and what is false eulogy worth when God's bar will set it all aside? It is difficult, therefore, sometimes, when you testify to the excellencies of good men, to know what to speak forth and what smaller blemishes to leave out of your estimate of their characters. But here there is no such difficulty. I have nothing to conceal. And this is ever recurring to my mind, that if the wise and good man, whom I am attempting to honor, knew that such a duty had fallen to me, and were allowed from the spiritual world to whisper his suggestions, although

he might justly desire to be held in a good light before his surviving friends, yet he would wish more than all that only words of truth should be spoken in honor of his memory. I am thankful that I can speak thus, and yet pay him the unfeigned, unalloyed tribute of my highest reverence.

I ask your attention while I proceed to give some account of President Day's life, both in its earliest developments and in its later periods, then of his work in the world, and lastly, of his character.

A person who examines the map of the State of Connecticut, will notice a settlement in the northeast part of the town of Washington (as it is now called), in Litchfield county, which bears the name of New Preston, and at present contains two Congregational churches. In 1752, the legislature of the colony, departing from the received practice of confining parish limits within the boundaries of towns, formed a new parish out of portions of Kent, New Milford, and Washington. This step was met at first by complaints on the part of settlers in Kent, East Greenwich (now called Warren, and then a part of Kent), and New Milford, on the ground of enfeebling the adjoining churches. But there was good reason for the measure, as any one must admit, who has traveled over those formidable hills, which are penetrated by the valleys of the two Ashpetucks, and perceives that the settlers in New Preston would need to spend almost half the day of rest on the road to and from the house of God.

In 1757, this ecclesiastical society, lying near the corner of four towns, called a minister—Mr. Noah Wadhams—and, not long after his dismissal in 1768, invited Mr. Jeremiah Day to the vacant pulpit. Mr. Day, a native of Colchester, son of a farmer from Hampshire county, Mass., who was one of the first settlers of the town, was a graduate of Yale College of the year 1756. Between this year and 1763, he taught school at Sharon, where his father is said to have removed; then, although not a professor of religion, read divinity with Dr. Bellamy at Bethlehem, and after some time, having doubts of his fitness to preach, returned to the employment of a school teacher. In 1763, his brother having bequeathed to him at his death a tract of land on Sharon mountain, or Ells-

worth, as it is now called, he went there to take possession, and to occupy himself with the labors of the farmer, to which he had had an apprenticeship in his boyhood before going to college. He represented the town in the General Assembly of the colony in 1766 and 1767. Here he married, and here his wife, a Miss Mills of Kent, died in 1767. Here, too, Divine grace affected his heart, and he resolved to devote himself to the preaching of the Gospel. He studied with the Rev. Cotton Mather Smith of Sharon, father of the late John Cotton Smith, Governor of Connecticut; was licensed to preach by the Litchfield Association in 1767, and was ordained as pastor of the church in New Preston in 1770. He was a man of note among his brethren, an able, successful minister. He lived until 1806, preaching to the people which first called him to the end of his ministerial life. Once, in 1801, he was moderator of the General Association, twice he preached the annual discourse before that body, and we find him in 1793 and 1794 engaged in missionary tours under the auspices of the Association in the more destitute parts of New York and Vermont.* By his third wife, who was the widow of the Rev. Sylvanus Osborn of Warren, and whom he married in 1772, he had four children, that grew up—Jeremiah; Thomas, long Secretary of the State of Connecticut, and author of the numerous and valuable volumes in which the cases decided by the Supreme Court of the State are reported; Noble, first a merchant in New Preston, then, towards the close of his life, a resident in Ohio; and finally, Mills, who died in 1812, while a tutor in Yale College.

Jeremiah Day, the oldest of these children, was born August 3, 1773, on the western slope of the bleak hill of New Preston, near where the present stone church is situated. Here, in the quiet and simplicity of a country parish, afar from the principal roads and settlements, his early years were spent, and as he grew up and became able to labor, his father gave the garden into his hands, and hoped that he would devote himself to the farmer's employment. His brother Thomas remembered the pleasant way he had of getting work

* See a memoir of him in *Conn. Evang. Mag.*, vol. vii., 212-216, for December, 1806.

upon the garden out of the younger boys. After rain he would say—"Boys, this is a good time to work in the garden; the weeds will come up easy now." In a dry season he would say—"Boys, this is a good time to work in the garden; the weeds will die quick now." He always loved a garden from that time onward, and has been in the habit of taking part of his exercise in this way. And, perhaps, the anecdote I have mentioned will identify child and man in the minds of those who know what a fund of pleasantry lay hid within his most serious and reserved character, as well as in the minds of that larger number who know that he always sought to win, and never to drive, those of whom he had the control, to do what was right.

In the autumn of the year 1785, Mr. David Hale, a brother of the well-known Nathan Hale, who was hanged as a spy by the British in 1776, came into the family to study divinity, and paid for his board by instructing the children. Under him our friend began to fit for Yale College, at which Mr. Hale had just been graduated. This instructor seems to have had a happy influence in the house, not only as a teacher but as a religious friend. It was his practice, after the services on Sunday, to call the family together and explain to them some portion of Scripture; and the impressions which he made were long afterwards remembered. After his departure from New Preston, our friend was sent to Waterbury to continue his education for college under Mr. Joseph Badger and Mr. John Kingsbury. He entered college in 1789.

I have not fallen upon many particulars of his college life. There is no reason to doubt that the peculiarly lovely character, the dutiful, quiet, gentle traits which are testified by very aged persons as having shone in him before, accompanied him to New Haven, and as a scholar he was excellent. But it became necessary for him, on account of his health, to leave college in 1791, and he was not able to return until 1793. During a part of the interval he was employed in teaching school in Judea, or the eastern part of Washington, and, perhaps, also in Kent. He seems, too, to have spent some time at Blanford, in Massachusetts, with Mr. Badger, then minister there, who had married a relative of his mother.

It was in the winter of 1791, during this interval in his college life, that he made a profession of religion. The outward change was not marked, for his life was blameless, his temper mild, and his deportment serious before. And, as was natural for him, he seems to have said very little of his inward feelings to those who were about him. His impressions were excited by reading "Doddridge's Rise and Progress." He joined the church at home just after he commenced keeping a school in Washington.

Returning to college in 1793, and thus falling back two years, he remained there until his graduation in 1795. In the spring of that year President Stiles died, and Dr. Dwight, being chosen to succeed him soon after, presided at the commencement, when young Day received his degree. Dr. Dwight had left a large and flourishing academy at Greenfield. It was no slight testimony to the confidence which the young collegian had inspired, that he was selected to succeed Dr. Dwight in this school. Here he remained nearly a year, and, while here, received the appointment of a tutor in Williams College, which was then in its infancy, having been founded but three years before, and placed under the direction of President Fitch, a former graduate of our institution. Mr. Day consulted Dr. Dwight in regard to accepting the place, and by his advice was led to consent; but in the autumn, his health becoming feeble and his spirits depressed, he wished to revoke his acceptance. He was, however, persuaded to go up to the college and fill the office until another person could be found to take the place, and then, on the improvement of his health, he remained there two years. At the end of this period, he was invited to the same office in his *alma mater*, where, among his colleagues, were the late President Davis of Hamilton College, and Mr. Charles Denison of New Haven, who had been fellow tutors with him at Williamstown, as well as Professor Silliman, who was to be associated with him for so long afterwards. In this office he continued for nearly three years, through all which his instructions, as was the manner then, were confined to one class—to that which was graduated in 1802. During this office he began to exercise his preaching powers, having been licensed so to do in 1800 by the Association

of New Haven West.* On the Sunday before the fourth of July, in 1801, he preached twice in West Haven for old Mr. Williston, and, after the services, was attacked with a slight hemorrhage. This was followed by so great debilitation, that his physician (the late Dr. Æneas Munson, senior) advised him to give up teaching and to try a warmer climate, and expressed to his friends his fears that a tuberculous consumption might soon set in. It so happened that at this time a person from Bermuda was in New Haven, who had sailed for the United States in his own vessel, and offered him a passage to the island. By the advice of friends, he embraced the opportunity, sailing in August and remaining there until the next April. Soon after his departure, at their meeting in September, just before Commencement, the Corporation appointed him Professor of Mathematics and Natural Philosophy in Yale College.

On his return he showed no symptoms of improved health, and it was a thing beyond question that he could not enter into the office for which he had been selected. For more than a year after his return he spent his time in the quiet and retirement of his father's house at New Preston, firmly persuaded, as were his friends also, that he had a fixed consumption. A plain woman, coming into the house, asked him if he expected to recover. "No more," he replied, "than I expect to go to the moon." The treatment of bleeding and a low diet, which his physician adopted, enfeebled him and left him nervous and sleepless. It was at this time that the shadow of a great darkness fell upon his spiritual prospects. His illness aggravated his self-distrust, and his fears increased that habit of introspection which has been so natural to minds trained under New England theology; hence he wrote bitter things against himself, and, for a time, was as positive in his judgment against the salvation of his soul, as against the probability of his recovery from his illness. How long this thick cloud hung over him I have no means of knowing. I heard him say once, if I am not deceived, that he found it neces-

* He was licensed at Derby, at the house of Rev. A. Porter. President Day told me he had been preaching about a year when taken ill.

sary to stop brooding over himself and looking into himself. As by and by his health grew better, his feelings also became healthier, and being occupied with the cares of instruction, and led more into the habits of intimacy with other minds, he was enabled to experience those influences from practical life and every-day duties undertaken with an honest purpose of serving God, which counterbalanced the leanings towards the morbid and towards self-analysis and self-distrust to which reflecting minds are often exposed. Nor can we believe that this severe, this terrible, discipline was lost upon him, that he was not a wiser and better man after he had gone through it than before.

We have said that in the first part of his illness a treatment of reduction was tried upon him. Afterwards, Dr. Sheldon, of Litchfield, one of the leading physicians in the State, becoming better acquainted with his case, decided to give him tonics, and under this practice he continued to improve, until he was able, in the early part of the summer term in 1803, to begin the duties of his professorship. These duties, at first, he was not able to perform in their full extent; he gave, for instance, no lectures during the first summer, but, by degrees, he became able to take upon himself a due share of labor, and to fill his place in the college with efficiency and success.

Here we may be allowed to say that Mr. Day's ill health exercised a positive and decided influence on his mind and character. It rendered great prudence necessary, and that prudence became a watchful sentinel over his whole life. It required him to find out what he could and what he could not bear in the way of intellectual and physical labor; it compelled him to understand himself, to have fixed habits of life, to adopt great simplicity in his habits, to control himself with a firm hand, all which redounded to the benefit of his inner man, and from being a trial grew into a blessing. It seems strange that a man of feeble lungs, given over to death by his friends and himself, always unable to bear the night air, should have lived a life prolonged beyond the age of ninety, and should be at his death the oldest man in New Haven. Yet, under God, this was mind conquering matter, soundness of judgment counteracting debility of constitution; and in the

quiet effort, not only did the body become invested with a longer life, but the mind also and character received back the power themselves, for their own benefit, which they had put forth to maintain the mortal part in its vigor.

From 1803 until 1817 the life of Professor Day flowed along amid the studies and instructions demanded by his office. In 1814 the first edition of his "Algebra" saw the light and was followed within two years by his Mensuration and Plane Trigonometry. The treatise on Navigation and Surveying, which closed the series, did not appear until 1817.

In the first month of the year 1817, the college was left without a presiding officer by the death of Dr. Dwight, and the question who should be his successor became a very grave one for an institution, whose only permanent officers were three professors, none of whom were of more than twelve years' standing. The choice of the Fellows or Corporation was at first directed towards Dr. Henry Davis, then President of Middlebury College, who had been a tutor at Williams College and at Yale, and a professor at Union, who had been elected to the chair of divinity at his Alma Mater, but was unable to accept the appointment, and with whom the professors here, who had all of them been his colleagues in the tutorship, were on the best of terms. He was elected on the 11th of February, 1817, about a month after Dr. Dwight's death, and a deputation of the Fellows was sent to Middlebury to offer him the place. On deliberation he declined the call, and the Corporation then appointed Professor Day on the 22d of April following. I am able to state on the best authority that Dr. Dwight, after the beginning of his fatal malady, one day when the Faculty of the College had been assembled and the Professors had remained behind, turned abruptly to Professor Day and said, "Mr. Day, you must be my successor." This his colleagues would have preferred from the first, but he utterly shrunk from it. How the Corporation first viewed the matter I cannot say: probably they wanted a man of more prestige than the Professor of Natural Philosophy, a man of some prominence as a preacher, and of showy qualities. It was with unfeigned reluctance, when the appointment was made, that Professor Day, after due deliberation and solely, as

I believe, from a sense of duty, signified his acceptance. He was inaugurated as well as ordained on the 23d of July. In the same year, Mr. Alexander M. Fisher was chosen adjunct professor of mathematics and natural philosophy, Rev. Chauncey A. Goodrich professor of rhetoric, and Rev. Eleazar T. Fitch professor of theology. President Day continued for about two years, I believe, to give written lectures on natural philosophy, after which he confined himself to the department of mental and moral philosophy, having thus the same field of instruction which Dr. Dwight had occupied, together with those innumerable cares of superintendence over the general interests of the college and over the senior class especially, which in this college have followed the office of the President. He preached occasionally, although seldom in the chapel. He sustained with honor those relations to public and especially to religious interests outside of the college walls, to which a man in his position would naturally be called. He was a member of the board of visitors for the theological seminary at Andover, and one of the corporate members of the American Board. He presided over the General Association of Connecticut in 1829, and at three meetings afterward. Other more honorary relations to public societies and manifestations of respect in the way of honorary degrees, I pass over.

President Day continued in his office during twenty-nine years, a longer term than has fallen to the lot of any presiding officer in Yale College, and, so far as I know, occupied his post longer than the President of any American college, with the one exception of Dr. Nott. These were years of prosperity and of increasing numbers, of enlarged resources, more vigorous discipline, and more thorough training. For a while the spirit of combination to resist authority disturbed the quiet of the college, but was met by the faculty whenever it broke out, and was at last quelled by the final separation of more than half a class. On the whole, too, there was a greater prevalence of morality and religion in the college, and an increase of the number of students who led a Christian life.

For the greater part of this time President Day's health—although always delicate—was equal to the discharge of his re-

sponsible work, and he appeared also before the public occasionally as an author. A number of Articles in the *Christian Spectator* came from his pen, and a noticeable Article on "Benevolence and Selfishness" appeared in the *Biblical Repository* for January, 1843. In 1838 he gave to the world his Inquiry on the self-determining power of the Will, or contingent volition, and in 1841, his examination of President Edwards' inquiry as to the Freedom of the Will. In the year 1836, he was attacked by a suspension of action of the heart—the disease called *angina pectoris* by the physicians—and was obliged to be absent from the conferring of degrees and the exercises at commencement. These attacks visited him from time to time afterwards. With characteristic calmness, prudence, and reserve, he studied the disease, provided himself with books describing its nature, watched its symptoms so that he could anticipate an attack, and seldom spoke of these ailments even to his family. About the year 1841 or 1842, he seriously thought of resigning, and communicated his intention to the Faculty. I have reason to believe that considerations presented to him in writing, by one of the professors, prevented his going forward to do what he desired at this time; but when he had reached the age of seventy-three, and feared that he might continue beyond his time, and might through age acquire an incapacity of judgment, he resolved to execute his purpose in the year 1846. His colleagues all regretted the step, for his judgment and all the qualities which made him an ornament of the college were unimpaired. His mind was a steady flame not likely to waver or go down. His health, which had been preserved by self-knowledge and self-restraint, might continue to be no more feeble than it had been for years to come. And yet, doubtless, the capacity to bear the burdens which a flourishing and ever enlarging college—now really expanded into a university—imposed upon him, must have been more and more trying, so that it was right and wise for him to seek repose and spend the evening of his days in exemption from care. But I do not believe that he considered himself in this matter—he acted under a conviction that the step was demanded by the best interests of the college.

Followed by the veneration of all his associates, of all who had been his students and of the whole community, at the age

of seventy-three he laid down his office, not expecting probably to survive his resignation many years. But Divine Providence extended his age beyond the limits of ninety-four ; nor could it be said of him, amid his infirmities of body, that his "strength was labor and sorrow." He was seldom unequal to that round of duties and employments which he prescribed to himself as not overtasking his bodily powers. Although in the course of years his sense of hearing became impaired, yet his inward faculties, his judgment, his memory, and all the endowments of his spiritual nature, were untouched by time. His connection with the college was not wholly broken off by his resignation. He was elected into the Corporation—one of the members resigning to preserve in that body the benefit of his wisdom and experience—and from year to year, until his resignation a few weeks ago, into the responsible committee which, in the intervals between the meetings of the Board, manages the financial and other affairs of the Institution. In these offices I have been brought into even closer contact with him than when he presided over the Faculty. I have never, even in his extreme old age, seen in him any evidences of weakness of intellect. The affairs of the college, in times past, were fresh in his memory, nay, I found him sometimes retaining a recollection of transactions which I had forgotten or remembered incorrectly. His judgments were as just and wise, as safe and as much built on principle, as they ever had been. In fact, freed now from the chief responsibility, he was more ready to accept of measures that were new and bordered on innovation. When called upon for his opinion he expressed it in clear, terse, and convincing terms, and at no time of his life could the appellation of a wise man be more deservedly bestowed upon him.

Nor ought I to forget the interest which he took during these years of repose in the progress of the religious and political world. As his life advanced, he seemed to give more of his mind to the state of the country, or, at least, expressed himself more freely. When the fugitive slave law was passed, he condemned it utterly, and to the enquiry what conduct was right towards it, replied, "I am for non-assistance and non-resistance." He reprobated slavery and its tactics more and

more, as it approached towards its final struggle. He took a hopeful view of the great war which has determined the condition and destiny of the country for future generations. So, too, into all the concerns of the kingdom of God, and into the enquiries of speculative theology he entered with as much interest if not more than he would have given to them in middle life. He had the gratification, also, of assembling at his study, from week to week, a company of elderly men, who, for the most part, had retired from the active affairs of life, and of spending the forenoon in debating some question of theology, morals, or politics, which had been before committed to one of the members. Here, too, he was as fresh, it is believed, and as ready even in the closing years of his life, as he had ever been, and the difference between his age and that of the youngest of the club seemed hardly perceptible.

A man who lives beyond the ordinary period of human life often outlives the greater part of his family. It was so, to a considerable extent, with President Day. One and another of his brothers died before him until, in 1855, he was left the only surviving member of his father's family. He married in January, 1805, a daughter of the distinguished Roger Sherman; she died in 1806, leaving one son, Sherman Day, who is still living, an excellent and useful man, yet prevented by his residence in California from administering to the comfort of his father in his declining years. Some years afterward, in 1811, he contracted a second marriage with Miss Olivia Jones of Hartford. By her he had several children that died in infancy or early youth, and three daughters who are to be ranked among the most gifted women that have been brought up in New Haven. Martha, a sweet poetess, a young woman of the brightest intellect and the highest promise, died at the early age of twenty-one, in 1833, leaving among us an expectation and a memory such as are bestowed on few of her years. Elizabeth, the wife of Professor Thacher, with whom her father lived from her marriage in 1847, died in 1858, leaving five children. Olivia married the Rev. Thomas Beecher, and after a short married life died in 1853. Stripped thus of his children, President Day found in his son-in-law, Professor Thacher, and his family, all those attentions that love and reverence could

render, until death called him to a higher home. There was in the later years of his life no loss of cheerfulness, serenity, or interest in the world of men or in the kingdom of God, and yet age was showing more and more its traces on his countenance and in his tottering pace. On the 13th of April last, as he was taking his accustomed walk to the Post Office, his limbs failed under him, he was conveyed home in a carriage and never walked again. This he regarded as a warning and an indication that death was drawing nigh, and said to one of his friends that he should never walk again. Although from this time he grew feeble in body—a feebleness which showed itself by the difficulty of seizing on the appropriate word—still the flame of life continued to burn. On the 11th of June, he wrote with a trembling hand the following note to the President of the college:

“My powers of life have so much diminished that I would ask your permission to resign the position which I have held in your Board for fifty years. May the college continue to prosper as it has done for twenty years past under your superintendence.

“Yours affectionately,

“JEREMIAH DAY.”

The President, feeling a natural desire that only death should end his connection with the Board, called on him after the receipt of this note and requested him to keep his seat in the Board during his life-time, although he might give up his place on the Prudential Committee. President Day replied twice that he could be of no use, and this seemed to be decisive with him. When the resignation was made known to the Corporation at Commencement, they passed the following resolutions, which have been already published:

“Resolved, That we regret that the increasing infirmities of old age lead President Day to consider it necessary to resign his seat in this board.

“Resolved, That we recognize the goodness of God in giving to this college for the space of seventy years, first as Tutor and Professor, then as President, and for just half a century as a member of this Corporation, the services and counsels of a man such as President Day, so pure, so calm, so wise, so universally beloved and honored.”

Through the summer, although confined to his bed and his chair, he showed his wonted clearness and sprightliness. Two weeks ago he presided at the meeting of the club gathered in

his study, and took a part in their discussions, and even since then he has shown that he was meditating on the next subject of debate. Last Tuesday, three weeks after he had completed his ninety-fourth year, he gave signs of increasing debility, and was persuaded the next day to remain in bed. His mind now wandered a little, and his articulation became more difficult, but he signified his hope in Christ, and seemed to be much in prayer. He recalled, too, with surprising accuracy of memory, the date of a family affliction fourteen years since, showing that the power of expression rather than the mind was giving out. At length, late on Thursday night—August 22d—not without having passed through some pains, either unwonted or unmanifested before, with no apparent disease or cause of death, his lamp of life went out. “The end of that man was peace.”

From this brief sketch of the principal events in the life of President Day, we naturally pass to his work in the world, and more especially to what he was and to what he accomplished as the President of Yale College. As being least important we will first give a brief estimate of him as an *author*. Few men, perhaps, have had less desire than he to draw upon themselves the notice of men, and thus all his writings have first originated in what he judged to be a necessity for them; he aimed neither at reputation nor at profit, but to do a service for men which another person was not likely to perform. When he first published his *Algebra* in 1814, there was no elementary treatise in this country fit to be put into the hands of students; and that he judged correctly of the need for such a work, as well as that he succeeded in his attempt, may be inferred from the diffusion of the *Algebra*—from the great numbers of editions through which it has passed, keeping its ground until the present time, notwithstanding the more advanced state of science in this country. Great, if not equal, success attended the other treatises in his mathematical series. These works, especially the *Algebra*, have some of the highest qualities which can belong to writings intended for young minds. They are clear and precise in definition, simple and elegant in explanation, proportionate in their parts; they leave no difficulties behind to embarrass the learner; they make such a selection from a wide subject as his wants seem to require,

reserving the higher and abstruser parts of the science for more advanced students. In short, if our American system is a right one, that of leading all the members of a class with different capacities and tastes along the same track, nothing could be nearer to perfection than a work constructed on the principles which President Day followed in his mathematical works.

Here let me add that the *Algebra*, being long a source of very considerable profit, sustained that uncommon and very remarkable liberality which President Day always practised.

After he left the chair of mathematics and natural philosophy, he gave but little study to the former subjects of his instruction, being now occupied with metaphysics and morals, as far as the general care of the college would allow. Two independent works on the Freedom of the Will, besides a number of contributions to periodical journals, are the chief productions of this period. He, also, about fifteen years ago, with the assistance of the late Professor Stanley, made a revision of his *Algebra*, in which he gave to the doctrine of the higher equations greater breadth and fullness than had been allotted to it in the earlier editions, besides making other considerable improvements.

The two works on the Will were written, perhaps, to modify and moderate the doctrines of the New Haven Theology, as it was called, on that topic. The earlier and smaller of them, "The inquiry respecting the self-determining power of the Will, or contingent volition," first published in 1838, and afterward in an enlarged edition eleven years later, was suggested by a translation of Cousin's psychology, of which President Day wrote a review for the *Christian Spectator*. As the review was too long to embrace an examination of Cousin's theory of the will, this work was published as a kind of supplement to the review, and not only seeks to refute Cousin's views, but also sets forth in a positive shape the author's own opinions on that important point of metaphysical speculation. Edwards, he says, regarded the opinions of those who held to a self-determining power of the will, as "involving the alternative that every volition is determined either by a preceding volition or by nothing at all." To the first

part of this alternative, Edwards had done such ample justice that the question concerning it may be regarded as definitely settled. It is to the other, or contingent self-determination, that the essay of President Day is devoted. The real question on the point of independent volition is, says he, whether anything, antecedent to a volition has any influence in giving direction to that act (p. 68, ed. 2). And this he discusses at large. Cousin held in his psychology, as an ultimate fact of consciousness, that when we take a resolution, we are able to take the contrary resolution—that all willing implies power to the contrary. President Day can accept of this only in a very qualified sense. "In what sense," he asks, "is it true that a man has power to will the contrary of what he wills? He has such power that, with sufficient inducement, he will make an opposite choice—but he may have such strength of inclination as will certainly prevent any contrary volition" (pp. 88–92).

The other and larger work which was given to the public in 1841, was suggested, perhaps, by the controversies which had appeared in New England, and in which the meaning of Edwards was drawn into question. It is a *résumé* or abstract of the work of Edwards, made in a lucid, dispassionate, truth-loving spirit, and not intended to present the views of the author himself, although he takes no pains to conceal that he is a follower of the great New England theologian.

Among the Articles contributed by President Day to periodical journals, the one entitled "Benevolence and Selfishness," to which we have already referred, contains highly interesting speculation upon the ultimate motives of a finite being, and the end of God in the creation of moral beings. This essay, written partly in explanation and correction of the views of Jonathan Edwards in his work on the "End of Creation," does great honor to his metaphysical capacity.

Of the life of President Day, the time during which he presided over the college forms a very considerable part. Twenty-nine years in this service, for which he was qualified by twenty years spent in discharging the duties of tutor and professor, was a term of office which few college men have reached, and it is by these years mainly that we are to judge of the fruit

which his life bore for mankind. Let us look at his conception of a college, and of what Yale College ought to be, at his administration and plans for the improvement of the institution, and at the course of discipline and instruction which he adopted.

His conception of a college was far removed from that of those who would teach a little of everything, and he felt keenly the pretentiousness of education in this country contrasted with its little performance. "We are too ready," he says in his address at the induction of his successor into office, "to be satisfied with the name, without even the form, certainly without the substance of a university. Some which are chartered with this high sounding title are inferior, in point of literary attainment, even to the gymnasia or grammar schools of Europe. Was there ever a people more under the influence of unmeaning sounds? The Chancellor of one of our chartered universities, who, so far as appears, is its only instructor, states that, as the institution has no public building, he has taught the students in an apartment in his own dwelling house." He then goes on to deprecate the imperfect preparation for a college life, which is chargeable not on the instructors of preparatory schools, but on the hurry with which an education is despatched. "In this country speed is everything; superior excellence, a secondary consideration."

Regarding a college as a place not for learning and teaching every study, but those studies only which are necessary for discipline and which lie at the foundation of all liberal pursuits, he was anxious that those who come to Yale College should represent all classes in the country, the poor and those of moderate means as well as the rich. He had a great dread of a system which should collect the children of the wealthy by themselves, thus forming a body proud of their own accidental advantage, wanting the stimulus to study derived from the necessity of exertion, and more exposed to vice than others. There would be a tendency towards this, if a college became a place from which the poor were excluded. Hence his desire, often expressed and in part realized, to have funds laid up for the assistance of this class of students. To such students, and to those whose parents could sustain them at college only with

self-denial, he looked as the part of the body from which there was most to hope; they would study, would be economical, would be moral and religious, would have the most independent minds, and generally the most vigorous bodies. From them a healthy tone would pervade the community, and by their respectability and high standing the distinctions of wealth would be repressed, so that every one, of whatever parentage, would attain to his proper level. But to encourage such students, rather than to repel them, tuition must, to some moderate extent, be remitted, and expenses be kept down. The latter is indeed a hard task, for it is fighting against the spirit of a community without, against habits engendered in homes of opulence and perhaps of thoughtless wastefulness. The Faculty might take measures to abridge such expensiveness, but the main dependence was upon the children of less wealthy parents, who were unable to be lavish. He looked also to this class as a main prop of good order. They come to their place of education to study, they have no means of dissipation within their reach, and they are generally likely to have had a good moral training at home. Students of professedly religious principles especially, he desired to have here, and to remove all those obstacles which poverty might put in their way. There was a short interval when, owing to peculiar circumstances, the college was nearly stripped of students of this character. I have heard him refer to this as a time when severer discipline became necessary, and he dreaded its recurrence.

In regard to improvement in study, President Day was cautious, yet willing to make changes. Probably his feeling was that in a certain state of a country there is a best practicable education, falling inside of a best conceivable one, so that the pursuit of the ideal and highest style of discipline, without reference to felt and acknowledged wants, would lead to failure and shipwreck. For the most part the improvements which were introduced into the college, during his presidency, were suggested originally by others,—by Professor Goodrich especially,—but this was owing not to his want of sympathy with progress in good things, but to his modesty, to his caution, and, perhaps, to the feeling that younger men had more access to a

knowledge of public wants, and were better able to carry a system of training forward.

I am led by these last remarks to consider him in his intercourse with the Faculty, and in what may be called his administration in a narrow sense of that word. His leading characteristic, here, was prudence and caution. Often have I heard one of his oldest colleagues speak of him as the balance wheel of the college, and no term could be more happily chosen. He had the power, by virtue of his office, to prevent any measure from being passed which he did not approve, but he rarely, if ever, used his authority, and was content to let it be known in a mild way that he had scruples about this or that measure. Thus changes came more slowly, but they were safer. For instance, all the Faculty had made up their minds that the system of commons ought to be abandoned before he gave his hearty assent to the measure; and on one occasion, when one of the professors proposed to him to introduce a new officer into the Faculty, he made no reply to the suggestion at the time, but a year afterwards declared to the same person that the measure was desirable. His attachment to college habits and usages was not, however, an unreasonable one. He was a man of fixed habits, yet the habits were grounded on principles. So it was in the affairs of the college; whenever he could see good reason for change, change became improvement, but the presumption lay against the change, and it was not desirable in itself considered.

In his intercourse as a superior officer with his colleagues, old and young, he was one of the mildest of men, never requiring, always confiding in their readiness to do their duties on principle, and without supervision. In no Faculty could there be less friction than in that over which he presided, as far as he was concerned; and, indeed, the balance wheel by its own regularity, steadiness, and punctuality, tended to preserve harmony in all the movements, and to effect everything just at the right time.

From the time when I became acquainted with him as an instructor, he taught the moral sciences. For these his clear, sound, common sense mind was peculiarly fitted. I do not think that either his health or his time allowed him to become

as deeply versed in these studies as if his life had been devoted to them from the first, and he had had greater access to German and French sources; but his comments, both in psychology and morals, were, although brief, terse, to the point, adapted to the wants of the student, and always rested on a principle which he brought to view. In the debates of the Senior Class, which were held generally before him, his soundness of mind was exhibited to great advantage.

In the discipline of the college, and in intercourse with the students, he had this great advantage from the beginning, that all revered and loved him for his mildness and other winning traits of character. His principles in discipline may be illustrated by a passage in an address already referred to, where he says that "a faithful and discreet college officer has his eye upon the minutest deviations from correct deportment. But he may suffer them to pass without censure, if he sees no danger that they will grow into evils of formidable magnitude. He distinguishes between the harmless light of the glow-worm, and the spark which is falling on the magazine of gunpowder." And again, after quoting a statesman's saying, "that the art of government consists in not governing too much," he corrects the maxim by saying, "that the art consists rather in governing just enough; neither too much nor too little; and still more exactly, in conducting a government in such a way that it shall be felt as little as possible except in its successful results." It should be also, "that which occasions the least observation." "All *displays* of authority, all discipline proceeding from the love of power is to be scrupulously avoided." Observations, let me say, which seem to be drawn from and to grow out of his own noiseless, unpretending character, from a nature which insisted not even upon its own just rights, and trusted less to authority than to persuasion and moral conviction. With a man of his character at the head of a college there could hardly be any danger of governing too much. The possibility rather lay in the direction of absence of authority. But in truth the vigor of the government increased during his presidency. I have already alluded to this in a general way. It may be added here that the tone of scholarship was raised by a more free weeding out of indolent or incapable students;

that, to a greater extent, character, without specific acts of wrong-doing and probabilities of success, were the conditions of residence at the college; that the rules of deportment and punctuality were made more stringent; that measures preventing excess and dissipation were devised; and that in those crises, when an open conflict showed itself between law and disorder, President Day had no hesitation in adopting the most prompt and decided measures. During the first half of his administration the spirit of combination, for the purpose of redressing some grievance, or attempting to do away with some unpopular study, threatened the safety of the institution. The Faculty wisely contented themselves at first with appeals to the reason of the students, and with moderate discipline; but when the spirit had burst out again and again, and seemed to have fixed its seat here, the vital nature of the contest with it was clearly discerned. In two instances a class, or the major portion of it, was suspended until the students returned to obedience, and at length, in 1880, more than fifty members of a class were separated from the college. This put an end to the evil, so that during the remaining fifteen years of President Day's official life there was scarcely a trace of it left.

It is remarkable that whatever unpopularity for the time the increased rigor of discipline, and greater exactions of study may have drawn upon some members of the Faculty, none of it fell on the President. The students never attributed anything which seemed to them harsh or unjust to him; they could not believe that he conceived of it, or did more than to support the Faculty in carrying it out. This mildness too, and the infrequency with which reproofs came from him, added strength to his few and rare words of reproof in the mind of every ingenuous student; it was mortifying, and a source of grief to have incurred censure from so mild, just, and even-tempered a man, one who admonished in proportion to the offense, in sorrow not in anger, with good grounds to allege for his displeasure, one on whom the offender could not lay any blame, or justify himself by any acts of his. Nor was this mildness misinterpreted into easiness of temper, and absence of moral indignation, for in his addresses to the academical body in the chapel on the occurrence of some marked disorder, the

elevated tone which he assumed made all feel his moral dignity, and here his general mildness added great power to his rebukes.

On the whole, if we consider his capacity to move in harmony with his colleagues, and to bring them into harmony, his principles of discipline, the great prudence, united with vigor, which he showed in his administration, the love and reverence he never failed to draw from the students, and the general success of his measures, we shall say that few, if any, men in the United States, placed in a position like him, have been so faultless, so judicious, so clear sighted as to the great ends of a college, so just in their estimate of what, in given circumstances, can be attained, or to such an extent have been honored by the united voice of those who knew best what had been accomplished.

These results, and all that has hitherto been said, refer us back to President Day's character, for it is evident that the character was the leading power in his life. Let us look now, last, at this which is most important, and was in him most beautiful, at the assemblage of intellectual, moral, and religious traits which made up the man. Some of these traits we have been obliged to mention in speaking of his life, and his official services; we desire now to look at him as an entire man, such as Divine Providence and grace formed him.

What we notice first in his character is its remarkable harmony and consistency. Nothing was wanting in him and nothing excessive. He had no striking defects or striking excrescences, and for this reason he lacked that showiness and that sort of attractiveness which a prominence of some one or more traits of character is apt to produce. He was a sound and entire man, noticeable for the symmetry of what principally makes up the man, for the consistency of intellect and character, for the noiseless play of faculties.

In estimating his character we cannot turn aside from looking at his qualities of mind, for, if I am not deceived, his traits of mind and heart almost ran into one another, and worked together, assisting one another so as to result in movements of perfect reason. What, then, were some of his qualities of mind?

One was very uncommon *clearness*, which was manifest in the distinctness of his ideas, the exactness of his definitions, the precision and neatness of his style, as well as in his terseness of expression in oral communications. He knew before hand what he meant to say or write, and thus neither did his tongue falter and hesitate for words, nor his pen need to blot out and make over again imperfect declarations of thought. That to this clearness his mathematical training contributed I do not doubt, but it was evident that the foundations of it were not laid by training, but by nature.

Another characteristic was *method*, which, in the form of preconceived arrangement, seems to be connected with clearness, and, indeed, to grow out of clear comprehension of a subject in the relation of the various parts to the whole and to each other. Here, too, we may see the influence of a mathematical education. But to make up this quality of methodical arrangement several qualities of *character* lent their help, such as *patience* in disentangling a subject of thought, *caution* keeping him back by fear of error from hasty conclusions, and *modesty* which removed him to the farthest distance from self-conceit.

And here we will say that method marked not more his intellect than his whole life. He knew what his shoulders could bear, and sought to carry no greater burden. His ill-health in early life, and again in his later years the attacks of the complaint of the heart, led him to study his constitution and to lay down rigid rules for himself, without which no doubt he could never have protracted life beyond the age of ninety. Rarely has a man practised more regularity in diet and exercise, or by greater self-control resisted temptations to deviate from the prescribed path. Rarely has one acquired so complete a knowledge of himself, of his physical nature, his power of endurance, his power of performance. Thus we may say his long life grew out of his character, for, although I do not suppose that he desired long life, or enjoyed life with any great zest, or was at all afraid to die, yet living by duty, living so as to do the most in the best way, he promoted at once the interests of body and soul.

President Day's mind was one of a reasoning cast, without

a prominence of the imaginative faculty, and without a speculative tendency—one in which sound, practical judgment had a controlling power. His judgment was always awake and always correct. He was as far removed from any tendency to the mystical as from any to scepticism. He took up subjects according to the light he had, gave them an unhasty, dispassionate, unprejudiced examination, and settled down in his convictions not with dogged adherence to opinion, but in the spirit of allegiance to right reason and truth. His mind was so well balanced, so little swayed by any biasing feeling or principle, that his opinions on questions of truth and of practice were uniformly right. Here, too, again we come to the confines of mental and moral qualities, and while we decide that his mind was naturally as well balanced as it was clear and methodical, we find it impossible to separate the influence of his moral qualities upon his intellect from the native cast of the intellect itself.

These traits of clearness and method, together with soundness of judgment, appeared in all the writings which he gave to the world as an author, in his mathematical treatises, in his metaphysical discussions, and in his shorter essays. No one who has examined these works can fail of being struck with the accuracy of his definitions, his full comprehension of the subject before he began to write, the simplicity of his statements, the nicety of his method, his directness and power of throwing out of view what was aside from the main subject. By these qualities he has had a most happy influence, through his writings, on the training of very great numbers, and has done an amount of good for which multitudes have owed him thanks.

The other qualities of President Day's mind were in happy union; there was no marked prominence or deficiency of any one of them. But strong and worthy of respect as was his intellect, the honor and dignity of the man lay not here but in his moral and religious qualities. And in speaking of these, while I can speak with the highest admiration and respect, I find that same difficulty of discrimination to which I have adverted already. Nature and grace were so blended, self-culture in the highest sense of that word, namely, the constant

subordination of will, desires, and propensities to the perfect rule of the gospel, was so thorough, and constant, and regular, that it is hard to say what was constituted by nature and what by divine principle. Thus much can be said, that the result was the formation of a faultless character, beautiful to the eye from its entire symmetry and purity.

Among these qualities I must first notice two, which, had they existed in greater strength or stood on a different basis apart from the rest of his character, might have deserved the name of defects. One was a more than usual *reserve*, which was manifested, not in forbearing to express his opinions freely at the right time on any question of doctrine or of practice, but in singular and uncommon silence with regard to himself. Hence his character had a certain impersonality about it, owing to which the love which went forth to him was an unfamiliar love, inclining towards awe and veneration. The source of this reserve seemed to be unselfishness and humility. Sometimes reserve is due to pride or want of sympathy, sometimes to timidity or sensitiveness; but in his case it sprung from an absence of those selfish affections which, like self-conceit and vanity, exalt the individual in his own regard, and from an humble estimate of what is personal compared with the great objects of interest which lie beyond the individual. Thus, for instance, he rarely spoke of his illnesses, and they came and went unknown, as far as he could make them so. Thus, too, his sorrows, although all men knew him to be tender and feeling, lay unexpressed, and very rare it was that he betrayed any emotion. And he seems to have kept his religious feelings closeted up, unless by describing them he could do good to others. There was this beauty about his character: all men believed it to be thoroughly good and holy, while yet it hid from public gaze, as if it were conscious of no uncommon excellence, in modesty and silence.

The other quality which came nearest to a fault was *caution*. In looking about as an impartial critic, and endeavoring to find some weak spot in this most blameless man, I have been able to come no nearer to one than by conceiving that a native timidity might easily have kept him from doing with boldness and vigor what was right. But caution, even if the daughter

of native timidity, is no fault, provided that in the play of character it serves only to keep a person from rash judgments and rash counsels. Such was his case. It interfered not with the discharge of his duties, it did not bias him in practice towards the side of slackness or of want of enterprise; it rather made him in the Faculty of the college where so much of his life was passed, a surer, if a slower counselor, a break against ill-timed innovations, but a stronger weight when they were demanded. He once said that he thought more enterprise was wanting in the college than he had infused into it; but his judgment, if it implied any censure of himself, was not just, for his measures in the way of discipline were more thorough than those which any of his predecessors had adopted, and the college made constant progress during his administration. It was this quality of caution, again, which in combination with good judgment and moderation lay at the foundation of that *prudence* for which he was distinguished. He never took a false step, for the ground was measured beforehand, he was not eager to move forward, and he made a sound calculation of the probabilities of things. Prudence, as the handmaid of duty and reason, not of selfishness and of policy, is a requisite to the highest wisdom. Such was his, as different as possible from cool sagacity, and the shrewd estimates of worldliness.

The *calmness* of President Day was one of his most beautiful traits of character. Here a native equanimity went before, which was strengthened and ennobled by dispassionate reason, and by faith in God. He was subject to none of those gusts of excitation which sway so many, even among good and great men. No strong passions heaved him and threw him from his center; no fears discomposed him; no violent expressions showed a loss of power over himself; but his feelings and desires being under perfect mastery, he rose above the disturbing causes of the moment into a region of peace, and of *holy* peace because trust in God animated it. How rare, and what an elevating sight to see a man, whose strength of character is such that peace and calmness seem the easy play of natural qualities, whose emotions make no show nor express themselves with violence, who wastes no energy, who, to the unthinking, scarcely appears to be strong, because his principles and deeds

have a silent power like the movements of nature. This calmness and placidity was a very radical and wide sweeping trait in President Day's character. It implied the subjection of intellect, desire, and will to a uniform law ; implied the capacity to remain unagitated amid the most trying scenes ; it implied the possession of a peace within which resisted and overcame every storm from without. Nor was this calmness only the control exercised by reason and principle over excitable forces within the soul, keeping them by an effort from any lawless eruption ; but it was a union of feelings and of a temper, happily proportioned by nature to the exciting object without, with acquired reason and religious principle. He who in a hard struggle prevails over native inequalities of character may have gained great strength, and become thoroughly good through the effort, but the beauty of a native endowment, pressed into the service of the higher formative powers, may be beyond his reach.

I have almost anticipated what I need to say respecting President Day's *mildness*, or gentleness of temper, and *his tenderness*. These, also, seem to have had a native root. With regard to the last, his reserve in manifesting his feelings prevented him from being very demonstrative, and his self-control would have kept him from more abrupt outbursts had he been inclined to them ; but there was a gentle stream of tenderness running along his whole life which everybody recognized, and which gave him the love of those who were in contact with him. He pitied the ignorant and straying, as was known to very many of his students ; he sympathized with the unfortunate and sorrowful ; the slightly tremulous voice and solemn tone told more of what he felt than many words of profession would have done, and to those under his care he was ever felt to be the kind and gentle father. Nothing like harshness ever appeared in his intercourse with others.

His *mildness of temper* was equally conspicuous, and was recognized by all. This again, which was not mere suppression of feeling, but a positive quality, was due alike to nature, self-discipline, and religion. He was scarcely ever known to be angry. In an intercourse of many years, and in circumstances which would ruffle the temper of almost any man, I

have never seen his temper ruffled. And yet there was no want in him of indignation against wrong, none of that weakness which arises from phlegm or from inertness of moral sensibility. No one who had any intercourse with him could help feeling that his silent disapproval would be a grievous thing to bear, far more grievous than the strongly expressed displeasure of others, as emanating from an unsullied reason and a benevolent soul.

This circle of virtues would not be complete without the presence of two implying the others and implied in them,—*patience* and *self-control*. I have already referred to these in an incidental way. Patience is a general, and therefore an ambiguous term. It may denote willingness to endure labor, —to take the proper pains and make the due examination of a subject before coming to a conclusion, in which case it is part of the disposition regulating the mental processes; or it may denote the power of bearing that which tries the temper without irritation, or the kindred quality of endurance of pain, without complaint. All these forms of patience were singularly manifest in his life, as we have had occasion to observe with regard to the two first already. As for endurance of pain, so little inclined was he to speak of his ailments that he might be in suffering without the knowledge of any one; and in fact the malady with which he was afflicted for the last thirty years of his life—as we have already said,—often came and went when not even his family were aware of it. Was this, now, the reserve of an incommunicative mind, or was it the silence of self-control,—or to what was it to be ascribed? It was partly due to something nobler which we shall presently notice; but his *self-control* seemed to be as great as his patience. In other words, while the native quality of his soul favored all the passive and gentler virtues, reason and principle held control over the character, leading the goodly train and suppressing what many take no pains to conceal.

The result of this sway of reason and of principle was that his character was very uncommonly *unselfish*. This I take to be the harmony of a soul under Christian principle, and in some shape any such soul will put this character on. But in most instances some selfish residuum will be left in the character

unobserved, will bias the conduct, and mar the entire beauty of the life. And in other cases, if all selfish biases are overcome, the struggle, noble as it has been, will show, as it were, scars on the character, as if reason had had a long hard fight with unruly desire, and was keeping it under by main force, without extinguishing it. But President Day's unselfishness was an apparently complete forgetfulness of self, a noiseless easy movement of unobstructed principle. Who ever traced actions in him to love of praise, or of money, or of ease, or of power? Who ever supposed that selfish calculations formed a part of the plan of his life, or came in to interfere with a higher life-plan? As far as he could be discerned by the eyes of others, he seemed unconscious of having interests separate from those of the great whole, of God, and man. Nor did he only forget himself; he remembered others, his acts of self-sacrificing kindness were constant, his liberality was unrestricted, he gave the due regard to every object up to the highest.

And this brings us to his religious character, for his unselfishness was really the sway of divine principle over a most happily constituted, a peaceful and harmonious nature. Yet as we looked at the early development of his religious character in the historical way we found agitation deep and sorrowful, ending only by degrees in assured and permanent peace. Strange that an unruffled lake, as his life always seemed to be since living men have observed it, should ever have been vexed by such a tempest. Ill health in part, and in part also the habit of self-analysis, common when he was young—the tendency to make the subjective in religion too prominent, and to put the objective too much in the background—must bear the imputation of bringing on a state of mind so unlike the movements of his nature, or of divine truth on such a nature. That it would be transient we might expect from his simple faith in the Gospel, from his good sense which would be apt to correct a morbid tendency, and from the general direction of his character. That, when it passed away, giving room to serenity and hope to do their work in his soul, it was not without most happy results, we can easily believe. He may have gained from it submissiveness and willingness to wait patiently for light, experience and knowledge of the mode in which relig-

ious truth takes hold on the heart, sympathy and power to aid others in like perplexity.

But, however this was, the religious character and life of President Day, as far as it manifested itself under the veil of his reserve, were exceedingly beautiful and Christlike. The leading feature of his character was, that mind, heart, and religious feelings were in unison. Religion, finding in him few or no excrescences to lop off, few faults and one-sided tendencies to alter, served rather as a motive force than as a corrective. Hence there was nothing put on or unnatural in his religion, for though he had the same sinful nature with other men, yet nature had already fitted him for that harmony of soul, which grace would only render more entire. We can therefore say little of the special traits of his Christian life, which has not been anticipated, and might not be expected by one who has carefully followed us thus far in our analysis. If he was natively unpretending, this trait was ennobled into a Christian humility, which, drawing its measures and rules of judging from the perfect standard, made him the more lowly, the higher he rose into fellowship with God. If he was natively unexcitable, his religious life was a calm, even flame, burning from an inward supply and not fed by superficial transitory causes. If he was reserved, his religious life would hide itself as the sweetest birds of song are concealed in the thicket, and you would have to judge of him by a thoroughly consistent, even, equable life of holiness, rather than by feelings expressive or more than expressive of the life within. If he was natively tender and gentle, you would see in him compassion, charity to others, the catholic spirit, born from the union of such a nature with grace, which would find it a congenial companion. If he was natively blameless and without faults, you would see *these* qualities exalted into Christian holiness, the mortal traits putting on an immortal nature and shining with a kind of spiritual transfiguration. And here we come to the impression which his life made on others, which was not that of simple blamelessness, but of holiness, of that conformity to the will of God in which the life seems set apart from and lifted above the world, and sin has become a foreign thing, cast out from the soul. This impression, I venture to say, was universal. Ask

any of our townspeople who saw him in his old age, as he slowly and gravely walked to the Post Office, or to the morning prayer meeting, what manner of person they thought him to be, and they would say that he was a godly, a holy man, a man to be revered as a man of God; they would not speak of him as an eloquent man or a zealous, or as having any distinctive trait of the Christian life, but as a man who walked with God in close fellowship and likeness. And this reputation was not derived from his reserve, which might keep special traits of character hidden from strangers' eyes, nor from his faultlessness, between which and properly religious traits even ordinary minds will quickly draw a distinction, but it was derived from his life, from a life so equable and consistent that the conviction of his fellow-men, handed down from year to year, kept growing and holding him in higher and higher reverence. There was no outbreaking fault, now and then, which would weaken the conviction drawn from the past, and demand the evidence of a year or two more in order to bring back his repute to the same place, but on he went like the sun through the sky, making an impression by steady deeds, not by words, by a tenor of life rather than by separate actions. How blest a reputation this, as being a reflection of the judgment that God pronounces, as growing up in silence without any effort to conquer the judgment of men; as being the conclusion drawn from an entirely harmonious life! Such was the silent growth of his esteem as a holy man. To this his prayers added their weight, which, whenever he discharged this duty in public, by their solemnity, their humility, their scripturalness, marked the man who habitually draws near to God in the hours of private devotion.

From this balance of qualities rising into the most confirmed Christian purity, President Day's character assumed a dignity before the eyes of other men, which ran up into high reverence. Some persons inspire respect by certain traits, and weaken it by certain others; some are revered as Christians, but not as men. He, by that thorough, pervading harmony of life which we have described, and of a life on a large scale, gave that impression through his manners and mode of communicating with men which we call dignity. He did not

strain after it or put it on, but it was the natural shadow going along with his character, of which he could no more divest himself than the body can lose its shadow in the light of the sun. It was not stateliness, or impression of strength, or solitariness, or self-respect, but something much higher, an elevation of the man, showing itself in the simplest, least self-conscious way. No doubt his reserve contributed somewhat to increase the impression of this dignity, but had he been as affable and communicative as most men, it would not have ceased to be remarkable, for it was an emanation from himself.

My impression of his religious life may be expressed in the words of holy Scripture, "he walked with God," and in those of the Hymn which we have just sung—

"He waits in secret on his God,—
His God in secret sees :
Let earth be all in arms abroad ;
He dwells in heavenly peace."

When he was with us, often have I thought of the value to society of a life like his protracted far beyond the usual limits of human existence. He had no duties nor cares which demanded him here below since the time when, at the age of seventy-three, he resigned his post in the college. And yet what a blessing it is for this world when a man who, like the divine Saviour, is holy, harmless, undefiled, is suffered to remain before the eyes of men, as a proof that God's gospel can bring a human soul, encompassed with our wants and infirmities, almost to perfection, that Christ can be reproduced in his disciples ! Surely such an old age is a testimony and a power beyond the active vigor of a Christian life at its meridian. And now that he has left us, there seems a link between heaven and earth broken, one complete life less to tell of the sway of grace over man's nature. But even his death to one who has known him, or can conceive of him in his excellence, is a testimony to the gospel, for if that heaven and that immortal life towards which he has been traveling for almost a century, are but fables and promises of a false gospel, then every one must feel that there is a waste of character, a destruction of virtue such as cannot be imputed to the Most High. Every one must feel, also, that there is a power in the gospel to

transform and exalt character which falsehood ought not to have and cannot have, to fit the soul for eternal life just as if it were the chosen instrument of God. And the verdict of the soul assigning immortal life to such as he was, is instinctive. When we think of one so holy going down in extreme old age among the shadows of bodily decay, walking with uncertain step, losing the acuteness of that sense without which the divine gift of speech would be useless, unable longer to take an active part in the affairs of men, in which nothing is so much wanted as just such a character,—when we see such a goal of the wisest and best life, do we not instinctively clothe such a mind in our anticipations with an immortal body, with a building of God, with a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens?

And so, as sure of his inheritance among the redeemed of Christ as we are of the inheritance itself, joyfully, full of honor and reverence, we commit what is earthly of this old servant of God to the tomb. "The end of that man is peace." In peace shall sleep his feeble, wasted body. In the peace of the blessed shall rest his peaceful soul. We bury him, not knowing whether so good a man shall ever appear among us or in the times of our children again, fearful lest there may be something, some epidemic of doubt, some depraving social or political influence, which may be dwarfing men and stunting their growth in goodness, but thankful that in the old times, as we may now call them, one was born of so happy a nature and so helped by grace as he. We bury him, a man of a clear intellect, who lived in harmony with all political, moral, religious truth, without a grain of party spirit, bigotry, or uncharitableness in his temper; who had a full-orbed character in which calmness, self-control, meekness, tenderness, unselfishness, all the virtues joined their radiance. We bury him, above all, a servant of Christ, eminently like the Master, thankful that we have known such a man, and that the remembrance of him may be a guide and a help to us in the remainder of this earthly life.

ARTICLE VI.—JUDGE FARRAR ON THE CONSTITUTION.

Manual of the Constitution of the United States of America.

By TIMOTHY FARRAR. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1867.

THOSE of our readers who remember the Articles from Judge Farrar's pen, which appeared in this Review during the war, in which he discussed the powers of the General Government and of the States under the Constitution, will welcome the announcement of this work. Nor will their expectations be disappointed upon a closer acquaintance. An elegant volume, as a mere specimen of book making, its beautiful typography and paper afford to the reader's eye the same pleasure in its perusal which the clear, strong thought, the logical argument, and the vigorous style of the author, will furnish to his intellectual powers and literary taste.

It is interesting in this year 1867 to turn back to the first of Judge Farrar's Articles above referred to, on "The Adequacy of the Constitution," written, as it was, in the fall of 1861, when the capacity of our Government to survive a civil war, or even to take suitable measures for its own defense, was a question of anxious uncertainty; and to read again the language of unfaltering courage and implicit faith with which "the plenary adequacy of the Constitution to all the purposes of its creation" is there asserted and maintained. The doctrines there set forth have since been fully sanctioned, and practically vindicated; so fully, that it may be doubted to-day, whether they will ever again be questioned even as abstract matters of law. That dread ordeal of secession, at whose very approach it was thought the Government and the Constitution must be rolled up as a scroll and pass away with a great noise, has been triumphantly passed through; and if there is a truth concerning our republic of which the world is still in doubt, it is not that of its ability under the Constitution to meet and

conquer internal convulsions which no other government could survive.

Not less instructive is it at the present time to recur to Judge Farrar's Article on "State Rights"—published in October, 1862—the darkest and most doubtful period of our great struggle for existence. With the same perfect confidence in the strength of the Constitution to sustain successfully the strain upon its endurance, he discusses the *status* of the rebel states, which had placed themselves outside of its pale, and, as if they were already subdued, the forfeitures and disabilities to which they had subjected themselves by their misuser or non-user of their rights, duties, and franchises. The question which most men scarcely wearied their anxious minds with then, but which, when the conflict was brought to a successful issue, became, and still continues, a Serbonian bog of inextricable muddle, "Are the rebel states in the Union or out of it?" Judge Farrar, with foresight of its future importance, treats with sound practical sense and lucid reasoning. In the volume before us, in considering "the means by which states may get out of the Union"—pp. 374-381—the same ideas are more fully elaborated, but for our present purpose we prefer to quote the language of the Article. These states, he says, *as states*, have neglected and disobeyed positive duties imposed upon them in their corporate capacity by the Constitution; as states they have abjured their allegiance, declared independence, and made organized war on the General Government.

No *misuser* or *nonuser* of privileges, to be compared with this, was ever alleged against the city of London, or the Colonies of Massachusetts or Connecticut, or any other political community, whose franchises were claimed as forfeited to the Government for that cause. The proceedings in those cases were never complained of, on the ground that they were illegal in form, or that those communities, as well as all others, were not liable to have their rights, privileges, and franchises, declared forfeited and canceled, for good cause, on information *quo warranto*; but solely on the ground of an unjust and oppressive use of judicial process, through the servility of corrupt judges.

If for these causes, the States that have been guilty of them, have not forfeited their privileges, there must be some reason for the distinction that is not readily perceptible. It is certain that if such violations of duty are not sufficient causes of forfeiture, and the forfeiture may not be exacted, that the States cannot be governed. Vol. xxi., p. 704.

And he adds,

It is to be hoped the nation will stand till Congress shall wake to the necessity of adopting some law by which the rejected privileges and franchises of rebel states may be legally declared forfeited and canceled; and so the way be opened for such new divisions, combinations, and organizations, as will guarantee the safety of the nation by securing the loyalty of the people. p. 706.

Five years have passed since these words were written; more than two since they became of practical importance in their bearing upon Reconstruction. The puzzle of casuistry, which Judge Farrar here and in his *Manual* disposes of in three pages of unanswerable argument, has meantime distracted the nation almost as dangerously as the war itself. The vociferous katydid dispute, "The States are in the Union"—"The States are out of the Union," has been and still is kept up, with as little prospect of final agreement as attends the insect discussion, but with far more serious consequences and possibilities. By the divisions it has caused it has given new strength to the pro-rebel party north and south; it has blocked the wheels of reconstruction in Congress, and caused that body, when every hour was of importance, and systematic action was of vital necessity, to flounder hopelessly for months and years through interminable discussions without a policy; and (worst and most afflictive dispensation of all!) it has enabled the crazy occupant of the White House, in the midst of the confusion, to escape from control, and to disgust the nation and threaten its safety by his antics. At last, driven by irresistible pressure to some immediate action, whether logical or not, the practical sense of Congress and the people has adopted (in spite of all their doubts as to its constitutional consistency) the very plan of action which Judge Farrar has here marked out as the legitimate course. At this day, by law of Congress, the abjured franchises of the rebel states are practically declared forfeited and annulled, until, upon promise and guarantees of future good behavior, they shall be restored by legislative enactment. What these guarantees should be is expressed by Judge Farrar in the volume before us—p. 377.

The first requisite to any reconstruction, as it should be to any original construction, is a loyal population of sufficient physical, moral, and intellectual

power to be adequate to the support and maintenance of the government of a State in the Union, according to the principles of the Constitution. Without this no new State ever ought to have been admitted, and no old State ought, in any form, to be resuscitated.

We have referred thus fully to Judge Farrar's Articles in this review because there is so much identity of thought, language, and topics, between them and his book, that a criticism of the one applies almost equally to the other. The *Manual*, however, is more comprehensive in its plan and analysis. It treats of the Constitution in all its parts and provisions, while the Articles referred to discuss it only in its relation to certain controverted subjects. But in the discussion of these subjects it became necessary to recur to the great underlying ideas and principles of the Constitution, by which alone it can be properly understood and interpreted in all its parts, and these ideas and principles themselves, not being universally understood or accepted, required to be more fully developed and established, in order to properly exhibit both their truth and their importance. Accordingly, Judge Farrar, during the war, as he states in his preface, "with a particular view to the practical operation of our Government under all the varieties of its circumstances, and to the principles on which the questions evolved by them have been, or should be, decided," compiled this treatise. Looking back over the history of our nation, its changing conditions, circumstances, and necessities, during the past eighty years, so extraordinary in themselves and so suggestive of future possibilities, it was natural that he should feel deeply impressed with the importance of applying such principles of construction to the Constitution of our government as should enable it to adapt itself to every possible change of circumstance, and thus prove adequate to every emergency. It was made not for a day but for all time, and it must contain within itself the anticipations of all possible futures. By this adaptability has the British Constitution maintained itself unshaken and ever-strengthening through six centuries, and without it there is no reason to believe that our own will escape destruction. The Constitution must expand with the country. If it is a bed of Procrustes, to which but one form, size, and shape of people and circumstance is

suted, and to the rigid narrowness of whose original, literal construction the nation must, in every age and condition, be made forcibly to conform, it must inevitably perish. But if it proves in its practical use to be an ample cloak, capable of expansion to cover abundantly within its protecting folds the mightiest people, and adjusting itself to all the varying requirements and exigencies to which nations in the long course of ages are liable, then we may well trust that the author of this volume breathes no vain hope in his reverent prayer, "*Esto perpetua!*"

The necessity for this adaptability is thus suggested by Judge Farrar in his preface, p. viii.

The difference between a community of three millions of people, scattered along a narrow belt of sea-coast, inclosed by impenetrable forests, and thirty or forty millions, occupying half a continent, and pursuing all the objects, and by all the arts and means, which the reason or passions, the interest or ambition, the virtues or vices, of men could invent,—must soon make itself apparent in the inevitable development of those powers of regulation which were expressly designed and intended to provide for just such increasing claims for their exercise.

And he adds, p. ix.,

The results of our marked experience should be noted and studied, as well to enable us to trace the footsteps of Divine Providence in the development of the destinies of a great people, as for the permanent use of those who may enjoy the future blessings of our institutions.

In these suggestions that our views of the Constitution must enlarge with the growth of the nation and its altering circumstances, Judge Farrar expresses what has long been felt by reflecting minds, and what the events of the past five years have deeply impressed upon the people at large. Indeed, scarcely had it gone into operation before the necessity of adapting it to unforeseen emergencies became apparent, and new views of its scope and purpose began to be taken. That literal construction at first insisted on, which allowed nothing to the General Government for which no clear language of grant could be shown, was speedily found to be totally impracticable. The purchase of Louisiana was almost universally agreed at the time to be an unconstitutional usurpation of power. Mr. Jefferson said that he found no difference of opinion on that subject. Yet so manifestly necessary and

proper was it for the security of the nation, so clearly within the province of a national government that it was universally approved, and afterwards imitated in similar acquisitions. Warrant was then found for such acts in the idea that they were extra-constitutional—the exercise of powers which, though not expressly or impliedly vested in the General Government by the Constitution, were not prohibited by it, and so, not being reserved to the states respectively or to the people, might suitably be adopted by the General Government for want of a better owner. But under the broader views of the Constitution which now begin to prevail, and of which Judge Farrar is the most advanced exponent, it is seen that all these acts are clearly within the constitutional power of the General Government as necessarily incident to its character. The same or similar changes of view have taken place with regard to other controverted acts by different departments of the Government. Judge Story enumerates several in his Commentaries, and many more have occurred since that work was written, especially in the course of our civil war. Everybody now sees and admits, with regard to some at least of these so-called usurpations, that they are so necessary and inevitable that if the Constitution confers no other authority for them, such authority legally and logically results from its governmental character. That without which the Government could not exist—could not exercise its functions—needs not be expressly conferred; it belongs to the Government as a matter of course, otherwise the Constitution perpetrates the absurdity of creating a government and then striking it with paralysis. The fact, if it be a fact, that the founders of the Constitution themselves did not contemplate any such expansion of powers by the General Government as is now accorded it, and that they provided a mode of effecting any necessary changes in its form or authority by amendment, is no argument against the correctness of this view. For the doctrine is that, without amendment, the Government already rightfully possesses all requisite powers. And as to the expectations of its framers, the question is not what expectations they entertained, but what they designed to *create*. With ideas and experience limited by the then moderate limits and brief history of the

nation, having some vague anticipations indeed of its possible future greatness, but no conception of those immense alterations in its material affairs and social composition, which may be said to have scarcely commenced till fifty years afterward, they yet designed to form an enduring government, one which through all mutations should, for ages to come, be adequate to all the ends and purposes of a national government, and preserve the blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterity. Little did they realize how magnificently their work would transcend their expectations! by what delicate and desperate tests its powers would be developed! They builded better than they knew! Had they foreseen the half of what has since transpired, they might well have despaired of devising any form of government that could endure. That their structure still survives, vaster, stronger, and more symmetrical than it stood in their own conceptions, is no disparagement of their foresight, but evinces that they were guided by a wisdom higher than their own.

What then is the great foundation principle which is to guide all generations in construing the Constitution, and determining its adaptability to every phase and every emergency? It is nothing newly discovered. It is as old as the Constitution itself. It was present, consciously present in the minds and counsels of its framers, and was by them conspicuously inscribed upon the very portal of their edifice, the record of its great idea and purpose—the rule by which it was intended to be judged and used in all its parts and applications. Yet, strangely enough nothing about the Constitution has been so much disputed as this very principle. Its truth has been denied and maintained in every form of writing and controversy, until finally bloody war, the last argument of all controversialists, has established it, it is to be hoped forever. Judge Farrar lays it down in the very first paragraph of his book as a postulate no longer requiring discussion, that “the Constitution as the supreme law of the land constitutes a GOVERNMENT, for the purpose, and of course with the power and duty of executing it.” The announcement of this fact, in the introductory clause of the Constitution, he treats as no formal, preliminary verbiage, but as containing, and designed to convey, the essen-

tial fundamental idea of the entire instrument. The clause itself he declares is "the essence and epitome" of the whole. It is itself the Constitution, the supreme law of the land, ordained and established by "us, the people," the original source of all political power, and it *proprio vigore* creates a *government*, with all the powers necessarily and properly involved in that term, which are requisite to accomplish the purposes for which it was created. And, farther to avoid all doubt upon this point, these purposes are distinctly specified. They are, "to form a more perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity."

These are the express purposes, and the only purposes, for which it was made. The ordinance of the American people is the law, the paramount law. The law imposes the duty, and the duty carries with it the power. Here, in this enacting clause, is the epitome and essence of the whole Constitution. Had it ended here, nothing would have been wanting but the details, specifications, limitations, and qualifications which the government itself could have supplied, if the people had seen fit to omit doing it for them. "There can be no doubt," says Mr. Madison, "that all the particular powers, requisite as means of executing the general powers, would have resulted to the government, by unavoidable implication. No axiom is more clearly established in law or in reason, than that, whenever the end is required, the means are authorized; wherever a general power to do a thing is given, every particular power necessary for doing it is included." p. 78.

In the proposition that the whole Constitution is embodied in this enactment of its establishment for certain specified purposes, Judge Farrar takes ground far in advance of other commentators and of the general view. It constitutes, nevertheless, the leading idea of his book, and is reiterated and enforced with an emphasis, learning and argument that fully command our attention and respect. Judge Story, in his chapter on "The Preamble," regards it as matter of inducement only—explanatory of what follows. "It cannot confer," he says, "any power *per se*; it can never amount by implication to an enlargement of any power expressly given. * * Its true office is to expound the nature and extent and application of the powers actually conferred by the Constitution, and not substantially to create them." But Judge Farrar, writing thirty-three years later, and in view of experiences undreamed

of by his predecessor, takes a broader view of this clause and its office. He denies that it is a preamble either in form or object. He claims that it was not so regarded or designated by the framers of the Constitution—and in support of these views, examines with much particularity and research into the history of the clause in the Convention. He insists that it was deliberately adopted after much discussion, and various changes, as expressing authoritatively the purpose and nature of the work—"the first, most authoritative, and commanding portion of the instrument." As it is a universal rule of construction that the *intent* is to govern,—this expression of the intent and purpose of the Constitution is the embodiment of it—the rest is matter of detail, subordinate and explanatory. Hence, rejecting the designation of "Preamble" he styles it "the enacting clause"—the ordaining and establishing Precept.

To put all this out of the Constitution, by construction, is to decapitate it entirely. It would leave it only the fragment of a law; without a lawgiver, without an enactment, without a subject and without an object. On the contrary, this first sentence is the principle and governing clause of the whole instrument. p. 87.

Having laid down this fundamental doctrine at the outset, Judge Farrar adopts, with logical consistency, all the corollaries which result from it, and advances views which thirty, or even ten, years ago would have been denounced as the most extreme and dangerous of political heresies.

On any just principles of reasoning, it is impossible to consider the general government unauthorized to do anything that the people assert they made it on purpose to do. "In order" to accomplish certain specified objects, those objects are *ipso facto* submitted to its jurisdiction, and may be accomplished by any means under its control; and not only *all specified powers*, but *all other necessary means*, are expressly placed at its control, for the very purpose of executing the jurisdiction so vested in it. When the Constitution requires an end, it authorizes all the means of the government to be applied to it; and, when it directs means, it authorizes their application to any constitutional end.

And not only may and must the General Government take all necessary measures to accomplish these general objects; but any measures which are in effect subversive thereof, even though apparently within the scope of its enumerated powers, are unconstitutional in character. Thus any recognition or toleration of slavery by statute, even as a state institution,

must be unconstitutional upon the general ground that it violates the purpose and duty of the Government "to establish justice and secure the blessings of liberty" to the people. And this being the design and character of the Government, immediately upon its establishment, *ipso facto*, all laws, customs, or institutions inconsistent with this supreme law became abrogated and void.

There is yet another reason why slaves cannot be intended by either classification; which is, because there are none, and can be none, under the jurisdiction of our government. The Constitution was made "to secure the blessings of liberty." It perpetuates the right to liberty by perpetuating the common-law right to the "writ of *habeas corpus*," which restores liberty whenever it is infringed. And it declared that "no person shall be deprived of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law." So there can be no slaves in the land. There never was, and never can be, a person legally held in slavery under our Constitution. p. 164.

And, accordingly, he considers the 13th amendment, whereby slavery was abolished, entirely superfluous.

We have heretofore seen that the Constitution, as it originally stood, never authorized slavery or property in man, in any form or under any name; and that the personal rights of the citizen, whether natural-born or naturalized, recognized and covered by it, are altogether incompatible with the existence of any such relation among the people. So that the only legal operation of this amendment was to reassure the original Constitution in this respect, and to negative and countermand, in express terms, the system of violence and injustice that had been illegally and studiously fostered and extended, under a false construction and maladministration of an instrument adapted and intended to effect its decline and extinction. The 2d section of the Amendment does a similar work of supererogation, by authorizing Congress "to enforce" this particular provision, when they had abundant authority for executing the whole Constitution without it. p. 400.

It will hardly be denied, we think, by Judge Farrar, that these views of Constitutional interpretation are in the extreme van of consolidationism, and it seems to us that they tend to the ultimate extinction of all state rights and governments. We have serious doubts from our recollections of history, whether the framers of our Constitution really designed to vest such unlimited authority in the central government, as best calculated to secure the establishment of justice or the security of liberty; and we are quite convinced that if they did, experience has not confirmed their view. The great safety of our country is not in our central system, nor in our federal system, but in both combined—balancing and controlling each

other; and it would, in our opinion, be as dangerous to reduce the latter to weakness or insignificance as the former. Hence we are not yet fully convinced that Judge Farrar's ingenious arguments should outweigh the legal constructions and judicial decisions of nearly three generations, whereby the limited power of the General Government has been established, and the rule settled, that neither a corporation nor a government, "ordained and established" for designated purposes, can claim an "enacting clause" to be the "essence and epitome" of its charter, and under it exercise "not only its specified powers, *but all other necessary means*, as expressly placed at its control for the purpose of executing the jurisdiction so vested." Yet these views, apart from the rare vigor and ability with which they are enforced, are interesting as a development of doctrines which are constantly growing in influence. The vast growth of the General Government in power and importance since its formation is well understood, and the tendency is still in the same direction. It is, indeed, the only expandible portion of our system. The states must remain stationary both in their territorial and political rights—but the grandeur and scope of the General Government may and must eventually become as unlimited as its domain. The party of strict, literal construction has passed away—that of liberal construction, as heretofore understood, begins to adopt a wider latitude of view—and a new school of broad constructionists is appearing who make little of the letter, and much of the spirit—and who find in general clauses the best possible warrant for the exercise of every doubtful power. The growth of our country in all the elements of Empire, and in the extent and complication of its interests, will stimulate this school of interpretation to large development. It must inevitably be so. The genius and the destiny of the Republic are to grow, and in another generation, Young America, following this class of commentators in their march over all barriers, and over all rules of construction, will practically adopt as "the essence and epitome" of its national charter, that original constitution first given to man:—"Increase and multiply and replenish the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over the beasts of the field

and over the fowls of the air and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth."

Our space will not permit us to notice at length the views of Judge Farrar upon other constitutional questions—such as those relating to habeas corpus, treason, and attainder, and the relations of the states to the Federal Government. They are such, however, as to command the general approval and concurrence, and have been already fully presented by him in this Review. Upon the respective powers and duties of the President and Congress in reconstructing the conquered states, he is clear and emphatic. He justly insists that the President has no power whatever to declare or to terminate war. That his sole province is to execute the laws of war towards enemies hostile or subdued until the legislature shall determine the fact and the terms of peace. If he goes beyond this and sets himself up as a legislative department with "a policy" of his own,—

If he undertakes to proclaim peace, abandons his military supervision, and re-mits them to the independent election and administration of such civil and political regulations and institutions as they may have formerly practised, or may thereafter adopt, he not only violates his trust, and abandons his official duty, but he usurps the sovereignty and authority of the nation which in no sense belong to him, and which only are adequate to confer peace and political rights on such a people. But, even if they could have peace, having no lawful civil government within the Union, and no right to create one, they would be exclusively under the Constitution and laws of the United States. These, as the executive and the only civil magistrate, he would be bound to execute and administer, as they stood, in the most effectual manner he could under the circumstances, till the law-making power should furnish the needful additions. He could make no new laws, nor authorize others to make them, or administer them if they were made, any more than he could do the same things for the rest of the national domain. pp. 442, 443.

On the other hand, the authority of Congress over conquered states, whether foreign or domestic, is supreme.

They had the same right to organize republican governments for them, and permit them, so far as they deemed it safe, to govern themselves thereby, and to readmit them to all the rights and privileges of "states in the Union," which they had cast off and rejected, as they had to perform a similar operation in the Territories. It was the failure of Congress in these respects that gave the President the right, and imposed on him the duty, of continuing to govern them by martial law; and enabled him, by the neglect of that right and the violation of that duty, not to govern them at all, but to leave them, in destitution of any suitable exter

nal control, to do what mischief they pleased to each other, and to the rest of the good people of the United States. pp. 444, 445.

These are, unquestionably, as it seems to us, the only principles by which a republican government can be maintained. The power of legislation is vested exclusively in the representatives of the people. The President has simply the subordinate office of executing the laws which the people by their representatives for that purpose duly elected may make. To assume himself to be an equal power in the government, to enter into a factious controversy with the legislature respecting the proper laws to be passed, or to interfere with their independent action by corrupting or intimidating influences, are flagrant violations of his duties and of their privilege. The President of this republic is a chief magistrate simply, and not a despot. There are few greater or more prevalent mistakes than the idea that presidential candidates should be selected from our most brilliant men. If the incumbent of that office will confine himself to his legitimate sphere, great talents are no more necessary to him than to a sovereign of the British Empire. Indeed, an honest man of sound sense, and firm resolution to do his simple duty plainly and well, makes a far safer chief magistrate than a talented, ambitious party chief, who will be tempted to use his high position for the aggrandizement of himself, his party, or even of the presidential office. A most interesting and instructive chapter might be written illustrative of this truth drawn from the history of executive usurpations in the progress of our Government. A bold, strong, self-willed man in the presidential chair, may be guilty of the most frequent and dangerous encroachments upon the liberties of the people, and yet by the very heroism of his crimes command their admiration and support. Happily there is some reason, also, to believe that a weak, low minded braggart, in similar attempts, will excite only ridicule and disgust. The crow could not carry off the sheep in imitation of the eagle, and the frog, which assumed to be an ox, only burst himself in the effort.

The subject of impeachment we should have been pleased to see more fully treated by Judge Farrar. Though he has given it considerable space, yet, as it may become a subject of much

importance, all the light that can be obtained regarding it from principle or precedent is desirable. It seems likely that in the earlier periods of our Government, impeachment was looked upon as a more simple and easily applied remedy for maladministration than we now regard it. Mr. Madison, in the first Congress, declared, that "for the wanton removal of meritorious officers, the President would be impeached and removed from his high trust." Yet the proceeding has been sparingly resorted to in the history of the Government, and at the present day it must be viewed, at least in its application to the presidential office, as a proceeding almost revolutionary in its character, dangerous as a precedent, and only to be employed in the very last emergency.

Eighty years have passed since the Constitution was framed, and in that period wonderful changes, social, material and intellectual, have passed over our country. Greater changes still are impending. The nation is fast becoming consolidated into a powerful Empire. Are all these changes favorable to the permanence of our republican system? and how shall the elements of danger which they suggest be best averted? Does the machinery of our system and of its free institutions continue to work with its original smoothness and precision; and if not, what repairs are requisite to save it from ultimate ruin? These are questions of the utmost interest and importance, and their solution, as it seems to us, must be sought for not so much in broader constructions of constitutional powers in the government, as in the careful study and constant improvement of those popular institutions upon which the whole fabric of Government rests; in promoting education and patriotism among the people—in devising and applying laws by which suffrage shall be made to rest upon intelligence, and the tenure of office upon qualification; by which the rancor and strength of parties shall be subverted through securing the representation of minorities—preventing political proscription, and diminishing patronage; by which elections shall be so regulated that frauds shall be impossible, and violence and corruption prevented.

What political students most need to employ their attention, skill, and contrivance upon for the next generation, is the *science*

of practical democracy. The great theoretic principles of universal justice and universal liberty are fully understood, and it is to be hoped, firmly and forever established. Let all the features of practical effort and legislation by which popular institutions can best be guarded from decay or contamination, be studied and tended with equal vigilance and care; let our republican system be so developed and improved that it shall be complete and perfect in all its details as a system of true principles rightly applied, and the Constitution, the great national heart, nourished and preserved by the pure strong blood of a healthy, popular life, will readily adapt itself to all the varying phases of the national existence, and our liberties will be enduring.

ARTICLE VII.—EX-PRESIDENT VAN BUREN ON POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES.

Inquiry into the Origin and Course of Political Parties in the United States. By the late EX-PRESIDENT MARTIN VAN BUREN. Edited by his Sons. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 1867.

WITHIN a comparatively recent period, we have been put in possession of a great variety of documents which cast much new light upon the rise and early history of our national government. Of the persons who were concerned in this most interesting and eventful era, we now know, on many points, more than they could know of one another; and we have the same advantage in respect to the transactions in which they bore a part. Mr. Sparks rendered an invaluable service by his various collections of letters and other documents, and by the impartial biographies of Washington, Franklin, Gouverneur Morris, and of other leading public men. Mr. Charles Francis Adams has given to the public the voluminous writings of his grandfather, which he has accompanied by a copious memoir, founded on a careful study of revolutionary and post-revolutionary history, and constituting a full record of the times as well as of the life of John Adams. The works of Hamilton have likewise appeared under the less able and judicious supervision of his son. Congress has published a full collection of the writings of Jefferson, and a warm admirer, Mr. Henry S. Randall, has issued, in three large volumes, an elaborate memoir of the great democratic leader. Madison has found an appreciative biographer in Mr. William C. Rives, of Virginia, whose second volume has appeared since the close of the civil war. The administrations of Washington and Adams have been illustrated, in two stout volumes, by the correspondence of Oliver Wolcott, Jr. We have mentioned some of the most important of the publications which bear closely on the early

period of our national annals, and especially upon the origin and character of the two great parties which first contended for supremacy in the public councils. The book of Mr. Van Buren presents no new facts upon this subject. It is a smoothly written description, from the anti-federalist point of view, of the principles of the party that controlled our government for the first twelve years, and of the doctrines and aims of their adversaries. Men still differ widely in their estimate of the character of Jefferson. In the opinion of Mr. Randall and Mr. Van Buren, he was not only a most sagacious philosopher, but a statesman of lofty and disinterested motives of action. We think that the verdict of historical students will turn out to be quite dissonant from this opinion. A curious instance of Jefferson's want of accuracy, and of the deduction which, from this cause at least, we are required to make from the value of his testimony, is furnished by Mr. Van Buren himself. In a letter addressed to him, under date of June 29, 1824, Jefferson affirms that, in the famous Mazzei letter, he did not refer to Washington, and he argues at length to show that there was no room for supposing such a reference. Now the text of the Mazzei letter, as published at the time, is printed on the last page of Mr. Van Buren's book. In this letter, Jefferson, speaking of "the Anglican, Monarchical, and Aristocratical party," whose avowed object is to bring in "the substance as they have already done the forms of the British government," observes: "against us are the *Executive*, the judiciary, two out of three branches of the legislature," &c., &c. When writing to Mr. Van Buren in 1824, he had forgotten that he had introduced this unlucky word "executive." A plainer example of condemnation out of one's own mouth could hardly be produced. We wish we could believe Jefferson's explanation that by "forms of the British government," he meant ceremonies of etiquette. It may be the truth, but we do not feel assured that it is. Another example of Jefferson's inaccuracy is found in a comparison of a passage in his letter to Mr. Van Buren (p. 433) with a passage in the "Anas." In the former place he says—and if we do not mistake, he has made the same assertion more than once—"My last parting with General Washington was at the inauguration of Mr. Adams, in March,

1797, and was warmly affectionate; and I never had any reason to believe any change on his part, as there certainly was none on mine." In the *Anas* (Works, vol. ix., p. 99), the same Mr. Jefferson, on Feb. 4, 1818, writes of Washington: "Understanding, moreover, that I disapproved of that treaty [Jay's], and copiously nourished with falsehoods by a malignant neighbor of mine, who ambitioned to be his correspondent, *he had become alienated from myself personally*, as from the republican body generally of his fellow-citizens," &c. This passage is connected with imputations respecting the alleged decline of Washington's mental powers after the retirement of Jefferson from the Cabinet,—imputations which remind one of the indignation expressed in a well-known letter of Washington to Jefferson, in which the former refers to the patronizing apologies from the Republican side for the pretended blunders of his administration. This scorching letter is sufficient to refute the assertion that Washington failed to discover and resent the peculiar undermining tactics of hostility which his persevering but timid opponent was willing to resort to. The charge that leading members of the Federal party were monarchists, was thrown out habitually by Jefferson in his lifetime, was *réechoed* by his partisan friends, is industriously maintained by Mr. Randall in his biography, and appears once more in this essay of Mr. Van Buren. It was denied over and over again by most of the persons against whom it was leveled. It is true that some in the Federal Convention, including Hamilton, would have preferred a stronger government. He was in favor of having the President and Senate chosen for life. John Adams never favored this proposition. His work on the American systems of government, which led to his being charged with being a monarchist, is a defense of the system of checks and balances, and an argument for the separation of the legislative, judicial, and executive functions from one another. It was in opposition to objections brought forward in France by advocates of the French revolution. But Hamilton acquiesced fully in the decision of the convention on that and all other points. He was the principal supporter of the new Constitution before the people, and contributed effectively to its adoption. In com-

mon with many wise men, he doubted respecting its permanency; but he was disposed, and determined to give it a fair trial, and there is not a particle of evidence that he cherished a disloyal thought towards the government which he was so influential in creating and organizing. If apprehensions and anticipations are to count against a man, then the fears, or the pretended fears, of Jefferson, as expressed in the Mazzei letter and on many other occasions, put him into the rank of the skeptics as to the long endurance of the new order of things. Jefferson was hardly less fearful on one side than Hamilton on the other. The one feared the government, the other distrusted the people. A great hue-and-cry have been raised by the Jeffersonians about the project of a sort of an alliance with Great Britain, in case of a war with France, which was generally looked for in 1798. That Hamilton had some correspondence with Miranda, and was interested in the scheme for dissolving the South American colonies from Spain, is, indeed, true. That he thought a large army necessary, and was ambitious to command it, is also undeniable. But there is no reason to think that he entertained for a moment the idea of using the army against the laws, or for the alteration of the established system of government. How far he may have looked forward to the possibility of domestic disturbances from a mutinous French party among us, it is not for us to say. Fears of this sort were natural and not without warrant. It appears to us that Mr. C. F. Adams has carried his strictures on this part of Hamilton's career and conduct a little too far. In case of a war with France, waged at the same time by both Great Britain and the United States, it would be natural and proper that there should be some concert in the prosecution of it. The attack on the Spanish dependencies in North and South America—Spain being the instrument of France—was a measure, to the feasibility and advantage of which attention was surely due. That Hamilton or his special friends in the Cabinet of Adams had in view any closer relations with England than are involved in a temporary coöperation for the purpose of securing a common end, there is no proof and no probability. It is idle to pretend either that Washington was deceived in Hamilton's character, or that he was misled in

respect to the exigencies of the political situation. Washington knew that Hamilton was ambitious, and admits this in a communication to Jefferson; but he adds, in substance, that his ambition was of a noble sort, which set before it no end separable from his country's good. As concerns promotion in civil life, Hamilton was singularly free from ambition; but he was conscious of possessing military talents, and was ready to embrace any fair opportunity for their exercise. In true nobility of character, Hamilton shines in comparison with Jefferson. The latter, with his unquestionable talents, was morbidly prone to attribute evil designs to his political opponents, and had a mean, mousing way of treasuring up flying reports of their unpremeditated conversation, which might be used to their disadvantage. His persevering patronage of the slanderers of Washington, of whose Cabinet he was a member, has left a stain upon his reputation which the eulogies of his admirers will never succeed in effacing. There was a degree of insincerity in his dealing with Washington, to which, as there is little room for doubting, the eyes of that great man were at last opened. Jefferson's feeling towards Hamilton may fairly be called malignant. This was owing to his dread of Hamilton's power, and in some degree, probably, to a secret sense of the loftier personal qualities that belonged to the ablest of his adversaries. There are few examples in history of a display of intellectual power and an attainment of influence over able men, which can bear comparison with the career of Alexander Hamilton. A boy of eighteen, when the first guns were fired at Lexington; at the age of twenty, after distinguishing himself in various engagements, made the aid-de-camp of Washington, and employed by him in conducting his multifarious correspondence; impressing his commander from the outset with the vigor and fertility of his genius; exerting, when only thirty years old, the largest influence in the framing of the Federal Constitution and in its acceptance by the states; and, shortly after, called to the Cabinet of the first President, where he revived the public credit and organized the financial policy of the country; becoming, by general consent, the second leader of the party which looked up to Washington as its chief—he deserves to be considered a prodigy of mental

power. Had he known, like Jefferson, the art of making himself popular, and had he been less under the influence of an aristocratic taste, or been actuated by a warmer sympathy with the generality of men, or even stooped to court and win their favor, lasting success might have followed him as a political leader.

The arraignment of the general policy of the Federal party is no better sustained than is the charge of being conspirators against the government, which has been brought against the Federalist leaders—a government which they had themselves founded. It is notorious that the opposition party was obliged to follow in the track of the party which they had hated and displaced from power. They were obliged to foster and build up a navy, which they had used their best endeavors to prevent their adversaries from doing. They had denounced a national bank as unconstitutional, but they had to propose such an establishment, and the bill creating it bore the signature of Jefferson's favorite statesman, Mr. Madison. They were always loud in contending for a strict construction of the powers of the general government; but, with Jefferson in the seat of power, they bought the foreign territory of Louisiana, out of which half a dozen great states have been carved; an exertion of prerogative on the part of the national authority which infinitely transcends the most obnoxious Federalist measures in this direction. Every fair-minded man must admit that while the healthy working, not less than the theoretical perfection, of our system, is contingent on keeping up the just balance between state and national prerogatives, on avoiding consolidation on the one hand and dissolution on the other, it must also be conceded that the Federalist leaders were right in looking out first and most anxiously for the strength and perpetuity of the central government. They were right, under all the circumstances, in apprehending danger from the encroachments of the local governments or from a disposition to curtail and fetter the action of the newly created, central organization. The recent history of the United States has stamped with a seal of honor the prognostications of the Federalist statesmen. Secession is the legitimate outgrowth of the political doctrines which Jefferson disseminated in the

period preceding the overthrow of the Federal party. When his followers, defeated in Congress and having no hope of immediately overcoming the majorities against them there, transferred the contest to the states—Madison, for example, leaving the House of Representatives and entering the Legislature of Virginia—in the expectation that by means of local agitation they could cripple the dominant party and ultimately supplant them in the national councils, then were issued the declarations of political doctrine known as the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions, which have furnished a platform for nullifiers and secessionists ever since. In this agitation Jefferson was the prime mover and Madison a steady auxiliary. Madison might explain, as he did in his letter to Mr. Everett, written at the epoch of South Carolina nullification, that those manifestoes looked to none but legal and peaceful methods of redress, involving no disobedience or resistance to the national authority on the part of the states. Such is not their natural interpretation. Such is not the impression which they made on the country at the time. Certain it is, whatever may have been the precise intent of the authors, that their words furnished a welcome rallying-cry for the politicians of the Calhoun school, who became strong enough to drag the South after them in a sanguinary rebellion. Jefferson was not himself in the country when the Federal Constitution was adopted. From his letters written at the time, it is impossible to decide whether he approved of it or not. He may be called a neutral on the subject of its title to public favor. He made no small ado about the omission of a bill of rights from the Constitution, for he was excessively fond of abstract and oracular utterances on the rights of man. His influence was cast generally in favor of the political philosophy of the French school. In view of his own explicit declarations, it is not unjust to say that he was rather fond of revolutions. An inborn jealousy of government seems to be at the root of his political theories. A Deist in religion, though Mr. Randall seriously attempts to make him out a Christian; exaggerating vastly the influence of bad government among the causes of iniquity and human misery; imbued, to his credit be it said, with a sincere love of liberty,

Jefferson stands, a fair specimen of the political philosophers—plausible rather than profound—whom the spirit of the eighteenth century and the atmosphere of the French revolution called into life.

What led to the downfall of the Federal party? Independently of its own divisions, there were probably causes at work which would inevitably, and before a long period, have placed this party in the minority. The democratic tendencies of American society would evidently have proved too strong to be resisted successfully by the party which had a less degree of confidence in "the people" and in the advantages of universal suffrage. But the downfall of this great, intelligent, and patriotic party, dates from the division in its own ranks, and but for this division might have been, perhaps for a considerable time, retarded. In the quarrel between Mr. Adams and a portion of his cabinet, which resulted in the separation of the party into the Adams and Hamilton factions, there were, as is usual in quarrels, two sides, and it is not perfectly easy to say where the blame principally belongs. Mr. C. F. Adams has written very ably in vindication of his grandfather for the part which he acted in this disastrous dispute. Mr. George Gibbs, in his commentary on the Papers of Oliver Wolcott, has presented the opposite side with much warmth and with needless asperity. The publications of the younger Hamilton, and of Randal, enter fully into the questions at issue. The personal characteristics of Adams unquestionably contributed much to produce the rupture in the federal ranks. Dr. Franklin pithily said of him that he "was always honest, sometimes great, but often mad." He was indeed thoroughly honest, and as intrepid as he was upright. He scorned concealment and had too little patience as well as too much principle to be a successful intriguer. He was one of the few great orators of the revolutionary period. His learning was ample, his reasoning powers of a high order, and though infected, like Jefferson, with the skeptical philosophy of the times, in the foundations of his character he was a puritan. But the hot passions of Mr. Adams stood in the way of his complete success as a public man. He was constitutionally jealous, and if the testimony of most of his contemporaries is to be believed, vain. He had

no prudence in restraining the expression of his thoughts, and his excited feeling frequently gave an exaggerated form to his utterances. Everything that his imagination construed into an attempt to manage him he repulsed with vehemence. Despite his infirmities of temper, John Adams was a patriot in every fibre of his heart. Had he received from nature a less sensitive temperament, he might be excused for feeling annoyed or even aggrieved at seeing his Secretaries deferentially consulting a man like Hamilton, and using their power to conform the policy of the administration to the suggestions of their chosen leader. It is true that he did not know the full extent of their confidential intercourse with Hamilton, for this has come to light through the publication of letters, of the existence of which the President was not at the time aware. But he was at no loss to divine the principal quarter from which the inspiration to counsels adverse to his own views really emanated. Yet it would be an error to suppose that Hamilton made himself the leader of a cabal, or was actuated by a love of power which impelled him to carry forward a systematic opposition of a personal character to the nominal chief of the party. On the contrary, he sometimes differed from his friends of the Cabinet and the Senate; and a signal example of his independence and unselfish feeling is afforded in the course he took at the outset of Mr. Adams's administration in regard to an embassy to France. In opposition to the strong wishes of his political associates, he favored the sending of such an embassy, to be made up from both parties. Mr. C. F. Adams maintains that there had been from the beginning in reality three parties; that President Adams in his political ideas and predilections stood between the Jeffersonians and Hamiltonians, so that the extreme policy with reference to France, as well as on questions of domestic politics, was of necessity distasteful to him. The first occasion in which he was placed in opposition to members of his Cabinet, was in reference to the relative rank of the officers to serve under Washington in the army to be raised for the expected war with France. That Washington was to some extent influenced by the representations of Pickering and McHenry to insist upon giving the precedence to Hamilton, in preference to Knox or Pickering, either of whom the

President strongly preferred, is not to be doubted. Mr. Adams was baffled in his wishes in this particular, and his keen disappointment was partly owing to such exertions on the part of ministers as in our days would ordinarily be considered inconsistent with their proper relations to the head of the government. The measure, however, which put an end to harmony in the Federal party, was the nomination by Mr. Adams, without consultation with his Cabinet, of a new minister to France in the person of Mr. Murray. The Federalists were resolved upon war. The long continued insults and injuries which France had inflicted on this country had awakened a deep resentment among men of the most pacific disposition,—a feeling which finds the strongest expression in the confidential letters of Washington. The Federalist leaders felt certain of carrying the country with them; and it is highly probable that their readiness for war was quickened by the expectation that it would ensure the continued ascendancy of their party. It is right to allow to Mr. Adams the credit of being animated by honest motives in the step he took of initiating a new attempt at negotiation. He could plead a semi-official avowal of Talleyrand that he was ready to receive a new minister; and in making the nomination, he recommended that before the ambassador should present himself at Paris, the most explicit assurance should be demanded of the French government that he should be honorably received. But to make the nomination at all without conference with his Cabinet, to proceed to this bold measure without even having asked their sanction, was the proclamation of the fact that he no longer trusted them and was determined not to expose himself to their opposition. He believed that the best and only sure way of accomplishing his object, which was to prevent the war if he could, was to proceed independently of his Cabinet and take the Federalists by surprise. The mission to France was a success. The country was saved from war with no sacrifice of national honor. But the Federal party was hopelessly rent in twain, and the sceptre passed out of their hands. If this calamity is partly chargeable to infirmities of temper which belonged to the President, Hamilton and his friends cannot be wholly acquitted of a like fault. The effort of Hamilton, in 1800, to

substitute Pinckney for Adams for the first office, could only have the effect to embitter the latter and his supporters, to the last degree ; and, when on the eve of the election, Hamilton allowed his attack on Adams to see the light, he struck a blow at the prospects of the party at which all its foes exulted. Exasperated by the derogatory remarks which Mr. Adams, with his usual imprudence, was in the habit of making about him and the "British faction" of which he stood as the leader, Hamilton was unable to resist the temptation to give vent to his natural indignation and to vindicate himself against unfounded aspersions. He proved himself a poor party manager on this as on other occasions, and allowed Jefferson to be carried into power by the bickerings and animosities of his adversaries, who, had they been heartily united or been able temporarily to hush up their quarrels, might have retained still longer their ascendancy.

ARTICLE VIII.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

DALE'S CLASSIC BAPTISM.*—Mr. Dale is known to us only from the testimony of his book; but this shows him to be a strong thinker, and a vigorous, if not a polished, writer. In the treatment of his subject he is too intensely controversial for our taste. He has his antagonist always before him, and like Homer's heroes, when he gives a good blow or thrust, he breaks out into loud triumph over the prostrate foe. Unfortunately, this is not a mere matter of taste. If Mr. Dale had developed his own views with the calmness of scientific inquiry, and in criticising the views of others had been content with a clear but unexultant exposure of their weakness, he would have been more likely to inspire the confidence or overcome the prejudices of his readers. The subject is, evidently, one to which he has devoted the study and reflection of years. Perhaps the long and labored preparation which has qualified him for his task, has given him a somewhat exaggerated notion of its importance. We fear, at least, that some will think so, when they find nearly four hundred octavo pages taken up with a discussion which covers only a part, though an interesting part, of the Baptist question. Here, again, we cannot help thinking that Mr. Dale has stood in his own light. The facts and arguments of his treatise might have been presented with equal, or even greater, clearness and effectiveness in a book of half the size; and many readers would have ventured upon the smaller book whose courage will hardly suffice for so bulky a volume. Indeed, a mere elimination of the passages in which he triumphs over the inconsistencies and absurdities of Baptist critics, would go far to effect the desired reduction.

By "*classical* writers" on the title-page are meant heathen writers, and, perhaps, it would have been better to call them so: there seems to be no sufficient reason why Plotinus, and Proclus, and Æsop, and Chariton of Aphrodisias should be esteemed classical more than a Basil or a Chrysostom. Of passages in which the

* *Classic Baptism. An Inquiry into the meaning of the word baptizo, as determined by the usage of classical Greek writers.* By JAMES W. DALE, Pastor of the Media Presbyterian Church, Delaware County, Pa. Boston: Draper & Halliday. 1867. 8vo., pp. xxii., 354.

word *baptizo* is used by heathen writers, Mr. Dale gives what must be nearly, if not quite, a complete list, including in all more than a hundred passages. In each of these the clause containing *baptizo* is cited in the Greek, after which comes an English version, embracing more or less of the context, and afterward the explanations required for a full apprehension of the meaning. This collection of the original texts, with translation and comment, is made with a thoroughness which deserves acknowledgment; it forms, in our view, the most interesting and valuable feature of the work. It is preceded by a similar, though naturally less complete, examination of the primitive verb *bapto*, as well as of the Latin *tingo* and *mergo*, and the English *dip* and *immerse*, which correspond closely in meaning to the Greek words. Between *bapto* and *baptizo*, in their primary sense, Mr. Dale makes a clear and strong distinction, which seems to be sustained by the passages quoted; we regard it as the best point in his book, after the one to which we have just called attention. The two words differ as *dip* and *immerse* differ in English: the first denotes the special act of putting an object lightly under the surface of a fluid, to be soon withdrawn from it again; the second denotes the causing—by whatever special act—an object to be wholly under or within a fluid, surrounded and pressed upon by it at all points. If, for example, a rising tide covers objects on the sea-shore, these objects are *immersed*, but cannot be described as *dipped*; here, therefore, the proper word in Greek would be *baptizo*, while *bapto* would be inadmissible.

But the Greek *baptizo*, like the English *immerse*, is used in many cases where there is no literal, physical submergence. Mr. Dale has not overlooked these uses; he gives them a great deal of space and of attention; but it is much to be regretted, and it is the great defect of the book, that his treatment of them is in important respects unnatural and arbitrary. He sets out from the undoubted fact, that a word after long use in a figurative sense may cease to be figurative, that is, it may come to be used without consciousness of its primary meaning, used as the direct, immediate expression of a non-physical act or object. This is especially true of words in which the physical sense has become obsolete; while, on the other hand, words which retain their physical sense in constant and familiar use are not very ready to give up all memory and consciousness of it in their secondary applications. It may be difficult in some cases to determine whether the primary meaning is

wholly lost in the secondary, or whether something of the former remains to give picturesqueness and vivacity to the latter. But very few, we think, will agree with the author of this work in the extent to which he assumes a complete obliteration of primary meanings and a consequent loss of the figurative character. He will not allow that such expressions as "immersed in ignorance," "immersed in debt," "immersed in care," "immersed in study," "immersed in business," "immersed in politics," "immersed in parliamentary reports," have anything properly figurative about them: they were figurative once (or similar expressions were so), but they have long ceased to be figurative; they denote simply the general idea of a "controlling influence" (so "immersed in ignorance," "immersed in debt"), or else some specific kind of controlling influence, as "thorough mental occupation" (so "immersed in care," "immersed in business," etc.). In like manner he denies the figurative character of such an expression as "drowned in sleep": it only means (he says) "that the influence of sleep is exerted over its object in a controlling degree"; and of such an expression as "buried in wine" (Virgil, "vinoque sepultus"): here (he tells us) "picture-figure fails; influence is the only and most sufficient source of explanation."

It is hardly necessary to remark how completely these and numberless similar expressions are by this treatment divested of the poetic liveliness and brilliancy which belong to them, and reduced to a *caput mortuum* of abstract meaning. Our author confesses it himself. "'Immersed in ignorance' directly and *prosaically* declares that those spoken of are *under the controlling influence of ignorance*." But are the two expressions "immersed in ignorance" and "under the controlling influence of ignorance" absolutely equivalent? Do they make exactly the same impression on the mind? Does not the latter seem a colorless abstraction by the side of the former, and how can this difference be explained without recognizing the fact that in the word *immersed* there is some suggestion of its primary meaning, and so something of a figurative character?

Quoting the Shakespearian lines,

"What is a drunken man like, fool?
Like a drown'd man, a fool, and a madman:
One draught, above heat, makes him a fool;
The second mads him, and a third drowns him"—

he contends that the word *drowns* in the fourth line is used not

figuratively but "literally, in the secondary sense of suspending the exercise of every faculty." He does not see that he is arguing against Shakespeare. A comparison of the second line shows that "drowns him" here signifies "makes him LIKE a drown'd man," "puts him into a condition *analogue* to that of one literally drowned," or, in other words, "*figuratively* drowns him."

These principles the author applies to the Greek word *baptizo*. Thus in "baptized (immersed) by grief, wantonness, debts, affairs," and the like, he regards the participle as expressing simply and directly the general idea of a "controlling influence, without mersion either in fact or figure." We use *immersed* here to represent the Greek *baptized*, because *mersed*, which Mr. Dale employs, is scarcely English, and the slight force of the *im-* (*in-*) has no bearing on the point in question. "Immersed by grief" is in accordance with Greek idiom, which treats the immersing element as the *means* rather than the *place* of immersion. When Mr. Dale says, "'I am mersed in study' and 'I am baptized by study,' are phrases expressive of very different ideas: the former expresses *thorough intellectual engagedness*; the latter expresses *thorough intellectual prostration*"—the remark is probably founded in a great measure on this difference of idiom. This, however, in itself, is no sufficient foundation; and we suspect that the distinction drawn between the two phrases is much overstated, if not wholly unreal.

In the following passage, "although immersed (baptized) by the passion, he endeavored, as a noble man, to make resistance, and emerged as if from a wave," the author acknowledges a figurative use of the word *immersed*. This he does, no doubt, because the figure is resumed and developed in the last clause: if it had not been continued, he would probably have denied it altogether. A figure suggested in a single word and not afterward dwelt upon or carried out further, is, in his view (it would almost seem), a rhetorical impossibility. Even in the sentence, "Love immersed (baptized) by anger sinks," he rejects the figurative use of *immersed*, although it is supported by the following *sinks*. In discussing the sentence, "Midnight was immersing (baptizing) the city by sleep," he quotes a line of Spenser, "Whose mind in meate and drinke was drownéd so," and remarks, "Spenser uses *drown* simply to give strong development to the influence of its adjuncts [*meat* and *drink*], without any regard to cold water."

The progress of meaning in the word *baptizo* is exhibited under

the following categories. 1. Intusposition without influence: as "swords immersed (*em-baptisménas*) by the marshes." 2. Intusposition with influence: as "the animals perish being immersed" (here with *destructive* influence). 3. Intusposition for (the sake of) influence: as "the dolphin immersing killed him" (immersing for its destructive influence). 4. Influence with rhetorical figure (of intusposition): as "I am (one) of those immersed by that great wave" (of calamity). 5. Controlling influence without intusposition in fact or in figure: of this we have already quoted several examples. The idea of "controlling influence" at which we have now arrived is one of great generality: it admits an almost infinite variety of specific applications. But our author regards the word *baptizo* as admissible in all these applications. The closing sentence of his book asserts, with the vigorous emphasis of small capitals, that "Whatever is capable of thoroughly changing the character, state, or condition of any object, is capable of *baptizing* that object; and by such change of character, state, or condition, does, in fact, *baptize* it." He does not say that a surgeon who, by a successful amputation, saves a dying patient, *baptizes* that patient; or that a whetstone, when it changes a dull knife into a sharp one, *baptizes* the knife; or that the sun, when it dries up a stream in summer, *baptizes* the stream. But we are left to infer that he would regard these, and others like these, as natural and appropriate expressions.

The English word *immerse*, however, according to our author, has nearly the same primary meaning as the Greek *baptizo*; and it runs *pari passu* through the same series of stages, "intusposition without influence," "intusposition with influence," "intusposition for influence," until at length, dropping the idea of "intusposition," it reaches the same general idea of "controlling influence": as Mr. Dale says, "it expresses thorough influence of any kind." Let the reader observe the words "*of any kind*," and say whether we are not then authorized to affirm, that "Whatever is capable of thoroughly changing the character, state, or condition of any object, is capable of *immersing* that object; and by such change of character, state, or condition, does, in fact, *immerse* it." We do not see how this conclusion is to be avoided, though we fear the Baptist enemy may take advantage of it to murmur with the little breath our author has left him: "*Baptizing*, then, *is immersing*, and *immersing is baptizing*."

Of the results which may be looked for from such views of lan-

guage, we are able to present a somewhat striking illustration. In a passage quoted from Plutarch, an impostor is represented as saying to a person whose superstitious fears have been excited by frightful dreams: "Call the purifying old woman, and immerse (baptize) thyself into the sea, and having sat down on the land pass the day (there)." Mr. Dale would translate, "merse thyself (going) to the sea;" and to this, though we think it less probable, we will not now object. But what is meant by the direction "(im)merse thyself"? Let it be remembered that, according to Mr. Dale, the primary sense of *baptizo* differs only very slightly from that of *immerse*; and that this is also the *ordinary* sense: he finds the idea of physical "intusposition" in more than half of all the instances collected. What, then, will a man understand if told "to go to the sea and *baptize* himself?" What would a man understand if told "to go to the sea and *immerse* himself?" Do we not understand a word in the sense which is at once primary and ordinary, unless there is something in the connection which will not allow us to do so? But in the connection here there is nothing irreconcilable with the primary and ordinary sense of this word. In the connection we find "the sea," and we find the idea of "purification;" but surely immersion—complete physical "intusposition"—is not impossible in the sea, and it is not incompatible with purification. And yet Mr. Dale will not allow to the word, as used here, its primary and ordinary sense; he will not allow that it denotes "intusposition" at all; he contends that it denotes a "controlling influence," that influence having here the specific character of "purification." The command is really no more than this, "Going to the sea, subject thyself to a controlling, purifying influence." Whether this influence was to be secured "by sprinkling," "by washing the hands," "by drinking sea-water," he leaves undecided: perhaps he would allow us to add "sculling" and "clam-fishing" to the list of possible methods. But why does not Mr. Dale put this passage under his third division of the primary use, making it a case of "intusposition for the sake of [a purifying] influence?" We cannot speak confidently as to his reasons for not adopting this course. Perhaps he thinks that, as the sole object of the command is to effect a religious purification, we must assume that any possible means of effecting a religious purification would be a fulfillment of the command. But if a boy was directed to immerse a kitten in order to destroy her, could he properly assume that any means

of destruction—as, for instance, hacking her to pieces, or roasting her over a slow fire—would be a fulfillment of the order, and that the word *immerse*, as used in the order, expressed only the general idea of a “controlling, destructive influence?”

But, perhaps, the true reason for our author's treatment of this passage is to be found in what he says when arguing against the construction, “baptize thyself into the sea.” He declares that the word *baptize* in its primary sense (which that construction would require) puts a man under the water, but makes no provision for taking him out again; so that the command to baptize oneself in that sense, if made the strict and single rule of conduct, would inevitably end in a case of *felo de se*. We acknowledge, with a shudder, the tremendous possibility; yet, at the same time, we have our doubts whether the good-for-nothing mountebanks referred to by Plutarch would have been deterred even by such a possibility from uttering the fearful, perhaps fatal, command.

It is worthy of remark that among all the instances of *baptizo* collected by the author, this is the only one in which he finds the meaning *to purify*. With what reason he finds it here, the reader can judge. It is supposed by many that in New Testament times *baptizo* had acquired the meaning *to purify*: but for that opinion—however supported by other considerations—we can discover no support in the usage of the heathen writers.

THE FIRST HISTORICAL TRANSFORMATIONS OF CHRISTIANITY.*

—This book is interesting in so far as it gives us a glimpse of the views of the neological writers of French Protestantism, of whom the Coquerels, father and son, are well known representatives. The root of this branch of destructive criticism is to be traced to Germany, and its results are but modifications of the system of Baur of Tübingen. But in France, as the translator says, “This movement originated chiefly in the pulpit, and consequently has a less speculative character and a more practical aim than the criticism of Germany, which sprang from the professorial chair.” It is not, therefore, from its learning or originality that the present volume has any claim on the public attention, but only as a

* *The First Historical Transformations of Christianity.* From the French of ATHANASE COQUEREL the Younger. By E. P. EVANS, Ph. D. Boston: William V. Spencer, 203 Washington street. 1867.

modification of the Tübingen school, produced by the practical stand point and national characteristics of the author.

Assuming the conclusion of Baur concerning the violent opposition of the Judaizing and Hellenistic parties in the early church, M. Coquerel regards the Christianity which proceeded from the lips of Christ as wholly pure, but as subjected, in consequence of men's inability fully to comprehend and receive it, from the very first, to an admixture of error. Thus he makes Stephen not only the first martyr, but the first reformer of the faith. It was he who started the movement usually ascribed to Paul, who was converted by imbibing his spirit. James and Paul represent the extreme views of the early church, and Peter is the compromise between the two—his reason inclining to Paul, his nature and habit to James. Hence the same old story of not only special individual apprehensions of Christianity, but of wholly antagonistic views held by those who were its original expounders. The Christianity represented by Peter became for many reasons the prevailing type in the Roman Church, which, from its metropolitan position, gradually gave the form to other churches, and pushed the oriental mysticism of John into the background, while it absorbed and transformed the Judaizing and Pauline elements. In its contact with Paganism, it was likewise changed by absorbing many of its elements, clothing them with Christian significance and symbolism. Thus, at the time of the Reformation, there existed something wholly alien from the mind of Christ, which the Reformers, in the spirit of the early Reformers, Stephen and Paul, transformed into something much more like the original idea. But as Paul himself had been far too dogmatic, and in his dialectic, especially regarding the decrees of God and the atoning work of Christ, contradicted the spirit in which he wrought and the aim for which he labored, so the Reformers repeated his error, and "fought Catholicism under its own banner." The transformation, therefore, which remains to be accomplished, and which the modern critical school aim at and may hope to accomplish, is to bring back Christianity to the Sermon on the Mount and other utterances of Christ, leaving out speculations as to his nature, objective work, and resurrection, as theological disputes which do not touch the essence of Christianity, "which is the reign of God in the conscience by the sole power of love." This is the universal element held by Peter, Paul, and John, but restrained and injured in the first by Judaizing tendencies to

ritual; in the second, by dogmatic subtleties; in the third, by theosophic theories. The church has in its course and creeds developed the erroneous bands which have shackled the spirit. Modern criticism would develop the spirit freed from these cramping errors. Even the Apostles' Creed is too dogmatic and historical. All we want is the pure idea.

So much for the aim and method of this book. There is something, however, very fresh and sprightly in the author's handling of his theme. It is very singular and inconsequent that he admits so much historical verity in the Gospels. He professes a belief even in the Resurrection of Jesus, which, however, he does not deem to be essential for a true Christian to hold, and does not seem to see the tremendous effect which this fact must have on the estimation of the person of Christ and his redemptive work. The difficult questions concerning his birth and nature, if not solved in that alembic, become simply matters of exegesis. This M. Coquerel's German teachers have not failed to see, and, therefore, reject the fact, which he admits, as fatal to that apprehension of Christianity which they seek to establish. And our author's admissions are fatal to his theory. They are an evidence of how the practical mind clings to facts which the mere theorist rejects without scruple; and had M. Coquerel been more true to his practical bent as a preacher, he could hardly, without more effort, have been induced to give up the doctrine of Christ's person, which he confesses John held, or the doctrine of Christ's redemptive work, which he ascribes to Paul, as superfluities not essential to a true apprehension of Christianity; constituting, as they do together, such an historical witness to the self-sacrificing love of God, whose love to man, M. Coquerel confesses, must awaken in him that love to God, whereby God shall rule in the conscience.

Whatever Christianity as a science may, in the minds of philosophers, be able to dispense with, as a religion, or act for bringing men to the realization of its idea, it demands imperatively the historical basis on which it assumes to rest. The historical Christ is what the soul wants both as a witness to God's love and as a mediator of it to sinful man. And to speak to men of Christianity apart from the person of its founder, or from the way in which it came into the world, is a *contradictio in adjecto*. This transformation is but a transmigration which must stifle its spirit and extinguish its life. Its soul can exist and work only in the body which God has appointed for it, which Peter, Paul, and John

embraced, and which the Church, despite such reasoning as that of our author, will, with the instinct of self-preservation, ever hold fast.

MONSELL'S RELIGION OF REDEMPTION.*—This volume is in some respects quite unique, and for a theological treatise altogether remarkable. The author, as the title informs us, has been Pastor in Neuchâtel. He tells us in his preface that he "has been for a quarter of a century, speaking, preaching, writing, and even thinking in a foreign tongue." But he has obviously been a diligent reader and an earnest thinker of the ablest religious writers of modern times, of every school and type of theology—Romanist, Protestant, and Rationalistic, in the English, French, and German languages, particularly in the two former. He has read earnestly, thought independently, and yet with a comprehensive and catholic spirit. He has quoted abundantly from the writers whom he has read and referred to many whose thoughts he has expressed in his own words. His English style is polished and copious, without being affected or wearisome, and indicates what advantage may be derived from familiarity with French diction, without losing the English idiom. But what is more noticeable than the style is the freedom from theological technicalities, without the sacrifice of precision of thought and the successful use of the language of literature, without either the cant of affectation, or the cant of libertinism. For a work which goes so thoroughly and somewhat minutely into theological distinctions it is surprisingly free from scholastic or theological nomenclature. Mr. Monsell is at home in modern literature as in modern theology, and his acquaintance with the various phases of European life and society is broad and appreciative. His opinions would be pronounced thoroughly evangelical, without being Calvinistic in the extreme. In respect to Sin and Redemption, none but a narrow minded and ignorant critic would think of quarreling with him. He was evidently an ardent admirer and disciple of Alexander Vinet, from whom he quotes more abundantly than from any other writer. The field of his discussion is somewhat wide, as will be readily inferred from the titles of the five books into which the volume is

* *The Religion of Redemption.* A Contribution to the Preliminaries of Christian Apology. By R. W. MONSELL, B. A., late Pastor of the Congregational Church of Neuchâtel, Switzerland. London: William Hunt & Co. 1867. 8vo. pp. 547.

divided, viz, Human Guilt and Misery; Redemption; Appropriation of Redemption; Individual Christian Life; Collective Christian Life and History.

LEA'S HISTORY OF SACERDOTAL CELIBACY.*—Mr. Lea, who has already given proof, in a volume of *Essays*, of his intimate acquaintance with the ecclesiastical history of the middle ages, has undertaken in this new volume to present a full, consecutive narrative of the rise of the custom of clerical celibacy, and of the establishment of this practice as a fixed law of the Latin Church. How copious were the materials which passed under his eye, the reader is enabled to judge from the extended, apposite marginal citations, by which the statements of the text are supported and illustrated. In a series of thirty chapters, the entire course of Church History, from Nicholas, the Deacon, and the Nicolites to the last enactments respecting clerical marriage in Italy, is traversed. The arrangement is clear and logical, and the style of the work is perspicuous and wholly free from all attempts at rhetorical effect. Mr. Lea writes with no controversial aim, and we are under the necessity of making no discount in consequence of any partisan bias in his mind; yet he does not withhold the natural inferences which are suggested to a reflecting mind in the progress of the history, and his work, by the ample array of facts which it offers, is really a powerful and convincing argument against the law of enforced celibacy in the church. The comparatively brief portion of the volume which is devoted to the Ancient Church, though it is instructive and generally correct, is still inferior to the subsequent chapters which relate to the middle ages,—a part of the field where the learned author is obviously more at home. One of the finest passages in the book is the detailed account of the Hildebrandian reform, and of the commotion which that great movement stirred up in the various countries of Europe. This account is here more full than in the principal manuals of Church History, and is founded, as is the work generally, upon a careful, independent study of the original sources of knowledge on the subject. We cannot refrain from an expression of satisfaction that an American publisher has had the inclination, and found the time, to add to the literature of his country so substantial and important a contribution to theological learning.

* *An Historical Sketch of Sacerdotal Celibacy in the Christian Church.* By HENRY C. LEA. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1867.

BERNARD ON THE PROGRESS OF DOCTRINE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.*—This small volume, which is introduced to the American public by Dr. Hovey, of the Theological Institution at Newton, is one that cannot fail to interest all who will read it. The author endeavors to prove that there is a progressive scheme in doctrine in the New Testament, which is clearly traceable through all the successive books. Commencing with the Gospels, he shows that they include, indeed, the substance of all Christian teaching, but that they present only the beginnings, which were plainly designed to be completed and brought to perfection afterwards. This completion, according to the declaration of Christ himself, was only to be accomplished after his own departure from this world, and after the coming of the Spirit who should enlighten his disciples beyond the possibilities of the earlier time. In the Acts the system is carried on to a further development—the book everywhere giving evidence of the personal guidance of the Lord Jesus, as well in the special interventions which are recorded as in the instructions which are given to the Apostles through the Holy Ghost. Even yet, however, the doctrine is presented only in outline, and rather in its external bearing as designed for those who are outside of the believing body. The Epistles add the unfolding of the truth within the Church itself—the teaching of the Spirit to the Christian soul for the growth of its own individual and inmost life. And finally the Apocalypse, looking beyond the single believer, opens to view the destiny and victory of the whole body of the Lord's people. Such, in briefest outline, is the plan of the volume, but the development of the plan, in which lies a large portion of the interest and force of the author's thoughts, can hardly be set forth in a notice of this kind. We can only say that the argument is carried forward with much skill, and with great clearness, and that the style is such as to bear the reader along easily and pleasantly. As giving the evidence of the unity of plan and of the Divine direction in all the various writings of the Evangelists and Apostles it will be highly valued, and should be widely read.

* *The Progress of Doctrine in the New Testament: Considered in Eight Lectures*, delivered before the University of Oxford, on the Bampton Foundation. By THOMAS DEHANT BERNARD, M. A., of Exeter College, and Rector of Walcott. From the Second London Edition, with Improvements. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1867. 12mo. pp. 258.

THE REDEEMER.*—The author of this book informs us, in the preface, that its chapters “are not sermons,” but that the preparation of them was occasioned by preaching a series of sermons on the subject discussed in them. This fact will account for some of the peculiarities of style, which are more adapted for hearers than for readers, as well as for the manner in which the argument is carried forward. It is not so much a scientific treatise, as an earnest setting forth of Jesus Christ as fulfilling all the promises and preparations of the Old Dispensation, and all the demands of the human soul for a Saviour and deliverer from the power of sin. It is well-timed in its appearance, and by the vigor of its thought, and the depth of its Christian sentiment must be of much service to those who would know the truth. The American Tract Society have wisely included it among their publications, offering it thus to many minds as a help and defense amid the doubts and dangers of the time.

ISAAC TAYLOR'S RESTORATION OF BELIEF.†—No English writer has, in our opinion, so well understood, and so ably met the Anti-Christian tendencies of his own country as Isaac Taylor. Long before these tendencies had begun to be expressed in writing, or had attracted public attention, while Churchmen and Dissenters were occupied with matters exclusively practical, or contemptibly frivolous, this sagacious interpreter of the tendencies of the times foresaw the appearance of the New Infidelity, and expressed himself in no doubtful terms as to the reforms in Christian Theology and Scriptural Interpretation which would be required to make successful headway against this infidelity when it should take the field. When it appeared in form and in fact, his criticisms and replies were always timely and able, and were distinguished above all others by their profound philosophy, their candid temper, their thoroughly tolerant spirit, as well as by the complete independence of their author of the trammels of sect or tradition. The *Restoration of Belief* is, perhaps, the most important and the ablest of this class of his writings. We rejoice that it is republished in a new and revised edition, and in a better form

* *The Redeemer; a Sketch of the History of Redemption.* By EDMOND DE PRESSENSE. Translated from the French Edition by Rev. J. H. MYERS, D. D. Published by the American Tract Society, Boston. 1867. 12mo. pp. 412.

† *The Restoration of Belief.* By ISAAC TAYLOR. A new Edition. Revised, with an additional section. Boston: E. P. Dutton & Co. 1867.

than before. The additional section is a discussion of Renan's "Life of Christ," which is of itself worth the price of the volume for its sagacity and power, softened by the noblest Christian charity.

LANGE'S CRITICAL, DOCTRINAL, AND HOMILETICAL COMMENTARY, VOL. IX., EPISTLES OF JAMES, PETER, JOHN, AND JUDE.*—The most recently published volume of this work, translated and edited by Dr. Mombert of Lancaster, Pennsylvania, will be more heartily welcomed, we think, even than those which have preceded it, because it supplies a want which has been widely felt—the want of a commentary on the Catholic Epistles, written from the standpoint of modern investigation, and presenting the views and criticisms of a scholarly mind. As supplying this want we cheerfully commend it, not only to all persons who are already familiar with and appreciative of the volumes on the Gospels and the Acts, but also to those who feel unable to purchase the entire work, and yet are desirous of possessing something of value upon this portion of the New Testament. The editor has devoted much time to his task—more than three years, as he tells us—and he seems to have accomplished it with success. In the more important points, where he differs from Dr. Lange and his associates, he presents briefly his own view with his reasons, and refers to other prominent writers, yet, at the same time, he does not go beyond the proper limits of an editor, and of the plan on which the American translation is carried forward. Especially in the Homiletical part he has made considerable additions,—referring to many English authors. The successive portions of this large Commentary are now appearing as rapidly as could be desired, and we are sure that the translators and publishers must be encouraged in their labors by the reception given to each new volume by the theological and religious public.

* *A Commentary on the Holy Scriptures; Critical, Doctrinal, and Homiletical, with Special reference to Ministers and Students.* By JOHN PETER LANGE, D. D., in connection with a number of eminent European Divines. Translated from the German, and edited with additions, original and selected, by PHILIP SCHAFF, D. D., in connection with American Divines of various Evangelical Denomination. Vol. IX., of the New Testament; containing the Epistles General of James, Peter, John, and Jude. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1867.

THE THEOLOGY OF THE GREEK POETS.*—This book consists of six Articles, which have been published before in different Quarterlies. The first two, making more than one third of the book, have nothing to do with the "Theology of the Greek Poets." Indeed, this title is open to another, more serious, objection, namely, that it makes a promise which is not fulfilled. The book is far from giving a complete view of the subject which its title proposes. It contains no account of the theology to be found in Hesiod, Pindar, Aristophanes, not to mention the earlier, less known, poets, and the reasons given in the preface for omitting all reference to Euripides seem hardly sufficient.

With the first essay, entitled "The Head of the Church, Head over all Things," we have nothing to do here. The second, on the "Homeric Question," is a fair presentation of what can be said in favor of the unity of authorship of the Iliad and Odyssey. It does not do justice to the arguments on the other side, and will fail to convince those who know them. Much of the reasoning shows the common error of applying to the Homeric poems analogies drawn from later and widely different periods of literature. Examples of this are the comparison with Chaucer on p. 85, with Virgil on p. 86, with English poets on p. 103. Then follows a chapter on the Homeric doctrine of the gods, then one on the Homeric doctrine of sin, and two others, on the theology of Æschylus and of Sophocles, finish the book. These are all interesting and valuable, especially the last, which sketches happily the story of each of the plays of Sophocles. There is some repetition and want of system in the essays, arising perhaps from their having been published separately and in a different order from the natural one of their subjects. They may be also criticised as failing here and there in accuracy and in clear methodical statement, and sometimes the desire to find Christian ideas in the Greek poets leads the author to unwarranted inferences. But, on the whole, there is, so far as we know, no better presentation of the subject in English.

* *The Theology of the Greek Poets.* By W. S. TYLER, Williston Professor of Greek in Amherst College. Boston: Draper & Halliday. 1867. 12mo., pp. 365.

CURTISS ON INSPIRATION.*—This is a conscientiously written book, which gives the results of a somewhat long-continued course of honest and anxious inquiry. The author once received the stricter views of Inspiration, but was first led to question their validity by the occurrence of special difficulties, and finally brought to an entirely different theory of the relation of the Human and the Divine Elements in the composition of the Sacred volume. The object of the present volume is in part to explain the process by which he was led to change his views so materially; in part to unfold the difficulties which stand in the way of the doctrine of plenary or verbal inspiration; in part to give the history of opinions upon the subject, and a conspectus of the several theories held during the present century by leading Protestant writers; and in part to discuss the doctrine of the New Testament in respect to the inspiration of both Scriptures.

Several other topics incidental to his principal theme, as Authority in Religion; The Christian Idea of the Paraclete; The New Testament Canon, and some others, are carefully considered. The book is eminently adapted to the times, and the author deserves great credit for the frank expression of the views which he entertains, and for the earnest Christian spirit in which he writes. We are confident that his work will meet the wants of very many persons who labor under the same difficulties with himself, and that it cannot but be very useful. We wish that the work were more methodical, more philosophical, and more scholarly. Some statements need to be more guarded, but we welcome the work as opening in an unobjectionable manner and spirit the discussion of a most important series of topics which no considerations can or ought to repress. The interests of truth and of spiritual and supernatural Christianity are hindered more than is generally believed, by the timid, superficial, and traditional treatment of this subject, which is so generally sanctioned and encouraged. There are other evils which deserve to be feared infinitely more than exposure to the suspicion of rationalistic tendencies.

PROFESSOR PARSON'S "DEUS HOMO."†—This work contains not

* *The Human Element in the Inspiration of the Sacred Scriptures.* By T. J. CURTISS, D. D., late Professor of Theology in the University of Lewisburg, Pa. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1867. 12mo. pp. 386.

† *Deus Homo: God-Man.* By THEOPHILUS PARSONS. Chicago: E. B. Myers & Chandler. 1867.

only a treatise on the Person of Christ, as it is received by the followers of Swedenborg, but also an exposition of the more important principles of his theological system. It will be read with great interest by all those persons who desire to peruse a clear and candid exhibition of these views—such as might be expected from an able and learned Professor of Law. It is very much more readable than if it had been written by a clergyman, in so far as it is free from the somewhat cumbersome and affected phraseology, and the rather supercilious manner into which most Swedenborgian clergymen fall, when they expound the doctrines of their faith. We cannot doubt that this book will be accepted in this country as the most satisfactory statement of these doctrines which is accessible.

PHILOSOPHICAL.

MAUDSLEY'S "PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY OF THE MIND.*—Dr. Maudsley's handsome volume, as its title indicates, treats of two distinct subjects, viz., the Physiology of the mind as he conceives it, and its Pathology, or the science of its morbid affections. The first treatise is made up of some very good physiology, in the common acceptation of the term, and not a little superficial and bad metaphysics. This last feature is somewhat surprising, inasmuch as the author's horror of what he conceives to be metaphysics and metaphysical psychology amounts almost to a pathological condition of the intellect, or, as we ought to express ourselves, to a morbid and ill-regulated action of the ideational nerve-cells. The metaphysics which he adopts are those of the school of Comte, Herbert Spencer, and Darwin. This is manifest from the rather nebulous, though imposing sketch which he gives of the disastrous influence of the metaphysical method of investigating nature and the soul which was pursued by the ancient schools, and also from the perpetual recurrence of a certain not very luminous exposition of the proper aim of true science. For example, in protesting against being misled by words he lays down the following axiom: "But words cannot attain to definiteness save as living outgrowths of realities, as the expressions of the

* *The Physiology and Pathology of the Mind.* By HENRY MAUDSLEY, M. D., London, Physician to the West London Hospital, &c., &c. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1867. 8vo. pp. 442.

phenomena of life in the increasing specialty of human adaptation to external nature." The inductive method he defines to be "the systematic pursuance of the law of progress in organic development; it is the conscious intending of the mind to external realities, the submitting of the understanding to things, in other words, the increasing specialty of internal adjustment to external impressions, and the result is a victory by obedience, an individual increase through adaptation to outward relations in accordance with the so-called principle of natural selection." Some acquaintance with the principles of Mr. Spencer enable us to understand the author's meaning, but we must confess neither the principles nor the phraseology in which they are expressed seem to us any the less truly metaphysical than those of the writers and schools whom he criticises so severely. The only difference between his metaphysics and theirs is that neither Mr. Maudsley's metaphysics nor his method seem so well-founded as those which he so contemptuously denounces.

After disposing of the metaphysical method of studying the mind, he proceeds to criticise the psychological, or that method which finds its material in the introspection of consciousness. Against this he urges manifold objections. The most of these hold equally against the physiological method. The charge of substituting theory for facts, or of adopting theories that are transient, could scarcely be urged with special propriety by a writer who had in mind the assertion of one of the most acute of living German physiologists, that "the average length of life of the more recent physiological theories has been about four years." One only plausible point which he makes against psychology is that it recognizes or makes little account of those states which are unaccompanied by consciousness, as those of infancy before consciousness is developed, and those of later years which consciousness does not notice. This charge lies against many, but not all of the modern psychological treatises, but as might easily be shown is not necessarily applicable to the method which finds its most important materials and its decisive criteria in the conscious observation of mental operations.

For the psychological method he would substitute the physiological, as the only one that is legitimate or trustworthy. But in expounding it he avows and defends the baldest and the grossest materialism. The points which he endeavors to make and defend are the following: "Mind, viewed in its scientific sense as a

natural force, cannot be observed and handled and dealt with as a palpable object; like electricity or gravity, or any other of the natural forces, it is appreciable only in the changes of matter which are the conditions of its manifestation." What he means by this last clause is made more clear by the assertion that "in the performance of an idea, as in the performance of a movement, there is a retrograde metamorphosis of organic element; the display of energy is at the cost of the highly organized matter which undergoes degeneration," &c., &c. That the energy of the mind is attended by this organic waste we do not deny, but we must differ entirely from the author's assertion that *it is only appreciable* in changes of this sort. That he is not always consistent with his own assertion is evident from hundreds of passages in which he recognizes other changes than organic as the effects of mental activity. For example, on pages 15 and 16 he speaks of acts of consciousness which leave *residua* in "the mind or brain," which *residua* "may reappear in consciousness at some future time." That is, as he explains himself in the very next sentence, they lay "the foundations of modes of *thought, feeling, and action.*" These are still further described as ideas quickly or slowly remembered—contented, cheerful, melancholy, and raving moods, &c., &c. The book abounds with illustrations, not only of the activity of mind as made manifest in other than material affections, but of the counter activity of matter as producing effects that are purely mental, and that are *appreciable only* in consciousness.

The second point on which he insists is, that the term mind is purely a general term formed by abstraction, and that it is necessary to enquire what is the reality, whether in being, or action to which the term corresponds. In support of this view he borrows largely from the logic commonly received in the schools, and assents to the definition by Coleridge of the *essential idea* of a steam engine. To all this we certainly have no objection, for we believe in this logical method. But Mr. Maudsley refrains from the application which he ought to make of this preparatory work. He fails to proceed to show that the essential idea of the mind can be satisfactorily defined as a series of nerve cells, composing a series of ganglia.

A third point which he urges is that mental power is truly an organized result—*i. e.*, matured by insensible degrees in the course of life. In enforcing this truth, which, in the common psychology,

is a mere truism, he overlooks the fact that growth and maturity of powers do not, of course, imply a material substance as their only possible condition, but may be as true of a spiritual essence as of a material organization.

The weakness of the substratum on which the author's theory rests is unconsciously confessed when the author thus gathers up his inductive result from the considerations which he had urged. "Nevertheless, it must be distinctly laid down, that mental action is as surely dependent on the nervous structure as the function of the liver confessedly is on the hepatic structure; that is the fundamental principle upon which the fabric of a mental science must rest. * * We know right well from experiment, that the ganglionic nerve cells scattered through the tissues of organs, as, for example, through the walls of the intestines, or the structure of the heart, are centres of nervous force ministering to their organic action; *and we may fairly infer that the ganglionic cells of the brain, which are not similarly amenable to observation and experiment have a like function.*" In these words the author confesses that the conclusion is purely a matter of inference, but he forgets that if we allow the analogy the full force which he claims for it, it does not justify the conclusion to which he would make it lead. If he means by "like function," a function similar to those performed by the cells in the heart and intestines—*i. e.*, as defined by himself, some result "that ministers to their organic action," we do not at all object. But such a function is not mental. To discover what function may be worthy of an organ made up of so many cells as the brain is the business of the physiologist;—the physiologist of the body, however, but not of the mind. If he means by "like function", a function worthy of so big an organ as the brain; and concludes that because physiology has discovered none that is bodily, it may assume that this must be mental or spiritual, and yet is "like" a function of the liver or heart—we deny the inference altogether, and we say the alleged function is so unlike those of the bodily organs, as to require some other agent competent to perform it—*i. e.*, an agent that is spiritual and not material.

We have not adverted to assertions still more gross than those we have cited. The author is undoubtedly a clever practitioner and a well-bred physiologist, but his claims to scientific capacity, even in physiology proper, are very slender, if we may judge from the way in which he expounds the physiology of the mind. We are

quite willing that the cerebral should kill off the spiritual psychology if it can. We only desire that it should perform the process—*secundum artem*.

JOHN STUART MILL'S DISSERTATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS.*—The numerous disciples and readers of John Stuart Mill in this country have good reason to thank Mr. Spencer for publishing this beautiful series of his miscellaneous and smaller works. We distinguish between his disciples and readers, for there are many in this country, many more than in Great Britain, we believe, who read everything which he writes, and are very far from being his disciples. A publicist and metaphysician of great ability like him can instruct as profitably those who dissent from his doctrines, as those who accept them. We do not, therefore, express our adhesion to many of Mill's opinions in politics or philosophy when we recommend his writings as well worthy to be studied, nay, as necessary to be studied, by every thinking man. The fourth volume of this series, as it is the largest, is also the most valuable. It contains the memorable Inaugural Address delivered at St. Andrews, in February, 1867, which attracted so much attention, and disappointed so many of the devotees to the new ideas of university education. It contains also the scarcely less memorable paper "On the Contest in America," published in *Frazer's Magazine*, in February, 1862, which was so timely and so serviceable to our cause. It also contains another paper (December, 1859), in defense of the non-intervention policy of England in continental affairs. It contains also "Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform," and "Recent Writers on Reform," 1859, as well as a review of Austin "On Jurisprudence," 1863, which are all able discussions of topics to which all England is most sensitively alive. The articles on Bain's Psychology and on Grote's Plato are very elaborate philosophical papers, of the greatest significance and value.

HERBERT SPENCER'S PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY.†—The second volume of Spencer's Principles of Biology completes the work,

* *Dissertations and Discussions: Political, Philosophical, and Historical.* By JOHN STUART MILL. In four volumes. Vol. IV. Boston: William V. Spencer. 1867.

† *The Principles of Biology.* By HERBERT SPENCER. Vol. II. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 12mo. pp. 566.

and constitutes the third volume of his *System of Philosophy*, as republished by Appleton & Co. The last installment of this series was issued in London, in March, of the present year. The volume has the characteristics of the previous one, and abounds in numerous cuts for illustration. It inculcates the same system of evolution, and is liable to the same objections with his other works. It is, at the same time, rich in facts and information. The Appendix B. contains a criticism of Prof. Owen's theory of the vertebrate skeleton, and of course exhibits in contrast two systems of interpreting nature and life, which are fundamentally opposed—the teleological and evolutional—the theistic and antitheistic.

HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL.

HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR.*—In this work, of which the first volume only is as yet published, Prof. Draper presents, in another application, his theory of the irresistible influence of climate and other natural causes on the growth of national ideas and character. In the same manner as he found the "Intellectual Development of Europe" to have principally depended on the state of the weather, and demonstrated that the future "Civil Policy of America" is to be chiefly determined by consulting the barometer, he now reduces the origin of our civil war to a matter of climate and temperature.

"The springs of history are not, as was for a long time imagined, the machinations of statesmen or the ambition of kings. They are to be found in the silent influences of Nature. The philosopher will often detect the true causes of great political and social convulsions, of sectional hatreds and national attachments, in the shining of the sun and in the falling of rains." p. 27.

The reader is constantly reminded by the incessant repetition of this sentiment, how Mr. Bumble found the complete solution of Oliver Twist's eccentricities in meat, and how Mr. Squeers explained (in advance of Mr. Buckle's school of philosophy) a certain extraordinary outburst of feeling; "It's Natur', sir! all Natur'! Ah! Natur's a rum'un, is Natur'!"

The great advantage of this theory, as Professor Draper announces, is that it promotes the work of reconciliation between the two sections. "Estrangements subside when men mutually

* *History of the American Civil War.* By JOHN DRAPER, M. D., LL. D., &c. Vol. I. New York. Harper & Brothers. 1867.

inquire into the philosophical cause of each others' obliquities, when they comprehend that there overrides so many of their apparently voluntary actions, a necessary, an unavoidable constraint"—p. 37. It is certainly easy to smooth over past dissensions by laying the blame on the thermometer, but this view of its "irresistible influence" is unfortunately not calculated to allay our apprehensions for the future. How is "permanent reconstruction" to be effected with the usual averages of weather? Nor does the Professor ignore this view of the subject. He rather plumes himself on predicting with the cold-blooded complacency of scientific certainty the renewal of these sectional controversies, so long as spring and summer, seed-time and harvest shall return. "To scientific history," he says (p. 37), "foreknowledge is not impossible"

"The conditions that brought on this conflict exist in other directions, and will in due time exert their deleterious power. * * * Varied climate and opposing interests will tend to renew these contests hereafter. If this has been the issue between the North Atlantic and the Gulf States, what may not be expected from the rivalries of the dwellers in the Great Basin, those of the Pacific Slope, those of the Columbian Northwest—the Germany of America? The imperial republic shortly to be made manifest has a Persia, an India, a Palestine, and a Tartary of its own." (p. 29.) "The American Teuton of the Northwest, a republican and monogamist by nature, as is the corresponding man in Europe, will in future generations have controversies with the American Tartar of the Great Sandy Plains, and with the American theocrat and polygamist of the Great Basin."

Happily the Professor is able to discern some milder features in the prospect. The thermometer will not always be at blood and fever heat.

"The arts of Eastern life, the picturesque orientalism of Arabia, will be reproduced in our interior sandy desert, the love songs of Persia in the dells and glades of Sonora, and the religious aspirations of Palestine in the similar scenery of New Mexico." (p. 103.)

But there is one most alarming picture that baffles analysis, and defies even "scientific foreknowledge." Fortunately the field of vision is a distant one.

"The distribution of heat is comparatively symmetrical in the old settled states of the East, but it is very different in the West. In the valley of the Colorado the mean heat of summer rises to 90°; across the mountains on the coast it is only 60°. In places but an insignificant distance apart, there are the most violent contrasts. Thus, in the San Joaquin Valley the mean heat for June, 1852, at 8 P. M., was 108.40°, while at Monterey, on the Pacific, 150 miles distant, the corresponding mean heat was 68.2°, a difference of 45°. What must be the in-

evitable result in the Pacific region in the course of a few generations? Climate irresistibly modifies men; and here are the most extraordinary differences in very restricted areas. If climate impressions are at the bottom of the dreadful collision between the Southern and Northern sections of the Atlantic regions, through which we have so recently passed,—what is the future that must be prognosticated for the inhabitants of the Pacific, when such impressions must be much more abrupt and much more profound?" p. 54.

We will do Professor Draper the justice to say that, notwithstanding all allowances made for the base and irresistible influence of the thermometer, he does not conceal the fact that slavery and rebellion were enormous crimes—and in the closing pages of his book he depicts with a powerful hand, and in language of glowing eloquence, the terrible retribution that they have brought upon their promoters. Not the least interesting and valuable chapters of the book are those in which "The accusations of the South against the North," and their reasons for secession—accusations and reasons never put forth in any authentic or collected form by the seceders themselves—are fully stated from a Southern standpoint. In these chapters all the charges and complaints ever fulminated by Southern editors or authors against the North, its political action, its institutions, and its society, with all the reasons for secession that distinctly or remotely influenced the Southern mind, are powerfully grouped and stated; while in the succeeding chapter they are briefly and conclusively answered.

In a former number of the *New Englander* (Jan., 1866) in an Article on Dr. Draper's "Thoughts on the Future Civil Policy of America,"—our general views upon the Buckle philosophy, and Dr. Draper's applications of it, will be found, and they need not be here repeated. We have no disposition to depreciate the interest or importance of these "climate" theories. We freely admit that they have a certain truth and value, however extravagantly these may be overestimated by their modern disciples. Especially is it absurd to predict for the future of our country, through climatic influences merely, any such divergence of ideas as have prevailed in the past, when throughout the world, and on this continent especially, railroads, telegraphs, newspapers, inventive activity in every branch of science and art, an extraordinary intermingling of races, and a thousand other causes peculiar to the present age, are producing uniformity of civilization, philosophy, and manners, and even a universal interchange of language and literature, with a power that mocks at "isothermal lines" and with a rapidity which we find it difficult to realize.

Dr. Draper's elegant volume has much of this extravagance, yet replete as it is with his great ability and learning, and written in his well-known brilliant and rhetorical style, it forms a valuable contribution to the history and literature of the war, and will be widely read, and always with instruction and enjoyment.

THE SEVEN WEEKS' WAR.*—The conflict for hegemony in Germany was the real cause of the late war, which terminated in the splendid triumph of Prussian diplomacy and Prussian arms. In the Schleswig-Holstein affair, both of these powers proceeded in antagonism to the public sentiment of Germany. They took into their own hands a matter which belonged, according to the general judgment of the German people, to the Confederation, and they were enabled to do this in consequence of their military superiority. Austria fell back on the Confederation at last, simply to save the territory conquered from Denmark from being annexed by Prussia, and in taking this step violated the Convention of Gastein, wherein it was agreed by the two nations that the disposition of the Duchies should be settled by Austria and Prussia alone, without the aid of the rest of Germany. Where both powers were actuated by selfish considerations, it is difficult to determine which was the most aggrieved party. Many think that either Denmark or Germany had a better right to complain of both the allies than either of them had to complain of one another. But, as we have said, the real conflict was one of long standing, and the Schleswig-Holstein difficulty simply precipitated the decision of the question, whether the seat of power in Germany should be at Berlin or Vienna.

In the management of the Prussian cause, both in the Cabinet and in the field, it is conceded on all hands that the most consummate ability was displayed. The skill, the dispatch, and the energy shown in the negotiations immediately antecedent to the outbreak of hostilities, were carried into the prosecution of the war. One is naturally reminded of the first campaign of the great Frederic in Silesia. Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, and Saxony were overrun with the Prussian forces, before the reigning princes in

* *The Seven Weeks' War. Its Antecedents and its Incidents.* By H. M. HOZIER, F. C. S., F. G. S. (Based upon letters reprinted by permission from "The Times.") In two volumes. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. London: MacMillan & Co. 1867.

these States had time to take breath. The army of Hanover was cut off from coöperating with Austria, and the theatre of the contest was transferred to Austrian territory. The passage of the armies through the defiles of the Bohemian mountains and their subsequent junction, reflect the highest credit upon Prussian generalship, while the behavior of the troops in the field merits the highest admiration. The great and decisive battle of Königgrätz was won by a flank movement, which Benedek did not discover or anticipate. Mr. Hozier is moderate and reserved in his criticisms upon the conduct of the Austrian leader. He wisely judges that we are not in possession of all the facts which are requisite for framing a verdict upon his conduct in the momentous battle. These volumes, from the pen of the correspondent of the London Times, on the Prussian side, are a careful military history of the seven weeks' contest. The operations of the armies are described in detail, and careful attention is requisite in order to follow the author in his narratives. The understanding of the text is facilitated, however, by frequent maps illustrative of the battles and of the prior movements of the contending armies.

MEMOIRS OF PRINCE ALBERT.—The Queen's book is, on various accounts, a remarkable one. It is remarkable that a sovereign should open to the public a door of admission to the scenes of domestic love and of sorrow, which are here recorded. It is remarkable that it should be an English sovereign who breaks through this reserve habitual with kings and even with private persons, and invites a whole people to listen to the most sacred passages in the story of her life. The publication of this book is in singular contradiction to the views of propriety which are supposed to prevail in England more than in most countries. Here is a frank, unreserved history of the late husband of Victoria from his childhood up, including a record of the love, the engagement, and marriage of the Queen, and large disclosures respecting the particulars of their married life. In the composition of it, the Queen herself has taken an important part. Not only did the manuscript pass under her revision, but the work contains frequent paragraphs and memoranda from her own pen. It is plainly

* *The Early Years of His Royal Highness the Prince Consort.* Compiled under the direction of Her Majesty the Queen. By Lieut. Gen. the Hon. G. GARY. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1867. Portrait. 12mo. pp. 371.

the offspring of deep, affectionate feeling, which craves expression, and finds a kind of satisfaction in dwelling on the virtues of the lost husband and on the details of his character and career. Yet, unexpected as such a work is, such are the good taste and good feeling that pervade it, the sincerity of love and of sorrow that dictate its composition, and the intrinsic interest of its contents, that only the over fastidious will find fault with its publication. Occasionally, it is true, the tender feeling of a loving and sorrowful heart may have inspired a degree of communicativeness at which the reader wonders. For example, in connection with a quotation from an early letter of Prince Albert, in which he speaks of *we* as expressing "the harmony of different souls," and as therefore less "egotistical and cold" than *I*, Victoria says: "No one felt the truth and anguish of this more than the Queen after December 14, 1861,' and never can she speak of 'my children,' but always says 'our'" (p. 157). Again, speaking of the Prince's love for the songs of nightingales as heard in the woods at Osborne, Her Majesty adds: "The Queen cannot hear this note now without fancying she hears him, and without the deepest, saddest emotion" (p. 165). But every right-minded person who peruses this unique volume will feel a constant and constantly increasing sympathy and respect for the bereaved lady who has chosen thus to open her heart to the people. It is a beautiful picture of home affection and home life which she presents. It shows more impressively than sermon or homily could do, that the real sources of happiness, and thus the real dangers and exposures of life, are the same for kings as for mean men. It is not the luxuries of a palace, or the sweets of power, or the incense of praise, or the pageantry and often wearisome ceremonial of a court, that give real joy to the soul. But it is friendship, the sympathy and companionship of heart with heart, the retired converse and intercourse of the domestic circle, which make up the most precious part of the happiness of princes. And these unspeakable blessings which, if they have at all, they have in common with those who are born in inferior stations, they hold by the same precarious tenure as other mortals. Death may come and leave darkness in the household that was before peaceful and bright.

The character of Prince Albert was worthy of all respect. He was carefully educated, being instructed in a variety of knowledges which educated Englishmen generally think themselves at

liberty to neglect. All through his boyhood and youth we are struck with the regular, patient industry with which he addressed himself to his studies. He seems to have had, moreover, a growing sense of responsibility for the beneficent use of the opportunities which were given him by his birth, and which came to him in consequence of his marriage with the ruler of a great empire. He was a man of refined and elevated sentiments, of pure Christian principles, of excellent personal accomplishments, and warmly interested in plans for the improvement of all classes of the English people. The husband of a queen without being himself a king, he held a station of no common difficulty and embarrassment, especially in a country like England, which is tenacious of its independence and jealous of all intermeddling with its politics on the part of foreigners. He had to avoid two extremes. On the one hand, he was obliged to refrain, as far as practicable, from giving offense to English prejudices, and on the other, he must preserve his own dignity and the influence which rightfully belonged to him as a husband, and not allow himself to be reduced to a cipher. The narrative of his life is an ample testimonial to the success of his endeavors to act well his part.

The very fact of the appearance of this book is one among the many signs that "the divinity that doth hedge a king" is fast vanishing. All the world is coming to know that sovereigns are merely human beings, with all the personal anxieties, griefs, joys, weaknesses, and liabilities of other members of their race. It will thus do its part indirectly and insensibly in helping forward the more popular and democratic tendencies which are rife not only in this country, but in all European states, and which seem destined either to obliterate monarchical and aristocratic government, or leave it but the shadow of its former self. To most readers, however, this more remote influence of the work will pass unnoticed. It will be read as an authentic revelation of the habits of feeling and of life which exist in a sphere inaccessible to most observers. It will be read still more, as a touching narrative of experiences analogous to those through which other human hearts are led, and capable, therefore, of stirring the fountains of sympathy.

LIFE OF JOSIAH QUINCY.*—Josiah Quincy was the descendant of Edmund Quincy, who came to Boston in 1633, in company

* *Life of Josiah Quincy.* By his son Edmund Quincy. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1867. 8vo. pp. 560.

with the Rev. John Cotton. He was born in Boston on the 4th of February, 1772. His father, an eminent patriot, died when the son was yet a child, so that he owed his early training to an energetic mother. He prepared for college at Phillips' Academy, Andover, and graduated at Harvard in 1790. His father, in a paragraph of his will, had bequeathed to him the works of Sidney and of Locke, along with other works, adding to the list of titles, the fervent aspiration, "May the spirit of liberty rest upon him." His entire subsequent life was an impressive fulfillment of this parental wish. He entered Congress in 1805, and was a member of the House of Representatives until 1813, when he voluntarily returned to private life. An ardent Federalist, he entered into the political combat of that day with the warmest zeal, and such were the boldness and severity of his speeches and their high ability, that he drew on himself the intense wrath of the Republican leaders in the National Legislature. It is remarkable, considering the asperity of the political contests of that day and the temper both of Mr. Quincy and of Mr. John Quincy Adams, that the desertion of the Federal party by the latter and the support which he rendered to the embargo, never had the effect to interrupt their friendly relations or chill their mutual regard. After his withdrawal from Congress, Mr. Quincy had six years of comparative leisure. He was repeatedly chosen a member of the Massachusetts Legislature, and in 1822 became the Judge of the Municipal Court of Boston, which office he resigned the following year, in order to accept that of Mayor of the same city. In this station he rendered important service to his native city, exerting a powerful influence in behalf of order and of public improvement. In 1828 he was elected President of Harvard College. His copious history of this institution was produced during his official connection with it. From his resignation in 1845 until his death in 1864, his time was not idly spent, but was devoted to occupations suitable to a dignified old age and to exertions having for their end the promotion of the cause of liberty in the land.

We have given a very meagre outline of the leading events in the long and honorable career of Mr. Quincy. The biography of his son is filled up with interesting information closely relating to the subject of the memoir, and yet presenting incidentally a lively historic picture of the times through which he lived. In his earlier days he discerned the aggressive and mischievous spirit engendered by slavery, and foresaw the dangers that would ulti-

mately overtake the country from the predominant influence of the Slave Power. His prognostications, which were heard with incredulity at the time when they were uttered, were fully verified in the last years of his life. Among the many valuable services which this able and fearless citizen rendered to the country, his public, unwavering advocacy of the cause of freedom, is deserving of signal honor. The memoir before us is prepared throughout with excellent taste and judgment. It is a contribution to the history, especially to the political history, of the country; and this is only one of its many titles to a warm welcome from the lovers of good books.

GUILD'S HISTORY OF BROWN UNIVERSITY.*—The researches which Mr. Guild was called to make by way of preparation for writing the Memoir of Dr. Manning, the first President of Brown University, contributed to qualify him for the larger task which he has undertaken in the elegant volume before us. A less sumptuous typography would have made the work accessible to a larger number of the author's fellow-alumni, but would never have satisfied so dainty a bibliographer as the esteemed Librarian of Brown. Turning from the exterior form to the contents of his history, we find it to contain a clear and sufficiently full narrative of the general progress of the college from the beginning, embracing sketches of the successive Presidents; an account of the Library (which is one of the best for its age in the country); an account of the charter, the spirit of which is on the whole very judicious and catholic; a narrative of the benefactions received by the college; a description of the college buildings; together with various other chapters on special topics germane to the subject. One of the most interesting portions of the work is the full list of Commencement programmes, from the foundation of the Institution. In 1769, we find the following title: "The Americans, in their present circumstances, cannot, consistent with good policy, affect to become an Independent State; a Forensic Dispute." Thus we have glimpses of favorite themes of discussion among college students at different points along the century during which the college has existed. We are glad to see that due

* *History of Brown University, with Illustrative Documents.* By REUBEN ALDRIDGE GUILD, Librarian of the University, Author of "Life, Times, and Correspondence of James Manning," etc. Providence, R. I. 1867.

justice is done to the princely munificence of Nicholas Brown and his kinsmen and connections, to whom Brown University is so largely indebted for its endowment.

The President of Brown University must be, according to the charter, "of the denomination called Baptists, or Antipædo-baptists." There are two governing bodies, the Trustees and the Fellows, with "distinct, separate, and respective powers." The Trustees are thirty-six in number, of whom twenty-two must be Baptists, five Quakers, four Congregationalists, and five Episcopalians. The Fellows (including the President) are twelve, of whom eight must be of the Baptist denomination, and the rest may be chosen indifferently from any or all denominations. For all measures the joint concurrence of the separate boards is required, except for the conferring of degrees, which belongs exclusively to the Fellows. The initiative is given by the Fellows in the making of college laws, and in some other matters, but the concurrence of the Trustees is requisite to give validity to their action. "The places of Professors, Tutors, and all other officers, the President alone excepted, shall be free and open for all denominations of Protestants." No religious tests are to be allowed, save the requirement respecting the President. The ratio given to the several denominations in the government is supposed to represent their relative strength in Rhode Island at the time when the charter was framed.

Brown University has had a series of able men in the Presidential office. It has generally been managed by them in a liberal and generous spirit, as regards the various religious denominations whose representatives constitute the minority of the governing boards. This was true of the administration of President Wayland, whose services to the college, as well as to the church and the world, are soon to be set forth in a carefully prepared biography. The resignation of Dr. Sears has left the place of President for the time vacant; and the duties of the office are at present filled by Professor George I. Chace, a gentleman whose admirable qualifications as a college instructor and disciplinarian are well known to the graduates of Brown for the last thirty years.

Although Brown University is only a century old, there is some doubt about important circumstances attending its origin. There is the same sort of debate as that which takes place concerning the origin of Rome, or—to come down to later times—concerning the origin of Andover Seminary. In particular, the agency which

Dr. Stiles and his Congregationalist friends had in reference to the beginning of the college, is a controverted question. We have no doubt that the statements of Mr. Guild on this part of the history are candidly made, and from a full conviction of their truth; but we are equally certain that further researches will establish the fact that Dr. Stiles was not employed merely as a clerk to draft a charter, but that he and his friends were one party in consultations preliminary to the establishment of the institution. How it happened that a plan different from that which Dr. Stiles preferred was actually adopted, is a question into which we cannot here enter. It is true, as Mr. Guild states, that Dr. Manning proved to be the leading person in the organization of the college. He thought that Rhode Island was the suitable place for it, on account of the preponderance of his own denomination in that colony. In sailing up and down the broad bay of Narragansett, it has occurred to us that he may have been insensibly influenced by what led John the Baptist to Ænon, near Salem—"because there was much water there."

There is no need of commending Mr. Guild's entertaining and instructive work to the attention of all persons who are interested in American colleges.

EX-PRESIDENT MONROE ON GOVERNMENT.*—President Monroe is generally thought of as belonging to that class of great men, who have greatness "thrust upon them." He was a favorite of Jefferson, and promoted by him, and becoming Madison's Secretary of State, the way was paved for his advancement to the presidency, in the "era of good feeling" which preceded a new organization of political parties. How few even of our professed politicians have ever perused Monroe's book in defense of his conduct as ambassador to France, or Washington's sharp strictures upon the statements contained in it! It may be that the popular judgment underestimates the talents of Monroe; but the present work will scarcely add to his reputation. It is a dry comparison of our system of government with the systems of the ancient

* *The People the Sovereign*; being a Comparison of the Government of the United States with those of the Republics which have existed before, with the Causes of their Decadence and Fall. By JAMES MONROE, Ex-President of the United States, &c. Edited by SAMUEL L. GOUVERNEUR, his grandson and administrator. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1867.

states,—Athens, Lacedemon, Carthage. It is composed, of course, without the advantage of the light which more recent investigations in ancient history throw upon the subject. The views advanced are not characterized by peculiar originality or force. We extract a brief passage, a favorable specimen of the author's style:—

"Our system is two-fold, State and National. Each is independent of the other, and sovereign to the extent, and within the limit of specified powers. The preservation of each is necessary to that of the other. Two dangers menace it; disunion and consolidation. Either would be ruinous. It was by our union that we achieved our Independence and liberties, and by it alone can they be maintained. It must, therefore, be preserved. Consolidation would lead to monarchy and to despotism, which would be equally fatal. That danger must be averted. Both governments rest on the same basis, the sovereignty of the people." (p. 22.)

BELLES LETTRES.

DR. HOLLAND'S NEW POEM.*—This poem is a metrical tale, or novel in verse, somewhat like Mrs. Browning's "*Aurora Leigh*," or Tennyson's "*Princess*," in the attempt of the author to unite in one the characteristics of a novel with the higher qualities of poetry. The writer, who makes this attempt, complicates his task and increases the hazard of failure; for his work must be successful as a tale, and also as a poem; and the tale and the poem must naturally and gracefully blend together. That the author has the soul of a true poet as well as his "gift of numerous verse," no candid or generous critic can deny. There are passages in *Kathrina* which bespeak the highest gifts of inspiration, fired by genuine pathos and the rhythm of which should satisfy a very fastidious ear. These passages are not few, and they are but the promise of higher achievements than any which the author has yet attained. We cannot, however, praise the work as a story, or a tale. The theme is noble, and the author's conceptions of it are as fervent as could be desired. There is no defect of feeling or spirit in him. He writes from the heart and expresses no more than he thinks or feels. But the machinery of the story is scarcely up to the requisities of his theme. The tale is too obviously manufactured for the moral. The incidents are too artificially contrived and awkwardly connected with one another. There is

* *Kathrina: Her Life and Mine*. In a Poem. By J. G. HOLLAND, Author of *Bitter Sweet*. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1867.

too great literalness in the possible facts, and too much awkwardness and unnaturalness in the extraordinary positions of the narrative, as well as too great strain and violence in the expressions of the emotions of the hero. The blasphemous skepticism of Paul is scarcely made to justify itself to the mind of the reader. It rises into an excitement, which is too high for the occasion, and goes off into incoherent utterances to which the responsive sympathies of the looker-on are not readily aroused. His recovery to himself and to God are not sufficiently psychological to satisfy our curiosity or to leave a distinct and glowing impression. However sudden and complete such a conversion might be, and however truthful it may be to assume it to occur at the death-bed of a wife like Kathrina, it is not justified to our thoughts by the exhibition of the processes which led to it. Poetical justice or poetic truth requires that the varied and gradual workings of all these events on the inner life of the subject of them should be depicted at length, till they culminate at last in his complete moral recovery. This leads us to observe that for a poem or tale which has to do preëminently with the affections and the religious feelings, Kathrina is far too objective. Its pictures of the outer world are graphic—but delineations of feeling are scarcely attempted. Hence it is hard, objective, and emotionless, when it ought to be tender, subjective, and emotional.

Dr. Holland has one very great merit for which we cannot commend him too highly. He is a thorough New Englander in his themes and associations. He is content with the scenes with which he has himself been conversant, and the life with which he has sympathized. He has persisted in the purpose to turn this material into higher poetry. That this material is capable of such application, such a Poem as Whittier's "Snow-bound" furnishes decisive evidence. But still it remains true that the New England scenery and the New England life are not as readily glorified and gilded by the imagination as the scenery and life of other countries. The Trosachs and a Covenanter's communion season are more readily translated into poetry than Mount Holyoke and a Puritan prayer meeting in Hadley. That Dr. Holland has not fully succeeded is, however, no reason why his partial success is not eminently commendable, nor why he should not try again. Let him study more of the "grand style" which Matthew Arnold conceives so essential to poetry, and which is the same thing as the ideally elevated and refined. Let him in seeking the grand avoid the stilted and the grandiose. In rendering the simple and the

sweet let him avoid the rude and coarse both in language and association, and he will attain the noble aim which he has obviously proposed to himself—to become the faithful exponent of the homely life as well as of the Christian faith of rustic New England.

That he seeks to represent the latter will of course expose him to a severe criticism of his weaker points in some quarters. It would not be surprising if certain writers, who find it convenient to shelter their Pagan faith and their Pagan venom under the convenient name of liberal Christianity, should be unjust to the real excellencies of this poem, because it represents what they sometimes patronizingly call Christian or Calvinistic ideas. The intolerance of such a spirit is manifest by the fact, that these very critics sometimes find poetry when there is only pantheism, provided it be put forth as poetry by one whom they are taught to admire as theologian, philosopher, and sage.

STORY OF DOOM, AND OTHER POEMS.*—We prefer the "other poems" decidedly to "the Story of Doom," which we have tried to think interesting, but could not succeed; not that it is without many points of striking excellence, but it is hard to fulfill so bold an effort as the writer proposed in writing a poem of the world before the flood. Of the other long poems, "Laurance" seems exquisite in feeling and words, and "Gladys and her Island" is admirable in its moral, though forced in its conception and execution. The shorter poems are like Jean Ingelow, somewhat farfetched and bizarre, and abounding in the choicest and tenderest passages.

PROFESSOR CONINGTON'S *ÆNEID*.†—We have read Professor Conington's *Æneid* through from beginning to end with no little pleasure; and we think the Roman poet has reason to thank his translator for this new introduction to the ever growing multitudes who speak English. Perhaps he might even thank him for having adopted a livelier measure than his own, or than that of his earlier translators; for many a reader, we believe, will be beguiled to

* *A Story of Doom and other Poems.* By JEAN INGELOW. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1866.

† *The Æneid of Virgil.* Translated into English verse by JOHN CONINGTON, M. A., Corpus Professor of Latin in the University of Oxford. New York: W. J. Widdleton, Publisher. 1867.

read on and on in this sprightly octosyllabic verse, charmingly varied as it often is by the introduction of the verse of six syllables, who might tire of the statelier style of Dryden.

Nor is this quicker and more inspiring measure ill-suited to the substance of the poem itself; for, although it is an epic, it abounds in passages to which even the dignified Latin tongue, thrown into dactylic hexameters, is better fitted than the long iambic verses in which Virgil has usually been presented to us in English.

It is to be observed also that Professor Conington has not been led by his familiarity with the language of Virgil to slight the power of his mother tongue. His diction is strikingly idiomatic,—so entirely so that one can hardly believe that he translated from the open book, but rather that he possessed himself completely of the poem with all its imagery, and then reproduced it by a kind of independent activity of his own mind.

To illustrate these several points, we cite a passage from the death of Nisus and Euryalus, first in the original, and then from the versions of Dryden, Pitt, and Conington, successively, as follows:—

Talia dicta dabat: sed viribus ensis adactus
 Transabit costas, et candida pectora rumpit.
 Volvitur Euryalus leto, pulchroque per artus
 It cruor, inque humeros cervix collapsa recumbit:
 Purpureus veluti cum floa, succisus aratro,
 Languescit moriens; lassove papavera collo
 Demisere caput. pluvia quum forte gravantur.
 At Nisus ruit in medias, solumque per omnes
 Volscientem petit; in solo Volsciente moratur.
 Quem, circum glomerati, hostes hinc cominus atque hinc,
 Proturbant. Instat non secius, ac rotat ensem
 Fulmineum; donec Rutuli clamantis in ore
 Condidit adverso, et moriens animam abetulit hosti.
 Tum super exanimum sese projecit amicum
 Confossus, placidaque ibi demum morte quievit.

“ In vain he spoke, for ah! the sword, address
 With ruthless rage, had pierced his lovely breast:
 With blood his snowy limbs are purpled o’er,
 And, pale in death, he welters in his gore.
 As a gay flower with blooming beauties crowned,
 Cut by the share, lies languid on the ground;
 Or some tall poppy, that o’er-charged with rain
 Bends the faint head and sinks upon the plain;
 So fair, so languishingly sweet he lies,
 His head declined and drooping as he dies.

Now 'midst the foe distracted Nisus flew;
 Volscens and him alone he keeps in view.
 The gathering train the furious youth surround;
 All, all unfelt; he seeks their guilty lord;
 In fiery circles flies his thundering sword;
 Nor ceased, but found at length the destined way;
 And buried in his mouth the falchion lay.
 Thus covered o'er with wounds on every side
 Brave Nisus slew the murderer as he died;
 Then on the dear Euryalus his breast,
 Sunk down and slumbered in eternal rest."

"Too late he speaks, the sword, which fury guides,
 Driven with full force, had pierced his tender sides.
 Down fell the beauteous youth; the yawning wound
 Gushed out a purple stream, and stained the ground.
 His snowy neck reclines upon his breast;
 Like a fair flower by the keen share oppress'd:
 Like a white poppy sinking on the plain,
 Whose heavy head is overcharged with rain.
 Despair and rage and vengeance justly vowed,
 Drove Nisus headlong on the hostile crowd:
 Volscens he seeks: on him alone he bends;
 Borne back and bored by his surrounding friends,
 Onward he pressed, and kept him still in sight,
 Then whirled aloft his sword with all his might:
 The unerring steel descended while he spoke,
 Pierced his wide mouth and through his weazen broke:
 Dying he slew, and staggering on the plain,
 With swimming eyes he sought his lover slain:
 Then quiet on his bleeding bosom fell
 Content in death to be revenged so well."

"In vain he spoke: the sword fierce driven,
 That alabaster breast had riven.
 Down falls Euryalus, and lies
 In death's enthralling agonies:
 Blood trickles o'er his limbs of snow;
 'His head sinks gradually low:'
 Thus severed by the ruthless plough,
 Dim fades a purple flower:
 Their weary necks so poppies bow,
 O'erladen by the shower.
 But Nisus on the midmost flies,
 With Volscens, Volscens in his eyes;
 In clouds the warriors round him rise,
 Thick hailing blow on blow:
 Yet on he bears, no stint, no stay;

Like thunderbolt his falchion's sway:
Till as for aid the Rutule shrieks
Plunged in his throat the weapon reaks:
The dying hand has reft away
The life-blood of its foe.
Then, pierced to death, asleep he fell
On the dead breast he loved so well."

MISS MUHLBACH'S NOVELS.—We shall not take the trouble to quote the titles of this infinite series of books. To judge from the volumes which we have examined, they are a heap of rubbish. They are of a high sensational order,—worthy in this respect of the classic pen of Sylvanus Cobb, Jr. As romances they are silly and melodramatic to the last degree. Regarded as histories, they are, to a great extent, dismal fabrications. Henry VIII and Frederic the Great, whatever their sins, were neither of them the completely absurd personages which they are figured to be on the pages of these "historical romances." And yet these ridiculous stories, in which so many love-sighs, so many awful frowns, and a given number of ecstatic kisses, are mixed together in a sort of hash, seem to be widely read even among people who cannot be charged with a want of cultivation. Is the public taste declining? Are really good novels so impossible to be procured, that hungry readers are obliged to feed on husks? It is a pity that the book market is not supplied with something better in the way of light reading than these ineffably stupid, fantastic, interminable books, in which the passion is torn to tatters, and historical personages exhibited in caricature.

THE SAYINGS OF DR. BUSHWACKER.*—The "Sparrowgrass Papers" make one of the most genuinely humorous books which our literature has produced. The experiences of farming and rural life which they contain are as laughter-moving as anything in Dickens. The present volume falls far short of its predecessor, and is, on the whole, rather melancholy mirth. Here and there we meet with a brighter scintillation. "Up the Rhine" is such a passage. From this conversation of an inquisitive English traveler with the author, on a steamboat on the Rhine, we copy the following:—

* *The Sayings of Dr. Bushwacker, and other Learned Men.* By FREDERIC S. COZZENS, author of "Sparrowgrass Papers," etc., et al. New York: A. Simpson & Co. 1867.

"Going to Switzerland?"

"Yea."

"Y' got *Moy* for Switzerland?"

"Moy? I beg your pardon."

"Yea, Moy—Moy; got Moy for Switzerland?"

"Moy—do you mean money? I hope so."

"Ged Gad, sir, no! I say Moy."

"Upon my word, *I do not* comprehend you."

"Moy, sir, Moy!" rapping vehemently on the red cover of my guide book that lay upon the table. "I say Moy for Switzerland."

"Oh, you mean *Murray*."

"Certainly, sir, didn't I say Moy?"

MISCELLANEOUS.

"THE ART OF COMPOSITION"* AND THE "ART OF DISCOURSE."†—No art is more difficult to teach than the art of Composition. Any person who has attempted to teach it must be aware how much easier it is to compose than to teach others to compose. He must have discovered how utterly useless any system of rhetoric is to one who has no ideas; and how very hard it is to make any system of rhetoric serviceable to one whose habits of writing are already formed. The difficulty has been caused in no small part by the fact, that in most treatises upon rhetoric very little attention has been paid to that most important branch of the subject—the invention of thought. We have been overwhelmed with rules and examples relating to style, but how to produce thought—in what way we may systematically investigate a subject, this, so copiously treated of by the ancient rhetoricians, has been almost entirely neglected by the moderns, apparently because the ancient system was not adapted to modern times, and no new system could be easily created. As a result, while general culture has been relied on very properly to produce thought, rhetorical training has consisted mainly of instruction in writing as a science not as an art, in methods of analysis rather than of synthesis, and in a system of cautions against faults, rather than directions for the attainment of positive excellence.

In the "Art of Composition" before us, Professor Day has attempted to remedy the defects of previous treatises. Recognizing the thought as the essential thing, he aims to develop the

* *The Art of Composition*. By HENRY N. DAY. New York: C. Scribner & Co. 1867.

† *The Art of Discourse*. By HENRY N. DAY. New York: C. Scribner & Co. 1867.

whole art of composition and the whole science of grammar from the thought. Recognizing rhetoric as founded not alone on logic, but on grammar, he analyzes thought, carefully separating that which we think and that of which we think from the thinking itself, thus relieving the logical predicate of that obscurity which has generally attended the modifiers, and which has been such a fruitful cause of inaccurate writing. Recognizing the importance of method in learning the art of composition, he begins at the simplest elements of grammar; classifies nouns, both Concretes and Abstracts—the latter expressing the Attributes of the former, namely, Qualities, Actions, Conditions, and Relations;—explains Phrases and Clauses—the Elements of the Sentence, the modifications of the Subject, of the Copula, of the Predicate, Abnormal Forms, the different kinds of sentences, the laws of Construction, Analysis, and the method of Explanation, embracing Definition, Narration, Description, Enumeration and Disposition, Division and Partition. Each point is fully illustrated, and exercises both oral and written are added. The whole is followed by a very interesting chapter on Symbolism in thought. We are very certain that no scholar of fair attainments can faithfully study this work without attaining to proficiency in the Art of Composition; and that teachers who use this work will find composition-writing no longer regarded by their pupils as a mere drudgery.

In the “Art of Discourse” we have a reconstruction of the author’s Elements of the Art of Rhetoric previously published. The new work is a great improvement on the old. The leading feature is the prominence given to the subject of Invention, although the chapters on style are admirable for their method and clearness. Under the head of Invention we have a statement of the objects of all discourse, Explanation, Confirmation, Excitation, and Persuasion; the various processes by which these objects may be accomplished, with the nature, theme, and laws of each. Under the guidance of such a system the student is no longer forced to work in the dark. He has a single theme, and a single purpose. If his object is to explain he knows the methods of explanation, and which is most appropriate to his theme. If his object is Persuasion he is not left to mingle explanation, and argument, and appeals in indiscriminate confusion, but he knows that knowledge must come first, conviction by argument next, and that only then can the feelings be reached so as to produce permanent results in action. And in every department he is directed as to the way in

which, and, so to speak, the place where he shall search for thought. He is not left to describe an object as a whole by vague generalities, but is taught to look at it in its parts, its relations, its attributes, to examine it as it is, to compare and contrast it with others. Training under such a system cannot fail to produce method in thought, and to open to the hitherto unprolific student avenues to thought of which he has had no conception.

We are aware that many are disposed to decry all such systems of rules as either absurd or tending to stiffness and formality in writing. But we confess that we have never got over the weakness of believing that a knowledge of the rules of English Grammar is serviceable to a writer, even though he rarely thinks of a rule as he constructs a sentence. And in like manner, while the skillful writer will seldom recur to rhetorical rules as he composes, we believe such rules to be of the utmost value to the learner, without which he will be a loose and immethodical thinker and writer. In this belief we cannot but express the hope that these works of Professor Day may come into general use in our schools and colleges.

SCHELE DE VERE'S STUDIES IN ENGLISH.*—This new work by Prof. Schele de Vere contains many curious and striking facts in relation to a theme which is attracting more and more of public interest and attention. It is written in a pleasing style, and will be read with enjoyment by many persons, especially by those who bring to it but little previous acquaintance with the subject. Readers of sound philological training will find in it a good deal which must be trying to their sensibilities. It is not the absence of scientific form to which we refer: no one would think of *that* as a defect to be complained of in a book designed for general circulation. But even in a popular work we justly demand precision of thought and accuracy of statement. To see how far the book before us may be regarded as satisfying this demand, we turn, almost at random, to page 28. Here we read that "in England it (the Latin) never superseded the old Gaelic." Very true: "the old Gaelic" was never spoken in England, and of course could not be superseded there. But, doubtless, our author meant to speak

* *Studies in English; or, Glimpses of the Inner Life of our Language.* By M. SCHELE DE VERE, LL. D., Professor of Modern Languages in the University of Virginia. London: Trübner and Company, 60 Paternoster Row. 1867. 8vo. pp. 365.

of dialects which were actually used in England under the Romans and were never superseded by the Latin; and these, it is well known, belonged to the *Cymric*, not the *Gaelic* division of the Celtic family. In accounting for this persistence of the earlier speech of Britain against the Latin, he says: "It must not be forgotten that while might and valor were on the side of the Romans, civilization and intelligence were with the Britons." We are so little accustomed to think of the Britons of that period as equal or superior to their Roman conquerors in civilization and intelligence, that we look with curiosity for some supporting arguments or allegations. The next sentence runs thus: "The *Irish* Celts were not only superior to all others of this race, but actually sent out teachers and missionaries to the adjoining countries." This is disappointing; for it was the *Britons* whose civilization and intelligence had been invoked to explain the preservation of their language. It is just conceivable, however, that if, *during the Roman occupation of Britain*, the Irish Celts had a highly advanced culture, this circumstance may in some way have helped the British Celts to maintain their language against the encroachments of the Latin. What then was the date of that Irish culture? The next sentence reads: "In the beginning of the fifth century, Christianity was already prevailing among them all, and had brought with it classic refinement and culture." Now, it was about the beginning of the fifth century that the Romans withdrew from Britain: they were no longer established there, when St. Patrick introduced Christianity, and "with it refinement and culture," into the before barbarous Ireland. With these facts in mind, the reader will find some difficulty in understanding our author's "therefore" in the next sentence: "Little Latin, *therefore*, in our English can be traced directly to this first invasion" [that of Britain by the Romans]. How could the failure of the invading Romans to establish their language in England be affected by a civilization of the Irish Celts, which did not begin till after England had been evacuated by the Romans?

Opening again, at page 57, we find it stated that the Normans, "at the time of the Conquest," introduced into English "the modern *k*, for which, before that time, *c* was used;" but "at the same time we lost *ch* and *h* as gutturals, pronounced in the manner in which they now form so striking a feature of German." But we could not have lost the digraph *ch* at the Norman Conquest, for "we" (*i. e.*, the Anglo-Saxons) did not have it before. And as

for the simple *h*, it has the same pronunciation in German as in English. "The combinations *sh* and *ch* were, on the other hand, introduced with their French sounds, for they were as unknown to Saxon as they are still to German." The French sound for the combination *sh*, which the French do not use, it might be hard to determine. The French sound of the combination *ch* is well known, but the example—*child*, for Anglo-Saxon *cild*—given by our author does not correspond to it. "And thus," he says, "*sal* became *shall*:" as if, before the Normans came, the word had been *sal*; though, in fact, the Anglo-Saxon form was *seal* (compare Gothic *skal*, Old High German *scal*), which originally, no doubt, began with the sound of *sk*, but had perhaps acquired, even before the Conquest, its now established pronunciation.

It is unnecessary to multiply examples of a looseness in thought and statement which unfortunately runs through the volume, and detracts very seriously from its value. A more excusable fault is the author's tendency to magnify his subject by excessive and indiscriminate laudation of the English language. That any one language should combine in itself all possible excellencies is scarcely conceivable; and it is quite certain that the English is no such paragon. The claims of superiority often put forward in its behalf are the product of a conceit which no scholar should encourage. It is well for every man who has to speak and write English that he should have a just appreciation of the instrument he uses, that he should know it in its strength and its weakness, its advantages and its imperfections. Undue praise, indeed, defeats itself. We mistrust the eulogiums of a writer who does not fairly acknowledge the defects of his subject. And we believe that our language has enough of positive merit not to require the concealment or understatement of its defects—its harsh combinations of consonant sounds, its excessive sibilation, the baldness of its frequent monosyllables, its limited capacity for making new words, the heterogeneousness of its borrowed and scarcely assimilated materials, the looseness of its syntactical structure, its liability to grammatical indistinctness and ambiguity. Least of all is it worth while to treat defects as if they were absolute merits, as our author treats the almost complete loss in English of the old system of inflection and formation. To maintain that inflections and formative endings are a useless encumbrance, and that a language is better without them, reminds us too strongly of the arguments by which the

Fox in the Fable sought to persuade his fellows to part with an appendage of which his own unhappy fate had deprived him.

Having thus criticised with freedom, though with regret, what we regard as the faults of this work, it gives us pleasure to acknowledge, in conclusion, the candid and liberal spirit in which it is written, and its author's evident desire to extend and promote the philological study of English.

WHITNEY'S LANGUAGE AND THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE.*—The object of Prof. Whitney in this work is not only to set forth the fundamental facts and principles of linguistic science, but to do this in a *popular* manner. He addresses himself, not alone to special students of philology, but to the great body of educated and intelligent people. He does not avoid the deeper questions connected with his subject, but he discusses them with a fulness of statement and an abundance of illustration which will make it easy for all attentive readers to follow and to understand him. Nor does he confine himself to certain portions of his subject, selected as more interesting to his own mind, or as better fitted for brilliant and attractive exhibition. With real and consistent method, though with little formality of division and subdivision, he takes up, point by point, all that comes fairly within the scope of his plan, so that the careful student may derive from the book a systematic and symmetrical view of the whole subject.

In his first lecture he propounds the question, "why we speak as we do;" which seems a very simple query, but is shown to involve in its complete answer the whole theory of language. It suggests immediately the facts that every language is a tradition, handed down by teaching and learning from one generation to another; that every language varies with different localities, classes of persons, and even individuals that speak it; that every language contains much more than is found in the use of any one person; that it is really the aggregate of many vocabularies belonging to different persons and classes of persons, all these vocabularies having enough of common material to serve the purposes of general communication:—still further, that every language is

* *Language and the Study of Language: Twelve Lectures on the Principles of Linguistic Science.* By WILLIAM DWIGHT WHITNEY, Professor of Sanskrit and Instructor in Modern Languages in Yale College. New York: Charles Scribner & Company. Crown 8vo. pp. xi, 489.

subject to incessant change, in its sounds, its words, its meanings, and even its grammatical structure.

In his second lecture he gives prominence to the fact that all the phenomena of language are the products of human action—of voluntary action under the influence of motives, though usually without the conscious purpose of making or changing language—of individual action, though requiring the concurrence of a community to give them fixity and permanence; and on this ground, while admitting and explaining the analogies between language and physical organisms, he argues with convincing force against the theorists who would place language among the physical sciences, the sciences of material nature and necessitated phenomena; and shows that its proper place is among those which deal with man's spiritual being and its manifestations in time; that is, among the moral and historical sciences. He then traces, in a singularly clear and interesting manner, the production of inflective and derivative forms by the composition of words originally independent; and shows how these complex words, when once produced, are treated as simple expressions of the ideas for which they stand, without consciousness of or regard for their composite origin.

While pointing out, in lecture third, the operation and effects of phonetic change, he is led to notice the extremely complex character of articulate utterance: this he illustrates by a full description of the different positions and actions of lips, tongue, and throat, required for the enunciation of the English word *friendly*—a description which leaves us amazed at ourselves that we ever learned to enunciate the word at all. Scarcely less curious are the examples given to show the immense variety of meanings which, by one association and another, develop themselves from a single root-word: we instance particularly the English derivatives which come from the Latin *pono*. It is observed, however, that the etymology of words, though highly interesting and valuable as a branch of knowledge, is of little consequence as regards the practical purposes of speech, a language being often used with the greatest propriety and power by those who know least of its etymological sources and relations.

Lecture fourth exhibits the modes of linguistic growth. This, in English, is effected to a great extent by importations from abroad; in German, by new combinations of its old material. As to the reason of the difference, we find the striking remark, that it

is wholly subjective, consisting in our own habits and preferences. We speak of compound words, like those so freely used in German, as being unsuited to our language, as contrary to its genius or its laws, its idiom or its analogy; but the real fact which lies at the bottom of these expressions is, that as a people we have not accustomed ourselves to such words or learned to like them.

The causes which affect the growth of dialects are fully illustrated from the history of the German and the Latin languages, as also from the successive conditions of our own language in England and America. Prof. Whitney, in his fifth lecture, combats the view, which, strangely enough, has the sanction of some eminent names, that the primary condition of language is that of extreme dialectic subdivision, and that the progress of speech is from diversity toward uniformity; so that, for example, the idea of a single Germanic mother-tongue, as the source of all existing Germanic idioms, would be an illusion, the Germanic having never at any time shown less diversity of dialects than at the present. He makes it evident that dialectic differences, viewed in detail, and, therefore, also in their entirety, point back to an original unity of speech; and that the same conclusion is unavoidable, if we believe (as everybody does) that the population of the earth, starting from one point, or from a limited number of points, spread itself out with the natural increase of the primitive communities. He shows how, by a comparison of our own language and those which most nearly resemble it, we are led to recognize three groups of dialects, Low-German, High-German, and Scandinavian, all belonging to one Germanic class, descended from one primitive Germanic language; how by similar comparisons we discover other classes of related tongues, Romanic, Celtic, Slavonic and Lithuanic, Greek, Persian, and Indian; and how by a further induction, proceeding on the same principles, we trace these to a primitive Indo-European language, the common parent of them all. The home of this original Indo-European, he regards as wholly uncertain; he shows that the common opinion which places it in the Iranian plateau, near the Hindu-Koh mountains, has no substantial basis in history, or tradition, or the evidence of language. The mutual relations of the different main branches, the order in which they broke off from the common stock, or from early divisions of that stock, he considers as being, to a great extent, unknown and undiscoverable. But, on the other hand, the character of the primitive Indo-European people, prior to the sep-

aration, their modes of life, social and civil state, knowledge, art, and religion—these are not wholly unknown; some interesting details of them are given, as inferred from the words which can be shown with more or less certainty, to have formed parts of their language.

The sixth lecture takes up the branches of the Indo-European family in a brief review, which aims especially to point out the period and character of the earliest monuments by which they are known to us. The seventh gives the reasons for believing that the primitive Indo-European tongue, polysyllabic as it was and highly inflected, was developed from a language of monosyllabic root-words, something like the Chinese; these root-words being of two kinds, the pronominal on the one hand, and those expressive of action and quality on the other. The next two lectures describe, naturally with much less fulness, the other groups of related languages, as made out thus far, with certainty or with various degrees of probability, by philological research. The first and most interesting is the Semitic (including Hebrew, Arabic, etc.), which in many respects approaches nearest to the Indo-European, but is separated from it by the extraordinary feature of its trilit-eral, or rather triconsonantal, roots—a feature which, implying, as it does, a complete working over of the earlier radical elements, seems to render almost hopeless the attempt to make out a radical identity between Semitic and Indo-European. In Northern Eu-rop and Asia, Prof. Whitney recognizes a “Scythian” family, characterized by some remarkable peculiarities of structure, and consisting of five branches, the Ugrian (or Finno-Hungarian), the Samoyed, the Turkish, the Mongolian, and the Tungusic; but he does this with the understanding that it is to be taken as a pre-sumptive or provisional classification, and that the evidence ob-tained for a genetic relationship extending through all the five branches is not yet such as to command conviction. As for the remoter families—the Japanese and its kindred in northeastern Asia, the Dravidian or Tamulian in southern India—which some inquirers would connect with the Scythian, he is still less inclined to admit that any sufficient proof has been given for such a con-nection. The ancient Egyptian, with its later, but long extinct, descendant, the Coptic, was supposed by Bunsen to have affinities at once with the Indo-European and the Semitic, so as to form a connecting link between the two families; but Prof. Whitney con-

siders its affinity with the Semitic as by no means established, and still less its affinity with the Indo-European.

The tenth lecture criticises various schemes for classifying languages not by descent, but according to their structure; especially the schemes of Max Müller and of Schleicher. The remarks on the threefold division into monosyllabic, agglutinative, and inflective—or, as Müller calls them, family languages, nomadic languages, and state languages—are exceedingly acute and instructive. Returning to the genetic classification, Prof. Whitney raises the question as to the comparative value of linguistic and of physical evidence of race. He holds that, as a general rule, connection of language implies connection of race; and that cases of a contrary kind—as those occasioned by the conquests of the Romans and the Arabs, who imposed their own languages upon alien races subject to their power—are of an isolated and exceptional character. And if the indications of language are liable to such exceptions, the same is true of the indications afforded by physical characteristics, as we see, for instance, in the physical differences between the Magyars of Hungary and their Uralian kindred, or between the Osmanli Turks and the wild tribes of Turkestan. While, therefore, the testimony of language and of physical science in regard to race is alike subject to uncertainty, the former has decided advantages in its fulness, its clearness, and its minuteness of distinction. As to the original unity of the species, or rather as to the bearings of linguistic science on this much-vexed question, Prof. Whitney comes to a conclusion which some may regard as disappointing, though all must admit the force and fairness of his argument. He holds that language furnishes no clear evidence on the subject, either one way or the other. The difference between widely separated languages, as Chinese and Sanskrit, is such that by philological reasoning we cannot prove or hope to prove an original connection between them; points of agreement we could doubtless discover, but not more than might be supposed to arise by pure accident between languages wholly unrelated. Yet, on the other hand, no amount of difference between two languages, taken by itself, is irreconcilable with the supposition that they were originally connected; for we can set no limit to the effects which the causes of linguistic diversity may produce, when operating under circumstances favorable to their action through indefinite periods of time.

The subject of the eleventh lecture is the difficult and disputed

problem of the origin of language. Prof. Whitney holds that language, in its inception, as in its whole subsequent history, was the product of human agency; that it was divine, only in the sense that man was divinely endowed with the powers required for its production. The sufficient motive to the exercise of these powers he finds in the social instinct: man, as a solitary being, would never have invented language; but man, among his fellows, would feel the impulse to hold communication with them, and would be driven to devise the necessary means for this purpose. Language is not thought, as some have supposed; nor is it, as others have supposed, the absolutely necessary instrument of thought: it is only the most convenient and effective means for conveying thought from one mind to another. But how could men, thrown together without any language as yet formed, make the first beginnings? how could they first fix upon particular sounds as the signs of particular ideas? Was it through an imitation of natural sounds, the inarticulate voices of animate and inanimate nature? Was it through the cries which in human beings are the spontaneous, untaught expression of joy, pain, anger, and other intense emotions? Was primitive language *onomatopoetic*, or was it *interjectional*? Prof. Müller, who stigmatizes these solutions as the *bow-wow* theory and the *pooh-pooh* theory, proposes a solution of his own, which others have named the *ding-dong* theory. His view, that the primitive man, when an idea struck his mind, would, by a spontaneous impulse, give out an articulate sound, as the bell rings when struck by the clapper, Prof. Whitney regards as without reason or even plausibility. He considers the onomatopoetic principle as the probable source of most of the primitive vocables, though some may have been supplied by interjectional utterances. After a very few were thus determined, others would be formed, as they were needed, by modifications of the material already obtained.

The last lecture of the twelve is occupied mainly with the subject of writing. It shows, in a most interesting manner, how much time and how many efforts were required to evolve the true ideal of writing, to make it an exact representation of spoken sounds by giving to each articulation its appropriate and constant sign. It shows, too, how far English orthography has fallen away from this ideal; how desirable, on many grounds, would be an orthography worthy of the name; and how weak are the objections usually urged against such an orthography.

We have thus skimmed over the volume, touching here and there on the *summa fastigia rerum*, with the view of giving some idea of its varied and instructive contents. The attempt, we are sensible, has been a failure: we have misrepresented what we aimed to represent. Our brief, disjointed statements must appear abstract and inanimate, perhaps obscure; while the full and flowing style of the work itself, and its wealth of illustration, make it in a high degree clear, vivid, and interesting. But we trust that most of those who look at this notice will read the book for themselves, and thus be in condition to rectify our unintended injustice.

NORTON'S ASTRONOMY.*—This work, in previous editions, has been long before the public, and extensively used as a college text book. The present edition, largely rewritten, and greatly improved, both in matter and arrangement, offers to colleges, and especially to the scientific schools so rapidly growing into importance in this country, a text book well adapted to the purposes of class instruction. If somewhat fuller and more mathematical, in some parts, than many of the treatises heretofore used in ordinary college instruction, it is not, we think, any too much so for a thorough college course, certainly not for institutions distinctively scientific, especially where astronomy is taught as a branch of higher engineering. The work is adapted, in a measure, to courses of greater or less extent, and to different grades of students, by having certain portions printed in smaller type, and other portions, including the more difficult mathematical discussions, wrought together in an Appendix, so as to be studied or omitted, as may be desired.

On certain points in Physical Astronomy, such as the Constitution of the Sun, the Phenomena of Comets, the Development of Stellar Systems, and the like, the author has contributed the results of his own investigations, and presented theoretical views of much interest and originality.

The work, on the whole, well represents the present condition of Astronomical Science in its great facts and principles, and will,

* *A Treatise on Astronomy, Spherical and Physical; with Astronomical Problems, and Solar, Lunar, and other Astronomical Tables. For the use of Colleges and Scientific Schools.* By WILLIAM A. NORTON, M. A., Professor of Civil Engineering in Yale College. Fourth Edition. Revised, remodeled, and enlarged. New York: John Wiley & Son, 535 Broadway. 1867.

we doubt not, be cordially welcomed by the classes for which it is particularly designed.

GUIZOT'S MEDITATIONS ON THE STATE OF CHRISTIANITY.*—This instructive volume by M. Guizot—the second of the series—was noticed in the *New Englander* for Oct. 1866. The translation, which professes to be made under the direction of the author, will make the work accessible to many who would not read it in French. It is printed with clear type and good paper.

FRASER'S REPORT ON THE COMMON SCHOOLS OF AMERICA.†—The author of this report visited this country in 1865; landing May 2d, and sailing the 4th of October. He was commissioned to examine and report upon the public schools of this country and the Canadas, and devoted himself very earnestly to the duties enjoined upon him. The results of his observations and reflections are embodied in this report—one of the blue books of 1866—a few copies of which have been sent to this country. While Mr. Fraser was with us he won many friends by the excellence of his character, the thoroughness of his investigations, the independence of his judgments, and the eminent fairness and uprightness of his intentions. The report before us has very satisfactorily fulfilled the expectations which his friends had entertained. It is thorough, critical, generous, and just. The facts from which he derives his inferences are given in detail, the inferences are honestly and fairly expressed, and the testimony to all that is good in the theory and operation of our schools is justly made and generously accorded. Perhaps his facts might have been more philosophically arranged, and the facts themselves might have been more instructive by being elaborated into forms which would have facilitated comparison, but the method adopted is more pleasant to read, and is more characteristically English—reminding us all the while of the admirable national tendency to tread squarely and surely at every

* *Meditations on the Actual State of Christianity, and on the attacks which are now being made upon it.* By M. GUIZOT. Translated under the superintendence of the Author. New York: Charles Scribner & Co., 684 Broadway. 1867.

† *Schools Inquiry Commissions.* Report to the Commissioners appointed by her Majesty to inquire, &c., &c., on the Common School System of the United States and the Provinces of Upper and Lower Canada. By the Rev. JAMES FRASER, M. A., Assistant Commissioner. London. 1866. 8vo. pp. 435.

step upon the solid footing of facts. Many of our readers will be anxious to know what the author thinks of our common school system. Perhaps some will assume that, as a matter of course, he was filled with unqualified admiration for its great superiority, and that he has expressed himself in language extravagant and laudatory enough to satisfy Mr. Horace Mann himself. This is by no means the case. Mr. Fraser is critical, but not ungenerous or unjust. Herein lies the chief value of his report, that it gives the judgment of an Englishman, who must necessarily look at our system from a point of view somewhat different from our own. That all the author's criticisms are exactly true we will not assert, but that they all and many more deserve to be carefully considered we do not hesitate to affirm. The day for the declamation and laudation which were incident to the arousal of the mind of the public is gone by, and the time for scrutiny and criticism into the actual working of the system has come. We welcome the aid of every critic from another country, who reports of us with a spirit so friendly, and yet so fair as Mr. Fraser has done.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

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Ezekiel and Daniel; with Notes, Critical, Explanatory, and Practical, designed for both pastors and people. By Rev. Henry Cowles, D. D. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1867. 12mo. pp. 472.

The Divine Rest; or, Scriptural Views of the Sabbath. By John S. Stone, D. D., Griswold Lecturer in the Divinity School of the Protestant Episcopal Church in Philadelphia. New York: A. D. F. Randolph. 12mo. pp. 304.

Origin and History of the Books of the Bible, both canonical and apocryphal; designed to show what the Bible is, what it is not, and how to use it. By Prof. C. E. Stowe, D. D. In two parts. Part I.—The New Testament. 8vo. pp. 183.

The Miscellaneous Writings of Miles P. Squire, D. D. With an Autobiography. Edited and Supplemented by Rev. James R. Boyd. Geneva, New York: R. L. Adams & Co. 12mo. pp. 408.

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The Gospel among the Animals; or, Christ with the Cattle. S. W. Osgood, D. D. S. R. Wells. New York: 8vo. pp. 20.

Bible Pictures; or, Life-Sketches of Life-Truths. By George B. Ide, D. D. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1867. 12mo. pp. 437.

Ritualism. A Pastoral Letter, including an Exposition of the Declaration of Bishops. By A. C. Coxe, Bishop of Western New York. New York: H. B. Durant. 18mo. pp. 38.

Explanation of the Church Services; or, a Series of Thoughts on the Lessons, Collects, Epistles, and Gospels, for young readers. New York: H. B. Durant. 18mo. pp. 340.

The Church Hymn Book. New York: A. D. F. Randolph. 1867. 12mo. pp. 284.

The Field and the Laborers. A Sermon delivered before the American Education Society, at the Anniversary Meeting in Boston, May 27, 1867. By Rev. John C. Holbrook, D. D., Homer, N. Y. New York: 1867. 8vo. pp. 16.

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HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL.

The History of the Eastern Expeditions of 1689, 1690, 1692, 1696, and 1704, against the Indians and French. By Benjamin Church. With introduction and notes by H. M. Dexter. Boston: Wiggin & Hunt. Small 4to. pp. 208.

Letters and Journals relating to the War of the American Revolution, and the capture of the German Troops at Saratoga. By Maj.-Gen. Riedesel. Translated from the original German by W. L. Stone. Albany: J. Munsell. 8vo. pp. 235.

Correspondence and Remarks on Baneroff's History of the Northern Campaign of 1777, and the Character of Major-General Philip Schuyler. By Geo. L. Schuyler. New York: D. G. Francis. 8vo. pp. 47.

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